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ABSTRACT 
The Development of Party Systems and the Determinants of Partisan Voting in English 
Local Government Elections 1973-1998 
This thesis takes a quantitative approach to the study of the development of party systems in 
English local government following its reorganisation in the early 1970s. Aggregate data, 
including local election results and census information, are used to identify the determinants of 
partisan support and the subsequent effects upon variations in local party systems. The study 
develops the first major classification of local party systems between 1973 and 1998, focussing 
principally upon factors accounting for variations in the evolution of such systems. 
This study provides the first clear evidence that the operation of local electoral systems contributes 
towards the production and maintenance of two-party dominance. However, in contrast to the 
national parliamentary situation, the two parties are not restricted to Conservative and Labour. 
The thesis highlights how third parties, particularly the Liberals, became a significant part of the 
local party system in a relatively large number of cases. Variations in electoral arrangements 
between local authorities, including differences in district magnitude and the nature of the 
electoral cycle, permit examination of their effects upon local party systems within a common 
national political culture. The effects of these variations are shown to either benefit or 
discriminate against the Liberals. 
Using aggregate data and methods of linear regression, the thesis analyses patterns of partisan 
voting in local government. It shows that socioeconomic factors such as class, housing and 
employment, theoretically identified as important for parliamentary elections, are related also to 
local voting for the three main parties, although the relationships are weaker for the Liberals than 
for the traditional two main parties. Confirmation of these findings is provided by the application 
of methods designed to solve the problems of ecological inference. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
L I Introduction 
The development of party systems has been the subject of many studies. This 
research tends, however, to be cross-national and as such concentrates upon the 
fortunes of parties in national systems'. Very few studies have been conducted that 
examine sub-national party systems and their development. Such systems however, 
could provide interesting fmdings. Unlike comparisons between national systems, 
sub-national party systems can be compared within a single country. We can 
therefore control for the national political culture and other factors, concentrating 
instead upon small differences in the electoral system and the effects these might 
subsequently have for the party system. 
This thesis will explore, therefore, the evolution and subsequent development of local 
party systems in Britain from 1973, when a whole scale reorganisation took place, 
until 1998. Specifically, it will use aggregate data to examine changes in the fortunes 
of political parties and the relationship between the electoral system, demographic 
characteristics of the electorate, and party systems. In so doing the thesis develops a 
typology of local party systems, examines the effects of the electoral system on the 
distribution of council seats and also identifies the pattern of local voting and party 
support among different social groups. 
' Notable studies of national party systems include Political Parties - T/ieir Organisation and 
Activity in the Modern State (Duverger, 1964); Party Systems and Voter Alignments (Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967); Parties and Party Systems - A Framework for Analysis (Sartori, 1976); 
Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Lijphart, 1994). 
L2 Why Study Party Systems? 
In modem liberal democracies, parties are the central and intermediary structure 
between society and government. Furthermore, insofar as they are a system, parties 
interact and such interactions can be viewed as mechanical propensities, as structures 
of rewards and opportunities that go a long way toward explaining the different 
performances of different polities (Sartori, 1979). According to Webb a party system 
is, therefore, "a particular pattern of competitive and cooperative interactions 
displayed by a given set of political parties'" (Webb, 2001: 1, italics in original). 
Given that political parties help determine the distribution of resources within a liberal 
democracy, an understanding of the party system can provide an explanation of the 
extent to which interests within society are represented. A study of party systems 
must, therefore, take account of not only political parties, but also the groups that they 
represent and the method by which those groups select their representatives. 
Direct elections are the means by which groups in liberal democracies select their 
political representatives and formal studies of party systems have identified the 
electoral system as having significant influence upon the party system (see Duverger, 
1964, Lijphart, 1994). The rules that govern elections - such as the number of seats or 
the method employed to convert the votes into seats - are instrumental in determining 
the outcome of an election (Rae, 1971). Duverger (1964) believed that such 
"mechanical" effects of the electoral system could encourage or inhibit the 
development of parties. The use of simple plurality elections - where the candidate 
with most votes wins - was viewed as encouraging the formation or maintenance of a 
two-party system in England. An understanding of these effects is important, 
therefore, when studying party system development. 
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The mechanical effects of the electoral system upon the party system are only part of 
the story. Explanations of factors that influence voting behaviour are also important 
in understanding not only the nature of party systems, but also have wider 
implications for anyone conducting research into human decision making processes. 
In English local elections, certain assumptions can be made about an individual's 
voting decision, upon which can be based, a rigorous and scientific enquiry. Firstly, 
elections and the voting decision are often recurrent, which permits the use of a 
longitudinal approach that can observe changes in phenomena over a period of time. 
Secondly, the electorate is faced with a common set of options within each ward, 
which enables comparisons to be made both within and between individual wards. 
Thirdly, although there may be regional variations between wards, the voting decision 
is largely made on the same day, in the same national economic and political climate 
and is converted into seats using a common electoral formula - in Britain's case 
simple plurality. Finally, given the pervasive role of the mass media, it can be argued 
that each voter has access to a common pool of information about various issues, 
when making the decision (Himmelweit et al, 1985). These common characteristics 
allow the researcher to compare how different social groups may act when faced with 
similar situations. 
The development of the party system however, can not be seen simply as the product 
of the electoral system or voters' decisions. While the electorate does of course play a 
part in the development of a party system, there is no simple sense in which the voters 
decide. The behaviour of the parties themselves in determining factors such as the 
range of candidates on offer force citizens to choose only within options that are pre-
defined for them (Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985). The interaction between parties, 
voters, and the simple plurality electoral system may create conditions that inhibit the 
survival of third parties. Plurality elections, according to Duverger (1964), will tend 
towards two party systems. This hypothesis - known as "Duverger's Law" - assumes 
that voters will endeavour to maximise the impact of their vote and be reluctant to 
"waste" it on supporting candidates with little or no chance of winning. The voter 
will calculate a party's ability to win and the resulting voting decision is based not 
only upon their preferred party, but also that party's ability to gain office. As there 
can be only one winner in a simple plurality election, the best option for the supporter 
of a party perceived as unlikely to win, might instead be a choice between the two 
strongest parties. This will result in the two main parties receiving "bonus" votes 
fi-om supporters of parties perceived as unlikely winners. Third parties, therefore, 
receive even fewer votes, thereby confirming the voter's original perception of the 
party's inability to win. After successive election defeats this process may make it 
more difficult to attract not only voters but also potential candidates. According to 
Duverger, the "mechanical" effects of the plurality system act like a catalyst to this 
process, severely reducing a minority party's ability to survive. Quite simply, not 
only is the voter restricted by the number of parties contesting an election, the number 
of parties is also a function of the voter's opinion of a party's ability to represent 
them. As both of these phenomena are affected by the electoral system employed, an 
explanatory model must consider the extent of interactions between these different 
aspects (Benoit, 2002: 44). 
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1.3 Why Study Local Government Party Systems? 
From 1931-70, British national elections were largely contests between the Labour 
and Conservative parties, both combined regularly poling close to 90% of the vote 
(Railings & Thrasher, 1997). Third party support in the form of a Liberal revival in 
1974, the appearance of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales during the 1970s 
and the arrival of the Liberal-SDP Alliance in 1983 to some extent weakened the 
strength of the two parties (Scarbrough, 1997: 219). Despite this. Conservative and 
Labour candidates have won over 70% of the national vote and over 90% of 
parliamentary seats between 1974 and 1998. It is widely agreed that Britain's use of a 
simple plurality electoral system (first past the post) favours large parties and 
discriminates against minor parties, leading to the establishment or continuation of a 
two party system. While the dominance of the Conservatives and Labour in national 
government appears to support this hypothesis^, it is at odds with the experience of 
many local authorities. Far from ensuring a two-party system, the experience of local 
government has been for the increasing proliferation of 'hung' councils where no 
single party has an overall majority of seats. In 1979, for example, 76 (14.7%) out of 
517 local authorities in Great Britain were hung (Railings & Thrasher, 1997). By 
1995, although the total number of authorities had been reduced to 442, the number of 
councils with no overall control by a single party had risen to 176 (39.8%). 
The increasing number of hung authorities reflected broader changes in the party 
systems of local authorities. The extent of these changes can be gauged fcom the case 
^ Sartori (1979: 186) claims that a two-party system differs from a three-party system 
whenever third parties such as the Liberals do not affect the alternation of power between the 
two major parties at the national level. 
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of England. In 1979, the combined Labour and Conservative vote exceeded 90% of 
total votes cast in some 74 English local authorities: by 1995 the number of local 
authorities with such two party dominance had more than halved (Railings & 
Thrasher, 1997: 107). As large sections of the local electorate deserted the 
established two main parties, the Liberals^ rose to become the second party of local 
government with over 5,000 councillors by 1996 (Railings & Thrasher, 1997: 132). 
Sub-national party systems in England then, do not simply mirror those of national 
government. Local government instead contains a mixture of different systems. 
Some authorities such as the London borough of Newham, have remained quite 
stable, the council dominated by Labour councillors over the entire period. Other 
authorities such as Taunton Deane district council have changed dramatically. The 
council was hung in 1973, controlled by the Conservatives from 1976 to 1987, and 
then by the Liberals from 1991 to 1998. Instead of only two-party systems, there 
appears to be far greater variety in local government. The mixture of different party 
systems raises an important question. What is it about local government elections that 
allow so many different party systems to develop and be maintained? 
L4 Research Problems 
There are several problems with attempting to address this question. The party 
system is affected by voting. There is however, very little data relating to this 
behaviour. Although the ballot paper contains a serial number that can be linked to 
^ Because of the methodological problems associated with the classification of parties (see 
Chapter 4), we class as Liberals, Liberal Party candidates prior to 1982, Liberal and SDP 
alliance candidates between 1982 and 1987, and Liberal Democrat candidates after 1987. 
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the voter, this data is not available to social scientists. Another problem is the lack of 
data relating to the socioeconomic characteristics of the voters themselves. The 
largest collection of socioeconomic data relating to local voters is the national census. 
This unfortunately, is also not available at the level of the individual. Authors such as 
Miller, overcome these problems by using survey data^. His study of local voting, 
"one of the most elaborate survey of public attitudes ever carried out in Britain" 
(Miller, 1988), utilised data collected from interviews with over 1,100 respondents. 
Local surveys such as Miller's are rare, however, making it difficult to track electoral 
behaviour over a long period. 
There are also methodological problems with using survey data to investigate local 
party systems in England. Different areas of the country have fundamentally different 
characteristics. Cornwall County Council differs considerably from the Greater 
London Council in terms, not only in terms of the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the electorate but also in terms of the policy considerations and structure of the 
council itself Obtaining a sample of respondents that adequately reflected such 
national variation would be beyond the resources of this thesis. There are also issues 
of validity and reliability concerning data obtained using such an approach. Evidence 
suggests that voters can have difficulty accurately recalling their voting decision from 
recent elections. A survey attempting to ascertain voting behaviour from 1973 
onwards would require the respondent to remember how they voted over 25 years 
^ Other studies that draw heavily upon survey data include Political Change in Britain (Butler 
& Stokes, 1969); How Britain Votes (Heath et al, 1985) and Voters Begin to Chose (Rose and 
McAllister, 1986). 
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ago. For these and other reasons (outlined in Chapter 4), a large-scale survey would 
be impractical. 
A more practical approach in this case is to estimate the required information from 
such data that are available. Although individual level data from the census are not 
obtainable, the Office of National Statistics does release aggregated socioeconomic 
data. The data cover the entire country and the methods used to collect the data are 
highly reliable, providing accurate measures of over 4,000 different variables (Marsh, 
1993). In addition to the census data there also exists a large database of local 
election results. Compiled by Collin Railings and Michael Thrasher, the British Local 
Elections Database was first deposited at the ESRC Data Archive at the University of 
Essex, covering local elections until 1996. The database contains information for 
over 100,000 local elections from 1973 and this is updated each year (Railings & 
Thrasher: 1997). As well as recording the votes cast for each candidate, the database 
contains other important information, including the number of seats to be filled and 
electorate size. The national census and local election data are both available at the 
same level of aggregation: local authority wards of which there were over 10,000 in 
England. The information contained within both sets of data are interval/ratio and 
are, therefore, suitable for analysis using quantitative methods. This research utilises 
a combination of both data sets. It examines a large number of cases from which 
reliable inferences - framed within existing theories and methods - can be made. The 
following sections outline how this research is structured within the thesis. 
14 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the Hterature on party systems and after an initial discussion on the 
study of party systems, its structure reflects the broad trichotomy of theories relating 
to party system formation and development. The first of these sections addresses the 
behaviour of the electorate, its effect on the party system, and critically evaluates the 
extent to which such effects can be explained by socioecomonic characteristics. The 
second section outlines the importance of political explanations to party system 
development in England and considers the extent to which these theories can be 
applied within our thesis. The final section examines theories that relate to structural 
influences upon the party system. It identifies which structural characteristics are 
important determinants of party system development and those that may be of 
particular relevance to the study of English local party systems. 
It would be difficult to assess the suitability of these theories to the study of English 
local party systems without a prior examination of the local government system. 
Chapter 3, therefore, discusses the nature and function of local government in terms 
of its historical development. It describes the various functions undertaken by local 
authorities, their distribution within the local government structure, and highlights 
their relevance to the thesis. The chapter also examines variations and change in 
some structural characteristics of the local government system including the number 
of vacancies (district magnitude) and fi-equency of elections. Focusing in more detail 
on the place of parties within local government, the chapter then discusses the 
growing importance of parties as a means of political representation and draws our 
attention to the development of parties since the local government reorganisation in 
1973. 
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Chapter 4 outlines the main research questions. The chapter critically evaluates 
possible methodological approaches and provides a justification of the quantitative 
approach that is to be used. The operationalisation of key concepts (e.g. the elected 
number of parties) into suitable measures is discussed and a detailed explanation of 
the construction of resulting variables is provided. The chapter also examines the 
methods employed to test the hypotheses and considers the reliability of inferences 
that can be made using such methods. 
The empirical analysis begins by highlighting, the variation and change of party 
systems in English local government. Chapter 5 demonstrates the large number of 
different party systems that have existed from 1973-98 and uses aggregate voting data 
to develop a classification of party systems, which attempts to reveal the extent of this 
variation. The resulting typology facilitates the examination of party systems using 
such concepts as the number of parties and overall stability (Taagepera and Shugart, 
1989). 
Chapter 6 examines the nature of the relationship between structural characteristics of 
the electoral system and the party system. Foremost among these characteristics is the 
number of seats that are available in local elections (district magnitude). While 
district magnitude is always equal to one in UK parliamentary elections, it varies 
somewhat both within and between local authorities. While larger district magnitudes 
theoretically increase the ability of smaller parties to gain representation in systems 
employing proportional representation (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989), its effect in 
simple plurality elections is not as clear (Niemi. et al, 1985). The chapter examines, 
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therefore, the effect of district magnitude upon the performance of third parties in 
terms of contestation of seats available and how votes are converted into seats. 
Chapter 7 focuses on relationships between socioeconomic characteristics of the local 
electorate and patterns of voting in local elections. It shows that while analysis of 
ward socioeconomic characteristics can explain variances in Conservative and Labour 
voting, factors accounting for levels of Liberal voting are more difficult to identify. 
While this may be due partly to the socioeconomic diversity of Liberal voters (Butler 
& Stokes. 1974; Heath et al, 1985; Doriing et. al, 1998: 64), survey data also suggest 
that Liberal voters may be less committed to their party than Labour or Conservative 
supporters (Railings et al, 1998: 126). Much of this evidence derives from studies of 
voting behaviour in parliamentary elections. Such research often combine aggregate 
voting data with evidence obtained from survey research to enhance explanations of 
Liberal voting. Survey research is not practical in a comprehensive study of local 
voting however, as local surveys are weakened by a limited number of authorities and 
respondents. The chapter therefore combines the election data used in the previous 
chapter with ward-level socioeconomic data taken fi-om the 1981 and 1991 censuses. 
Chapter 8 attempts to provide a greater understanding of party system development by 
constructing an explanatory model of partisan voting based upon the combined effect 
of the socioeconomic, structural and political characteristics of local authorities. 
While the model highlights consistent relationships between certain characteristics 
and voting for the three main parties, the total explanatory power of the model is 
limited, especially for the Liberals. Chapter 9 focuses in more detail upon findings 
from the previous chapter. It uses a recent method developed by Garry King that 
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provides greater reliability when inferring individual level behaviour from aggregate 
data (King, 1997). King's model is used to test the hypothesis that Liberal support 
differs between some authorities among certain social groups. It centres upon two 
different types of authority holding elections in the same year and attempts to measure 
the difference in voting behaviour between similar socioeconomic groups in these 
authorities. 
1,6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, it provides students and researchers of 
English local government with a classification of local party systems, which is both 
intuitive and empirical. Such a classification simplifies the identification of 
authorities where the party system is dominated by a single party or those where 
multiparty systems are more common. The classification also facilitates the 
identification of those authorities where the party system has remained stable or those 
that have experienced dramatic change. In so doing this provides a useful source of 
information for future research into local party systems. Secondly, the research 
provides valuable insights into the causal relationships between the structural and 
socioeconomic characteristics of local authorities and party system development. The 
thesis reveals an apparent weakness in these relationships that challenge deterministic 
views of party system development in local government. Thirdly, the apparent 
weakness of such causal relationships raises questions regarding the suitability of 
using aggregate data to investigate individual level relationships. The thesis attempts 
to address these questions using more recent statistical techniques. The product of 
this research constitutes a comprehensive source of information. It adds considerably, 
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therefore, to the existing body of knowledge about local government party systems in 
England. 
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Chapter 2 English Local Party Systems - Previous Research 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review previous research relevant to an explanation for 
the variety of English local party systems. The opening section highlights the 
immediate and main problem associated with conducting such a review, namely the 
absence of prior research about English local party system formation and 
development. The following section identifies relevant theories regarding the nature 
of the relationship between parties and voters. We then consider the importance of 
such theories to English local party system formation and development. Subsequent 
sections examine three important strands, socioeconomic, structural and political 
explanations of local party system development. The chapter concludes by 
summarising the findings and their importance to this research. 
2.2 English Local Party System Evolution and Development - A Quest 
for Research 
Although many studies have been carried out for national party systems, there is little 
research relating to party system formation and development in local government. 
That which does exist tends to focus upon political developments in local government 
- such as systems of political management, councillor-officer relations and party 
structure (Gyford el al, 1989, see also Wilson & Game, 1994; Leach et al, 1994; 
Stewart, 2000) rather than socioeconomic and structural explanations for the 
development of the party systems. 
Such research that exists, however, is useful in that it allows us to underpin some of 
the broader theories of party system development within the context of English local 
government. This literature is reviewed in subsequent sections. For now we focus 
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upon the more generalised literature regarding the study of party systems and their 
relevance to the case of English local government. 
2.3 The Study of Party Systems 
One of die first and most influential studies of party systems is that contained within 
Duverger's Political Parties (1964). Originally published in French in 1951, 
Duverger's study was concerned that research into political parties at the time - which 
although based upon "considerable and serious observation" - was lacking a general 
theory. As such these studies could never be truly profound as, *'Nature answers only 
when questioned and we do not know what questions this subject demands" 
(Duverger, 1964). Duverger's aim was to break out of the confines of non-theory 
driven research and produce a general theory of parties. He realised that any such 
preliminary theory would be, "vague, conjectural, and of necessity approximate" 
(Duverger, 1964). Nevertheless, Duverger's ideas and their implications have been of 
profound importance for research into parties and party systems and have 
underpinned and informed subsequent important studies. 
The concept of the party system allows for comparative study and testing of theories 
between different competitive political systems. According to Duverger, 
"With the exception of the single-party states, several parties coexist in each 
country: the forms and modes of their coexistence define the party system of the 
particular country being considered" (Duverger, 1964: 203). 
Duverger suggests that party systems are the product of many complex factors. Some 
are peculiar to individual countries, while others are more general. Among those 
factors peculiar to individual countries are tradition, history, social and economic 
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structure, religious beliefs, racial composition and national rivalries (Duverger, 1964: 
203) . He suggests, for example, that the personal rivalry between Jefferson and 
Hamilton in the early years of the Union led to the opposition between the 
Republicans and Democrats in the USA. In Great Britain, he posits that the Irish were 
the fundamental reason for the disturbance of the two-party system at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Such localised political factors are many and varied* and are 
difficult to include into any generalised theory of party systems (Duverger, 1964: 
204) . Part of the reason for the difficulty in explaining party system development in 
local government is because such localised political factors may operate. 
There are, according to Duverger, however, three factors that are "common to all 
countries" - ideological, socioeconomic and technical (Duverger, 1964: 204). 
Ideological factors are concerned with the parties and voter's view of the role of 
government. While Duverger acknowledged that ideology and socioeconomic 
attitudes were related in rather complex ways, he viewed the influence of 
socioeconomic factors upon the party system as being of great importance. The 
appearance of Socialist parties at the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, 
coincided with the entry of the working classes into political life (Duverger, 1964: 
204). While class was undoubtedly a strong contributor to the party system in some 
countries, they are not as Duverger first asserts, "common to all countries". The main 
parties in America do not correspond to definite classes and there is no party that is 
completely homogenous in terms of the social composition of its supporters. 
' Such factors may go some way to explain the differentiated nature of the historic growth of 
the Liberal party in areas such as Comwall. The effects of such localised factors are 
discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters 
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Duverger's technical factors primarily concern the nature of electoral systems. He 
drew attention to the similarity between the electoral systems of Britain and America 
and suggested that one underlying cause for the existence of two-party systems in 
both countries was the operation of simple plurality elections (Duverger, 1964). 
According to Duverger, however, the electoral system itself is not a sufficient 
condition for the production of a two-party system. It instead acts as a "brake or 
accelerator" upon the main influences upon the party system - socioeconomic factors 
(Duverger, 1964: 205). Before addressing the nature of the electoral systems effect 
upon the party system, we need first establish the underlying effects of socioeconomic 
factors. Why and how are such factors important determinants of the party system? 
In order to achieve this aim we need to understand better a) the nature of political 
parties and b) the nature of voters. 
2.4 The Nature of Parties and Voters 
Before examining in more detail the important characteristics of party systems, it is 
essential to provide some definition of a political party in liberal democracies -
although Duverger does not provide one. Sartori's abridged minimal definition of 
party is, "any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing 
through elections, candidates for public office" (1979, 64). This definition in English 
local government applies to a wide range of groups (see chapter 4.4.3). According to 
Downs (1957), however, the primary objective of politicians from all parties is to 
become elected. 
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2.4.1 An Economic Theory of Party Competition 
Downs' (1957) Economic Theory of Democracy established the principle that parties 
compete for votes in much the same way that shops along a high street compete for 
customers. His "spatial analogy" is similar to that proposed by economists trying to 
understand why two competing shops end up positioning themselves next to each 
other. The conclusion reached was that shoppers try to minimise utility costs 
associated with shopping and would not support the stores at all i f they were too 
distant. Rather than being situated at both ends of the street, the stores would 
converge towards the centre, eventually reaching a state of equilibrium when their 
closeness does not discourage consumers at the extreme ends (Downs, 1957: 117). 
When the analogy is applied to democratic systems, the high street is replaced by a 
left-right scale along which parties can be placed according to their stance on 
particular policies. Voters are able also to position themselves along this space and 
more easily identify the party positioned closest to them. Parties, according to 
Downs, are "vote maximisers" and, therefore, position themselves along this uni-
dimensional space where they will attract the most votes (Downs, 1957: 119). 
Assuming the electorate is distributed normally within the voting space, the maximum 
number of potential voters will be positioned in the centre. Therefore, in order to 
maximise votes parties are drawn to the centre, by reformulating policies in 
accordance with the median voter's position, in much the same way as the shops 
trying to maximise profit. 
Figure 2-1 represents Downs' original model. The normal distribution curve 
represents the ideologies of voters. In this case, A represents the ideological position 
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of the Liberal Party and B that of the Conservative Party before the creation of the 
Labour party. The ideological positions of both parties move towards the large 
number of voters in the centre. These ideological shifts mean that the position of the 
parties become further away from voters at the extremes. These voters have little 
option but to continue voting for party nearest to them, however, as abstention may 
result in victory for the party even fiirther from their views. 
Figure 2-1 - Spatial Voting Pre-Labour 
1 
Adapted from Downs (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, p.118. 
In the late nineteenth century, the mass enfranchisement of the working class shifted 
the ideological centre of the voting space leftwards. Although both parties shifted 
leftwards also, the Liberals were still to the right of the ideological centre (see Figure 
2-2). According to Downs (1957: 128), the creators of the Labour Party correctly 
guessed that they could outflank the Liberal Party by positioning themselves 
ideologically to the left of the latter at position C. This effectively trapped the 
Liberals between the two modes of the electorate and their support rapidly diminished 
in size. After the creation of Labour, the Liberals found themselves in an untenable 
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position. Should the party stay in the centre and be squeezed from both sides or move 
to one of the extremes where the number of voters is far fewer? They stayed in the 
centre. 
Figure 2-2 - Spatial Voting Post-Labour Party 
Area representing newty 
extended franchise 
Area of older 
franchise 
Adapted from Downs (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. p.129. 
Downs' theory has come under attack fi-om a number of sources. Sartori argues that 
Downs' conceptualisation of parties does not equate with the facts. Although, at 
elections, parties wil l inevitably try to maximise votes, parties may not necessarily 
reformulate policy in order to do so (Sartori, 1979: 327). Local elections fi-equently 
contain small parties that have specific policy stances, such as the Green Party. While 
the party no doubt attempts to win as many votes as possible, their strategy is to 
mobilise support for existing policies rather than alter their policy position. The 
concept of voting space being one-dimensional is also contentious. Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967), identified not one, but several social cleavages which influenced 
party system formation. Some social cleavages are aligned with and reinforce each 
other while others may be crosscutting. The space in which parties and voters operate 
is, therefore, multi-dimensional. Downs overcomes this problem by placing parties 
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upon a scale in a position corresponding to their ideology. This, according to Sartori, 
means that Downs was actually placing the parties along the scale using a weighted 
average of all of the particular policies they support (Sartori, 1979: 326). 
2.4.2 Issues, Identification and Image 
Dovms' model raises important questions regarding the nature of party competition 
and the means by which voters choose their party. According to Sartori, three 
concepts stand out as being crucial to an understanding of voting - issue voting, 
partisan identification and party image. Issue voting occurs when a visible and 
controversial topic is perceived by informed voters, who then make their voting 
decision based upon their perception of the parties' position on that issue. In contrast, 
partisan identification describes the process whereby voters support a party because 
they develop long-term feelings of attachment towards that party. 
For both issue voting and partisan identification, party image is the cue from which 
individuals form their opinions of the parties. A party image for Sartori, "is a vague 
policy package condensed in, and rendered by, one word or slogan (1979:329, italics 
in original), such as New Labour. 
The sources of this simplification of parties to a broad image have fascinated writers 
on political psychology. Wallas (1910) suggested that the parties became important 
in popular perceptions of politics because the electorate required something simple 
and permanent to identify. Part of the reason for this, according to Butler and Stokes 
(1974), lies in the remoteness of the citizen from the affairs of government. Their 
survey of political behaviour at the 1964 general election revealed that only one in ten 
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of the electorate went to a political meeting during the campaign (Butler & Stokes. 
1974: 21). They suggest that the extent of the public's political activity is similar to 
the limits of their political knowledge. Despite this lack of information, however, 
voters were capable of behaving in a purposive way and of seeking goals they value 
(Butler & Stokes, 1974: 23). 
The image of parties in Britain, therefore, allows voters - without incurring the utility 
cost of acquiring detailed political information - to identify the policy stances of 
parties necessary to place them within a policy space. Lack of detailed political 
knowledge means that policy voting, that is a voting choice determined by issues and 
reacting to policy stances of parties, is relatively rare. According to Sartori (1979), 
"Whenever politics develops, whenever electorates have a capacity for 
abstraction, and whenever the party system is structured by mass parties, the 
strong presumption is that position-voting related to party images represents the 
single, prevalent determinant of the voting choice. And to the extent that voters 
are position-orientated^ to the same extent the spatial understanding of party 
competition is worth pursuing" (Sartori, 1979: 333, italics in original). 
He argues that although voters must have issue preferences, the question hinges on the 
point at which a non-desired issue-policy of the preferred party is perceived and 
breaks the pre-existing image, loyalty or affiliation of the voter to a given party 
(Sartori, 1979). Once partisan identification has been established, voters will remain 
loyal until the party's policy stance is no longer in accord with their own. For Butler 
and Stokes, the direction of an individual's partisan identification is the legacy of the 
early years of political awareness. A young adult is very likely indeed to share the 
parents' party preference. Over the years, however, the similarities become somewhat 
blurred as the individual's preferences are influenced by wider experience (Butler & 
Stokes, 1974:51). 
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The rather simplistic model of the relationship between voters and parties, view 
parties as having distinct images that can be appropriately interpreted by voters that 
form tong-teim attachments to a party - primarily during childhood. The process is 
both facilitated by and maintains the public's limited knowledge of the political 
system. The following sections discuss the nature of this relationship for English 
local party systems. 
2.5 Parties and Voters in English Local Party Systems 
Chapter 1.1 noted that research regarding the nature of the relationship between 
parties and voting in England tends to focus upon parliamentary elections. Most of 
the concepts discussed so far in this chapter have been formulated and developed 
within the same context. Local party systems are such a neglected area of research 
that much of the literature that examines these concepts in detail applies principally to 
the national party system. This section examines the extent to which these concepts 
may apply to the study of party systems in local elections. 
Local party systems differ largely fixjm the national party system in that they are so 
varied. In parliamentary elections, few candidates from parties other than the 
Conservatives. Labour and Liberals are elected in England (Webb, 2001). In local 
elections this is not the case. A variety of other candidates are able to win seats in 
local authorities. Even when focussing only on the main three parties, local party 
systems are substantially different from the national system in that the Liberals (and 
their various successor parties) were able, at one point, to become the second largest 
party within English government (Railings & Thrasher, 1997). 
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2.5.1 Local Elections as Second Order Elections. 
Some of the explanation for the variety of party systems in local government might lie 
with the intrinsic difference between the two types of political office being elected. 
The concept of first and second order elections, developed by Reif and Schmitt, 
attempts to explain the effect of such differences upon voting. In parliamentary 
systems, first order elections are the national parliamentary elections. "In addition to 
these, however, there is a plethora of'second-order' elections: by-elections, municipal 
elections, various sorts of regional elections, those to a 'second-chamber' and the 
like" (Reif & Schmitt, 1980: 8). 
According to these authors, perhaps the most important aspect of second order 
elections, such as those for local government, is that there is "less at stake". Because 
of this they argue that small or new political parties are more likely to be successful at 
gaining seats in such elections. "While a small party might represent the voter's 
opinion more precisely, he may opt for the opportunity - when more is at stake - of 
supporting a large, established party and thereby the general direction of his political 
views" (Reif & Schmitl, 1980:9). 
Heath and others' study of second-order elections provided considerable support for 
Reif and Schmitt's theories. They found that, 
"many of their [Reif and Schmitt's] propositions apply not only to the case of 
European elections for which they were first designed, but also apply, albeit 
with less force, to the British local elections as well" (Heath et al, 1999: 406). 
Heath and others also revealed that the electorate behaved as i f there was more at 
stake in local than European elections. More of their respondents turned out to vote in 
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the local elections and felt that it made a difference who won, while fewer reported 
that they voted on the basis of national issues. Local elections have, consequently, 
less of a second-order character than European elections. 
Electoral behaviour in local elections, therefore, may not differ largely from that of 
national elections. Indeed, for Butler and Stokes, the concept of partisan 
identification applied particularly well to local elections: 
"In 1963, for example, those who went to the polls in local elections that were 
fought on a party basis voted to an overwhelming degree in line with their 
expressed party self-image...the most central fact is that well over 90 per cent of 
our respondents stayed with their generalised tie to the national parties, though 
local elections might be thought to be fought on entirely special local issues" 
(Butler & Stokes. 1974: 40). 
This view was also confirmed by Miller (1988), who found that 80% of voters had 
local choices that were exactly in accord with their party identification - and 83% in 
accord with their current parliamentary preference (Miller, 1988: 166). Partisan 
identification, therefore, appears relevant to both types of party system - local and 
national. Reiff and Schmitt did not, however, deny the influence of national parties: 
"Many voters cast their votes in these elections not only as a result of the second-
order arena, but also on the basis of factors in the main political arena of the nation" 
(Rei f& Schmitt, 1980: 9). 
Despite the influence of national voting preferences, evidence suggests, around 20% 
of local voters do not act in accordance with their national party preference. For 
Heath and others, it seems plausible to suppose these votes are swayed by local 
factors and issues, rather than by national ones (Heath et al, 1999: 392). Section 2.8 
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discusses local factors and issues in more detail, and discusses the extent to which 
these characteristics can be applied to the study of party system development. 
Although the fortunes of the parties in local elections may to some extent be 
influenced by local factors there is much evidence that a large majority of voters 
express identical voting preferences in both national and local elections^. We can 
assume, therefore, that the literature relating to party choice applies equally well to 
these voters in local elections. The following sections discuss this literature and its 
relevance to party system formation and development in English local government 
elections. 
2.6 Socioeconomic Determinants of English Party Systems 
The evolution and development of local party systems is the net result of voting and 
as such it is essential to understand why voters support particular parties. As a large 
proportion of voters in local elections vote in accordance with their national party 
preference (Miller, 1988; Heath et al, 1999), the literature that addresses national 
voting behaviour applies to a targe extent to local government elections. This section 
reviews the literature in order to ascertain its applicability to the study of party 
systems in local government. 
^ In addition to the evidence from Miller (1988) suggesting that 80% of respondent's local 
election preferences were in accordance with their national preferences, a cursory 
examination of ranked position by votes received reveals that the finishing positions of the 
three main parties in general elections between 1979-92 were identical to local elections held 
in the same year. 
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2.6.1 Social Conflict and Cleavages 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in Party Systems and Voter Alignments focused specifically 
upon the sources of conflict between groups in society and the effects of such upon 
the structure of party systems. The first group of questions they ask concerns, "the 
genesis of the system of contrasts and cleavages within the national community", 
while the second focus on ''the conditions for the development of a stable system of 
cleavage and oppositions in national political life. The final group of questions 
relates to ''the behavior of the mass of rank-and-file citizens within the resultant party 
systems" (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 7). Drawing upon a series of national studies, they 
formulised a view of party systems within which, potential cleavage bases could be 
identified. 
The first task for Lipset and Rokkan was to ask what cleavages manifested themselves 
in the national community in the early phases of consolidation, and what cleavages 
emerged in the subsequent phases of centralisation and economic growth? They 
found that in Britain, the initial conflicts were essentially local or regional oppositions 
to encroachments of the aspiring and dominant national elite. The heads of 
independent landed families in the counties opposed the powers and the decisions of 
the government and administration in London (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 11). In the 
Celtic areas of Wales, opposition to the territorial, cultural, and economic dominance 
of the English offered a basis for community wide support for the Liberals and 
retarded the development of conventional class politics, even in the coalfields (Lipset 
& Rokkan, 1967: 12). Even at this early stage of party system development it is 
possible to observe the effect of local factors which act against the development of 
party systems along national lines. 
34 
2.6.2 Class Conflict 
While territorial cleavages in Britain were a result of the national revolution, the 
industrial revolution triggered a variety of cultural counter-movements that, in the 
long run, "tended to cut across the value communities within the nation and to force 
the enfranchised citizenry to choose sides in terms of their economic interests" (Lipset 
& Rokkan, 1967: 19). The economic division in society in Britain manifested itself in 
the party system in the form of a class cleavage between the working class and those 
that owned or managed the means of production. 
The interests of the working classes in Britain were originally represented by the 
various trade union organisations. These organisations however had little or no 
political power and as society became increasingly polarised so the need for political 
representation of the working class increased. The Labour party was formed by the 
trade unions in order to secure such representation of their members within Parliament 
and support by political action the objectives sought by the trade unions in the interest 
of their members (Jennings, 1961). 
According to Lipset and Rokkan the decisive lower class breakthrough in Britain 
came with the elections of 1918 and 1922. Before World War I the Labour party 
contested relatively few constituencies and won no more than 42 out of 670 seats but 
in 1922 the party contested 411 constituencies, winning 142 of them (Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967: 31). Despite the fact that the party had positioned itself ideologically 
in accordance with the greatest number of voters, they were disadvantaged by an 
inability to contest elections. Of course, far more candidates are required to contest 
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seats in local elections, meaning that small and developing parties are at an immediate 
disadvantage. 
2.6.3 Class Voting 
By the time Robert Alford contributed his study of class voting in Anglo-American 
countries the relationship between class and voting in Britain and the USA had been 
amply documented. Studies such as Benney et al (1956), How People Vote and Milne 
and McKenzie (1958), Marginal Seat 1955, found that the middle-class tended to vote 
Conservative while the working-class generally supported Labour. A summary of 
voting studies that focused upon this aspect of voting behaviour was also presented in 
Lipset (1960), Political Man. According to Alford, 
"Studies of voting behaviour have routinely found a correlation between the 
social class position of voters and the party they typically vote for. Persons in 
professional and business occupations, persons at upper-income levels, persons 
with more than a high-school education are more likely to vote for a party that 
stands for protection of business interests and little welfare legislation than 
persons in low-prestige occupations, with low incomes, or with little 
education.... That class position and voting behaviour are correlated is by now 
commonplace" (Alford, 1967: 68). 
Alford asked whether class voting was the same for countries in which an Anglo-
American political system existed. He produced an index of class voting by 
subtracting the percentage of non-manual workers voting for left parties fi-om the 
percentage of manual workers voting for such parties (Alford, 1967: 80). He found 
that the levels of class voting in Great Britain and Australia were higher than were 
those for the United States and Canada (Alford, 1967:88). He suggests some possible 
reasons for the differences in countries where class voting is higher. The parties in 
these countries may more consistently represent or appeal to class interests, or 
command greater historical loyalties of certain classes. The social classes in such 
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countries might also be exposed to situations in which the political relevance of class 
interests becomes apparent (Alford, 1967:89). 
For Lipset and Rokkan and Duverger, alike, social class was the main influence 
behind the national party system development in Britain (Duverger, 1964). A large 
body of research has since focused upon the effect of social class and other socio-
economic characteristics upon voting behaviour in Britain. Butler and Stokes' (1969) 
Political Change in Britain, sought to explain changes in support of parties using 
socio-economic data obtained from detailed and repeated interviews with British 
electors over a seven year period (Butler & Stokes, 1974: 3). 
Butler and Stokes identified a high level of voting along class lines. This closed-class 
explanation of electoral choice is based upon the assumption that an individual's 
voting behaviour is influenced essentially by key social characteristics. The voter's 
class attachment to a particular party is developed in both childhood and early 
adulthood when the voter first participates in politics. The resulting party 
identification is deeply rooted in an individual's psyche, which both reinforces the 
voter's propensity to vote for a particular party and is in turn reinforced by the act of 
voting (Heath et al, 1985: 8). Voting is thus seen largely as a symbolic act whereby 
people express their allegiance to their social group. The manual worker, for 
example, votes Labour out of class solidarity because it is "the party of the working-
class" (Heath et al, 1985: 9). 
The class equals vote theory was a persuasive argument for Conservative and Labour 
voting in parliamentary elections and what research exists has also suggested a similar 
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relationship for local elections. Miller (1988: 159) found that more working-class 
respondents chose Labour than any other party and more middle-class chose the 
Conservatives than any other one party. But how can theories of class voting 
accommodate the Liberals? Sartori (1979) suggests that the Liberals' position in the 
centre of Downs' left-right ideological scale resulted in the party having no clear 
image in the minds of voters. Indeed, class explanations of Liberal voter support have 
proved much harder to develop than those for the other two parties. Miller found no 
strong connections between Liberal support and any of his predictors - including 
class, although there was some evidence of support among the middle class. 
Heath and others too found evidence in the early 1980s of some class voting for the 
Liberals. This, they suggested, was located particularly among the educated and those 
employed in professional and technical occupations. 
"The Alliance vote is not, as previous interpretations have suggested, an 
amorphous vote drawn evenly from different social classes. Its base, though 
small, is an expanding one and thus its share of the vote might be expected to 
have an underlying upward trend" (Heath et al 1985: 171). 
The Alliance vote in local elections did not, however, display such signs of an upward 
trend, decreasing fi-om 25.4% in 1983 to 22.6% in 1987. The reformation of the 
Alliance into the Liberal Democrats did not prevent this decline with the share of the 
vote for the newly named party falling to 17.8% in 1992 and fiuther still to 16.8% in 
1997 (Railings & Thrasher, 1997). 
2.6.4 Ciass-Dealignment 
In recent years there has been research that suggests that class voting is no longer as 
important it once was (Sarlvik & Crewe, 1983; Franklin, 1985; Rose & MacAllister, 
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1986). Butler and Stokes first identified the phenomenon of class-dealignment using 
an index based upon the respondent's occupational grade, class self-image and their 
own view of partisanship. The index is similar to Alford's class index and is 
calculated by subtracting the percentage of working class Conservative identifiers 
from the percentage of middle class Conservative identifiers. When the index for 
1963 is compared with 1970, there are reductions in partisan self image of almost 17 
percentage points for class based on occupational grade, and 20 percentage points for 
class based on self-image (Butler & Stokes, 1974: 203). There are, according to 
Butler and Stokes, very good reasons for believing that the electorate had become less 
inclined to respond to politics in terms of class. In terms of social trends, the most 
important of these is identified as the increase of economic well being among the 
electorate (Bufler & Stokes, 1974: 203). 
The impression of a class based and frozen party system, that successfully expressed 
and channelled all significant political demands, was undermined after 1970, as a 
series of new social and political challenges beset the major parties. 
"These challenges were either based on issues and lines of political conflict 
which potentially cut across existing patterns of electoral alignment, or had the 
effect of generally undermining the electorate's trust in both major parties" 
(Webb & Fisher, 1999: 16). 
Webb and Fisher believe that since the 1970s, the political system in Britain has been 
under various pressures that have had a profound effect upon the party system. The 
notion of a 'two-party, two-class' system, which summarised the way that the two 
major parties absorbed approximately 90% of the vote in general elections until 1970, 
was overwhelmingly structured by the class cleavage (Webb & Fisher, 1999: 8). 
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Much of this orthodox account has recently been challenged by a number of 
interconnected developments including partisan and class dealignment; and the 
erosion of two-party domination (Webb & Fisher, 1999: 10). Sarlvik and Crewe 
suggested that class voting fell in 1979 because the popularity of the Conservatives 
rose while that of Labour dropped among manual workers. They assert that 1979 was 
only the latest instalment in a series of elections in which "class voting has fitfully but 
gradually declined" (Sarlvik & Crewe, 1983: 86). Sarlvik and Crewe argued that 
while the relationships between the social status of individuals and party choice have 
not disappeared completely, their importance as determinants of voting behaviour 
have decreased. They suggest that immediate economic interest rather than class 
membership may increase in importance and that white collar employees may come to 
differ less Groin manual workers in their political views, as the precise meaning of 
such determinants is gradually redefined (Sarlvik & Crewe, 1983: 332). 
The declining influence of socioeconomic explanations led Rose and MacAllister to 
suggest that the traditional closed-class model of political socialisation is an 
anachronism in that it assumes that people do not think for themselves, or that 
learning stops as soon as a person is old enough to be independent of parents (Rose & 
MacAllister, 1986: 114). They employed Butler and Stokes' index o f determination, 
(the percentage sum of the electorate voting for their natural class party) to 
demonstrate a decline in class-voting from 59% in 1964 to just 48% in 1983 (Rose & 
MacAllister, 1986: 53). Afler showing that the relationship between class and vote 
has been declining, they criticise the original closed-class model of electoral 
competition as being "too simple by half . They argue that reducing social structure 
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to a single dimension ignores other possible social sources of economic influence, 
such as housing (Rose & MacAllister, 1986: 55). 
2.6.5 Instrumental Voting 
The apparent process of class dealignment in Britain fuelled the debate about the 
importance of 'expressive' voting over that of 'instrumental' voting. The orthodox 
expressive theory held that voters possessed little detailed knowledge of the policies 
or programmes of the parties but rather formed attachments on the basis of 
generalised conceptions and transmitted family and group attachments. The 
instrumental theory suggests the opposite. It holds that voting is primarily an 
individual action, based not on group identity but on rational calculation. Emotional 
ties, habit and group loyalty do not signify. Voting is a means by which the 
individual attempts to maximise his or her interests. The act of voting is therefore 
analogous to other consumer choices and involves deliberate comparisons between 
the competing qualities of the various packages on offer (Heath et al, 1985: 9). 
Dunleavy and Husbands in their analysis of voting behaviour found little support for 
the party identification model while personal contacts were mentioned by only a 
negligible number of respondents. While party loyalty was an important influence on 
Labour voters, the Conservative and Alliance supporters evaluated it below issues and 
positive attractions as an influence on their decisions (Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985: 
212). National issues and the positive attractions of the parties were mentioned as key 
influences on their voting behaviour by most of their respondents. There was also, 
however, extensive evidence of negative voting to prevent a least preferred party from 
winning (Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985: 212). 
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Not all political scientists readily accepted the relegation of class voting, however. 
Heath et al compared survey data fi-om the 1983 general election with that of previous 
elections in order to uncover the social and political origins of electoral change 
According to Heath et al, the 1983 general election was remarkable as it challenged 
the long standing and overwhelming dominance of the Conservative and Labour 
parties within British electoral politics. The study raised serious doubts about the 
class-dealignment thesis. Instead, Heath et al believed that the decline in Labour's 
performance was part of a pattern of long-term fluctuations - around an underiying 
trend in class voting - in partisan support. They attributed these fluctuations to 
political, not social influences, and suggested that they reflected people's changing 
confidence in the parties, concluding that, "there is no need to introduce concepts like 
class dealignment to explain them" (Heath et al, 1985: 171). 
Given that many voters express the same preferences at local elections as they do at 
parliamentary elecfions, we should be able similarly to observe the effect of class 
voting at local elections. Moreover, since these elections are held more frequently 
than parliamentary elections, we might also be able to identify and track fluctuations 
in class voting. Given a long enough period we should be able to ascertain whether 
class voting is declining or just fluctuating or both. 
2.6.6 NoD-Class Socioeconomic Determinants 
Research has shown that class is the primary social cleavage around which party 
systems in England are structured, although its influence may be waning. However, 
what other social cleavages exist and have these increased in importance i f class 
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voting has declined? Miller (1988) identified other socioeconomic characteristics that 
also appeared as determinants of voter choice in local elections, including housing 
tenure and education. The following sections discuss how these and other 
characteristics, might be related to partisan choice. 
Housing 
There is evidence to suggest that public-private housing distinctions have been 
increasingly significant in structuring patterns of party support since the 1960s (Rose 
and McAllister, 1985: 61; Heath et al, 1991: 106; Webb & Fisher, 1999: 18). Butler 
and Stokes also identified housing tenure as being an important factor in both class 
and political identification. While they distance themselves from the discredited 
embourgeoisement theories that had been prominent until the collapse of 
Conservative support in the early 1960s. they suggest that housing may be far more 
important than other forms of consumerism. The link between housing and the social 
grade of families was identified, with far more middle class families living in 
privately rented or owner-occupier housing than council housing. Conservative 
support among both manual and non-manual workers was higher in privately rented 
housing than council housing, and higher still among owner occupiers (Butler & 
Stokes, 1974: 109). 
Two quite different types of explanations for the relationship between housing and the 
vote have been suggested. One explanation is that housing tenure will structure 
individual interests in the same way that position in the laboiu* market structures class 
interests. Homeowners have valuable marketable assets that give them a measure of 
security and economic advantage. They have an interest in the maintenance of 
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property rights and of a maricet for housing which preserves the value of those assets 
(Heath et al, 1985: 46). Another argument sees housing as an extension of the 
influence of the workplace. Housing estates are thus assumed to constitute social 
communities, which foster and reinforce class cleavages at the local level (Heath et al, 
1985: 46). 
I f housing does influence local voting then its effect is likely to have changed over the 
period. With the Conservative victory of 1979, the gradual rise in council house 
building was not only halted but also reversed. Assisted by the government's policy 
of requiring local authorities to sell council houses on favourable terms to existing 
tenants, the proportion of council tenants fell fi-om 32% in 1979 to 28.5 per cent by 
1985. Owner-occupation, meanwhile, continued to grow, and in 1983 accounted for 
60% of households (Heath et al, 1985: 44). Such transformations in patterns of 
housing consumption may have contributed to changes to local party systems over the 
period. 
Occupation 
Research has shown that occupational status is related to electoral behaviour in local 
elections. When unemployed respondents were questioned about their intention to 
vote, Miller found that they showed a very low level of intention (Miller, 1988: 95). 
Among those unemployed that do vote, there is much evidence to suggest that they 
are much more likely to support Labour and much less likely to vote Conservative 
(Heath et al, 1991,165). Marshall et al. (1988: 218) argue, however, that this political 
allegiance is determined prior to the event of unemployment and that unemployment 
itself would have no direct impact on voting choice. The surveys used in both studies 
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were, however, subject to very small numbers (see also Heath et al, 1991: 163). 
Unfortunately, there is little research regarding the voting behaviour of unemployed in 
local elections, let alone the effect of unemployment when controlling for class. 
Self-employment also appears to be related to voting choice. In 1979, for example, 
the self-employed were overwhelmingly Conservative with three out of four voting 
Conservative giving the party a 60% lead over Labour. Moreover, the self-employed 
status they share overrode differences of social class. Self-employed manual workers, 
such as plumbers and decorators, were as likely to vote Conservative. Independent 
professionals were also more likely to vote for the party than were professional 
employees. A division of the electorate between employees and self-employed rather 
than manual and non-manual therefore has one benefit. The vote of the self-employed 
can be predicted with greater certainty than the vote of non-manual workers (Sarlvik 
& Crewe, 1983:93). 
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Education 
Butler and Stokes believe that educational experience is also strongly related to the 
individual's social status. They found that children both from middle and working 
class homes who went to a grammar school or fee-paying school were more likely to 
have achieved non-manual social status than were those who went to a secondary 
modem school (Butler & Stokes, 1974: 106). However, while it may be true that 
class influences educational attainment, which in turn influences class, it would be 
quite misleading to treat education as i f it were related to class in the same way as 
housing. This is because higher education does not produce *free enterprise' values in 
the way that home ownership does (Heath et al, 1985: 64). 
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Ethnicity 
The one thing that is abundantly clear from all of the major surveys of ethnic voting is 
that the Labour party has been the major beneficiary of the black vote. Moreover, the 
influence of social class upon black voting among black voting patterns appears to be 
remarkably limited and even the younger cohorts of upwardly mobile black voters 
seem cautious about backing the Conservatives (Saggar, 1992: 152). Heath et al. 
(1991: 99) also observe that ethnicity has such an effect, "black and Asian 
respondents are much more likely to vote Labour than are white respondents, but only 
a small proportion of the electorate is black". According to Saggar (1992), therefore, 
any effect of blacks on the party system is likely to be limited. Such effects would be 
more limited if, as is likely, turnout among blacks were disproportionately low. The 
proportion of blacks in some local authorities is somewhat greater than the national 
average, particularly in London and other cities, and this may provide some scope for 
investigation. 
2.7 Structural Determinants of Party Systems 
In addition to socioeconomic factors discussed in the previous sections, Duverger 
suggested that technical factors were also important determinants of the party system. 
His conclusion was based partly upon the assumption that the natural state of the party 
system is one of two-partyism. The reason for this assumption was foremost the fact 
that "throughout history all the great factional conflicts have been dualist" and that 
'Svhenever public opinion is squarely faced with great fundamental problems it tends 
to crystallise round two opposed poles" (Duverger, 1964: 216). In this way the two 
party system appears for Duverger, to correspond to the nature of things. Political 
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choice usually takes the form of a choice between two alternatives. Whereby a 
duality of parties might not always exist, there is always a duality of tendencies. 
"Every policy implies a choice between two kinds of solution: the so-called 
compromise solutions lean one way or the other. This is equivalent to saying 
that the centre does not exist in politics: there may well be a Centre party but 
there is no centre tendency, no centre doctrine. The term 'centre' is applied to 
the geometrical spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet: 
moderates of Uie Right and moderates of the Left. Every centre is divided 
against itself and remains separated in two halves, Left-Centre and Right-
Centre. For the centre is nothing more than the artificial grouping of the right 
wing of the Left and the left wing of the Right. The fate of the Centre is to be 
torn asunder, buffeted and annihilated (Duverger, 1964: 215). 
Given the "natural" order of things, therefore, the party systems in those countries that 
hold democratic elections should be comprised only of two main parties. While this 
theory fitted well the two-party systems in the USA and Britain, the existence of 
multi-party systems throughout Europe presented Duverger with a dilemma: 
" I f we accept the idea that the two-party system is natural we still have to 
explain why nature should have flourished so freely in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries and their few imitators and why nature should have been thwarted in 
the countries on the continent of Europe" (Duverger, 1964: 216). 
Although an explanation for the existence of two-party systems in England and 
America might lie to some extent in the history of dualism of the two nations, 
Duverger believed that technical factors associated with the ballot system offered an 
important explanation for the different types of party systems. 
"The influence of such national factors is certainly very considerable; but we 
must not in their favour underestimate the importance of one general factor of a 
technical kind, the electoral system. Its effect can be expressed in the following 
formula: the simple majority single ballot system favours the two-party system. 
Of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches the 
most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law" (Duverger, 1964: 217 italics in 
original). 
Duverger maintained that an almost perfect correlation is observable between the 
simple-majority single ballot system and countries in which a two-party system exists. 
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He found that excqjtions to this rule were rare and could be explained as the result of 
the special conditions within each country. This influence of the ballot system upon 
the party system (i.e. that simple majority systems favour two-party systems) has 
subsequently become known as "Duverger's Law" and has raised fundamental 
questions regarding die relationship between ballot systems and party systems. 
In discussing the importance of Duverger's work, Riker (1994) pointed to the 
ambiguity in his statement of the relationship between electoral systems and the 
number of parties, 
Does Duverger mean that plurality voting [Duverger calls it simple-majority, 
single ballot] is a necessary condition of the two-party system or a sufficient 
condition or both or neither? The claim that the relationship is "a sociological 
law" suggest causality or a necessary and sufficient condition, while the use of 
"favors" suggests that the relationship is at best probabilistic, not deterministic 
(Riker, 1994: 20). 
Riker suspected that the formulation was deliberately ambiguous because the author 
himself was not entirely sure of what he wanted to claim, Duverger, however, had 
ah*eady acknowledged that his theory, would by necessity, be vague and conjectural 
due to the "paradoxical" nature of political research at the time. That the statement is 
ambiguous does not preclude it from being useful. Indeed, depending upon the 
definition, two-party national party systems did and still do exist in the simple-
plurality systems that Duverger studied. 
I f Duverger's theory still holds then this would raise important implications for the 
local party system. I f only two-parties can be maintained then how did the Liberals 
manage to survive and prosper in a system that should prevent them from doing just 
that? In order to answer this question a better understanding of the logic behind 
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Duverger's original formulation is required, specifically his views about the twin 
operation of so-called psychological and mechanical effects. The following sections 
examine more closely these effects and their implications for party system 
development in English local govemment. 
2.7.1 Mechanical Effects of Electoral Systems 
One of the concepts underpinning Duverger's Law is the "mechanical effect" of the 
electoral system upon the distribution of seats, the discussion of which had begun 
before Duverger formed his theory. These discussions were instigated by both 
increases in the size of the electorate and the operation of the simple-plurality system 
in the distribution of seats. 
In order to ensure a proper representative govemment (i.e. proportionality), some 
writers proposed altemative methods of voting. The concept of the single-transferable 
vote was introduced by Hare (1859) in The Election of Representatives and was 
subsequently popularised by the English philosopher, J.S. M i l l (1910) in 
Considerations on Representative Government? Mil l believed that parliament should 
contain "not just the two great parties alone," but representatives of every minority 
"consisting of a sufficiently large number" (Mil l , 1910: 263). 
For these authors, the mechanical effects of the simple-plurality single ballot system 
were clear. In order for a candidate to win, she must receive the greatest number of 
votes of all the candidates. Unless a candidate comes top in the poll, then they have 
lost, and will receive no seat in the legislature. This differs significantly fix>m a 
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Proportional Representation (PR) system in which a candidate or party might need 
only to achieve a certain share of the votes to guarantee seats in the legislature 
(effective threshold). While the minimum effective threshold in a plurality system is 
50% plus one vote (or toss of the coin)'*, the effective threshold for PR systems is 
normally substantially lower (Lijphart, 1995: 28, Riker, 1994: 22). This large 
obstacle to election makes it difficult for smaller parties to win a share of seats that is 
proportional to their share of the vote - especially i f support for the party is evenly 
distributed. 
2.7.2 Psychological Effects of Electoral Systems 
Another of Duverger's concepts was "psychological effects". Psychological effects 
are likely to affect both parties and voters. In a simple-plurality system, the fact that a 
candidate might need to secure half of the votes in order to win, results in candidates 
for political office adopting specific strategies to produce a winning result. The 
competitive nature of all democratic political systems wil l , therefore, generally induce 
groups of potential candidates to form into political parties. According to Riker 
(1994), 
"Political parties whatever their other functions of an ideological or 
programmatic nature, serve to organise elections. Politicians and candidates 
with some common interests - perhaps only a common desire to win or perhaps 
also a common ideology or a common identification with a group - appeal to 
voters under a common banner and thereby generate political parties" (Riker, 
1994:21). 
In a proportional system, a large number of competing interests might well produce a 
corresponding number of parties. The mechanical effects of the simple plurality 
^ Originally published in 1861. 
" In an election with the minimum number of two candidates. 
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system, however, will tend towards a more disproportional result. Since the best way 
to win is to get more than half of the votes, smaller parties might be expected to 
structure a coalition before the election, in the hope of getting a majority (Riker, 
1994). 
Riker states that, 
" I f winning is defined as receiving the most votes; that is, as a plurality, then 
one might reasonably expect a two-party system owing to the necessity under 
this definition of maximising votes" (Riker, 1994: 21). 
In a simple plurality single-ballot system, therefore, the natural tendency of political 
parties is to merge into two polarised groups, each representing their own broad range 
of similar ideological positions. 
In addition to the effects upon the parties, simple-plurality has a profound 
psychological effect upon the voter also. These effects were recognised by Henry 
Droop (1869) who wrote that, 
"Each elector has practically only a choice between two candidates or set of 
candidates. As success depends upon obtaining a majority of the aggregate 
votes of all the electors, an election is usually reduced to a contest between the 
two most popular candidates or sets of candidates. Even i f the other candidates 
go to the polls, the electors usually find out that their votes will be thrown away, 
unless given in favour of one or other of the parties between whom the election 
really lies" (Droop, 1869 cited in Riker, 1994: 22). 
According to Duverger, "Voters grow tired of seeing their votes lost i f they give them 
to a party which is handicapped by the operation of the ballot procedure" (Duverger, 
1964: 282). This, he maintains, is clearly demonstrated by the polarisation of parties 
that occurred in countries using the simple plurality system. According to this view, 
the voter perceives her vote as a valuable commodity. This may be because she 
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believes her vote is important as it helps to maintain or endorse the democratic 
system. She may also wish to express her opinions about a particular party or issue 
and may have incurred substantial cost in acquiring the political information 
necessary to make an informed decision (Cox, 1997). I f at the time of the election, it 
is apparent that the voter's most preferred candidate will win then her choice is clear. 
I f however her most preferred candidate has little chance of winning, then her best 
option - in order to maximise her vote by choosing a winning candidate - might be to 
vote for the candidate that most closely represents her views and has the best chance 
of winning (Fishbum, 1994: 198). 
2.7.3 Effects of the Electoral System on Small Parties 
The combined effects of the simple-plurality ballot system can have profound effects 
upon smaller parties. The mechanical effects physically discriminate against smaller 
parties in terms of proportionality, while psychological effects lessen incentives both 
for candidates to stand for, and voters to choose, a party with no real chance of 
winning. 
Rather than helping to explain the success of the Liberals, Duverger's Law only 
serves to confound the problem. We ask, therefore, i f there are other characteristics 
of local government elections that may help to explain the ability of the Liberals to 
survive and prosper. The following sections discuss further electoral system 
characteristics that have been known to vary over time or between local authorities 
and may, in turn, have contributed to the pattern of party system development. 
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2.7.4 District Magnitude 
One of the main structural differences between national and local elections is district 
magnitude - the number of seats at stake for each electoral area. Although both 
systems employ simple plurality, the district magnitudes of parliamentary 
constituencies are now restricted to one. This is not the case, however, for some local 
authority elections where district magnitude has been as large as twelve. In local 
elections the voter receives as many votes as vacancies. In a five-vacancy election, 
therefore, an elector may have up to five votes.^ 
In PR systems district magnitude will significantly affect the proportionality of the 
outcome. Generally in such systems, increases in district magnitude wil l lead to 
increases in proportionality. For plurality elections, however, the effect of district 
magnitude is unclear. Some authors have suggested that district magnitude may have 
little effect on the party system (Niemi et al, 1991) while others have suggested that 
increased district magnitude may lead to a more disproportional outcome (Taagepera 
& Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994). 
As disproportionality in plurality elections tends to affect smaller parties, any increase 
due to district magnitude is likely to most affect the Liberals. A comprehensive study 
of the effect of district magnitude upon English local party systems has never been 
undertaken. Any explanation of party systems in English local govemment must, 
therefore, also incorporate a study of the possible effects of variations in district 
magnitude. 
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2.7.5 Frequency of Elections 
The frequency which elections are held can also be important. Given that the key 
tasks of the local party are to draw up an election manifesto, select candidates and 
organise the campaign, it follows that in authorities where there are elections three 
years out of four - metropolitan districts and about a third of English shire districts -
there is a greater propensity for sustained action than in those authorities where 
elections are less frequent (Game & Leach, 1996: 142). It could be argued, however, 
that the abnost contiguous cycle of elections might exhaust the limited resources of 
smaller parties such as the Liberals or that a defeat for the party every year might 
accelerate the operation of Duverger's psychological effects. Both scenarios would 
be likely to impede the Liberals ability to succeed. 
2.7.6 Ward Size and Boundary Changes 
The size of local authority wards, in terms of area and population, can affect the 
evolution of party systems in local authorities. In small wards with few residents it is 
relatively easy for voters to develop personal attachments to candidates. The larger 
the population within an area, the harder it becomes for voters to identify with the 
individual characteristics of the candidates. In order to reduce the utility costs 
associated with making an informed voting decision in large wards, voters have an 
increased incentive to identify with party image. Stanyer (1975) believes, 
"It is fairiy easy to establish that local politics becomes 'nationalised' as the size 
of the population of the area increases: the larger the local authority, the greater 
the probability that its political system will be dominated by the two national 
parties" (Stanyer, 1975: 40). 
* See Railings & Thrasher (1997) for a complete description. 
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The period immediately following local government reorganisation in 1974 saw, 
particularly in more rural areas, a marked acceleration of the party politicisation of 
local government. One major cause of this development was the structural 
reorganisation itself: the boundary changes and the amalgamation of small and 
independent dominated authorities into larger and more overtly partisan ones (Game 
& Leach, 1996:127). 
2.8 Political Explanations of Local Party Systems 
The previous sections have highlighted socioeconomic and structural determinants of 
party system evolution and development with relevance to English local government. 
Research suggests that such characteristics may explain the electoral behaviour of up 
to 80% of local voters (Miller, 1998). This section examines political explanations of 
local party system evolution and development, which might account for the different 
patterns of local voting among the remaining voters. 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to provide an explanation for the variety of local 
party systems that exist in England. According to Railings and Thrasher, 
To a significant degree we should talk of the local political system in the plural 
rather than the singular. Each local authority's elections are affected by local 
issues and the peculiar local application of national issues. While national 
trends do operate, and the growing party politicisation of local government 
indirectly contributes to that picture of uniformity, important differences 
continue. It is still possible, for example, to observe local elections in what are 
effectively one-party dominated authorities taking place alongside other 
authorities where party competition is fierce and the result always in doubt. 
Over time the impact of increased party competition combined with a more 
volatile local electorate, has meant that more local authorities than ever before 
are 'hung' with no single party enjoying an overall council majority (Railings & 
Thrasher: 1997: 9). 
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These observations are key to understanding the nature of party systems in local 
government. Railings and Thrasher maintained that local politics in the three decades 
after 1945 conveyed an air of considerable stability. Although party politicisalion 
increased, it did so slowly. Even as late as the early 1970s barely half of all councils 
could be described as partisan (Gyford at al, 1989: 15). The increasing party 
politicisation since the reorganisation of local government in the early 1970s may 
have had profound effects upon the development of local party systems. 
2.8.1 The Politicisation of Local Government 
Both the Conservative and Labour parties saw the reorganisation of local government 
as an opportunity to strengthen and extend their roles in local politics. On the 
Conservative side, Central Office positively encouraged the replacement of 
Independents of Conservative sympathy with official Conservative Party councillors, 
even i f that meant confronting recalcitrant Independents with official party 
candidates. For its part the Labour Party introduced a new structure of district, county 
and Scottish regional party organisation to parallel that of the new local authorities 
(Gyford etal, 1989:16). 
Increased contestation by all parties has led to an increase in hung authorities that 
reflected a further change in local politics, namely the move away from the two-party 
contest of the post war era to a multiparty contest in the wake of the Liberal revival 
and the creation of the SDP (Gyford et al, 1989: 18). The pattern of contestation has 
important consequences for local party systems as voters can not choose a party i f 
they do not stand for election. This might have particular consequences in elections 
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with higher district magnitudes (see Chapter 2.7.4) as smaller parties may not have 
sufficient resources to contest all available seats. 
2.8.2 Party Organisation 
One of the implications of increased politicisation has been the increased involvement 
of the national party in local party business. As consensus politics of the post-war era 
evaporated so the parties felt the need to protect their ideological positions in local 
govemment. Labour, in particular, operated a strong whipping system in local 
authorities, with group decisions binding on members. This is automatic for most 
groups and most whips spend their time making sure that members are actually 
present to vote and that they know which way they are supposed to vote (Game & 
Leach, 1996: 130). Whipping systems in Liberal groups are usually nothing like as 
formal as Labour's. Group standing orders expect members to stand by group 
decisions, but even then leaders often have to persuade, rather than automatically 
expect their group members to stand by majority decisions. Some Conservative 
groups, particularly in smaller and more rural authorities, are also relatively 'flexible' 
about discipline (Game & Leach, 1996: 130). 
The idea of a strong party is anathema to many Liberal activists. There is no central 
organisation with responsibility for local govemment. The Association of Liberal 
Democrat Councillors (ALDC) exists as a separate organisation fix)m the Liberal 
Democrat Party and is affiliated to the party rather than a sub-section of it. Yet local 
govemment and participatory democracy occupy very important positions in the 
Liberals' thinking. This is partly because local politics has sustained liberalism for 
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such a long period and partly because of the party's emphasis on 'community politics' 
(Game & Leach, 1996: 138). 
2.8.3 Local Diversity 
Although the Widdicombe committee found the survival of some of the old bi-
partisan consensus in a number of authorities the research concluded that the overall 
picture was one of an underlying diversity (Widdicombe, 1986: 205). They identified 
some sources of diversity: different sets of functions, social, economic and 
demographic structure, the state of the local economy and, local topography 
especially in rural areas, and recent political history. 
Local elections mean that the political composition of the local authorities varies. 
There are authorities that are normally controlled by Labour or by Conservatives, 
although exceptional political conditions, locally or nationally, can overturn the status 
quo. There are some authorities in which one party can gain virtually every seat and 
regards itself as permanently in control. Equally, there are other audiorities in which 
there is a greater likelihood of the electoral outcome being inconclusive. The social 
geography of an area is an important determinant of its composition, but each area has 
its own political history. The variation in the results of local elections is an important 
source of diversity in local government (Stewart, 2000:131). 
2.8.4 Local Issues 
Local issues have been known to disrupt traditional patterns of voting in local 
elections. The proposal of a new by-pass or closure of a local hospital, for example, 
can produce winning candidates that stand only on such an issue. In interviews 
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conducted with officers and councillors, the Widdicombe inquiry (1986) found that 
recent electoral history in these areas had been affected by local factors: 
Rather than local events and considerations having very little impact on local 
election results, the emphasis of the impressions we received was that, in a 
small but not insignificant number of cases, they can have a decisive impact on 
individual ward-level elections, and occasionally, as a consequence on the 
overall election outcome within an authority (Widdicombe, 1986: 44, cited in 
Stoker, 1991:53). 
The effect of local issues can often explain why the result of an election is different 
than what we might have expected. Information relating to local political issues is, 
however, not only difficult to collect but likely to be subjective in nature. 
2.8-5 Local Parties 
Local elections feature parties that may be considered as purely local parties. 
Examples of such are those various Residents' associations that present candidates for 
election. Strength of support for such candidates can sometimes contradict the 
assumption of national/local party identification as critical to partisan choice. The 
shire district authority of Epsom and Ewell, for example, has been controlled by 
representatives of Residents' Associations since 1973. The Residents' Association in 
Epsom and Ewell have more than half the population in membership with street 
representatives in many areas (Stewart, 2000). According to Stewart, the objectives of 
the Residents' Association in this local authority are fairly typical: 
To safeguard and promote the interests of residents and to encourage them to 
take an active part in local affairs. To assist in just, efficient and economical 
local government and to nominate candidates for Borough and County Council 
elections and keep local government fi-ee fix)m party politics (Stewart, 2000: 
143). 
Councillors represent their own residents' association. Although they meet together 
before the council, there is no group discipline and it is not uncommon for views to be 
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divided and for decisions to be determined by these discussions (Stewart, 2000: 143). 
However, although local parties can affect the party system, they do not normally 
control local authorities. 
2.8.6 Local Campaigning 
One possible explanation for the Liberals' local electoral success is the variation in 
campaigns between authorities. Unlike the Conservatives and Labour, national policy 
does not feature very highly in the Liberals* local election and by-election campaigns. 
Instead, these tend to concentrate on local issues such as hospital closures or road 
developments, the local candidate's hard work and commitment to the area and the 
record of local Liberal councillors iand councils (Brack, 1996: 94). As such local 
issues can be election winners (see Chapter 2.8.4), and the ability of the Liberals to 
contest on these issues is no doubt advantageous to these candidates. 
2.8.7 Local Geography 
In addition to regional location, social milieu also appears to be important for voters. 
The minority of working class who live in neighbourhoods dominated by professional 
and managerial workers behave much more like salaried than working class 
individuals when voting (Heath et al, 1985: 64). Butler and Stokes reason that, 
"The residential milieu helps form and conserve party preference partly because 
it helps define the social networks through which there is a continued flow of 
informal information about politics. The content and partisan angling of what 
the voter hears about politics are quite different on the council housing estate 
and the suburban housing estate. Because these differences tend to follow class 
lines and because residential environments are notably stable in class terms, the 
residential milieu tends to reinforce the class alignment" (Butler & Stokes, 
1974: 114). 
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Analysis of these effects has been hampered by a lack of appropriate data. In order to 
demonstrate properly a neighbourhood effect, two kinds of data are required. Data on 
the social background and electoral behaviour of the individual; and data on the social 
character of the neighbourhood. The census of population is able to provide this 
information for each and every neighbourhood in Britain (Heath et al, 1985: 76) but 
individual level data are largely absent. 
Miller examined the effects of neighbourhood using such data. He calculates the 
regression coefficients for a number of models using social variables at different 
levels of aggregation. When the resulting coefficients are compared, he finds a 
similarity between the slopes at different levels of aggregation. This similarity, and 
also the fact that there appears to be no consistent trend upwards or downwards with 
more aggregation, can be explained by the contact-makes-consensus model (Miller, 
1977: 104). 
Doriing and others studied neighbourhood effects by examining ward-level socio-
economic census characteristics in order to identify areas that might be territory for 
the Liberal's success. Although constituency level analysis had persistently found 
patterns for Conservative and Labour but not the Liberals, smaller scale analysis 
might have provided more information. The Liberal vote was less easily explained 
using this approach than electoral support for the Conservative and Labour parties 
(Doriing et al, 1998: 64). Arranging wards into different clusters, however, revealed 
that Liberal wards exhibited a pattern. Once a ward was won by the Liberals, it 
became more likely that neighbouring wards would be captured by the party. The 
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reasons for this, however, seemed to be less a case of tactical voting and more a case 
of tactical campaigning (Dorling et al, 1998: 64). 
2.8.8 National Issues - Local EfTects 
Prominent national issues may also affect the development of local party systems. The 
almost universally unpopular 'poll tax', introduced in the early 1990s, damaged the 
Conservative party in local elections across the country. National issues relating to 
economic performance and sleaze resulted in one of the most unpopular Conservative 
governments of the tv^entieth century and the effect of this was evident at the 1994 
local elections. The Conservatives were defending an ah*eady woefully weak position 
resulting from the 1990 'poll tax elections', which they were hoping significantly to 
improve upon. Instead, they suffered net losses of a further 429 seats and 20 councils, 
leaving them in control of just 15 of the 198 borough, district and regional councils 
being contested. With a projected national share of the vote of 27 per cent, their 
lowest in any post war set of nationwide elections, the Conservatives were at least 13 
points adrift of Labour and possibly even more embarrassingly, fractionally behind 
the Liberals. Statistically then there can be very little doubt that the Conservatives' 
1994 results were the worst in recent comparable history (Game & Leach, 1996: 132). 
2.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the research literature relating, in some way or another, to 
the evolution and development of party systems in English local govermnent. It 
began by highlighting the main problem with conducting such a review - the lack of 
specific research relating to local party system development in England. 
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Party systems in liberal democracies are subject to a common set of interactions 
between parties and voters. We discussed the nature of these interactions. Successful 
parties can be viewed as "vote maximisers" and in order to succeed they must, 
therefore, appeal to the greatest number of voters. We discussed the concept of 
ideological positioning whereby the parties align themselves in accordance with the 
values of a large number voters. In order for parties and voters to become aligned 
voters need to be able to identify particular parties as being compatible with their own 
ideological beliefs. This raises important questions regarding how voters perceive the 
parties. It appears that the public, generally, does not examine the nature of the 
parties' policies in great detail before making their voting decision. Rather, voters 
assess the parties according to cues provided by the parties' image - a broad and 
sometimes vague characterisation of the sum of the parties policies. 
As much of the research literature relates to national party systems, the next issue that 
we addressed was the extent to which local party systems were subject to the same 
influences as national party systems. There is evidence that elections for local 
government differ from those for the national parliament. Voters may feel that there 
is less at stake in "second-order" local elections and, therefore, are more likely to vote 
according to their actual party preference rather than on the basis of the party most 
able to govern. A large body of research suggests, however, that although there is 
some difference in voting, a large proportion of local voters, behave in accordance 
with their national party preference. Studies of national party system development 
can, therefore, be appropriately applied the local case. 
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Following sections discussed prior research discussing socioeconomic and structural 
effects upon the party systems. It began by discussing the primary social cleavage 
determining voting behaviour - social class. While the relationship between social 
class and voting, was undoubtedly strong during the period, there is evidence that this 
relationship has now weakened. This leaves us towards identifying other 
socioeconomic factors that might be considered important determinants of local party 
system development. This led us to discuss the theoretical relationship between 
voting and factors such as housing, occupational status, education and ethnicity. We 
found that not only were these factors important for parliamentary elections but there 
may be grounds for thinking that these affect the local party system also. 
Although socioeconomic factors are important determinants of vote choice, there are 
structural characteristics that affect not only the conversion of votes to seats, but may 
also shape voting behaviour. These so-called mechanical and psychological effects 
and their relevance to local party system development were discussed. For third 
parties, such as the Liberals, the outlook is, a priori, not good. Theoretically, the use 
of simple-plurality elections in local government will discriminate against smaller 
parties in the conversion of votes into seats. The psychological effects of this 
discrimination both discourage voters from choosing the party in subsequent elections 
and may also prevent prospective candidates from standing. 
Structurally, local elections differ from national elections in that for each electoral 
unit more than one candidate can be elected at a time. The effect of using higher 
district magnitudes in simple plurality elections is, however, considerably under-
researched, particularly upon the success of third parties. The effects of ward size and 
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boundary changes upon were also considered. Research suggests that larger wards 
will lead to remoteness between candidates and voters, thereby increasing the 
possibility of voters expressing preferences according to party image. The 
amalgamation of smaller wards in the late 1970s may well have assisted the process 
of party politicisation of local government and, by definition, helped shape 
subsequent party system development. 
Despite the influence of socioeconomic characteristics and structural factors, local 
elections remain exactly that - local - and as such may be influenced by local issues 
and politics. We reviewed these processes in some detail, beginning with the party 
politicisation of local government. As political parties have become increasingly 
important actors in local government, we discussed the nature of party organisation 
and its affect on the party system. We found that while Conservatives and Labour 
councillors were largely subservient to national party policy. Liberal councillors 
might be more able to represent specifically local community interests. 
The diverse nature of local party systems may reflect the diversity in local politics. A 
wide range of local issues can dramatically affect the outcome of an election and local 
parties representing a specific issue or social group may be better placed to win seats 
than would be the case at parliamentary elections. The lack of party whipping and 
emphasis on community politics allows Liberal candidates more freedom to appeal to 
voters on such issues. 
This chapter has highlighted influences upon party system development in general 
and highlighted factors specific to party systems in English local government. The 
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following chapter, therefore, examines the party system in more detail in order to 
identify factors that might provide insights to account for this variety. 
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Chapter 3 The English Local Government System 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies the different types of local authority that existed from 1973-98 
and highlights the variation between them. It outlines the structural differences 
between each type of authority and their relevance to the thesis. In order to 
understand the nature of this complex structure, the chapter begins by charting some 
of the historical developments that led to the modem day system. This is followed by 
a description of the geographic differences that to some extent the structures of local 
authorities reflect. The chapter then examines the nature of local government 
elections. It identifies structural differences between electoral systems employed in 
each type of authority and highlights patterns of contestation over the period. The 
final section focuses in more detail upon the place of political parties in local 
government. It maps the political landscape from 1973 to 1998 and highlights broad 
changes in the political control of local authorities during the period. 
3.2 The Evolution of the Modern Local Government Structure 
Local government in England arose fix)m the natural impulse of small communities to 
meet their collective needs, such as the upkeep of roads and bridges, care of the poor 
and the maintenance of order (Kingdom, 1991: 21). Until the industrial revolution, 
the provision of services to address these problems fell mainly upon local parishes. 
During the nineteenth century, however, the number of urban residents increased from 
one fifth of the population to around four fifths, as large cities formed around the new 
factories, which lured workers fix)m the rural towns and villages. This in turn led to a 
number of social problems including, slums, disease, inadequate transportation, vice 
and corruption, pollution, and poverty. 
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The Local Government Act of 1888 addressed these problems by establishing a two-
tier system of administrative counties divided into districts. Large towns - with 
populations of over 50,000 - were reformed into independent county bonaughs 
combining the powers of county and borough into individual local authorities 
(Redclifife-Maude & Wood, 1975: 30). The structure of local govenunent evolved 
from a desire to provide a provision of services at an appropriate geographical level. 
The shire counties had responsibility for area-wide functions such as piarming, roads, 
public transport, social services and education. The shire districts had responsibility 
for more localised services such as public health, licensing, trading standards and 
waste disposal (Wilson & Game, 1994: 64). The metropolitan boroughs however had 
far greater operational importance than the shire districts with responsibility for 
education and social services provided by this tier of local government rather than the 
metropolitan counties (Webb, 2000). 
3.3 The Modern Structure of Local Government 
The post-war period brought a wide range of social problems associated with large 
industrial based societies and it became increasingly apparent that the structure of 
local government was unable to meet the demands being placed upon it. This was 
particularly the case for the capital city where the acute transport and housing 
difficulties prompted for the creation of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1963. 
The GLC reforms showed the way for the Local Government 1972 Act, which 
provided the most dramatic changes to the local government system since the 1888 
act. The resulting two-tier structure is shown in Figure 3-1. The reforms recast the 45 
counties into 39 shire counties divided into 296 districts, and six metropolitan 
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counties divided into 36 boroughs. The metropolitan authorities covered the major 
conurbations of Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, West Yorkshire, 
South Yorkshire and the West Midlands (Wilson & Game, 1994: 77-83). 























Source: Adapted from Wilson & Game (1994: 52). 
The structure of the local govemment system reflected the large geographical 
differences that exist between authorities. The 1981 census reveals that the shire 
counties constituted the largest type of authority (see Table 3-1). They covered over 
120,000 square kilometres and provided services for over 28 million residents. 
Although the metropolitan authorities provided services for 11.2 million residents the 
total combined area of these authorities was only 7,000 square kilometres. The 
London authorities were still further densely populated with 6.6 million residents 
living in a total area of only 1,600 square kilometres. Such differences were also 
reflected in the average size of wards for each type of authority. The average area of 
each ward being 17.7 square kilometres for the shire councils, 8.4 for metropolitan 
councils and 2.1 for London. The average population density was 1352 residents per 
square kilometre for shire wards, 3,111 for the metropolitan wards and 6,514 for 
wards in London. 
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Table 3-1 - Size and Population of Local Authorities and Wards 
Authority Number Number Total Area Mean Ward Area 
Type of Wards of Residents (1000 Km') (1000 KM') 
London Boroughs 754 6603910 1.5 2.1 
Metropolitan Boroughs 830 11156222 6.9 8.4 
Shire Districts 6875 28001400 121.8 17.7 
Source: 1981 Engiish Census. 
Such aggregate values hide the variation within each type of authority. The number 
of residents in the metropolitan counties ranged from 1.1 million in Tyne and Wear to 
2.6 million in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. In the shire counties this 
figure ranged from just 115,000 in the Isle of Wight to 1.5 million in Essex. The least 
populated metropolitan borough was South Tyneside in Tyne and Wear with 160,000 
residents and an average ward density of 3,855 residents per square kilometre. The 
most populated was Birmingham with 996,000 residents and an average ward density 
of 4,489. In contrast, the smallest shire district in terms of population size was 
Teesdale in Durham with a total population of 24,000 and an average ward population 
density of just 185 residents per square kilometre. The largest shire district was 
Bristol in Avon. Its total population of 385,000 and average population density of 
4,498 residents was comparable with some metropolitan boroughs. Although the 
London boroughs are by far the most densely populated local authorities, the largest 
authority in terms of population size (Croydon with 316,000 residents) contained only 
a third of the number of residents as Birmingham. 
Despite the metropolitan and London boroughs being both densely populated, they 
differed considerably in the socioeconomic characteristics of their residents. The 
industrial areas of the metropolitan boroughs were populated by much higher 
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proportions of working class than were those of the London boroughs. While there 
was a similar proportion of manual (37.4%) to non-manual workers (37.1%) in 
London, there were almost twice as many manual workers (47.8%) than non-manual 
(26.2%) in the metropolitan boroughs. In terms of this social cleavage the London 
boroughs bear more of a resemblance to the shire districts which have 38.8% manual 
and 36.8% non-manual workers. We might expect, therefore, that Labour would do 
better in the more working class metropolitan boroughs than in London or the shire 
districts. There are however other characteristics which may cut across the class 
cleavage. The Conservatives favoured homeowners in the 1980s, by giving 
substantial tax incentives to this group (Smith, 1990: 136). I f we assume that this 
encouraged homeowners to vote for the party then we might expect the Conservatives 
to do better in areas with a higher proportion of residents in this group. London 
however, had on average 4.5% fewer owner-occupiers in 1981 than the metropolitan 
boroughs and 13.3% less than the shire districts. 
The structure of the local government system altered during the period fiom 1973 to 
1998. A fiill list of local authorities that existed between 1973 and 1998 is provided 
in Appendix One. The Greater London Council and the Metropolitan Counties were 
abolished by the Local Government Act 1985. The Conservative government's 
reason for the policy - included in their 1983 General Election manifesto - was that 
the unitary nature of the boroughs had resulted in the authorities becoming redundant 
(Elcock, 1991:31). According to Leach & Stoker (1997: 56), however, there was a 
great deal of tension between these authorities and central government. All seven 
authorities were dominated by Labour and as such had very different policy priorities 
than that of the Conservatives. The Thatcher government regarded as excessive, local 
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authority spending on subsidies in areas such as public transport, employment 
provision and economic development in the GLC and metropolitan counties. Such 
tensions led Flynn et al. (1985) to claim that the "proposals should be seen as an 
attempt by central govemment to gain further control of local govemment, rather than 
a series of small adjustments within local govemment in London and the metropolitan 
county areas". 
The trend towards unitary style authorities continued with the creation of 46 new 
unitary authorities between 1995 and 1998, resulting in a reduction of shire districts 
from 296 to 238. The county elections in 1997 saw therefore a reduction of shires 
from 39 to 34 as the counties of Avon, Berkshire, Cleveland, Humberside and the Isle 
of Wight were abolished. 





















Source: British Local Elections Database. 
3.4 Local Government Elections 
English local govemment elections are fought using a common set of rules. 
Councillors are elected using the plurality system. Electors choose their councillors 
by clearly marking their preferred choice, on a ballot paper upon which the 
candidates' names are listed in alphabetical order. Rules goveming the eligibility of 
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people able to vote and stand as candidates apply equally to all authorities. There did 
exist, however, several differences between the electoral systems employed by local 
authorities after 1972. 
3.4.1 Number of Councillors 
The top tier of local government consisted of 4,414 councillors while the second tier 
consisted of 19,751. Because of this difference councillors in the top tier represented 
far more residents than those in the second tier. According to Stewart (2000: 69), 
councillors in the larger county authorities have to spend a greater proportion of their 
time conducting council affairs while those in smaller authorities find it easier to 
make contact with a larger proportion of their electors. The effect of these economies 
of scale may result in councillors forming more personal contacts with electors, 
benefiting those not standing for the main parties. 
The county level consisted of a total of 3,465 wards, which held elections at the same 
time once every four years. The GLC and metropolitan counties had on average 
around 90 wards per authority while the shire counties had almost 20 wards fewer. 
While only one councillor was elected to GLC wards using the Single-Member 
Plurality (SMP) system, some metropolitan and shire county wards elected more than 
one councillor at each election. For these elections a Multi-Member Plurality (MMP) 
electoral system was used, with the electorate casting as many votes as councillors 
elected (Webb, 2000). 
The second tier of local authorities was divided into 7,710 wards, which were 
therefore much smaller than the top fier. The London boroughs held whole council 
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elections every four years with the majority of wards electing two or three councillors 
using MMP. All of the shire districts held whole council elections for the 15,062 
councillors in 1973 and 1976. Although most wards elected only a single councillor, 
the total of only 6,229 wards resulted in some electing as many as 12 councillors. 
Three councillors represented most metropolitan borough wards. After the whole 
council elections of 1973, however, these authorities elected a third of their 
councillors three years out of four using SMP. Since 1976, 144 shire districts adopted 
this system of partial council elections. With elections for top tier authorities being 
held in the year when second tier elections are not held, voters in these wards have the 
opportunity to express their electoral choice every year. Similarly, party machines in 
such areas hardly finish work for one election when another is just around the comer. 
Such systems may over-extend the resources of non-party candidates and inhibit their 
ability to contest repeatedly these elections. 
3.4.2 District Magnitude 
The number of seats contested in a ward constitutes the district magnitude of that 
particular election. The full extent of the variations in district magnitude is shown in 
Appendix Three. Large district magnitudes were not uncommon in local elections at 
the beginning of the period. This was particularly the case for some shire district 
authorities where elections were held in which candidates fought for over eight seats. 
In such elections ballot papers with over 20 names listed upon them were not 
uncommon. Although not as large, variation in district magnitudes also existed for 
other types of authority. The shire counties held elections with two or three vacancies 
before 1985 and the metropolitan boroughs held elections where district magnitude 
was as high as six in 1973. Although the GLC held only single seat elections, the 
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1974 London borough elections saw candidates contesting four and five seats. Since 
1978 however, elections with district magnitudes of two or three have been the norm 
in London boroughs. 
3.4.3 Contestation of Elections 
Local elections in England have become more closely contested since 1973. 
Appendix Four lists patterns of contestation and non-contestation by district 
magnitude for each type of authority, hi the Shire counties in 1973 there were 6,783 
candidates contesting a total of 2,826 seats, the proportion of candidates to seats was 
therefore 2.2. The proportion of candidates to seats in shire counties has risen steadily 
since 1973. In the 1997 elections there were over three times as many candidates 
(6,809) as seats being contested (2,202). Of the 2,826 elections held in 1973, there 
were 390 (13.8%) that were uncontested. By 1997 only 33 (1.5%) of the 2,202 
elections returned councillors that were unopposed. A similar picture can be observed 
for the shire districts. A total of 26,902 candidates stood for election and 13,538 seats 
were available in 1973, the proportion of candidates to seats being just under two. 
Since 1982, however, the proportion of candidates to seats has not been less than 2.8 
for partial council elections. In those years where whole council election were held 
the increase was not as great. The proportion of candidates reached 2.4 in 1987 but 
did not increase since then. Non-contestation has also decreased dramatically. Over a 
quarter of all elections and almost half of single vacancy elections were uncontested 
in the whole council elections of 1976 and 1979. By 1995, less than 9% of elections 
were unopposed. For years when partial council elections were held the percentage of 
uncontested elections decreased from 6.9% in 1980, to 2.2% in 1996 and 1% in 1998. 
Levels of contestation in shire district elections were far lower in those years when 
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whole council elections were held. As district magnitude in these years tends to be 
higher than in those when partial council elections are held, this suggests that 
contestation may decrease as district magnitude increases. 
Contestation in the metropolitan authorities was generally higher than in the shires. If 
we compare the top tier authorities, we find that the proportion of candidates to seats 
in the metropolitan counties was 0.5 higher than the shire counties from 1973 to 1981. 
The proportion of uncontested elections was substantially lower in the metropolitan 
counties. Of the 547 elections held in 1973, only 20 (3.7%) returned unopposed 
councillors. For the same number of elections in 1981 there were only 2 (0.4%) 
where no opposition candidates stood. Patterns of contestation in the second tier of 
metropolitan councils resemble those for shire districts holding partial council 
elections. This might be expected, as elections for these types of authority are mainly 
single plurality elections. The proportion of candidates to vacancies in the 
metropolitan boroughs, however, is generally slightly higher than in the shire districts. 
The small number of elections in the metropolitan boroughs allows us to observe 
extremely small changes in the patterns of non-contestation. Only 21 (2.6%) elections 
were uncontested in 1973 and this number fell to 7 (0.9%) in 1978 and 1979. As will 
be seen in the next section, this rise in contestation within the metropolitan boroughs 
corresponds to a sharp increase in Conservative control of these traditionally Labour 
authorities. After the abolition of the metropolitan counties, the percentage of 
uncontested elections increased, its highest point being 6.4% in 1990. There appears 
to be a cyclical pattern to the levels of contestation with greater contestation around 
the time of general elections. 
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The Greater Lx)ndon Council was the most contested authority in England. There 
were on average over three candidates contesting each seat in 1973 and over 5 
candidates for each vacancy in 1977 and 1981. The GLC was also the only authority, 
which never had an uncontested election. This pattern of contestation is hardly 
surprising. As the GLC was the most densely populated authority, we might expect 
its elections to be likewise. The council also had the largest spending budget and 
attracted a great deal of media attention. Contestation in the London boroughs was 
not as great as for the GLC. With no less than three candidates for every seat, the 
levels of contestation were slightly higher than metropolitan districts holding elections 
in the same year. Since 1974 when nine (1.4%) of elections were uncontested, all 
London borough electors have had a choice of candidates with only one election 
being uncontested in 1982-90 and 1998. 
3.5 The Party Politicisation of Local Government 
The reorganisation in 1973 had a major impact on the politics of local government 
that led to increased party politicisation. According to Stewart (2000), a number of 
factors combined to have this impact. The abolition of aldermen removed an 
influential group, less involved in party activity, while the introduction of attendance 
allowances opened the way to full time councillors. This facilitated a reorganisation 
of local authorities into groups of councillors, with the majority group holding the 
chairs and vice chairs of important committees. There was recognition of leadership 
positions, and offices in the council building were provided for groups, leaders and, in 
some cases, chairs. The end of consensus politics also led to a greater emphasis on 
party discipline and such national party influence encouraged the organisation of 
council groups along political lines (Stewart, 2000: 128). 
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Figure 3-3 shows the impact of party politicisation for the second tier of local 
government in 1973 and 1979. Of the 364 second tier local authorities, 66 (18.1%) 
were controlled by councillors other than those of the three main parties in 1973. By 
1979 however the number of authorities controlled by other councillors had fallen to 
only 42 (11.5%). The Conservatives appear to have been the only beneficiaries of the 
reduction in Independent authorities. In 1979, the party controlled all of the 17 
councils where Independents no longer held a majority. One explanation for the 
success of the Conservatives was the incoiporation of formeriy Independent 
councillors into the party. Many of these were already associated with, or even 
members of, the Conservative party and explicit pressure was placed upon them to 
stand in future as official Conservative candidates, or risk facing the opposition of 
such candidates (Game & Leach, 1996: 127). 
Figure 3-3 also shows a reduction in the number of authorities where no single party 
had an overall majority of seats. These more than halved, from 103 in 1973 to only 
51 in 1979. Again, the Conservatives appear to be quite successful in gaining control 
of these councils. Of the 103 councils where no party held a majority in 1973, the 
Conservatives controlled 72 in 1979. It is also worth bearing in mind, that 25 
authorities where a party held a majority of seats in 1973 no longer had a majority 
party in 1979. Of these authorities, the Conservatives originally controlled only two. 
It was however, not only in Independent or hung councils, where the Conservatives 
were successful. During the period, the number of authorities controlled by Labour 
fell from 118 to 80, with 26 of those authorities controlled by Conservatives in 1979. 
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Figure 3-3 - Party Control of Local Government 1973 and 1979 - Second Tier 
Majority Party Majority Party 
Source: British Local Elections Database 
The period immediately following local government reorganisation in 1974 saw a 
marked acceleration of party politicisation. One major cause of this development, 
according to Game and Leach, was the structural reorganisation itself. Not only did a 
large number of Independent councillors stand as Conservatives, but the boundary 
changes and the amalgamation of small and Independent dominated authorities in turn 
created larger and more overtly partisan ones (Game & Leach, 1996: 127). 
In terms of local authorities, the picture is slightly different for the top tier of local 
government. Figure 3-4 shows that in 1973 only 2 of the 45 county councils had an 
overall majority of Independent councillors. This situation did not last long however, 
as control of the Isle of Wight was gained by the Conservatives in 1977, while the 
independents lost majority control of Cornwall in 1985. However, although only 2 
county councils were controlled by Independents in 1973, of the 3836 councillors in 
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total, 434 (11.3%) were not from the three main parlies. By 1979 however, the 
number of Independent councillors had fallen to 281 (7.4%). There appears to be a 
spatial divide for the top tier of local government in 1973, with the Conservatives 
controlling only one authority north of Northamptonshire. The success of the 
Conservatives in this tier of local government during the period is clearly evident. 
The party only controlled 13 of these authorities in 1973. By 1979 however, all but 5 
authorities were controlled by the Conservatives, leaving Labour with control of only 
Durham, South Yorkshire, and Tyne and Wear. 
I i^ure 3-4 - Party Control of Local Government 1973 and 1979 - Top Tier 
Majority Party Majority Party 
Source: British Local Elections Database 
The dominance of the Conservatives proved to be only temporary however. In the 
following elections of 1981 the number of top tier councils controlled by the 
Conservatives had fallen to 19. In the same elections. Labour regained control of 12 
of the 14 authorities they originally controlled in 1973. 
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The increase in party politicisation continued during the period up until 1992. Figure 
3-5 shows that in 1992, Independent councillors were much rarer with only 119 (4%) 
out of 3,005 top tier councillors not being from the main parties. This process appears 
to have abated however. The 108 Independent councillors in 1996 again represented 
only 4% of the reduced number of top tier councillors. Indeed between 1986 and 
1998 the proportion of Independent councillors has ranged only from between 3.3% 
to 4%. The number of hung councils however has not reduced. In 1992 the number 
of authorities where no party held a majority of seats was 13, while in 1996 25 
authorities were hung. This figure was also as high as 23 from 1985-88 and 26 from 
1993-94. 
From 1979 until 1992 the Conservatives generally remained the most successful party 
in terms of control of top tier local authorities. One reason for the fewer number of 
these authorities with Labour majorities was the abolition of the metropolitan counties 
in the mid-1980s. Labour councillors controlled all six of these authorities when they 
were abolished. By 1992, the spatial distribution of party control among top tier 
authorities resembled the geographic divide in 1973. By 1996, however, the picture 
had changed dramatically. Political control across the country was virtually the 
opposite of that in 1979. Instead of controlling almost every top tier authority in the 
country the Conservatives controlled only one - Buckinghamshire! By 1996, hung 
authorities had replaced 15 of the former 17 Conservative authorities of 1992, with 
the Liberals now controlling Somerset. 
The creation of new unitary authorities again cut into those top tier councils 
controlled by Labour, with Humberside and Cleveland being abolished in 1995. 
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Overall Labour were far more successful in retaining the authorities that they 
controlled in 1973. Of the 14 top tier councils originally controlled by the party, 5 
were still controlled by the parly in 1996, and the rest were abolished. Of these 9, all 
were controlled by Labour at the time that they were abolished. 
Msure 3-5 - Party Control of Local Government 1992 and 1996 - Top Tier 
Majofity Partv Mijoritv ParTy 
Jriitdfy Un ta rv 
Source: British Local Elections Database 
The geographical distribution o f party support for second tier local authorities in 1992 
and 1996 (Figure 3-6) resembled that o f the top tier. By 1992 the Conservatives 
controlled only 89 (24.4%) o f these councils, the majority being in the south o f 
England. Labour however now controlled 111 (30.5%) second tier authorities, having 
made steady gains since 1979. The number o f hung authorities had also increased 
steadily since 1979 reaching 115 (31.6%) in 1992. For the first time since the 1973 
reorganisation, there were more second tier authorities that were hung than controlled 
by a single party. 
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If we were to compare the number of authorities controlled in 1992 with those for 
1973 we might be mistaken into thinking that little had changed. The Conservatives 
controlled only 3.6% more authorities in 1992 than in 1973, Labour controlled only 
1.9% fewer authorities, and the number of hung councils had increased by only 3.3%. 
While there appears to be little difference in the numbers of Conservative, Labour and 
hung councils between the two periods, the Liberal controlled authorities had 
increased from just one in 1973 to 24 in 1992. The number of Independent authorities 
had on the other hand decreased from 66 to 25 during the same period. There was 
also considerable change in the actual authorities controlled between the two years. 
Table 3-2 shows the control of authorities in 1973 by control in 1992. Of the 89 
authorities controlled by the Conservatives in 1992 only 37 were originally controlled 
by the party in 1973. Of authorities that the Conservatives lost control of since 1973, 
the majority were hung in 1992. The reverse is true of those authorities that the party 
gained control of The greatest number of these were hung in 1973. 
Figure 3-6 - Party Control of Local Government 1992 and 1996 - Second Tier 
Mijoritv Party Majofitv Party 
NOG 
Source: British Local Elections Database 
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By 1996 the pictiu-e was even worse for the Conservatives with the party holding a 
majority of seats in a mere 13 (3.7%) of second tier authorities. They controlled even 
fewer authorities than did Independents, even though the number of Independent 
councils had fallen to 17 (4.8%), The number of hung councils was actually slightly 
lower in 1996 than at any time since 1992, with 106 (29.8%) of authorities having no 
majority party. Perfiaps the most striking aspects of Figure 3-6 are the success of 
Labour and the Liberals. In 1996, Labour controlled almost half of all second tier 
authorities in England while the Liberals with 53 authorities controlled almost 15% of 
local councils. The Liberal's success however appears to have been on the back on 
Conservative unpopularity. Of those authorities controlled by the Liberals in 1996, 
the Conservatives controlled 41 (77.4%) in 1979. It was Labour however who were 
the main beneficiaries of the Conservatives misfortune v^th 59 Labour councils being 
formerly controlled by Conservatives in 1979. 
Table 3-2 - Change in Party Control 1973 to 1992 
Control 1992 
Control 1973 CON LAB LD OTH NOG 
CON 37 7 9 23 
LAB 10 87 3 18 
LD 1 
cm 7 2 4 23 30 
NOG 35 15 7 2 44 
Source: British Local Elections Database 
When comparing 1973 and 1979 to 1992 and 1996 it appears that no single party was 
able to capitalise on the demise of the Independents. Over four fifths of Independent 
councils in 1973 were either still controlled by Independents or hung by 1992. Of the 
Independent controlled councils in 1979 almost 90% were still not controlled by any 
one of the main parties in 1996. 
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Table 3-3 - Change in Party Control 1979 to 1996 
Control 1896 
ControM979 CON LAB LD OTH NOG Unitary 
CON 12 59 41 67 11 
LAB 69 3 8 
LO 1 
OTH 1 4 17 18 2 
NOG 28 6 15 2 
Source: British Local Elections Database 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the English local government system. It has shown how 
the structure of local government evolved from an historical need for the provision of 
services within local communities. It highlighted the structural differences between 
the different tiers of local government and explained why these differences led to the 
present structure of local government. In so doing the chapter has raised important 
questions regarding the effect of these structural differences upon the party system. 
The variation in district magnitudes is a particular area that needs addressing in order 
to determine whether this variation affects the party system as some authors have 
suggested (see Chapter 2.7.4). 
The chapter also highlighted the increasing party politicisation of local government. 
It has charted the fortunes of the main parties over the period and shown how these 
fortunes have fluctuated dramatically. The decreasing importance of Independent 
councillors in a politically saturated system was identified along with the increasing 
place of hung councils. Such dramatic changes and variation in the local political 
landscape have yet to be explained. The following Chapter discusses the means by 
which we might provide some explanation of these developments. 
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Chapter 4 Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the data and methods employed in this thesis. It outlines the 
main hypotheses related to party system development and considers how these might 
best be tested in the context of English local government. It will discuss the 
suitability of the data used in the thesis, identifying the advantages and disadvantages 
with the chosen methods. 
4.2 Research Questions 
A variety of party systems appear to exist in English local government authorities. 
What is it about local government elections that allows so many different party 
systems to develop and be maintained, was an important question posed in Chapter 
1.3. Chapter 2, discussed theoretical explanations for party system development. As 
much of the research on the subject applies to national government, however, the 
development of local party systems remains largely unexplained. In order to redress 
this lacuna in the research literature, our study attempts to explain the development of 
local party systems. 
Our main hypotheses consider the nature of structural and socioeconomic 
characteristics of local authorities and their effect upon the development of local party 
systems. We begin by asking, what is the nature of local party systems? Duverger 
(1964) stated that the use of simple-plurality elections would favour two-party 
systems. To what extent is this the case for local government elections? The 
rationale imderpinning Duverger's proposition was that the electorate would tend not 
to support small parties with little chance of winning. Chapter 3.5 showed that. 
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despite Duverger's claims, the Liberals had managed to become the second largest 
party in English local government. Were the Liberal's more able to achieve success 
under certain conditions of party competition? In order to address such issues, we 
feel it is necessary to develop a typology of party systems that can be applied to 
English local government. Such a classification will provide us with the means to 
examine the similarities and differences between types of party system. 
Although investigating local authority party systems will clarify the nature of English 
local government and may provide some explanation for the Liberal success, it is 
important also to understand the direct effect of the electoral system upon third 
parties, such as the Liberals. District magnitude has been identified as possibly 
exaggerating the effect of the electoral system, resulting in discrimination of third 
parties. I f the Liberals' success were in some way related to district magnitude, then 
this may partly explain any variation in party systems. What, therefore, is the effect of 
district magnitude upon local party systems? Are the Liberals, due to such 
discrimination, less successful in areas with higher district magnitude? In order to 
answer such questions we need to establish a suitable measure of electoral 
discrimination that can be applied to the parties. 
Chapter 2 identified also, the importance of socioeconomic characteristics as 
determinants of voting in national elections. Little research has been conducted, 
however, that examines these relationships in local elections. To what extent do such 
ward level characteristics help explain local party system development in different 
types of local authority? Do specific social groups appear to support certain parties 
and does this support vary between different types of authority? 
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In order to provide answers to such questions, this research uses methods upon which 
a reliable study of local party systems can be based. Following sections discuss the 
methodological approach and methods that will be employed within the thesis. 
4.3 Methodology 
Chapter 2 highlighted the theoretical relationship between social class and voting in 
English elections. Approaches such as those by Himmelweit et al. (1985), however, 
focus on the individual voter not as a person in isolation, but as a member of many 
groups that respond to social and political contexts. This systems approach was 
originally advocated by Kurt Lewin (1951) and also, by Campbell et al. (1960) in 
their study, the American Voter, Lewin sought explanations of people's behaviour in 
the study of the changing environment and the individual's interpretation of that 
environment. He looked for indications of institutions' changing roles in the public's 
perception of these institutions and changes in that perception. In the case of voting, 
there is not only the interdependence of the political and economic climate and the 
parties' and the voters' responses but also the dependence of the present on the past. 
Changes in the individual's circumstances, changes in the life history of issues and in 
the parties' records and promises, as well as the individual's past voting record, 
interact to affect the relative strength of the influences that bear on the decision 
(Himmelweit et al, 1985: 2). 
Such models offer an account of how voting need not be dependent solely upon an 
individual's social class. More recent studies focus upon how the expansion of a 
variety of public services can differentiate citizens as consumers of these services. 
Those who consume predominantly in the public sector (in areas such as transport or 
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housing) might well be expected to see jobs and services sustained, even at the cost of 
higher taxes. This public-private dualism cuts across traditional patterns of class 
alignment, and can be illustrated, by groups such as manual workers who own their 
own homes or middle class professionals employed within the public sector 
(Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985, Webb & Fisher. 1999: 18). 
The discovery of such complex motivations behind voting decisions is ideally suited 
to a qualitative approach. By their very nature, qualitative studies endeavour to obtain 
some insight through an understanding of the perceptions of the subject. Individuals 
act according to their individual perception of their environment. In order to discover 
why people voted for a party therefore, we would first need an understanding of each 
individual's motivation. Methods such as in-depth qualitative interviews might help 
provide such an understanding (DeVaus, 1990). 
A qualitative approach to the problem would, however, have a number of problems. 
In order for the results of a qualitative study to be applicable to party systems across 
the country as a whole we would need to be sure that we could generalise the findings 
fi-om such a study to the whole country. For a qualitative approach, this would 
normally involve the specific selection of a sample based upon characteristics that 
reflect those of the wider population (Denscombe, 2002: 142). The variation in the 
nature of English local government (see Chapter 3) may, however, result in variations 
in electoral behaviour. In order to make valid and reliable generalisations, therefore, 
the sample would require participants fix)m across the entire country. Such a cross-
local survey would result in a substantial number of cases, meaning that a detailed 
qualitative study would prove too costly. In addition to the resources required to 
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undertake such a survey, other complex issues arise involving reliability of findings. 
Such issues include interviewer bias and variations in the interpretation of questions 
by respondents (see Pennings et al, 1999; DeVaus, 1990). 
Because of the methodological problems associated with qualitative methods, studies 
of electoral behaviour have tended to use quantitative methods. This approach 
assumes that larger volumes of data overcome the problems of differences in 
individual perceptions. It is argued that i f enough people are subjected to similar 
conditions then the majority will act in a similar way. Observing the differences 
between conditions and the differences between actions allows the quantitative 
researcher to draw inferences about the nature of the relationship between individuals 
and their actions. 
Quantitative election studies tend to use close questioned surveys to collect the data. 
The use of these methods helps to ensure that the survey's questions and respondent's 
answers fall within a predefined fi*amework. In many cases the use of such surveys 
eliminates the need for an interviewer, as questionnaires can simply be mailed to a 
representative sample. In addition to saving time and money, such methods also 
claim to be highly reliable, reducing unwanted effects - such as interviewer bias. 
Unfortunately, however, cross-local survey data relating to electoral behaviour in 
local government elections is unavailable for most of the period between 1973 and 
1998. 
Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) argue that the analysis of voting behaviour must deal 
strictly with aggregate social phenomena, focusing on shifts of party support in a mass 
91 
electorate. They dismiss studies that reduce changes to individual accounts of why 
particular voters acted as they did. and argue that even i f plausible individual level 
explanations did exist, that the aggregate phenomenon would still have its "own 
collective properties and identity" (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985: 18). Such 
aggregate data for the period is available in the form of the 1981 and 1991 British 
Census and the British Local Elections Database. As quantitative data studies must 
contain both sufficient numbers of cases and sufficient variation within the set for the 
purposes of the investigator, local elections score very highly on both counts (Stanyer, 
J. 1975: 26). The 1981 and 1991 British Census data are available at exactly the same 
level of aggregation as the electoral data - the local authority ward. A combination of 
both types of data result in a detailed cross-national dataset that is representative of 
the entire country. 
4.4 Quantitative Measures 
This section outlines the key measures used within the thesis. It begins by 
operationalising the concept of the party system into quantitative measures that 
accurately and reliably describe the phenomenon. It discusses also, the relevance of 
local parties and measures of proportionality before proceeding to a discussion of 
measuring relationships between ward characteristics and the party system. 
4.4.1 Classifying Party Systems 
The party systems of local government authorities differ torn each other in different 
ways. According to Railings and Thrasher (1997), to a significant degree we should 
talk of the local political system in the plural rather than the singular. The elections of 
individual authorities are affected by both local issues and the peculiar local 
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application of national issues. While national trends do operate, and the growing 
party politicisation of local government indirectly contributes to that picture of 
uniformity, important differences still continue. Any classification of party systems 
must distinguish, therefore, the party systems at the local authority level. 
Mair (1996) suggests that the number of parties in competition is the most 
conventional and frequently adopted criterion for classification. For Mair, the 
conventional distinction between systems other than single-party systems is that 
between a two-party system, on the one hand, and a multiparty (i.e. more than two) on 
the other. This categorisation was believed to tap into the distinction between stable 
and consensual democracies associated with the two-party type and unstable 
conflictual democracies associated with the multi-party type (Mair, 1996: 84). 
Sartori suggests that these classes do not adequately describe the party systems that 
exist and instead claims that seven classes of party system can be obtained from the 
original classification. Sartori broke down the single-party system into three 
categories. He classified a one-party system as one in which only one party is 
allowed to exist within the political system (Sartori, 1979: 221). This classification 
however, does not apply in the democratic system of English local government. The 
second single-party classification he used is that of a hegemonic party system. Unlike 
a one-party system, other parties do exist in a hegemonic system. These parties 
however are permitted only i f they remain subordinate to a single main party (Sartori, 
1979: 127). The final classification of single-party system is that of predominant-
party. This is the only single-party classification that exists in a competitive system. 
Despite the presence of competitive elections however, the predominant party. 
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"governs alone, without being subjected to alternation, as long as it continues to win, 
electorally, an absolute majority" (Sartori, 1979: 127). This is the only one of 
Sartori's singe party classifications that applies to local government. 
Sartori claimed that two-party systems were the least problematic in terms of 
definition. In these systems two parties compete for an absolute majority that is 
within reach of either party. Multi-party systems are those where, "no party is likely 
to approach or at least maintain a majority" (Sartori, 1979: 127) with a further three 
categories - limited pluralism, extreme-pluralism or atomised. Sartori suggests that 
party systems with 3-5 parties (limited-pluralism), have very different interactions 
than those with 6-8 parties (extreme pluralism), or those with 10 to 20 parties 
(atomised) (Sartori, 1979: 126). While this system works well to classify different 
national party systems, it has limited application in England. There are virtually no 
instances in local authorities where 5+ parties exist and so the classifications of 
extreme or atomised pluralism are for our purpose redundant. Although Sartori's 
framework "recommends itself on the grounds of being easily intelligible and easy to 
construct" (Sartori, 1979: 291), for party systems in local government, it appears that 
the traditional one-party, two-party, and multi-party trichotomy is more appropriate 
than Sartori's seven-category classification. 
One classification that has been applied to local government is that developed by 
Game and Leach (1996) who classify the party systems in local government for each 
of the different tiers of local government that existed in 1995 (see Figure 4-1). Their 
six-category classification was as follows. 1) substantially non-partisan (60% or more 
seats held by Independents), 2) Weak Partisan (20-50% of seats held by 
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Independents), 3) Multi-party/fragmented (20% or more seats held by third 
party/parties), 4) Two-party (80% of seats held by two parties, neither over 55%), 5) 
One party dominant (55-60% of seats held by one party), 6) One-party monopolistic 
(70% or more of seats held by one party (Game & Leach, 1996: 128). 
Although useful. Game and Leach*s classification is a snapshot of the party system 
taken in 1995. As such, the classification takes little account of the fluctuations that 
occur in local party systems and is, therefore, of little use for our purpose. 
Figure 4-1 - A Classification of Local Party Systems 
New Counties London Metropolit Non-Met Total 
Unltaries Boroughs an Districts 
Districts (1995) 
Substantially norvpartisan - 1 - 10 - 11 
(60% or more seats held by 
Independents) 
Weak Partisan 1 - - 38 39 
(20-59% of seats held by 
Independents) 
Multi-party fragmented 19 7 3 63 3 95 
(20% or more seats held by 
3"* party/parties) 
Two-party 9 3 6 29 1 47 
(80% of seats held by 2 
parties, neither over 55%) 
One-party dominant Con 1 - - 5 - 6 
(55-60% of seats held by Lab 6 7 8 32 1 54 
one party) LD2 - - 31 - 33 
One party monopolIstJc C o n - 3 - - - 3 
(70% of seats held by one Labl 10 19 59 8 97 
party) LD- 2 - 7 1 10 
Total 39 33 36 274 14 396 
Adapted from (Game & Leach, 1996:127). 
4.4.2 Measuring the Number of Parties 
Rae believed that, "To talk accurately about party systems, it is essential to begin with 
some fairly precise measures which describe the competitive relationship between 
parties" (Rae: 1967: 47). The number of parties (AO is an important measure in 
determining the competitive nature of the party system. To derive Rae simply 
counts the number of parties that received any votes or seats. He acknowledges that 
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although the measure may tell us how many competitive positions exist, "it tells us 
nothing about the relative strengths of these positions" (Rae: 1967: 49). To overcome 
this potential weakness, Rae also presents the concept of fractionalisation (F), based 
not only upon the number of party shares (?) but the relative equality of these party 
shares. The calculation of F is derived from the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration 
index which is based upon simple probability of two randomly selected voters not 
choosing the same party and is specified as^ 
N 
2 
Where p is the fractional share of the vote for each party. The value of HH ranges 
between 0 and 1, and provides a measure of the amount of concentration of parties in 
a political system. Values approaching 1 indicate a party system that is concentrated 
around a single party. To obtain the fractionalisation index (F) Rae simple subtracts 




According to Rae and others, the values produced are consistent with the concept of 
party system fractionalisation (Rae, 1967; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). Sartori uses 
Rae's index to classify the party system defined in terms of pairwise disagreement, 
thereby indicating the likelihood that any two members of a parliament will belong to 
' Monroe (2000: 117) incorrectly defines the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index as a 
measure known as the effective number of parties 1 / ll(pf). The number of parties however 
is derived directly from the concentration index. Calculating the measure using Monroe's 
incorrect definition is therefore not recommended. 
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different parties (Sartori, 1979: 307). In his study, out of the 85 countries holding 
parliamentary elections between 1962 and 1968 he ranked the United Kingdom in 40*^  
place with a fi^ctionalisation index of 0.507, with Lebanon topping the table with a 
fi^tionalisation index of 0.945 (Sartori, 1979: 311). To provide an overall measure 
of fractionalisation, he calculates the mean of the index for some 27 democracies from 
1945 to 1973. The mean fi*actionalisation for the United Kingdom over the 28-year 
period (0.512) was little different from the 1964 election (Sartori, 1979: 313), 
suggesting a fair degree of stability during the period. 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) refined the index of finctionalisation in order to provide 
a more intuitive measure of the number of parties in a system. Their method - the 
effective number of parties - provides a measure of the number of parties based upon 
either their relative vote share (Nv) or seat share (Ns). Taagepera and Shugart (1989) 
use this concept to analyse the proportionality in a variety of party systems, while 
Boucek (1998) uses the same measure in order to explore ways of examining the 
notion of single-party dominance (Boucek, 1998: 121). The use of Nv and Ns has 
since become widespread (Lijphart, 1994: 70; Cox, 1997: 29). One reason for this is 
that it tends to agree with our intuition about the number of serious parties. These 
closely resembles Sartori's (1976) esfimates of the number of 'relevant' parties. 
Taagepera claims the measure comes as close as any operational index based on seat 
(or vote) shares alone can come - to Sartori's estimates - without detailed knowledge 
about the given country (Taagepera, 1999: 498). 
Taagepera stresses that, "for most purposes N alone will do, just as we often deal with 
the means of distributions, without the concomitant standard deviations" (Taagepera, 
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1999: 499). However, for the classification of the party system in English 
government over a 25-year period N alone will not do. Although Sartori provided the 
mean values of fractionahsation over the period of his study he provided no measure 
of the dispersion of this value. The importance of such a measure is not ignored in 
Taagepera's attempt to supplement the number of parties. While he agrees that the 
mean is an important characteristic of a distribution it is not the whole story. We also 
require a second measure to reflect typical divergence torn this mean, for example 
the standard deviation (Taagepera, 1999: 499). The divergence from the mean 
number of parties is an important measure when studying party systems. A large 
standard deviation is a reflection of an unstable party system. 
The party systems in English local government are seldom static. Properly speaking 
any typology of these party systems must, therefore, include a classification of such 
changes. Stanyer (1975) focuses upon the instability of the party system and 
identified two types of instability that might exist. Episodic instability occurs when a 
general state of relative stability in party fortunes is occasionally interrupted by a 
short period of instability, whilst endemic instability occurs when the situation of 
rapidly and widely varying fortunes continues for a longer time (Stanyer, J. 1975: 48). 
While endemic stability might be considered as a system that is unstable for most of 
the period, the concept of episodic stability is more problematic. At what point is the 
party system recognised as unstable? Is a party system in which a single-party was 
predominant for almost the entire period classed unstable, be it episodic or otherwise? 
I f no single-party ever has a majority of seats then does this mean the system is 
unstable or rather that such a system might be considered as a stable multi-party 
system. Rather than classifying the party system in terms of endemic or episodic 
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instability, the typology classification used within this thesis will classify the party 
system in terms of a stable or unstable dichotomy. 
Having settled upon the characteristics of number and stability of parties it would 
seem appropriate to introduce some measure of strength of the party system. Cox 
(1997), notes the idea of a continuum of systems from strong to weak - developed by 
Sartori - is now conmionly accepted within the literature. Here, 'weak' is defined as a 
system in which "sd-ategic voting and elite coalitional activity act forcefully to 
depress the number of parties" (Cox, 1997: 10). Alternatively, 'strong' is defined as a 
system in which "strategic voting and incentives for coalitions are largely absent and 
thus put little download pressure on the number of competitors" (Cox, 1997: 10). 
This thesis wil l also employ a strong/weak classification of the party system. In this 
case however, strength will be defined in terms of the proximity of the party system to 
its ideal-type. A two-party system that conforms closely to an ideal type two-party 
system will be classed as strong, whereby those that have more in common with a 
single-party or multi-party system will be classed as weak. 
The typology of party systems within this thesis utilises a classification based upon 
the mean and standard deviation of die elected number of parties (see Figure 4-2). 
The typology employs three classifications. The first is the party system type, and it 
relates to the number of parties that existed during the period. The party system type 
for an authority is produced by calculating the average number of elected parties and 
rounding to the nearest whole number. An authority is classed as single-party i f the 
average effective elected number of parties lies between 1 and 1.5, and two-party 
where the value lies between 1.5 and 2.5. Any authority with an average number of 
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elected parties over 2.5 is classed as multi-party. The second classification relates to 
the strength of party system in relation to the number of parties. It is calculated by 
measuring the proximity of an authority's average number of elected parties to the 
centre of its party type category - what might be considered as the ideal-type. I f the 
absolute difference between these values is less than 0.25 then the party system is 
classed as strong, else it is classed as weak. The third classification relates to the 
stability of the party system and is measured by calculating the standard deviation of 
the effective number of parties. A standard deviation greater than 0.5 indicates that 
the party system deviated from one type of classification into another approximately 
65% of the time. 
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Figure 4-2 - A Typology of Party Systems in English Local Government 
Party Systems 




























































4,4.3 Which Parties are Relevant? 
Calculafing the number of parties in English local government is somewhat 
problematic. The large number of party labels used candidates and the complex 
definitions of what constitutes a political party (see Sartori, 1979), provides scope for 
alternative classifications of candidates into party groups. According to Epstein, 
"almost everything that is called a party in any western democratic nation can be so 
regarded" (Epstein, 1967: 5). Using this approach we would have to regard 
candidates from the Monster Raving Loony Party or the Lets Have A Party Party as 
belonging to a party in the same way as candidates challenging frx)m the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. Ashford district council between 1983 and 
1987 consisted of councillors using the following party labels: Conservative, 
Independent, Labour, Liberal/SDP, Rates Association, True Ashfordian and True 
Liberal. Do the Independent candidates belong to an Independent party? Do 
candidates representing the Residents Association belong to a party? Sartori would 
argue that, 
"a minor party must be counted, no matter how small it is, i f it finds itself in a 
position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the 
possible governmental majorities" (Sartori, 1979: 122). 
I f we used Sartori's typology we might well classify the party system in Ashford as 
one of extreme pluralism. Recognising 'fiinge' or 'joke parties' as legitimate parties, 
however, would result in a classification containing highly fragmented party systems. 
Ball imposes a far more restrictive definition, 
"Parties have a nimiber of characteristics that define them from other groups. 
Among these are a degree of permanence, a commitment to fighting elecdons 
and gaining influence on the legislature, a commitment to gaining executive 
power, or to influencing those who have done so through strength in the 
legislature; a distinct identity" (Ball, 1981: 3). 
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In short, a group may only be considered as a party i f they continually seek political 
power. Such a definition would include candidates from residents associations or 
even Independent candidates. Ingle, however, offers the following simple working 
definition of a party, 
"Parties are principally organisations of people seeking to wield political power 
in the name of some interest which binds them together and which distinguishes 
them from other groups, and that interest may be for example, religious 
geographical, ideological or economic, or a combination of these and others" 
(Ingle, 1989: 2). 
This definition differs from that of Ball in that candidates from a party, can be 
distinguished from others by the possession of a shared interest which binds 
candidates together in a common cause. Sartori (1979: 26) states that "unless a party 
is different than a faction it is not a party (but a faction)". The difference between 
parties and factions are that parties are instrumental to collective benefits. I f a party is 
not capable of governing in view of a general interest, then it does not differ from a 
faction (Sartori, 1979). 
Local elections provide opportunities for small groups and Independent candidates to 
determine the governmental majority of the local authority. We might suppose, 
therefore, that any group of candidates with a common identity that have also 
controlled the council could be classed as a party. In some authorities it is the 
Independent councillors that hold a majority of seats. The only cause common to 
these councillors might be the desire to represent their individual ward. A complex 
classification would risk being extremely subjective and restrict subsequent research 
into using similar definitions in order to produce reliable results. 
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The presence of Independents and other categories of candidates might also affect the 
elected number of parties in such a way that would produce different values for 
locations where these candidates stood against those where they did not. In Eden 
shire district council in 1973, for example, the authority was comprised almost 
entirely of Independent councillors (see chapter 5.4.1). Classifying these councillors 
separately would result in an elected number of parties in excess of 30. I f electors in 
Eden viewed these candidates as a coherent group then such a high value for the 
number of parties would be misleading. In order to reduce such problems the thesis 
considers only Conservative, Labour and Liberal candidates and councillors as 
belonging to a party. Al l other candidates are classed as belonging to a residual 
category of OTHER. 
4.4.4 Measuring the Effects of District Magnitude 
Chapter 2 discussed the theoretical effect of district magnitude upon the party system. 
In particular it has been claimed that increases in district magnitude under simple-
plurality elections can exaggerate the disproportional nature of such elections. There 
is some debate, however, about the most suitable measure of proportionality for the 
classification of electoral systems. One of the oldest measurements (/) is that 
employed by Rae (1971). The index sums the difference between vote and seat share 
for each party and divides by the number of parties thus: 
/=-I(v,-^ ,) 
Where v/ is the vote share and s, is the share of seats received by the /th party. 
Lijphart, however, states that one problem with the Rae index is that it is overly 
sensitive to the presence of very small parties. I f the hypothetical situation arises 
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where an infinite number of other parties stand but receive no share of votes or seats 
then the system would appear to be perfectly proportional (Lijphart, 1995: 58). In 
contrast with / which registers the average deviation fcom proportionality per party, 
another method suggested by John Loosemore and Victor J. Hanby (1971) sums the 
difference between vote and seat share and divides not by the number of parties but 
by a constant of two: 
The index, however, tends to exaggerate the disproportionality of systems where there 
are a large number of small parties (Lijphart, 1995: 60). Michael Gallagher (1991) 
proposed a solution to this particular problem. His "least-squares" method effectively 
weights proportionality according to the size of the difference between vote and seat 
share by squaring the differences: 
Lijphart also supplements this measure of disproportionality with one that reports the 
largest deviation fix)m proportionality by any party (Lijphart, 1995: 62). The choice 
of measure depends upon the classification of parties used. I f smaller parties are 
classed simply as 'other parties' then the Loosemore-Hanby index will normally 
suffice. As diis is the case in this thesis, we use the Loosemore-Hanby index. 
4.4.5 Measuring the Effects of Socioeconomic Characteristics 
There are ahnost countless quantitative methods that can be used to measure the 
relationship between ward socioeconomic characteristics and the party system. The 
following sections discuss the methods used in this thesis. The first two of these are 
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concerned with testing hypothesised effects by calculating the significant 
relationships within the data. This is followed by a discussion of a recent technique 
that can be used to estimate the number of individuals exhibiting certain voting 
behaviour. 
4.4.6 Bivariate Analysis 
The theorised relationships between different social groups and partisan voting can be 
examined by calculating the Pearson correlation scores between party vote shares and 
the proportion of residents within different social groups for all elections. The 
variation of this relationship over time can be gauged by calculating the correlation 
scores for each year in turn. This information wil l allow us to ascertain the extent to 
which such social groups are related to voting in local elecfions and the extent of any 
change over the period. 
4.4.7 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Although bivariate analysis is an important tool for measuring the effect of one 
variable upon another, it is unable to provide information about inter-relationships 
between three or more variables. As voting is likely to be the result of more than one 
characteristic a method that is able to identify the combined effect of such 
characteristics is required. 
One of the most common methods used is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In 
order to test hypotheses, a mathematical model is constructed which defines the 
theorised relationship between the independent variable (V) and the explanatory 
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variables (Ai). The method specifies the relationship between the dependent and 
explanatory variables as: 
where k is the number of explanatory variables included in the model, p is coefficient 
for each explanatory variable and € = the total unexplained variance in the vote. 
This model possesses a number of properties that are desirable when applied to large 
data sets such as local government election results. The Gauss-Markov theorem 
proves two of the important properties of OLS, which is that the model provides the 
Best (minimum variance) Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE or MvLUE) of the 
coefficients (Dougherty, 1992). That the estimates of the coefficients for the model 
are unbiased means that the estimates are centred around the true population values of 
the parameters being estimated. The property of minimum variance means that the 
distribution of the coefficient estimates around the true parameter values is as 
narrowly distributed as is possible whilst still retaining an unbiased distribution. No 
other linear model for unbiased estimators has a lower variance for estimated 
coefficients than OLS. The estimates are also consistent and normally distributed. 
The estimates of the coefficients therefore approach the true value of the coefficient 
as the sample size gets larger (Studenmund, 1997: 113). For large data sets (such as 
those utilised within this thesis) therefore, the model should provide accurate 
estimates of the coefficients, providing the following assumptions of the OLS model 
are met. 
Assumption one is that the regression model must be linear in the coefficients, 
correctly specified, and has an additive error term. The model for the explanation of 
class voting for the Labour party might, therefore, take the form: 
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LABSHARE^ =^^+ y?,CI, + fi^Cl. + fi,C3Ni + >9,C3A/, + /3,C4. + ^^^5,+ €, 
Where the dependent variable {LABSHARE) is the share of the Labour vote and the 
explanatory variables {CI, C2, C3N, C3M, C4, C5) are the census social class groups 
and P I to P6 the size of each coefficient. 
The coefficients in the model are estimates of each explanatory variable's effect upon 
the dependent variable. The error term (ej) is additive and in this case wil l contain all 
of the variation of the Labour vote share that is unexplained by the regression model. 
In addition to the effects of omitted variables, the error term wil l also capture the 
effects of any measurement error in the explanatory variables. Given that the data 
used is relatively robust to measurement error, the effect of this within the enror term 
should be quite small. 
Assumption two is that the error term has a zero population mean. The OLS model 
forces the distribution of the error term to have a central tendency of zero through the 
inclusion of the constant term PQ. I f the mean of the error term is not equal to zero 
then the nonzero amount is implicitly subtracted from each error term and added to 
the constant term. While this produces an error term with a zero mean, the constant 
term is changed by the difference between the sample mean of the error term and 
zero. The constant term can be thought of as the fixed portion of the dependent 
variable that can not be explained by the independent variables while the error term 
represents the stochastic or random portion of the unexplained value (Studenmund, 
1997: 96). 
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Assumption Three is that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error 
term. This assumption can be summarised by stating that the expected value of the 
simple correlation coefficient between an independent variable and the error term is 
zero for all independent variables. I f an explanatory variable and the error term were 
correlated with each other then the OLS estimates would be likely to attribute to the X 
some of the variation in Y that actually came from the error term. I f the error term 
and X were positively correlated then the estimated coefficient would probably be 
higher than it would otherwise have been (biased upward). 
Assumption Four is that observations of the error term are uncorrelated with each 
other. This means that the error term from one observation should not have an effect 
of the error term of another observation. I f this does occur then the error term is said 
to be serially correlated (or autocorrelated) (Studenmund, 1997). 
Assumption Five is that the error term has a constant variance. This means that the 
variance of die distribution from which the observations of the error term are drawn is 
constant (homoskedastic). I f the variance of the distribution of the error term were to 
change for each observation then a precise estimation of the coefficients becomes 
difficult. This is because a deviation of the error term from the mean can only be 
known to be significant in relation to the standard deviation of the distribution in 
question. I f one assumes that all error term observations are drawn from distributions 
with a constant variance when in reality they are drawn from distributions with 
different variances, then the relative importance of changes in the dependent variable 
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is difficult to judge. The OLS method would, therefore, generate imprecise estimates 
of the coefficients (Dougherty, 1992). 
Assumption Six is that no explanatory variable is a perfect linear function of any other 
explanatory variables (no perfect multicollinearity). Perfect collinearity between two 
independent variables implies that they are really the same variable, or that one is a 
multiple of the other, or that a constant has been added to one of the variables. 
Because every movement of one variable is matched to the other the OLS estimation 
procedure wil l be incapable of distinguishing one variable from the other 
(Studenmund, 1997). 
In addition to these six assumptions a seventh is usually added. The error term is 
normally distributed. A violation of the seventh assumption, however, does not 
produce unbiased or non-minimum variance estimators. Normal distribution of the 
error term instead allows the model to be used to test hypotheses about the 
coefficients, using standard tests for normal distribution (Studenmund, 1997). 
The OLS model can be used to test two main hypotheses about the relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables. The first concerns the combined 
effect of all explanatory variables upon the dependent variable. I f we were to 
examine the class relationship specified above for shire district partial council 
elections in 1982 we would need the following null hypothesis: 
HQ: There was no relatiotiship between class and Labour voting in English shire 
district, partial council elections held in 1982. 
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Calculating the F-statistic Grom the residuals in the regression model can test the 
validity of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship. The test works by 
determining whether constraining the regression equation to conform to the null 
hypothesis significantly reduces the overall fit of the regression model (Studenmund, 
1997: 157). The null hypothesis of the F-test is that all of the coefficients in the 
equation are equal to zero simultaneously. 
Ho:P i=p2=-=PK = 0 
The F-statistic is determined using the following equation: 
ESS/K 
RSS/in-K-l) 
Where ESS is the estimated sum of squares (or regression sum of squares), RSS is the 
residual sum of squares and K is the number of independent variables included in the 
equation. 
The SPSS regression output for the estimated and residual sum of squares generated 
for the model in 1982 shire district partial council elections is shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 - Analysis of Variance for Regression Residuals 
Sum of Squares Of Mean Square F SIg. 
Regression 254035.B33 6 42339.306 342.185 .000 
Residual 147612.496 1193 123.732 
Total 401648.329 1199 
Substituting these values into the equation above produces the following F-statistic: 
F= 254035.833/6 ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ 33 
147612.496/(1200-6-1) 
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I f the F-statistic is greater than or equal to the appropriate critical F-value (Fc) then the 
null hypothesis can be rejected. The test for the F-statistic is therefore: 
Reject Ho i f F > Fc, do not reject Ho i f F ^ Fc 
The critical value for the F-statistic with 6 degrees for freedom for the numerator and 
1193 degrees of freedom for the denominator is 2.80 for 1-percent levels of 
significance. As the F-statistic is greater than the critical value we can reject the null 
hypothesis and can conclude that there is a relationship between class variables and 
voting for the Labour party at these particular elections. 
The second hypothesis that can be tested concerns the individual slope coefficients 
(PI...Pi). Do all of the class variables appear to have an effect on Labour voting and 
i f not which ones do have an effect and is the effect positive or negative? The null 
hypothesis for the relationship between individual coefficients is similar to that for the 
whole regression model. To test for a negative relationship between social class 1 and 
Labour voting, one would use the following hypotheses: 
HQ: Tliere is no negative relationship between class I and voting for Labour 
candidates in English shire district, partial council elections held in J982, 
or 
Ho:p ,>0, H A : P , < 0 
The t-statistic for each slope coefficient can be calculated using the formula: 
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Substituting the slope coefficient for class 1 and its standard enror into the equation: 
,=MlZ=o. i7 
* 0.103 
I f the t-statistic is greater than the appropriate critical t-value and the coefficient also 
has the expected sign then the null hypothesis can be rejected. The critical value for 
the t-statistic with 1193 degrees of freedom is 2.326 for 1-percent levels of 
significance. As the t-statistic is less than the critical value we can not reject the null 
hypothesis and can conclude that - when holding all variables constant - there is no 
evidence of a relationship between social class 1 and Labour voting in 1982 shire 
district partial council elections. 
In addition to such hypothesis testing the OLS model allows us also to estimate the 
total and relative contribution of each explanatory variable to the variance in the 
dependent variable. The total contribution of the explanatory variables is measured 
using R .^ The value of R^ ranges between 0 and 1. A value of 1 indicates that the 
model fits the data perfectly and that the dependent variable can be accurately 
predicted by the explanatory variables. A value of 0 indicates that the mode! predicts 
no better than simply using the mean value of the dependent variable. Generally the 
value of R^ will increase with the inclusion of additional explanatory variables 
(Studenmund, 1997). 
Regression models can, however, become complicated i f a large number of 
explanatory variables are included. Knowing the relative contribution of each 
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variable allows us to retain the most relevant variables with only a slight reduction in 
the models explanatory power. This results in a model that is easier to interpret. 
4.4.8 Ecological Inference 
Ecological inference is the process whereby statements about individual behaviour are 
made from analysis of aggregate data. Ecological analysis was identified in chapter 
1.4 as being particularly important in certain circumstances. In Ireland, for example, 
opinion polling started relatively recently and as a result, analysis of voting behaviour 
prior to 1969 is dependent upon aggregate data (Sinnot, 1995: 21). A similar 
problem, of course, besets research into English local party systems. Even today, 
there is little survey data available for English local elections. That which does exist 
tends to be a by-product of the wider focus upon parliamentary elections. Such data 
tends to concentrate, therefore, upon questions more relevant to parliamentary 
elections, those years when general elections were held, or areas that are aggregated 
to the parliamentary constituency - not the local authority or ward. 
Although regression analysis is useful in identifying aggregate relationships between 
ward characteristics and voting, conclusions that can be drawn from such analysis 
about individual voting behaviour are limited. As Robinson (1950), has shown, 
relationships that exist at the aggregate level may appear stronger than the individual 
level relationships. If, for example, a positive correlation exists between the 
proportion of working class residents and Labour voting in wards, we could not infer 
from this alone that working class, people are more likely to vote Labour. One 
approach to the problem, as Sinnot correctly asserts, 
"...is to rigidly confine inference to the aggregate level, drawing conclusions 
simply about the kinds of areas that tend to support one party than another and 
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bearing in mind that the strength of the relationships identified will be 
somewhat inflated" (Sinnot, 1995: 20). 
I f at the ward level we found such a positive relationship between working class 
residents and Labour voting, we could make inferences about only the aggregate 
behaviour. We could state, for instance, that residents fi*om wards with higher 
proportions of working class residents were more likely to vote Labour, or that Labour 
voting was generally higher as the proportion of working class residents increased. In 
the case of this thesis, evidence fi-om regression analysis is not used to infer individual 
behaviour but to test pre-formulated hypotheses regarding the nature of voting 
behaviour. 
Ecological inference is extremely desirable, however, i f the exact nature of the 
relationship between a social group and voting behaviour is required. Since such 
information would be usefiil in determining the behaviour of local voters, the 
following sections examine the nature of the problem of ecological inference, and 
review some of the methods used to infer such individual behaviour from aggregate 
data. 
4.4.9 The Problem of Ecological Inference 
The goal of ecological inference in this thesis is to determine the precise number of 
residents fivm social groups exhibiting specific electoral behaviour - such as partisan 
voting, turnout or voter registration. One might suppose that i f the relationship 
between the working class and Labour voting were strongly or even perfectly 
correlated, then it would be a simple matter. The product of the regression coefficient 
for that class and the Labour vote would give an estimate of the actual percentage of 
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voters within that class that voted for the party. The following hypothetical example 
demonstrates the flaw in this logic. 
Table 4-2 shows a hypothetical example of class voting in five areas. In these areas 
the Conservative vote increases to exactly the same extent as the proportion of middle 
class voters. I f these two variables were graphed on a scatter plot then the points 
would form a perfect 45% line from 0,0 to 1,1. 
Table 4-2 - Hypothetical Example of Partisan Voting 
Ward Name Conservative Labour Middle Class Worlclng Class 
Votes as a Votes as a Voters as a Voters as a 
Proportion of Total Proportion of Total Proportion of Total Proportion of Total 
Votes Votes Voters Voters 
Ward A .90 .10 .90 .10 
WardB .80 .20 .80 .20 
WardC .70 .30 .70 .30 
WardD .60 .40 .60 .40 
WardE .50 .50 .50 .50 
A normal linear regression model would estimate the slope for the relationship as 
follows: 
Y. =a + >SX^ +^ ,. 
Where Yj is the proportion of Conservative votes and X; is the proportion of middle 
class voters in each ward. In this case the value for the regression constants and 
coefficients are as follows: 
Which when substituted into the equation results in: 
As the error term is zero, the model must therefore explain the total amount of 
variance within the Conservative vote {R^ = \) for this data. We can estimate the 
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total proportion of middle class voting Conservative in each ward, therefore, simply 
by substituting Xj with the proportion of Conservative votes. In this case the number 
of upper class voters is always equal to the number of Conservative voters. 
The results from this model allow us to estimate the number of middle class voters for 
a given Conservative vote. It does not, however, tell us how many middle class voters 
chose the Conservatives. One method of estimating this figure was developed by 
Goodman (1953, 1959) and his model has been the most fi^uently used method of 
ecological inference in US voting rights cases since the Supreme Court endorsed its 
use in the 1980s (King, 1997: 38). 
Goodman uses a variation of the linear regression model that includes the proportion 
of working class voters - assuming that residents are either middle class or working 
class - and forces the regression line through the origin by omitting the constant from 
the equation. Goodman's regression equation is based upon the following accounting 
identity: 
Y, = >g;'"x,+/?;(!-^,) 
Where Yj = the proportion of the Conservative vote and Xj = the proportion of middle 
class voters in each ward; the coefficient /?" represents the proportion of middle 
class voting Conservative in each ward and flj^ the proportion of working class. 
Unfortunately trying to compute estimates of two unknowns and from only 
one observation of an election seems hopeless. Goodman resolves this problem by 
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assuming that =S"and^* = B'*'for all / - where 5* and 5* are the aggregate 
proportions of class voting. I f this assumption is correct then the equation for 
Goodman's model becomes more manageable (King, 1997: 39): 
Y. =5 '"X, .+5"( l -^ , ) 
Applying Goodman's regression to our hypothetical example produces the 
coefficients 5" = 1 and 5*" = 0. That is 100% of middle class voters supported the 
Conservatives while no working class voters did. Table 4-3 shows for our 
hypothetical example, voting for each ward i f this class relationship did exist. The 
model perfectly predicts voting for each ward. 
Table 4-3 - Hypothetical Voting Outcome A 
Ward Name Middle Class Working Ciass Middle Class WorMng Class Error In 
Conservative Conservative Labour Voters Labour Voters Predicted 
Voters as a Voters as a as a Proportion as a Proportion Middle Class 
Proportion of Proportion of of Total Voters of Total Voters Conservative 
Total Voters Total Voters Voters 
Ward A .90 .00 .00 .10 .00 
WardB .80 .00 .00 .20 .00 
WardC .70 .00 .00 .30 .00 
WardD .60 .00 .00 .40 .00 
WardE .50 .00 .00 .50 .00 
Goodman's assumption that - B"* and - 5**" for all / can, however, be shown to 
be incorrect in many cases. The problem is that i f the parameters vary and they turn 
out to be conrelated with Xi, ordinary regression wil l not produce estimates of the 
average of these parameters (King, 1997). This might certainly be the case in English 
local elections. Evidence fi-om Miller's (1988) survey of local attitudes suggests that 
voting decisions might be based not only upon an individual's own socioeconomic 
characteristics, but also those of their fellow residents- the so-called 'friends and 
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neighbours' effect. I f this were the case then we might expect middle class voters to 
vote disproportionately for Labour as the number of working class residents 
increased. Table 4-4 shows, for our example, an alternative set of voting outcomes 
based for the same hypothetical data. As the proportion of working class residents 
increases, so to does the proportion of middle class voting Labour. As a result the 
error in our ward estimates increase in proportion with the middle class voters not 
complying with our aggregate B" =1 estimate. 
Table 4-4 - Hypothetical Voting Outcome B 
Ward Name Middle Class Working Class Middle Class Woflcing Class Error In 
Conservative Conservative Labour Voters Labour Voters Predicted 
Voters as a Voters as a as a Proportion as a Proportion Middle Class 
Proportion of Proportion of of Total Voters of Total Voters Conservative 
Total Voters Total Voters Voters 
Ward A .80 .00 .10 .10 .10 
WardB .60 .00 .20 .20 .20 
WardC .40 .00 .30 .30 .30 
WardO .20 .00 .40 .40 .40 
WardE .00 .00 .50 .50 .50 
There are other problems with using Goodman's regression to estimate individual 
level behaviour. The model does not restrict the estimates of the proportions to 
between 0 and \. As a result the model can produce impossible results such as over 
100% of working class voting Labour (King, 1997: 57). Even i f estimates from 
Goodman's regression fall within the [0,1] interval, there may still be problems. For 
many wards the true possible values of the estimates fall within bounds that are far 
narrower than [0,1]. I f for example, a ward consists of 100% middle class residents, 
we can determine precisely the proportion of middle class voting for each party. Even 
wards that are not so homogenous can provide narrower bounds than [0,1]. For Ward 
A in our example, the actual proportion of the middle class group voting Conservative 
must lie somewhere between 0.88 and 1. The Goodman model ignores this 
information. 
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4.4.10 A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem 
In 1997 Gary King published a proposed solution to the ecological inference problem. 
The method, in King's terms, not only "consistently works in practice" but also "is 
intended to put the ecological inference literature on a theoretical and empirical 
foundation" (King, 1997: 17). The King model claims to improve Goodman's 
regression in a number of ways. Firstly, it restricts the quantities of interest to lie 
between 0 and 1. Secondly, it takes account of the known bounds. Thirdly, the model 
does not assume that ^ " = 5 " or y^ *" =5*but only that >9,'**and B'^ovfi^ondB'^aTe 
related in some way. In this way the model "borrows" information about the 
quantities of interest from the other wards in the data set. In his example, King uses 
the model to validate studies of the effect of ethnicity upon voter turnout in US 
district elections. This following section applies King's method^ to a particular area 
of English local government. Our purpose here is to show that a largely unproven, 
though innovative method for ecological influence can be applied to the subject of our 
thesis. 
In order to determine the suitability of the model for inference of individual level 
local voting behaviour, we examined the effects of the same ethnic division as King 
observed (i.e. black versus white) within the context of voter turnout^ within London 
^ Statistical software developed by Gary King and Ken Benoit was used in this thesis. The 
software, EJA(n easy) Program for Ecological Inference^ is available from King's homepage 
on the World Wide Web at http://gking.harvard.edu (King, 1997: xix). 
^ Turnout varies quite considerably among local government elections and has itself been the 
subject of many different studies (See Miller, 1988; Downe, 1998). Rather than replicate 
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borough elections. The London boroughs are particularly pertinent as elections in 
these wards have the highest proportion of black residents (9.2% in 1990) of all types 
of local authorities. Downe (1998) found several socioeconomic characteristics to be 
related to voter turnout in London. Among these was the proportion of blacks, which 
is negatively correlated with voter turnout. Can we determine the extent to which 
blacks turn out to vote less than whites in London? 
A negative relationship exists between the proportion of blacks and turnout in London 
borough elections. A normal linear regression of turnout on the proportion of blacks 
produces a constant a = 52.67 and a coefficient /J = -0.47. This can be interpreted 
in the following way. The aggregate turnout for the London boroughs in 1990 would 
be 52.67% i f the proportion of blacks were zero. Holding all other variables constant, 
for every 1 percent increase in the proportion of blacks the turnout would be expected 
to decrease by 0.473 percent. 
Using Goodman's method for ecological inference produces 5* = 0.0535 (the 
aggregate proportion of blacks turning out to vote) and 5'*' =0.5267 (the aggregate 
proportion of whites turning out to vote). The value for 5**" is the same as the 
constant in the normal linear regression equation, while the value for 5* is the 
predicted turnout when the proportion of blacks is 100%. Estimates from the 
Goodman model suggest that blacks in London are excluded fix)m the voting process 
to a greater degree than whites. Moreover, i f the Goodman model is accurate then 
there is a huge disparity between the two social groups when it comes to turnout. As 
such research within this thesis we take account of turnout only when attempting to estimate 
121 
ah^ady demonstrated, however, the assumptions of the Goodman model may not be 
correct, leading to unreliable estimates. In order to validate these findings, the 
following section uses the King method in order to attempt to determine the true 
proportions. 
Before proceeding with the model it would be wise to check for the presence of 
aggregation bias. I f blacks in heavily white wards, vote less than blacks in other 
wards, (because perhaps, they believe that their candidate has little chance of 
winning) then this will lead to being underestimated and 5*" being overestimated 
(King, 1997: 41). The effect of aggregation bias can be gauged by plotting 
Goodman's regression line to the data points on a scatterplot. I f the regression line 
cuts across both of the vertical axes within the [0,1] interval then there is less 
evidence that aggregation bias exists (King, 1997: 282). Figure 4-3 plots the turnout 
in the 1990 London borough elections (T,) by the proportion of blacks in those wards 
(Xi); Goodman's regression line is superimposed upon it. The regression line passes 
through both vertical axes between 0 and 1. This indicates that there is little 
aggregation bias and that the estimates from Goodman's model may indeed be 
reliable. 
individual level behaviour from aggregate data. 
122 












0 00 0 2S 0.50 0 75 1.00 
The King model uses information determined from the bounds of each possible true 
value of /^l^ and . Church ward in Kensington and Chelsea, for example, has 
3.17% of black residents and 83.11% of white residents. Turnout in the ward in 1990 
was 46.8%. 
Knowing this information allows us to specify the possible range of true values 
(bounds) for the proportion of black and white residents turning out to vote. The 
bounds for fi^ are calculated as follows: 
max 0, 
T,-(\-X,) 
< < min 
max(0,-15.7666)< < min(l4.7495,l) 
The bounds for are calculated in a similar way: 
max 0 , ^ 
\-x. 
< /?; < min 
T 
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max(0,0.4506)^ p"^ <, min(0.4833,l) 
The true values for >9f in the Church ward must lie, therefore, between 0 and 1 while 
those for must lie between 0.4506 and 0.4833. In this ward, therefore, the 
percentage of blacks that voted must have been between 0% and 100% while the 
percentage of whites voting must have been between 45.06% and 48.33%. Figure 4-4 
plots all possible true values for turnout among blacks and whites in the ward. The 
graph highlights how the range of possible true values for fil'is very narrow while 
those for are wide. For this ward we can make a very accurate estimate for 
turnout among whites but not for blacks. 
Figure 4-4 - True Values for Turnout among Blacks and Whites in Church Ward 
betoB 
A scatterplot of the data can be used to give a sense of how much information exists 
in the deterministic bounds for all wards. Figure 4-5 shows a scatterplot of turnout 
(T) by the proportion of blacks (X). The overlaid cross on the graph gives an 
indication of the deterministic bounds for each election. Points that lie in the left 
124 
triangle have [0,1] bounds for but narrow bounds for p;^ (King, 1997: 89). 
Nearly all of the data points lie in the left triangle. The true value for the proportion 
of blacks turning out to vote can lie between 0% or 100% in these wards. A handful of 
points lie in the bottom triangle. For such wards we are able to produce much better 
estimates of turnout among black electors. 
Figure 4-5 - Strength oflnformation Contained within the Deterministic Bounds. 
Another useful summary of the data is a tomography plot that re-expresses the data in 
terms of what is knowTi about p^ and for all 1990 London borough elections (see 
Figure 4-6). Those lines that are relatively steep indicate narrow bounds for /?* and 
wide bounds for p^. Lines that cut of f either the top left or bottom right comers of 
the graph have narrow bounds for both these quantities of interest (King, 1997:282). 
Most of the lines are relatively flat indicating that p^ have very wide bounds while 
those for p^ are relatively narrow. There is one case that distinctly cuts across the 
bottom right comer of the graph indicating that the possible range of values for /?* 
and p'^ are limited for this election. This particular case is Liddle ward in the 
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London borough of Southwark. This ward had a turnout of only 18.1% while the 
proportion of black residents was 51.5%. This limits the possible values of ^^''lo 
between 0 and 0.352 and the possible values for^^'^ to between 0 and 0.373 for this 
particular ward. Turnout among blacks in Liddle ward must, therefore, lie somewhere 
between 0% and 35.2%, while turnout for whites must lie between 0% and 37.3%). 
Figure 4-6 - Tomography Plot of Deterministic Bounds and />' . 
In using this approach the King model reduces the possible values for/?,'' a n d f r o m 
the entire 0,0 to 1,1 range to only those values that lie on the lines. Although this is a 
substantial improvement, we still need to determine where on the lines the true points 
most likely lie. I f we examine Figure 4-6 we can see that the lines appear to emanate 
from half way up the left side of the graph. This is not unreasonable given that most 
of the data points lie within this area. The distribution of the lines for the entire data 
set can be estimated by calculating the truncated bivariate normal distribution for all 
elections, weighting each case by the actual number of residents in each ward. 
Calculating the truncated bivariatc normal distribution allows the model to borrow 
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strength from data in other wards via the statistical proportion of the model (King, 
1997: 115). Truncating the bivariate normal distribution ensures that the estimates 
line between 0 and 1. 
The parameters of the truncated bivariatc normal distribution are estimated using 
maximum likelihood and consist of the mean and standard deviations of 
(0.0628,0.0510) and/?; (0.5010, 0.0681) with a correlation between p"; and/?; of 
0.2018. The truncated bivariate normal distribution can be represented by overlaying 
the tomography plot shown in Figure 4-6 with 50% (inner) and 95% (outer) maximum 
likelihood contours (see Figure 4-7). The true values for /?; and are most likely 
to lie within the centre of the contours. The contours are centred round the area where 
the lines appear most densely clustered, giving more confidence that the estimates arc 
accurate. 
I i^ure 4-7 - Tomography Plot with Maximum Likelihood C ontours. 
We can check these parameters by comparing them with an alternative non-
parametric representation of the distribution of the lines (see Figure 4-8). This 
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approach does not assume that the distribution of the Hnes is truncated bivariate 
normal. The height of the contours for any given value of and represent the 
probabihty of these values being the true values under this model. The probability 
that is between 0 and 0.2 is extremely unlikely, with the highest probability being 
for values between 0.4 and 0.6. The most likely values for white turnout are between 
40% and 60%. For any given value of p*^ the probability is over 0.75. The 
probability appears, however, far higher for the smaller values of p'^. The graph 
indicates the lack of information about p'/ . This uncertainty needs to be adequately 
represented in all inferences based upon this data (King, 1997: 229). 
Figure 4-8 - Nonparametric Surface Plot of the Truncated Bivariate Normal 
Distribution. 
Nonporomelric Surfoce 
The additional information provided by these parameters allow the model not only to 
borrow strength from individual wards, but also make the model more resistant to 
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aggregation bias. There still remains, however, the task of estimating the aggregate 
proportions of voter turnout. The technique of simulation is the easiest way to 
estimate these values. The method involves drawing random samples of the 
parameters of interest from the probability distribution, averaging to approximate the 
mean and then calculating the standard deviation to approximate the standard error 
(King, 1997: 141). Increasing the number of random draws can increase the degree of 
precision obtained by the method. Smoothed histograms of the estimates are shown 
in Figure 4-9. The more the density estimates are centred within a range on the 
horizontal axis the more confidence we have that that range includes the Ime value of 
the aggregate parameter (King, 1997: 207). 
Figure 4-9 - Posterior Distribution of the Aggregate Quantities of Interest. 
The model estimates the quantities of interest as 5''=0.066 (standard error 
(s.e.)=0.020 and 5"* =0,523 s.e =0.002). I f the model is accurate then only 6.6% of 
blacks voted in the 1990 London borough elections compared with 52.3% of whiles. 
By contrast, the Goodman model using the same data set estimated 5.3% of blacks 
voting and 52.7% of whites voting. The values for whites are similar for both models. 
Presence of aggregation bias, however, would probably lead to an underestimation of 
the proportion of blacks using the Goodman model. Although this effect does not 
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appear great the King model's estimate of 6.6% of blacks voting is likely to be more 
accurate. 
4.5 Data Collection, Storage and Retrieval 
Having determined that aggregate data and related methods are appropriate for 
conducting the study, we now discuss the methods behind data collection. 
4.5.1 Electoral Data 
The source data of local election results was derived from the British Local Election 
Database compiled by Collin Railings and Michael Thrasher with the aid of an ESRC 
grant in 199L Prior to the creation of this data, no comprehensive electoral data 
existed for local government elections, especially for the period between 1973 and 
1981 (Railings & Thrasher, 2002. Local Elections Overview: p i ) . These data and 
subsequent local elections have been stored in a format re-designed by myself 
The data sets contained over 90,000 individual ward election results and the irregular 
nature of the electoral arrangements of local authorities caused several problems in 
finding a suitable method of storage (Railings & Thrasher, 2002, Local Elections 
Overview: p2). One potential problem perceived by the compilers was the efficient 
storage of such a large quantity of data. The results of each candidate needed to be 
stored along with the ward and year in which the election was held. This resulted in 
replicating for each candidate the ward-level data such as the ward name, the 
authority to which the ward belonged, the year of the election and voter tumout. The 
altemative of storing the ward level data in a different file and using lookup tables to 
cross reference the data store was rejected by Railings and Thrasher. It was felt that 
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such a complicated system of lookup tables might be beyond the scope of many social 
scientists. The final method of storage was guided therefore not only by the 
limitations of computer systems available at the time but also by the data processing 
skills of potential researchers (Railings & Thrasher, 2002, Local Elections Overview: 
P3). 
However, the actual relational stmcture of the data was more complicated than was 
realised by Railings and Thrasher. Wards in themselves do not have vacancies, 
candidates or voters. Wards hold elections in which candidates compete for vacant 
seats and voters tum out to vote. Storing the data in a more efficient relational form 
would therefore, require the data to be held in separate tables, not just for wards and 
candidates, but also for elections. 
Another problem with the data is the "unique" 13-digit identification number that was 
assigned to each ward/candidate. This number was composed of; the last two digits 
of the year of the election; a 2-digit county code; a 2-digit district code; a 3-digit ward 
code; a 2-digit party code and a 2-digit candidate code. Such a coding system has a 
number of problems. The first of which is that the resulting number is not unique. As 
the district code is stored both for county and district elections, the years in which 
these two tiers of authority held elections simultaneously (1973 and 1976), produced 
identical codes. In order to overcome this problem the compilers stored the data for 
the different tiers in different data files. Other problems arise fix)m the use of a single 
number to represent several different types of information. For each candidate the 
county code, district code, ward code and election year is duplicated. Storing such 
county, district and ward level information for each candidate is not only highly 
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inefficient but also produces a code that is mainly meaningless in itself. The 
compilers might well be aware that the code "7301010010101" refers to the first 
Conservative candidate in the Abbey ward of Bath district council in Avon. For other 
users however the identification code means very little and requires some form of 
lookup table of the sort the compilers were striving to prevent. The code also 
produces problems when trying to match secondary data that use a different coding 
system or in producing aggregations of the data to different levels of analysis. How 
might we produce a summary of votes received by Conservatives in three vacancy 
elections as opposed to those received by Labour? With great difficulty! Other 
problems with such a code number arise when aggregation is required at a different 
level. How would we aggregate the data in terms of the proposed regional 
assemblies? Would we have to insert another 2-digit number between the year and 
the county? 
Computer systems in the early 21^* century are far more powerful than those used 
when the original database was complied and database software is now commonly 
available to most researchers. Of these software packages Microsoft's Access system 
is widely recognised as being one of the industry standards. Although this success 
may well be due to the market dominance of the Microsoft Corporation the database 
itself is based upon the sound concepts of a relational database system (RDBS). In 
such a system the data is stored in separate hierarchical tables dependent upon its 
relationship with other data within the database. The structure of the relationships 
must reflect as closely as possible the structure of the real-life relationships of the 
characteristics upon which the data is based. A relational local elections database 
system would, therefore, need to be split into several related tables. As local elections 
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are held within different countries (e.g. England, Scotland and Wales), the highest 
table in the hierarchy must be a table holding details of the countries in which 
elections are held. The next tier of English local government organisation are the 
administrative counties. The next relational table must therefore contain data relating 
to these divisions. The process continues until the last level in the hierarchy has been 
reached. In this case it is the number of votes cast for a candidate. I f voter records 
were available then the last level would be a record of each individual voter. The 
basic structure of the Relational Local Elections Database is outlined in Figure 4-10. 
The nature of the structure results in a far more efficient means of storing the data. In 
the original Local Elections Database, the Abbey ward in Bath was stored 63 times 
for the elections from 1973 to its abolition after 1994. In the new relational Local 
Elections Database, the ward is stored only once. 



















































Storing information in this form allows local election information or surrogate 
variables - such as the effective number of parties (N) - to be retrieved from the 
database at different levels of aggregations. Information is retrieved from the 
database using standard commands expressed using Structured Query Language 
(SQL). 
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Table 4-5 shows the electoral variables constructed using SQL for each English local 
authority election held between 1973 and 1998. 
134 
Table 4-5 - Local Election Variables 
Variable Name Description 
TYPE Authority Type (e.g. LB - London Borough. SC • Shire County) 
AVGNPS Mean of the elected numt}er of parties 
STDNPS Standard deviation of the elected number of parties 
TIMESWON Number of t'mes the ward was won by the Liberals 
LDFREQ Number of times the ward was contested by the Uberals 
YEAR Year of Election 
VACS Number of Vacancies 
ELECT Total Electorate 
TURNOUT Turnout 
TOTVOTE Total Votes Cast 
CONVOTE Conservative Votes 
LABVOTE Latx)ur Votes 
IDVOTE Libera) Votes 
CONSHARE Conservative Vote Share 
LABSHARE Labour Vote Share 
LOSHARE Liberal Vote Share 
INDWONrg Dummy indicating Independent win prior to 1980 
CONWON Dummy indicating a Conservative win prior to this election 
LABWON Dummy indicating a Labour win prior to this election 
LOWON Dummy Indicating a Liberal win prior to this election 
Aggregate data used in this thesis has been derived from the new relational database. 
4.5.2 Socioeconomic Data 
Even at aggregate level, surveys are needed to produce socio-economic data of the 
society being studied. Such surveys are liable to errors other than simple 
misrepresentation of the general population. Unambiguous or unclear questions may 
lead respondents to give particular answers, or be interpreted by the respondents in a 
way that was not intended by the questionnaire designer. Interviewers may make 
mistakes in recording a respondent's answers and slips may also happen during the 
tedious process of coding questionnaires and the subsequent entry of data onto 
computers. Even so, sample surveys are generally reliable and powerful research 
tools and have become an indispensable part of electoral analysis and have played a 
crucial role in advancing our analysis of electoral behaviour (Denver, 1989: 6). 
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The most comprehensive form of demographic information on population data for 
Britain is the 10-year national Census (Marsh, 1993: 155), which since 1961 has 
produced statistical infonmation at the ward level. Although this 'building brick' 
approach to producing statistics was initially incomplete - as it did not cover all wards 
- changes in 1971 saw the introduction of the Small Area Statistics (SAS), which 
covered all wards, civil parishes, and Enumeration Districts (Denham, 1993: 53). The 
major advantage of using these data is that they refer to the total population being 
studied and therefore, are not susceptible to sampling error in the way that survey data 
are (Denver, 1989: 22), 
The SAS for 1981 and 1991 is available from the Manchester Information and 
Associated Services (MIMAS) worid wide web site. The 1991 census data is 
available through an easy to use interface called CASWEB, which can be accessed 
over the Intemet. Using CASWEB, the researcher simply selects the variables and 
the level of aggregation required and the resulting data set is automatically 
downloaded. Expect for the occasional network problem, the CASWEB system was 
relatively simple to use. Unfortunately, information from the 1981 census has not 
been converted to the CASWEB. In order to obtain the 1981 SAS, researchers must 
connect to the UNIX server at the Manchester University via a terminal emulator 
program such as TELNET. Once connected to the server, the researcher has access to 
the SASPAC system, which can be used to access the required information. The 
SASPAC system has its own set of commands, which must be precisely stated in 
order for the system to work. The commands must be contained in the correct 
sequence in a SASPAC command file that can be compiled using the editor on the 
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server. Once the researcher is satisfied that the SASPAC command file contains the 
appropriate commands in the correct sequence, SASPAC is instructed to proceed. 
The result of the SASPAC output is either a data set containing the required variables 
or a log file containing a list of unintelligible errors. After straining to understand 
several such log files, correcting our command files and repeating the procedure, only 
to be confronted with more log files, we contacted the Census Dissemination Unit 
(CDU) at Manchester University. After much dialogue between the CDU and 
ourselves, we were finally able to retrieve the required data. 
The complete data sets for the 1981 and 1991 censuses each contain more than 4,000 
different variables for over 8,500 wards in England. Unfortunately there is no lookup 
table that links the census wards to the local election database wards. However, 
converting the census data into a similar relational database structure as the local 
elections data enabled us to use SQL to match wards according to their name and 
local authority. Each census ward could then be assigned an ID corresponding to the 
appropriate local election ward. Differences between ward names, however, resulted 
in over 3,000 wards not matching for the 1981 census. Further refinements and 
manual checking resulted in approximately half of these being matched. The 
remaining wards could not be matched because of boundary changes that took place 
between 1979 and 1982. 
The combined data allowed the following socioeconomic characteristics to be 
constructed for matched wards holding elections between 1973 and 1998. 
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Table 4-6 - Ward Socioeconomic Characteristics 


















































Area of ward (square KM) 
Easteriy grid position of ward centre (M) 
Northeriy grid position of ward centre (M) 
Number of residents 
Population density (Residents per Square KM) 
Males (%) 
Married (%) 
Aged 16 years or over (%) 
Employed full-time (%) 
Employed part-time (%) 
Self-employed without employees (%) 
Self-employed with employees (%) 
Seeking wort( (%) 




Other economically inactive (%) 
Trainees (%) 
Owner-occupiers (%) 
Council tenants (%) 
Housing Assodaliori tenants (%) 
Private tenants (%) 
Residents In non-permanent accommodation (%) 
Residents in other tenure (%) 
Residents with own bath (%) 
Total residents In private accommodation 
Social a a s s l ( % ) 
Social Class 2 (%) 
Social a a s s 3N (%) 
Social a a s s 3M (%) 
Social a a s s 4 ( % ) 
Sodal a a s s 5 ( % ) 
Other Class (%) 
Total residents In dass sample 
Residents qualified to diploma, degree or higher degriee level (%) 
Total aged over 18 in qualification sample 
Agricultural sector (%) 
Energy sector (%) 
Mining sector (%) 
Manufacturing sector (%) 
Construction sector (%) 
Catering sector (%) 
Transport sector (%) 
Other service sector (%) 
Total residents worthing in occupational sectors 
Black residents (%) 
Non-black residents (%) 
Total residents in ethnic sample 
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When examining the effects of class upon local party systems, we use the six category 
social class schema rather than the 18 category socioeconomic group classification. 
Although the latter provides a more detailed classification of occupational status, the 
larger number of categories results in much lower proportions of residents in each 
group. An explanatory model of party systems based upon socieconomic groups is 
much harder to achieve as the small variations in these variables are in themselves 
unlikely to produce large variations in the party system. As the six category social 
class schema provides higher proportions of residents in each group, it is more 
suitable for an explanatory model of party systems (see Chapter 8). 
4.5.3 Geographical Information System 
The final source of data used in this thesis, is the digitised boundary data. The data 
contains information needed for producing geographical maps of local authority and 
wards (see Chapter 3.5). The data is available from the UKBORDERS service at the 
Edinburgh Data and Information Access (EDINA) web site. The digitised boundary 
data is utilised by an appropriate geographical information system (GIS). The CIS 
used is the Archlnfo package by ESRI. Archlnfo has the advantage of being able to 
link directly to the relational database. Using SQL, geographical maps can be 
produced for any of the socioeconomic or electoral variables held within the database. 
The use of this system is quite complicated. Fortunately the Department of 
Geographical Sciences at the University of Plymouth offer an undergraduate course 
based upon Archlnfo, which we were able to attend. The final structure of the 
database is shown in Figure 4-11 
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4.6 Calculating Socioeconomic Data Between Censuses 
Since a full British census is conducted once every 10 years, strictly speaking we 
know only the socioeconomic characteristics of wards holding elections in 1981 and 
1991. The scope of the research however covers the period between 1973 and 1998. 
We therefore need a method for estimating ward socioeconomic characteristics before 
and after each census. 
In terms of the theoretical relationship between such characteristics and voting, one of 
the most important is social class. The Registrar General's social class schema was 
introduced into the census in the 1920s as a categorisation of occupations that 
reflected the wealth or poverty and the culture associated with class. Although the 
schema was retained in 1991, the title was extended to social class based upon 
occupation. According to Dale (1993) this was to make clear that "occupation 
provides the key to the classification" (Dale, 1993: 46). In order to maintain 
consistency between the 1981 and 1991 censuses, this thesis uses the standard six-
category classification of class. 
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Unfortunately, the census data do not provide information relating to social class for 
years when a census was not held. One method of estimating these values is to 
calculate the missing data from a linear extrapolation of the 1981 and 1991 census 
data. While this is mathematically feasible, there are good reasons for not using this 
method. One argument is that the results may be improbable or even impossible. If, 
for instance, the proportion of residents in social class 5, was 40% in 1981 and 10% in 
1991 then the predicted figure (assuming a strictly linear trend) for 1996 would be -5%. 
Figure 4-12 illustrates this effect. It plots the correlation coefficients between each of 
the extrapolated social classifications and the Labour vote share in shire district wards 
with partial council elections. 













Dactton Y M T 
The Strength of the relationships between the extrapolated social class and Labour 
voting appear fairly constant between the two census years of 1981 and 1991. Both 
before and after these years however, the strength of these relationships deteriorates 
rapidly. Although the decline in the relationship between class and vote may reflect 
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real changes in this relationship, it is highly doubtful that the period between 1973 
and 1981 is accurately represented on this graph. We would not expect to see little 
class voting occurring in 1973 followed by rapid class-alignment over a five-year 
period. Clearly this method produces inaccurate results for the 1973-81 period. I f 
this were the case for the pre-1981 census period then this would also raise doubts 
about the post 1991 census period i f the same method were used for both periods. 
As a linear extrapolation appears unsatisfactory, we could have proceeded by using a 
non-linear equation to estimate the missing values. We considered that such a model 
would be more difficult to operationalise and decided instead to assume that little 
geographic change occurred in individual wards around the census years. Although 
the geographic composition of wards would no doubt have changed, we assume that 
the change would be so little, its effect upon our analysis will be small. Our 
preliminary analysis of the relationship between partisan voting and ward 
socioeconomic characteristics appears to confirm this assumption (see Chapter 7.3.2). 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the nature of the research problems associated with this thesis. 
It began by formulating broad research questions and then considered the 
methodologies that may be used to provide answers to such questions. One area of 
interest within the thesis is the relationships between socioeconomic characteristics 
and partisan voting. A qualitative methodology would be useful in determining the 
nature of these relationships. In depth qualitative interviews could determine the 
voters perception of themselves and their relationship with political parties in local 
government. The problems associated with the scale of such projects, however, were 
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instrumental in leading us to reject a qualitative methodology in favour of a 
quantitative approach. 
Having settled upon a quantitative approach, the chapter proceeded to discuss the 
various methods that could be used to answer our research questions. The first of 
these sections discussed how best to operationalise the concept of the party system 
into quantitative measures. The number of parties in the system was identified as 
being the most important characteristic, and the effective number of parties as being a 
commonly used measure that intuitively reflects this characteristic. The mean and 
standard deviation of this measure should enable us to provide a typology of party 
systems based upon the central tendency and stability of the number of parties. 
We then discussed appropriate measures for determining the effect of district 
magnitude upon the third party. Measures of proportionality are particularly useful in 
determining the amount of discrimination that a party receives for an electoral system. 
Due the to nature of our classification of parties, we decided to use the Loosemore-
Hanby index to measure this concept. 
The chapter then focused upon various methods used to determine the relationships 
between aggregate ward socioeconomic data and voting. Bivariate analysis is useful 
in determining whether a socioeconomic characteristic is related to voting and as such 
is useful as a preliminary tool used for establishing i f theoretical relationships are 
feasible. However, the determinants of party system development are likely to be 
more complicated than the relationships which bivariate analysis can express. We 
discussed, therefore, the widely used method of multiple regression analysis. The 
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method differs from bivariate analysis in that the effect of several explanatory 
variables can be considered in a single model. In so doing, regression analysis allows 
us to observe the effect of each characteristic upon partisan voting holding all other 
characteristics constant. This enables us to test the individual hypothesis regarding 
each characteristic in turn. 
Finally, we discussed the possibility of using statistical models to estimate accurately 
from aggregate data the behaviour of specific social groups. Much of the discussion 
focuses upon a new method developed by Gary King that claims to improve 
substantially the ability of researchers to make ecological inferences. In order to 
gauge the suitability of the method, we applied it to the problem of voter turnout 
among blacks in London. The results revealed that turnout among blacks in London 
appears to be much lower than for whites. The method was verified using Goodman's 
regression and a non-parametric approach. Although differences existed, all three 
methods appeared to show a marked reduction in turnout among blacks. This exercise 
gave us confidence in King's method for ecological inference and his method will be 
discussed and used in Chapter 9. 
We are confident that the methods outlined in this chapter wil l provide a useful means 
of studying the evolution and development of party systems in English local 
government. Subsequent chapters apply these methods, beginning with a 
classification of party systems since local government reorganisation in 1973. 
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Chapter 5 Party Systems in English Loca l Government 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the variety of party systems that existed in English local 
government between 1973 and 1998. It applies to local authorities, the previously 
developed classification of party systems (see Chapter 4.4.1). The first section 
outlines, according to previous theories, the expected nature of the party systems, and 
formulates appropriate hypotheses based upon these expectations. Following sections 
address each type of local government authority in turn'. Within each section, 
authorities are listed according to their primary classification - the elected number of 
parties. Authorities that may be considered as typical of the categories are then 
examined in more detail, to establish whether their classification appears appropriate. 
Each section also highlights party systems in which the third party was successful in 
gaining control and concludes by summarising evidence supporting or refuting the 
initial hypotheses. 
5.2 Local Government - A Favoured Two-Party System? 
Duverger (1964: 217) stated that, "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours 
the two-party system". Of all the hypotheses that were defined in his book this 
formula was claimed to approach "the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law" 
(Duverger, 1964: 217). His study of national party systems cites Britain as being a 
particularly good case and earlier we highlighted how this still appears to be the case 
' Only the shire counties are included in the detailed analysis of the first-tier as Greater 
London and the metropolitan counties provide too few cases for comparison. For the second-
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- at least in terms of seats in the national legislature (see Chapter 1.2). Chapter 3.4-
3.5 highlighted variations and change in English local government since 1973. The 
nature of these changes were not only structural, with changes in the number of 
councillors, wards and authorities; but also political, with increasing party 
politicisation of local government, a reduction in the number of Independent 
councillors and increases in the number of Liberal councillors. One factor that did not 
change, however, was the voting system. I f "Duverger's Law" were indeed a 
sociological law, we would expect therefore, local government elections to favour 
two-party systems also. I f this were the case then we would expect to find supporting 
evidence for the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.1: The use of simple plurality in English local government elections 
favours two-party systems. 
Classifying local government party systems according to the number of parties and 
then observing i f a two-party system is the most common, may provide evidence to 
support this hypothesis. Riker (1994), however, argues that the hypothesis is far more 
difficult to falsify. According to him, Duverger's use of the term "favour" is 
ambiguous, suggesting that the proposition is not deterministic, merely probabilistic. 
The law is itself, therefore, neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for the 
existence of a two-party system. In short, discovering a two-party system where 
plurality elections are not held would not disprove the theory and neither would a lack 
of two-party systems in English local government. The status of Duverger's 
proposition as a genuine social law is still questioned by political scientists. 
tier, the shire districts, metropolitan boroughs and London boroughs are included. New 
unitary authorities established in the mid-1990s and later are excluded. 
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Nevertheless, given that a national two-party system appeared to exist during the 
period, there is merit in observing i f this were the case for local government also. 
What about party systems that do not fall into the two-party classification? Duverger 
is quite clear about the inability of third parties to prosper under a plurality system. 
Although the number of parties might temporarily increase torn two to three, 
successive defeats for the third party would result in a loss of support and a reversion 
back to a stable two-party system. We would expect, therefore, those multi-party 
systems that did exist to be weak. Duverger, however, is not as clear about single-
party systems in elections using the plurality formula. Under this formula, a single-
party system that remained intact over a long period, must have been the result of a 
fairly homogenous electorate (Stewart, 2000:129). I f this were the case then we 
would expect these party systems to be stable. These observations regarding single 
and multi-party systems give rise to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.2: Single-party systems In English local government tend to be 
stable. 
Hypothesis 1,3: Multi-party systems In English local government tend to be 
weak. 
Unlike Duverger's Law, these hypotheses can be easily falsified. I f a minority of 
single party systems are stable or a minority of multi-party systems are weak then the 
hypothesis will not be supported. Strength can be measured by the party system's 
proximity to the numerical criterion for the elected number of parties. A two-party 
system can be classed as stronger as the central tendency of the number of parties 
approaches two. Stability is a measure of the deviation from the party system's 
central tendency over the period. Unstable party systems wil l , therefore, experience 
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significant changes in the number of parties over time. Comparing the proportion of 
single-party systems that are stable with those that are unstable is one way of testing 
the validity of hypothesis 1.2. Similarly, comparing the proportion of multi-party 
systems that are weak with the proportion that are strong should provide an adequate 
test of hypothesis 1.3. 
Duverger's proposition does not describe the nature of the two-party system being 
favoured. It tells us nothing about whether over time, it is the same two parties in the 
system, or the extent to which third parties exist. Chapter 3.5 highlighted the 
significant increase in the number of Liberal controlled authorities. What was the 
relationship between this success and the party systems in these authorities? If, in a 
two-party system, the Liberals quickly replaced one of the dominant parties, then the 
number of parties would change little. If, however, this transition were gradual, then 
the system would be less stable and also exhibit the characteristics of a multi-party 
system (i.e. an increase in the elected number of parties). According to Duverger, this 
would be unlikely. A lack of success by the third party over successive elections 
would inhibit the its ability to survive. Therefore, their best strategy under such a 
system is to gain control of an authority quickly and decisively, leading to hypothesis 1.4. 
Hypothesis 1.4: English local authorities won by Liberals tend to have strong and 
stable two-party systems. 
Counting the number of Liberal authorities and observing i f strong and stable two-
party systems were the most common in these authorities can test this hypothesis. 
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Although all local government elections use the plurality system, the frequency of 
when elections are held varies for the second tier authorities. The London boroughs 
hold whole-council elections every four years, while the metropolitan boroughs elect 
a third of councillors three out of four years. The shire districts, however, may hold 
either whole-council or partial-council elections. This variation within the shire 
districts provides an excellent opportunity to observe any possible effect of election 
frequency upon the party system. Whole council elections provide a mechanism 
whereby the electorate can produce large changes in council composition in a single 
election. In an authority holding whole-council elections a completely dominant 
party^ could lose every seat on the council. I f the authority held partial council 
elections, however, the same party could lose only one-third of its seats. As there is 
far greater opportunity for the party system in whole council elections to vary, we 
would expect, therefore, that: 
Hypothesis 1.5: English local authorities holding partial-council elections will be 
more stable than those holding whole-council elections. 
The above proposition can be examined by comparing the number of stable party 
systems in authorities holding whole-council elections with those holding elections by 
thirds. Finding that a higher proportion of stable party systems in authorities holding 
partial council elections would provide evidence to support hypothesis 1.5. 
It was demonstrated previously that the different types of local authority differ, not 
only socioeconomically, but also structurally and politically (See Chapter 3.3-3.5). 
Each section tests the hypotheses for each type of authority in turn. A l l authorities 
Controls every seat on the council. 
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within each type are listed according to the measures for strength and stability 
outlined previously (see Chapter 4.4.1). The classification of party system type is 
determined by the mean value for the elected number of parties (Ns). Mean values of 
Ns below 1.5 are classed as single-party, from 1.5 to 2.5 inclusive, two-party, while 
those above 2.5 are classed as multi-party. The strength of the system is measured by 
the proximity of the mean Ns to the centre of the single/two/multi-party category. A 
strong two-party system must be between 1.75 and 2.25, else it would be classed as 
weak. The stability of the system is measured using the standard deviation (s.d.) of 
Ns. Systems are considered as unstable i f they vary widely fix)m the mean elected 
number of parties (s.d.>0.5). An indication of whether the Liberals controlled the 
authority at any time during the 26 year period is also provided in the tables. The 
mean and standard deviation of tiie number of parties was calculated using the 
political composition for every year (26 cases in all where the authority existed in 
every year from 1973 to 1998). 
There are sound methodological and practical reasons for using 26 data points and not 
just those where the council changed its composition or held elections. Firstly, the 
councils were in existence for every year during the 25-year period, not just during 
election years and no doubt the electorate still perceived the council to be under some 
form of political control during the years when no elections were held. I f only those 
years where the council composition changed were analysed, those authorities that 
held by-elections would have more data points than others, giving additional weight 
to those authorities. 
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Another variation on this method might be to divide the 26 years into two or more 
periods. Chapter 3.4.3 highlighted how contestation was lower towards the beginning 
of the period. If, as a result, some party systems were more stable during this time 
(simply because there was no challenge to incumbents), then these might be more 
easily identified. In addition to this involving a subjective decision regarding the cut-
of f point for each period, it would also reduce the number of years for each authority. 
Dividing the time period into three, for example, would result in a duration of only six 
or seven years for each term. This may reduce the reliability of the measures of 
central tendency and dispersion i f a specific local issue led to a temporary increase in 
the elected number of parties. I f such events occurred once over a 26-year period it 
would (and should) have little impact on our classification of the party system. Over 
a six-year period however, this temporary increase might result in the party system 
being classed as unstable when generally it was not. Such concerns led us to measure 
the party systems across the entire period of 1973-1998. 
5.3 Party Systems in English Shire County Councils 
A total of 39 top-tier shire county councils existed after 1973 (although Avon, 
Berkshire, Cleveland, Humberside and the Isle of Wight were abolished after 1993). 
The classifications of party systems for these authorities are shown in 
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Table 5-1. Sub-totals are provided that indicates the total number of two-party/multi-
party systems and the number classified as weak/strong and stable/unstable within 
these categories. Although some authorities, such as Suffolk and Cambridgeshire, 
experienced periods where single-party systems existed, none could be classed as 
predominantly single-party throughout the entire period. Indeed, 29 (74%) of the 
counties are classed as having two-party systems, the mean number of elected parties 
(Ns) in these councils being greater than 1.5 and less than 2.5. Two-party systems 
are, therefore, the most common in English shire counties, supporting hypothesis 1.1. 
It appears that shire county elections do favour two-party systems. 
154 
Table 5-1 - Party Systems in English Shire County Councils 
County Name Count Mean Ns S.d. Ns 
Ourtiam 26 1.81 0.36 
Nottinghamshire 26 1.94 0.15 
West Sussex 26 1.98 0.44 
Cleveland 22 2.00 0.14 
Oertyshire 26 2.00 0.12 
Staffordshire 26 2.04 0.21 
Northamptonshire 26 2.13 0.29 
Somerset 26 2.16 0.37 
Lancashire 26 2.16 0.37 
Humberslde 22 2.16 0.17 




22 2.24 0.36 
26 1.92 0.52 
Buckinghamshire 26 2.04 0.51 




26 2.23 0.56 
26 2.26 0.44 
Isle Of Wight 22 2.30 0.23 
Cheshire 26 2.38 0.44 
Warwickshire 26 2.42 0.42 




26 2.45 0.23 
26 2.25 0.54 
Hampshire 26 2.30 0.52 
Devon 26 2.32 0.54 
East Sussex 26 2.34 0.50 
Cornwall 26 2.41 0.78 
Bedfordshire 26 2.41 0.53 
Essex 
N 
Hereford & Worcester 
26 2.41 0.54 




26 3.21 0.42 




26 2.94 0.63 
22 2.55 0.45 
Lincolnshire 26 2.62 0.41 




26 2.69 0.30 
26 2.58 0.58 
Oxfordshire 26 2.59 0.60 

























































































































29 13 7 
MutU Strong Stable No 
MulU Strong Stable 
o 
No 
r^ulti Strong Unstable No 
MulU Strong Unstable No 
4 2 
Multi Weak Stable No 
Multi Weak Stable No 
Multi Weak Stable No 






MulU Weak Unstable No 
10 6 2 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Al l of the remaining 10 shire counties, are classed as having multi-party systems 
(mean Ns>2.5) between 1973 and 1998. As no single-party systems existed, we 
cannot test hypothesis 1.2 for the shire counties. Of the multi-party systems, four are 
classed as strong, with two of these being stable and two being unstable. Of the six 
weak party systems, four are classed as stable and two - Cambridgeshire and 
Oxfordshire - as unstable. Although the majority of multi-party systems are weak. 
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supporting hypothesis 1.3, there are only two more weak party systems than there are 
strong. For the shire counties there is only some evidence that multi-party systems 
tend towards two-partyism. 
5.3.1 Typical Two-Party Systems in English Shire County Councils. 
We can establish the suitability of the typology by studying authorities that may be 
considered as typical of the various classifications. The ideal type for a strong and 
stable two-party system would have a mean Ns = 2 with no standard deviation. 
Although no such ideal types exist in English local government we can examine those 
authorities that are closest to the ideal types. Derbyshire is a typical example of a 
shire county with a strong and stable two-party system. The mean elected number of 
parties over the period was 2 with a standard deviation of 0.12 (mean Ns=2. 
s.d.=0.12)^. Table 5-2 shows the council's composition during the period"*. 
Conservative and Labour dominated the council with never less than 87% of the seats 
between them and with Ns ranging from 1.79 to 2.17. The one occasion when the 
Conservatives gained control of Derbyshire was in 1977 when the party produced a 
278-page manifesto (Gyford et al, 1989,169). The temporary gain of 37 council seats 
in these elections may, however, have been related to the general unpopularity of the 
Labour government, rather than the Conservative "mammothesto". Despite the 
Liberals contesting over three-quarters of the seats from 1985 onwards, the party has 
had little success, never winning more than 8.4% of seats. Although Labour 
controlled Derbyshire for most of the period, the relative strength of the 
In order to be more concise, this notation is used in future. 
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Conservatives and absence of a significant third party, suggest that the classification 
of a two-party system in Derbyshire is appropriate. The lack of a third party is, 
moreover, what we would expect to find i f hypothesis 1.1 was correct. 
Table 5-2 - Number of Elected Parties for Derbyshire from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH OIL Na 
1973 25 61 5 7 LAB 2.17 
1977 62 30 0 6 CON 2.01 
1981 21 59 1 3 LAB 1.79 
1985 24 54 4 2 LAB 2.01 
1989 27 51 3 3 LAB 2.11 
1993 21 55 7 1 LAB 2.01 
1997 12 45 6 1 LAB 1.86 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Suffolk is among those shire counties classed with an unstable but strong two-party 
system (mean Ns=2.23, s.d.=0.56). The Conservatives controlled the council for 
much of the period, pioneering such policies as teacher appraisal in local schools 
(Wilson & Game, 1998: 34). Despite this, Labour was also very strong, resulting in a 
two-party classification for the authority. The instability of the system is apparent, 
however. When, in 1977, the Conservatives won 85% of the seats, the value of Ns 
fell to 1.35. The decrease in Conservative strength towards the end of the period, 
together with an increase in Liberal strength, resulted in an increase of Ns to 3.19 in 
1993, falling back to 2.81 in 1997. For Suffolk, the range of Ns is far greater, than the 
more stable system of Derbyshire and appears, therefore, to be appropriately classed 
as unstable. 
Table 5-3 - Number of Elected Parties for Suffolk County Council from 1973 to 
1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ng 
^ Only the base year (1973) and years when council composition changed are shown in these 
Tables. For that reason mean Ns values may be different in these Tables compared with 
Table 5-1. 
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1973 47 29 3 3 CON 2.19 
1977 70 9 1 2 CON 1.35 
1981 49 31 0 2 CON 2.00 
1985 50 23 3 4 CON 2.10 
1989 46 26 4 4 CON 2.27 
1993 27 31 17 5 NOC 3.19 
1997 31 33 15 1 NOC 2.81 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Cumbria is an example of an authority where a minority administration formed when 
no single-party had an overall majority. One party, usually the largest, was permitted 
by the others to take all committee chairs and vice chairs, and govern as i f it were in 
overall majority (Wilson & Game, 1998, 290). Cimibria is classed as having a weak 
but stable two-party system (mean Ns=2.45, s.d.=0.23). Although Labour and 
Conservative councillors dominated the council throughout, Independents and others 
were relatively strong towards the beginning of the period. As in Suffolk, the number 
of seats being won by Liberals increased sharply after 1989, the party replacing 
Independents and others as the third largest group in the council. 
Table 5-4 - Number of Elected Parties for Cumbria County Council from 1973 to 
1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 31 38 1 12 NOC 2.64 
1977 52 23 0 7 CON 2.05 
1981 35 42 3 3 LAB 2.29 
1985 36 39 5 3 NOC 2.42 
1989 37 37 6 3 NOC 2.48 
1993 28 39 13 3 NOC 2.77 
1997 23 44 12 4 LAB 2.62 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
These typical examples of two-party systems in the shire counties appear to confirm 
the method of classification. Only two parties dominated the three authorities 
highlighted during the period. The classification of Derbyshire as a strong and stable 
system reflects the fact that Ns ranged narrowly between 1.79 and 2.19. Although 
Suffolk was also classed as strong, a single-party system existed in 1977 and a multi-
party system existed in 1993. Suffolk appears, therefore, to be appropriately 
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classified as unstable. The nature of council control in Cumbria is also reflected well 
by its categorisation of weak but stable two-party system. The Conservatives and 
Labour were the main two-parties, with either the Liberals or Independents being 
relatively strong for most of the period. 
5.3.2 Typical Multi-Party Systems in English Shire County Councils. 
Among the multi-party systems that existed in the English shire counties, Shropshire 
is among those classed as strong and stable (mean Ns=3.21, s.d.=0.42). The mean 
value of Ns never fails below 2.5 and exceeds the 3.5 threshold on only one occasion. 
Although Shropshire was one of the few authorities that resisted party politicisation 
immediately following the 1974 reorganisation (Gyford et al, 1989: 26), the number 
of Independents and others still fell from 31 in 1973 to 22 in 1977. This decline 
coincides with the only term in which the council was not hung. The 1977 elections 
saw the number of Labour seats fall from 17 to five, the Conservatives gaining control 
of the council with a twenty seat increase from 1973. The Liberals made inroads into 
the council in 1981, resulting in a quite even division of seats between the three main 
parties and Independents. This is reflected by the value of Ns in that year being 3.81, 
the highest elected number of parties of the period. 
Table 5-5 - Number of Elected Parties for Shropshire County Council from 1973 
to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 12 17 3 31 NOC 2.83 
1977 32 5 4 22 CON 2.56 
1981 18 21 11 16 NOG 3.81 
1985 20 25 10 11 NOC 3.50 
1989 27 24 8 7 NOG 3.07 
1993 24 23 13 6 NOG 3.33 
1997 17 8 13 6 NOC 3.47 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
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Gloucestershire is classed as having a strong but unstable multi-party system (mean 
Ns=2.94, s.d.=0.63). For most of this period, there was no party with overall control 
of the council. The exception to this was in 1977 when the Conservatives won 79% 
of the seats and Ns fell to 1.64. This is in stark contrast to 1985 when the elected 
number of parties exceeds 3.5 with seals distributed fairly evenly between the three 
main parties and Independent councillors. A prolonged period where no one party has 
overall control can lead to formation of a minority administration where the largest 
party assumes the role of a majority party (Wilson & Game, 1998). Although this 
kind o f administration existed in Gloucestershire in 1993, it led to an agreement by 
Labour and the Conservatives to vote down the Liberal administration on the basis 
that the Conservatives would hold chairs one year and Labour the next (Stewart, 
2000: 165). 
Table 5-6 - Number of Elected Parties for Gloucestershire County Council from 
1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 30 18 5 8 NOC 2.83 
1977 46 3 0 12 CON 1.64 
1981 25 17 11 8 NOC 3.39 
1985 18 14 23 8 NOC 3.57 
1989 20 16 23 4 NOC 3.30 
1993 10 20 30 3 NOC 2.82 
1997 21 18 22 2 NOC 3.17 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Among the multi-party systems in the shire counties, Northumberland is classed as 
being weak but stable (Ns=2.69, s.d.=0.3). Although the Labour party always had a 
plurality of seats in Northumberland from 1973 to 1997, the Conservatives, Liberals 
and others were also strong in the county. The elected number of parties ranged from 
2.75 in 1981 to a perfect three party system in 1977. Unlike other authorities where 
the decrease in Independents appears to coincide with a rise in Conservative 
councillors, this decrease in Northumberland coincides with a rise in the number of 
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Liberals elected. The council had a tradition of cross-party working - based upon a 
war time agreement to minimise conflict - which lasted into the 1980s (Stewart, 2000: 
129). Such closeness between the two-parties may have helped marginalise the 
Independents in Northumberland. 
Table 5-7 - Number of Elected Parties for Northumberland County Council from 
1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 10 28 3 21 NOC 2.88 
1977 20 21 0 21 NOC 3.00 
1981 14 34 15 3 LAB 2.75 
1985 12 30 20 4 NOC 2.98 
1989 17 38 8 3 LAB 2.41 
1993 13 39 11 3 LAB 2.39 
1997 13 43 8 2 LAB 2.09 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Cambridgeshire is classed as having a weak and unstable multi-party system (mean 
Ns=2.58, s.d.=0.58). From 1973 to 1997 the authority experienced single-party, two-
party and multi-party systems with Ns ranging from 1.44 to 3.16. During this time, 
the council alternated between Conservatives majority councils (particularly in 1977 
with 82% of seats) and periods where no single party held a majority. 
Table 5-8 - Number of Elected Parties for Cambridgeshire County Council from 
1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTL N3 
1973 28 22 5 13 NOC 3.16 
1977 56 7 1 4 CON 1.44 
1981 35 19 11 3 CON 2.69 
1985 29 21 26 1 NOC 3.03 
1989 46 20 10 1 CON 2.27 
1993 33 21 21 2 NOC 3.00 
1997 33 10 16 0 CON 2.41 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Our typical multi-party systems appear to be appropriately classified. In addition to 
strong first and second parties, significant numbers o f third parties or Independents 
were present in all. The strong multi-party systems of Shropshire and Gloucester 
were characterised by long periods where no single party held a majority of council 
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seats. Although hung councils did exist for Northumberiand and Cambridgeshire, 
they were not the norm. More often than not one of the main parties was able to 
secure a majority of seats in these weak multi-party systems. 
5.3.3 Third Party Success in English Shire County Councils 
In addition to the classification of party system, 
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Table 5-1 shows also, those councils gained by the Liberals during the period. 
Although all of these successes were in authorities that were classed as having two-
party systems, there is little evidence to support hypothesis 1.4 diat the party would 
tend to win councils where a strong and stable two-party system existed. For the shire 
counties the Liberals were more successfiil in authorities with weak two-party 
systems such as Devon and the Isle of Wight. Whereas Duverger suggested that third 
parties would find it difficult to survive after successive elections without gaining 
power, evidence torn the shire counties suggests that third parties can build support 
gradually to achieve a winning majority. How were the Liberals able to overcome 
any mechanical and physiological effects of the electoral system? 
Somerset was the only authority with a strong and stable two-party system (mean 
Ns=2.16, s.d.=0.37) that the Liberals gained. We should expect, therefore, to see a 
sudden rise to victory for the party. This was indeed the case. The Liberals in 
Somerset, progressed ft^om being the third party in 1981 with 14% of the seats, to 
replace the Conservatives as the largest party in the council at the following elections 
(see Table 5-9). Despite a temporary blip in 1989, the Liberals took control of the 
council fi'om the Conservatives in 1993 increasing their seat share in that year alone 
by 42 percentage points, from 29.8% to 71.9%. 
The success of the Liberals in Somerset may support some of the reasoning behind 
Duverger's Law. Prior to 1985, there was an absence of a distinct second party in 
Somerset and the Liberals only required a small number of seats to become an almost 
joint-second party. I f Duverger's own logic were correct, once the Liberals reached 
this position, they would no longer be subject to the psychological effects associated 
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with being politically irrelevant. When the Conservatives and Independents lost 
support in 1985, voters appear to have viewed the Liberals party as having a real 
chance of winning and supported the party. The case of Somerset appears to confirm 
Duverger's psychological effect. It also shows how the Liberals can circumvent these 
effects by leapfrogging over small second parties. 
Table 5-9 - Number of Elected Parties for Somerset County Council from 1973 to 
1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 34 8 2 12 CON 2.29 
1977 44 3 0 9 CON 1.55 
1981 33 9 8 7 CON 2.53 
1985 24 7 26 0 NOC 2.50 
1989 32 6 17 2 CON 2.40 
1993 13 2 41 1 LIB 1.75 
1997 17 3 37 0 LIB 1.95 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
It was not always the case that the Liberals suddenly came to power in the shire 
counties. Cornwall is classed as having a weak and unstable two-party system (mean 
Ns=2.41, s.d.=0.78). Cornwall from 1973 to 1981, was a single party system with Ns 
ranging from 1.23 to 1.42. The county was dominated by Independents with 90% of 
seats being held by such councillors. Since 1981 however, Ns has always exceeded 
2.5 as the main parties gradually eroded support for the Independents. This 
subsequently resulted in council control shifting to the Liberals in 1993. 
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Table 5-10 - Number of Elected Parties for Cornwall County Council from 1973 
to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 5 3 0 71 INO 1.23 
1977 13 1 0 65 IND 1.42 
1981 16 6 12 45 IND 2.54 
1985 16 5 30 28 NOC 3.18 
1989 14 8 32 25 NOC 3.27 
1993 6 8 41 24 LIB 2.65 
1997 7 8 39 25 NOC 2.76 
Sotirce: British Local Elections Database. 
The Liberals' rise to power in Devon was also quite gradual. The party held 11 
council seats in 1973, more than trebling to 39 by 1995. Control of the county passed 
to the party in 1997 when the total number of seats was reduced following the 
elevation of Plymouth to unitary status. Many of these seats were held by Labour 
councillors, which reduced the party's share of county councillors, providing a 
majority for the Liberals. The only other county controlled by the Liberals was the 
Isle of Wight. The party held seven seats on the council for eight years before they 
gained 20 seats (and control of the council) in 1981. 
One method of gauging the extent to which the Liberals performed better or worse 
than expected for the different classifications of party system would be to calculate 
the chi-square statistic for each classification. Unfortunately this cannot be relied 
upon for the English shire counties as 50% of the cells have an expected count of less 
than five. For chi-square to be reliable the expected count must be greater than five in 
80% of the cells. Another less sophisticated method in this case might be to examine 
the observed and expected frequencies of Liberal success for each of the different 
categories. The difference between the observed Liberal success in two-party or 
multi-party systems and that normally to be expected, was no more than one. This 
suggests that there is little relationship between this difference in the party system and 
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Liberal success in the shire counties. The difference between the observed and 
expected frequency of Liberal success in stable or unstable party systems was no 
more than 0.5, while the difference between strong or weak party systems was no 
more than 1.1. The party does not, therefore, appear to have been more successful in 
any one type of party system in the shire counties. 
5.3.4 A Summary of Party Systems in English Shire County Councils. 
Overall, for the English shire counties, the typology describes appropriately, the 
nature of the party systems that exist for each authority, providing a simple method of 
categorising into single-party, two-party and multi-party systems that are weak/strong 
and stable/unstable. The majority of party systems in shire district councils are two-
party, while the majority of multi-party systems are weak. Evidence from the shire 
counties supports, therefore, both hypotheses 1.1 and 1.3: Shire county elections do 
appear to favour two-party systems and the majority of multi-party systems are weak. 
This particular evidence supports Duverger's original hypothesis that simple plurality 
elections favour two-party systems. Hypothesis 1.2 could not be tested since there 
were no single-party systems. The small number of counties controlled by the 
Liberals created some difficulty in testing hypothesis 1.4. There appeared, however, 
to be no significant difference in the observed number of Liberal controlled 
authorities for each classification and that which would normally be expected. For the 
shire counties, therefore, we cannot accept hypothesis 1.4 that English local 
authorities won by the Liberals tend to have strong and stable two-party systems. 
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5.4 Party Systems in the English Shire District Councils 
There were 296 shire districts after 1973. Although there were a number of changes 
in the number and pattern of elections we can say that 182 (61%) of the authorities 
held whole council elections once every 4 years. The remaining 114 (39%) held 
partial council elections, with roughly one third of the councillors elected once every 
four years for wards with more than one councillor. We might expect the majority of 
the English shire districts to be two-party systems since this appeared to be the case 
for the English shire counties examined above. 
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Table 5-11 shows the party systems that existed in the English shire district 
authorities between 1973 and 1998. Of these authorities, 222 (75%) are classed as 
two-party systems - abnost exactly the same proportion as shire counties. Of the 
remaining 74, only 18 are single-party systems while the remaining 56 are classed as 
multi-party systems. I f our classification is appropriate for the shire districts then the 
large number of two-party systems appears to support hypothesis 1.1. 
Unlike the shire counties, single-party systems do exist in the districts. Of these, 3 
(17%) can be classed as strong and stable, 15 (83%) as weak but stable. There were 
no unstable single party systems for the shire districts during this period. This 
supports hypothesis 1.2 that single party systems in English local government tend to 
be stable. It appears, therefore, that Stewart (2000: 129) was correct in asserting that 
the relative homogeneity of many authorities means that elections by simple plurality 
can have an even greater impact in these local authorities than on parliament, thus 
leading to one-party authorities. It appears that this process is far greater in the shire 
districts than counties. One possible explanation for this may be the difference in of 
geographical size between the two tiers - the smaller districts being far more likely to 
be homogenous than counties. 
Among those authorities classified as multi-party, 22 (39%) can be classed as strong 
and stable, 8 (14%) as strong but unstable, 21 (38%) as weak but stable, 5 (9%) as 
weak and unstable. As with multi-party systems in the shire counties, the majority of 
them are stable (77%). Unlike die counties, however, the majority of multi-party 
systems in the districts are strong (53%). Evidence fix)m the shire districts does not, 
therefore, support hypothesis 1.3 that multi-party systems in local government tend 
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towards two-party systems. The majority of multi-party systems in the districts 
appear not to be gravitating towards a two-party system. 
But what of the effect of the electoral cycle upon the party systems? Hypothesis 1.5 
states that the party system of authorities holding partial-council elections will be 
more stable than are those holding whole-council elections. Of the 114 authorities 
electing by thirds, 95 (83.3%) are stable. While of the 182 authorities holding whole-
council elections, a slightly smaller proportion fall into the same category, 140 
(76.9%). Although weak, evidence from the shire districts appears, therefore, to 
support the hypothesis, suggesting that authorities with whole-council elections are 
more likely to produce larger changes in political composition than are those not 
electing the entire council. 
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Table 5-11 - Party Systems in English Shire Districts from 1973 to 1998 
District Namo Election 
Type 
Count Mean Ns S.d. Ns System 
Type 
Strength Stability LIB 
Controlled 
Eden Whole 26 1.11 0.15 Single Strong Stable No 
CasUe Point Whole 26 1.22 0.30 Single Strong Stable No 
Wanst>eck Whole 26 1.23 0.20 Single Strong Stable No 
N 





Richmondshire Whole 26 1.29 0.31 Single Weak Stable No 
Surrey Heath Whole 26 1.29 0.45 Single Weak Stable No 
Holdemess Whole 22 1.32 0.15 Single Weak Stable No 
Bolsover Whole 26 1.34 0.24 Single Weak Stable No 
Kingston Upon (Hull Partial 22 1.34 0.20 Single Weak Stable No 
Epsom & Ewell Whole 26 1.34 0.12 Single Weak Stable No 
Ashfleld Whole 26 1.38 0.33 Single Weak Stable No 
Mansfield Whole 26 1.39 0.17 Single Weak Stable No 
Corby Whole 26 1.39 0.24 Single Weak Stable No 
South Herefordshire Partial 24 1.40 0.32 Single Weak Stable No 
Harlow Partial 26 1.40 0.15 Single Weak Stable No 
Spellhome Whole 26 1.43 0.39 Single Weak Stable No 
Stevenage Partial 26 1.43 0.29 Single Weak Stable No 
North Cornwall Whole 26 1.47 0.25 Single Weak Stable No 
N 18 15 15 
Nottingham Whole 26 1.75 0.31 Two Strong Stable No 
Crawley Partial 26 1.76 0.22 Two Strong Stable No 
Horsham Whole 26 1.76 0.29 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Thurrock Partial 26 1.77 0.47 Two Strong Stable No 
Woodspring Partial 22 1.77 0.29 Two Strong Stable No 
Vale Of White Horse Whole 26 1.79 0.41 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Wyre Whole 26 1.79 0.42 Two Strong Stable No 
Oerwentside Whole 26 1.79 0.41 Two Strong Stable No 
Burnley Partial 26 1.80 0.17 Two Strong Stable No 
East Devon Whole 26 1.80 0.38 Two Strong Stable No 
Redditch Partial 26 1.82 0.23 Two Strong Stable No 
Lewes Whole 26 1.84 0.32 Two Strong Stable Yes 
South Buckinghamshire Whole 26 1.84 0.30 Two Strong Stable No 
Wokingham Partial 26 1.84 0.44 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Bromsgrove Whole 26 1.85 0.27 Two Strong Stable No 
Brentwood Partial 26 1.85 0.29 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Middlesbrough Whole 22 1.85 0.08 Two Strong Stable No 
Tamworth Partial 26 1.85 0.35 Two Strong Stable No 
Leicester Whole 26 1.86 0.21 Two Strong Stable No 
Leominster Partial 24 1.87 0.49 Two Strong Stable No 
Slough Partial 26 1.87 0.38 Two Strong Stable No 
Gediing Whole 26 1.88 0.34 Two Strong Stable No 
Broxtowe Whole 26 1.88 0.29 Two Strong Stable No 
Worthing Partial 26 1.89 0.34 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Blackpool Whole 26 1.89 0.39 Two Strong Stable No 
Barrow In Fumess Partial 26 1.89 0.24 Two Strong Stable No 
Tunbridge Weils Partial 26 1.90 0.49 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Waverley Whole 26 1.91 0.35 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Oxford Partial 26 1.91 0.13 Two Strong Stable No 
Rossendale Partial 26 1.92 0.33 Two Strong Stable No 
West Devon Whole 26 1.92 0.43 Two Strong Stable No 
Poole Whole 26 1.92 0.25 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Derby Partial 26 1.93 0.24 Two Strong Stable No 
South Ribble Whole 26 1.94 0.34 Two Strong Stable No 
Gravesham Whole 26 1.94 0.18 Two Strong Stable No 
Eastbourne Partial 26 1.95 0.26 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Uchfleld Whole 26 1.96 0.39 Two Strong Stable No 
Plymouth Whole 26 1.96 0.36 Two Strong Stable No 
Dartford Whole 26 1.96 0.20 Two Strong Stable No 
Huntingdonshire Partial 26 1.97 0.38 Two Strong Stable No 
Hyndbum Partial 26 1.97 0.35 Two Strong Stable No 
Worcester Partial 26 1.98 0.09 Two Strong Stable No 
Luton Whole 26 1.98 0.32 Two Strong Stable No 
Wanington Whole 26 1.99 0.23 Two Strong Stable No 
Welwyn Hatfield Partial 26 1.99 0.09 Two Strong Stable No 
Canterbury Whole 26 1.99 0.48 Two Strong Stable No 
Chamwood Whole 26 2.00 0.41 Two Strong Stable No 
ConW..y 
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Thamesdown Partial 26 2.00 0.19 Two Strong Stable No 
Southampton Partial 26 2.00 0.34 Jvto Strong Stable No 
Northampton Whole 26 2.00 0.30 Two Strong Stable No 
East Dorset Whole 26 2.03 0.31 Two Strong Stable Yes 
BIyth Valley Whole 26 2.03 0.41 Tv«) Strong Stable Yes 
East Undsey Whole 26 2.05 0.34 Two Strong Stable No 
Brighton Partial 23 2.05 0.24 Two Strong Stable No 
East Hampshire Whole 26 2.05 0.36 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Dover Whole 26 2.07 0.25 Two Strong Stable No 
Erewash Whole 26 2.07 0.20 Two Strong Stable No 
Bridgnorth Whole 26 2.07 0.48 Two Strong Stable No 
Bournemouth Whole 26 2.08 0.46 Two Strong Stable No 
Beverley Whole 22 2.08 0.39 Two Strong Stable No 
Glanford Whole 22 2.08 0.47 Two Strong Stable No 
The Wrekin Whole 26 2.08 0.35 Two Strong Stable No 
Runnymede Partial 26 2.09 0.31 Tvwj Strong Stable No 
Dacorum Whole 26 2.09 0.14 Two Strong Stable No 
Great Yarmouth Partial 26 2.10 0.29 Two Strong Stable No 
Hartlepool Partial 22 2.11 0.42 Two Strong Stable No 
Bristol Partial 22 2.11 0.18 Two Strong Stable No 
North Warwickshire Whole 26 2.11 0.36 Two Strong Stable No 
Rochester Upon Medway Whole 24 2.11 0.39 Two Strong Stable No 
Preston Partial 26 2.11 0.25 Two Strong Stable No 
Test Valley Whole 26 2.14 0.41 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Mid Sussex Whole 26 2.14 0.43 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Guildford Whole 26 2.14 0.43 Two Strong Stable Yes 
South Staffordshire Whole 26 2.14 0.36 Two Strong Stable No 
South Norfolk Whole 26 2.15 0.26 Two Strong Stable Yes 
South Holland Whole 26 2.15 0.30 Two Strong Stable No 
North East Derbyshire Whole 26 2.16 0.42 Two Strong Stable No 
North Devon Whole 26 2.17 0.32 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Kings Lynn & West Norfolk Whole 26 2.17 0.48 Two Strong Stable No 
Waveney Partial 26 2.17 0.41 Two Strong Stable No 
Copeland Whole 26 2.17 0.32 Two Strong Stable No 
Tonbrldge & Mailing Whole 26 2.18 0.39 Two Strong Stable No 
New Forest Whole 26 2.18 0.16 TVW5 Strong Stable Yes 
Chrlstchurch Whole 26 2.18 0.43 Two Strong Stable No 
North Wiltshire Whole 26 2.18 0.38 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Newcastle-under-Lyme Partial 26 2.18 0.37 Two Strong Stable No 
Watford Partial 26 2.19 0.33 Two Strong Stable No 
Hambleton Whole 26 2.19 0.50 Two Strong Stable No 
Chichester Whole 26 2.21 0.34 Two Strong Stable No 
Carlisle Partial 26 2.22 0.19 Two Strong Stable No 
Bath Partial 22 2.23 0.41 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Chorley Partial 26 2.23 0.29 Two Strong Stable No 
St Edmundsbury Whole 26 2.23 0.50 Two Strong Stable No 
Hanrogate Partial 26 2.24 0.34 Two Strong Stable Yes 
Gloucester Partial 26 2.25 0.49 Two Strong Stable No 
N 
West Somerset Whole 26 1.76 0.74 Two Strong 
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Unstable No 
Restonmel Whole 26 1.87 0.52 Two Strong Unstable Yes 
Wycombe Whole 26 1.90 0.73 Two Strong Unstable No 
Cannock Chase Partial 26 1.91 0.56 Two Strong Unstable No 
Tandrldge Partial 26 1.94 0.56 Two Strong Unstable No 
Tonidge Whole 26 2.01 0.50 Two Strong Unstable No 
Blaby Whole 26 2.02 0.52 Two Strong Unstable No 
Newbury Whole 26 2.02 0.50 Two Strong Unstable Yes 
Hinckley & Bosworth Whole 26 2.04 0.63 Two Strong Unstable No 
Rutland Whole 26 2.05 0.69 Two Strong Unstable No 
South Hams Whole 26 2.09 0.56 Two Strong Unstable No 
Wear Valley Whole 26 2.12 0.54 Two Strong Unstable Yes 
Mid Bedfordshire Whole 26 2.17 0.54 Two Strong Unstable No 
Metton Whole 26 2.17 0.69 Two Strong Unstable No 
East Yorkshire Whole 22 2.18 0.60 Two Strong Unstable No 
South Cambridgeshire Partial 26 2.20 0.80 Two Strong Unstable No 
Suffolk Coastal Whole 26 2.20 0.67 Two Strong Unstable No 
West Wiltshire Whole 26 2.23 0.56 Two Strong Unstable Yes 
Contd..../ 
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South Bedfordshire Partial 26 2.24 0.67 Two Strong Unstable No 
Broadtand Partial 26 2.25 0.65 Two Strong Unstable No 
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North Shropshire Whole 26 1.51 0.21 Two Weak Stable No 
Lincoln Partial 26 1.54 0.34 Two Weak Stable No 
East Cambridgeshire Whole 26 1.54 0.41 Two Weak Stable No 
Broxboume Partial 26 1.55 0.26 Two Weak Stable No 
South Shropshire Whole 26 1.56 0.31 Two Weak Stable No 
Oadby & Wigston Whole 26 1.57 0.35 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Hove Whole 23 1.58 0.30 Two Weak Stable No 
Norwich Partial 26 1.58 0.07 Two Weak Stable No 
Scunthorpe Partial 22 1.59 0.21 Two Weak Stable No 
Mid Devon Whole 26 1.59 0.29 Two Weak Stable Yes 
North Dorset Whole 26 1.60 0.35 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Teesdale Whole 26 1.61 0.38 Two Weak Stable No 
Easington Whole 26 1.61 0.33 Two Weak Stable No 
Sedgefield Whole 26 1.64 0.26 Two Weak Stable No 
Chesterfield Whole 26 1.65 0.20 Two Weak Stable No 
Nuneaton & Bedworth Partial 26 1.65 0.32 Two Weak Stable No 
Halton Partial 26 1.68 0.32 Two Weak Stable No 
Tortwy Whole 26 1.69 0.41 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Wealden Whole 26 1.70 0.39 Two Weak Stable No 
Ipswich Partial 26 1.72 0.19 Two Weak Stable No 
East Northamptonshire Whole 26 1.72 0.36 Two Weak Stable No 
Chiltem Whole 26 1.74 0.46 Two Weak Stable No 
Cotswold Whole 26 1.74 0.36 Two Weak Stable No 
Ellesmere Port & Neston Partial 26 1.74 0.24 Two Weak Stable No 
Chester Le Street Whole 26 1.75 0.31 Two Weak Stable No 
Rlbble Vailey Whole 26 1.75 0.29 Two Weak Stable No 
Darlington Whole 26 2.25 0.23 Two Weak Stable No 
York Whole 22 2.26 0.45 Two Weak Stable No 
Wansdyke Whole 22 2.26 0.28 Two Weak Stable No 
Southend On Sea Partial 26 2.26 0.38 Two Weak Stable No 
Crewe & Nantwich Partial 26 2.26 0.17 Two Weak Stable No 
Bassetlaw Partial 26 2.27 0.23 Two Weak Stable No 
East Hertfordshire Whole 26 2.28 0.35 Two Weak Stable No 
West Lancashire Partial 26 2.28 0.43 Two Weak Stable No 
Adur Partial 26 2.28 0.32 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Chelmsford Whole 26 2.28 0.33 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Woking Partial 26 2.28 0.47 Two Weak Stable Yes 
StAibans Partial 26 2.28 0.43 Two Weak Stable Yes 
EasUeIgh Partial 26 2.29 0.49 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Stockton-on-Tees Whole 22 2.30 0.24 Two Weak Stable No 
Great Grfmsby Partial 22 2.30 0.32 Two Weak Stable No 
Portsmouth Partial 26 2.30 0.34 Two Weak Stable No 
Gosport Partial 26 2.30 0.43 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Newark & Shenwood Whole 26 2.32 0.18 Two Weak Stable No 
Langbaurgh Whole 22 2.32 0.20 Two Weak Stable No 
Durham Whole 26 2.33 0.41 Two Weak Stable No 
East Staffordshire Whole 26 2.33 0.37 Two Weak Stable No 
Cherwell Partial 26 2.34 0.31 Two Weak Stable No 
Tewkesbury Whole 26 2.34 0.23 Two Weak Stable No 
South Somerset Whole 26 2.35 0.42 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Uttlesford Whole 26 2.35 0.39 Two Weak Stable No 
Fenland Whole 26 2.35 0.25 Two Weak Stable No 
Fareham Partial 26 2.36 0.49 Two Weak Stable No 
Hertsmere Partial 26 2.36 0.20 Two Weak Stable No 
Fylde Whole 26 2.37 0.29 Two Weak Stable No 
Rochford Partial 26 2.37 0.45 Two Weak Stable Yes 
North Hertfordshire Partial 26 2.37 0.26 Two Weak Stable No 
Peterborough Partial 26 2.38 0.27 Two Weak Stable No 
Wellingborough Whole 26 2.38 0.10 Two Weak Stable No 
Reading Partial 26 2.38 0.46 Two Weak Stable No 
Cheltenham Partial 26 2.38 0.38 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Northavon Whole 22 2.39 0.31 Two Weak Stable No 
Stratford On Avon Partial 26 2.39 0.35 Two Weak Stable No 
Winchester Partial 26 2.40 0.31 Two Weak Stable Yes 
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Basildon Partial 26 2.41 0.32 Two Weak stable No 
Cambridge Partial 26 2.41 0.23 Two Weak Stable No 
Biackbum Partial 26 2.42 0.47 Two Weak Stable No 
Boottiferry Whole 22 2.42 0.35 Two Weak stable No 
Breckland Whole 26 2.43 0.23 Two Weak Stable No 
Dertiyshire Dales Whole 26 2.43 0.36 Two Weak stable No 
Siiepway Whole 26 2.43 0.36 Two Weak Stable No 
Kingswood Whole 22 2.47 0.26 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Rother Whole 26 2.47 0.36 Two Weak Stable No 
Colchester Partial 26 2.47 0.34 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Hart Partial 26 2.48 0.46 Two Weak Stable No 
Aylesbury Vale Whole 26 2.48 0.14 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Exeter Partial 26 2.48 0.43 Two Weak Stable No 
Oaventry Partial 26 2.49 0.36 Two Weak Stable No 
Chester Partial 26 2.50 0.47 Two Weak Stable No 
Rushdiffe Whole 26 1.53 0.54 Two Wealf 
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Unstable No 
Bracknell Forest Whole 26 1.60 0.55 Two Weak Unstable No 
Caradon Whole 26 1.65 0.54 Two Weak Unstable No 
Windsor & Maidenhead Whole 26 1.71 0.56 Two Weak Unstable Yes 
Anjn Whole 26 1.74 0.57 Tvw) Weak Unstable No 
Oswestry Whole 26 2.25 0.53 Two Weak Unstable No 
South Northamptonshire Whole 26 2.26 0.64 Two Weak Unstable No 
Gilllngham Partial 24 2.27 0.60 Two Weak Unstable Yes 
Ryedale Whole 26 2.28 0.64 Two Weak Unstable Yes 
Relgate & Banstead Partial 26 2.28 0.75 Two Weak Unstable No 
South Wight Whole 22 2.32 0.51 Two Weak Unstable No 
Epping Forest Partial 26 2.32 0.86 Two Weak Unstable No 
Sevenoaks Whole 26 2.32 0.52 Two Weak Unstable No 
North Norfolk Whole 26 2.32 0.69 Two Weak Unstable No 
WanAdck Whole 26 2.36 0.55 Two Weak Unstable No 
Penwith Partial 26 2.38 1.11 Two Weak Unstable No 
Forest Heath Whole 26 2.39 0.56 Two Weak Unstable No 
Rushmoor Partial 26 2.39 0.55 Two Weak Unstable No 
North West Leicestershire Whole 26 2.39 0.56 Two Weak Unstable No 
Teignbridge Whole 26 2.40 0.61 Two Weak Unstable No 
Herefordshire Partial 24 2.41 0.76 Two Weak Unstable Yes 
Amber Valley Partial 26 2.41 0.57 Two Weak Unstable No 
Kennet Whole 26 2.42 0.80 Two Weak Unstable No 
Hart)orough Whole 26 2.43 0.67 Two Weak Unstable No 
TTianet Whole 26 2.44 0.53 Two Weak Unstable No 
Purbeck Partial 26 2.44 0.54 Two Weak Unstable No 
Milton Keynes Partial 26 2.47 0.54 Two Weak Unstable No 
South Dertyshire Whole 26 2.49 0.50 Two Weak Unstable No 
N 222 107 28 
Mole Valley Partial 26 2.75 0.30 Multi Strong Stable Yes 
Bedford Partial 26 2.76 0.42 Mult] strong Stable No 
Bralntree Whole 26 2.79 0.42 Multi Sbt}ng Stable No 
Rugby Partial 26 2.60 0.29 MulU Sfax)ng Stable No 
Hastings Partial 26 2.80 0.40 MulU Strong Stable Yes 
Wyre Forest Partial 26 2.81 0.39 Multi strong Stable No 
High Peak Whole 26 2.85 0.49 MulU strong Stable No 
Staffordshire Mooriands Whole 26 2.86 0.26 MulU strong Stable No 
Craven Partial 26 2.90 0.43 MulU strong Stable Yes 
Mid Suffolk Whole 26 2.90 0.32 MulU strong Stable No 
South Kesteven Whole 26 2.91 0.42 Multi Strong Stable No 
Babergh Whole 26 2.93 0.45 Multi Strong Stable No 
Shrewsbury & Atcham Partial 26 2.97 0.41 MulU strong Stable No 
South lakeland Partial 26 3.03 0.45 MulU strong Stable No 
Salisbury Whole 26 3.03 0.34 MulU strong Stable Yes 
Scartxirough Whole 26 3.08 0.49 MulU strong Stable No 
Stafford Whole 26 3.12 0.40 MulU strong Stable No 
Boston Whole 26 3.22 0.38 MulU strong Stable No 
Stroud Partial 26 3.23 0.48 MulU strong Stable No 
Castle Morpeth Whole 26 3.34 0.32 MulU strong Stable No 
Cleethorpes Whole 22 3.43 0.18 MulU strong Stable No 
Tynedate Whole 26 3.44 0.34 Multi Strong Stable No 
N 22 Contd..../ 
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Alnwick Whole 26 2.79 0.82 Multi Strong Unstable Yes 
Wychavon Whole 26 2.83 0.53 MutU Strong Unstable No 
Weymouth & Portland Partial 26 2.84 0.50 MulU Strong Unstable No 
West Oxfordshire Partial 26 2.84 0.67 Multi Strong Unstable No 
Havant Partial 26 2.85 0.55 MulU Sbt)ng Unstable No 
Maidstone Partial 26 2.95 0.51 MulU Strong Unstable No 
Kettering Whole 26 2.97 0.60 Multi Sbx)ng Unstable No 
West Undsey Partial 26 3.00 0.56 MulU Stronn Unstable Yes 
N 30 8 
Malvern Hills Whole 26 2.50 0.29 MulU Weak Stable No 
Three Rivers Partial 26 2.50 0.31 MulU Weak Stable Yes 
Taunton Deane Whole 26 2.51 0.22 MulU Weak Stable Yes 
Congteton Partial 26 2.51 0.31 MulU Weak Stable Yes 
l^ncaster Whole 26 2.51 0.48 MulU Weak Stable No 
Allerdale Whole 26 2.54 0.25 MulU Weak Stable No 
Macclesfield Partial 26 2.55 0.42 MulU Weak Stable No 
Mendip Whole 26 2.58 0.35 Multi Weak Stable No 
Pendle Partial 26 2.58 0.35 MulU Weak Stable Yes 
Vale Royal Whole 26 2.59 0.42 MulU Weak Stable No 
Swale Partial 26 2.62 0.32 MulU Weak Stable No 
Carrlck Whole 26 2.63 0.41 MulU Weak Stable Yes 
Forest Of Dean Whole 26 2.65 0.42 MulU Weak Stable No 
Medina Whole 22 2.67 0.49 Multi Weak Stable Yes 
North Kesteven Whole 26 2.68 0.45 MulU Weak Stable No 
Maldon Whole 26 2.69 0.39 MulU Weak Stable No 
Ashfbrd Whole 26 2.69 0.41 MulU Weak Stable No 
Selby Whole 26 2.69 0.29 Multi Weak Stable No 
Basingstoke & Oeane Partial 26 2.71 0.36 MulU Weak Stable No 
Sedgemoor Whole 26 2.72 0.34 MulU Weak Stable No 
Elmbrldge Partial 26 2.74 0.45 Multi Weak Stable No 
N 
West Dorset Whole 26 2.51 0.76 MulU Weak 
21 
Unstable No 
Berwick Upon Tweed Whole 26 2.54 0.77 Multi Weak Unstable No 
South Oxfordshire Whole 26 2.55 0.51 Multi Weak Unstable No 
Tendring Whole 26 2.65 0.53 MulU Weak Unstable No 
Kerrier Whole 26 2.69 0.61 MulU Weak Unstable No 
N 56 26 5 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.4.1 Typical Single-Party Systems in English Shire District Councils. 
The shire districts provide an ideal opportunity to study single-party systems. The 
typology identifies 18 authorities with such systems. Eden in Cumbria is classed as a 
single-party system that was strong and stable (mean N s = l . l l , s.d.=0.l5). Eden is, 
however, a peculiar case in that it is one of the only authorities to be controlled 
exclusively by Independents. Between 1973 and 1998, none of the main three parties 
has ever held a majority or plurality of seats. No less than 84% of the seats were won 
by Independent candidates at any election with Ns ranging only from 1 to 1.49. 
Independents, according to Railings and Thrasher (1997: 142), are much more likely 
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to be elected in rural wards with a below average electorate size. This is certainly the 
case for Eden where residents have little choice of candidate. Since 1973, out of 352 
candidates, only 31 were from the three main parties. 
Given the lack of national parties, to what extent can Eden be considered as a single-
party system? Do the Independent councillors behave as i f they are a party, that is, 
working together towards common goals? Do voters identify Independents in Eden as 
a coherent party group? We have no way to determine these questions using our data. 
The model has, however, highlighted the exceptional case of Eden as being worthy of 
further study. 
Table 5-12 - Number of Elected Parties for Eden Shire District Council from 
1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH on. Ns 
1973 0 0 0 37 IND 1.00 
1979 0 1 0 36 IND 1.06 
1983 0 0 0 37 IND 1.00 
1987 1 0 0 36 IND 1.06 
1991 0 0 4 33 IND 1.24 
1995 0 2 4 31 IND 1.40 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
The single party system in Harlow is classed as weak but stable (mean Ns=1.4, 
s.d.=0.15). During this period, however, the Labour party has always held overall 
control of the council, with no less that 76% of seats held by the party at any one time. 
Although the elected number of parties ranged from 1.15 to only 1.63 the figure was 
over the 1.5 threshold for eight years in the period under examination. This is 
particularly interesting, as the MP for Harlow was a Conservative until the landslide 
parliamentary elections of 1997. We might expect, therefore, that the level of 
competition between the two parties would be high in the local elections. This 
appears not to be the case. The average difference in vote share between the two 
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parties is over 30 points for the period. Railings & Thrasher (1997: 161), hypothesise 
that many electors in Harlow, "desire different policy outcomes from the two types of 
election and adjust their vote accordingly". 
Table 5-13 - Number of Elected Parties for Harlow District Council from 1973 to 
1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 0 38 4 0 LAB 1.21 
1976 3 35 4 0 LAB 1.41 
1979 6 35 1 0 LAB 1.40 
1980 7 33 2 0 LAB 1.54 
1982 3 34 5 0 LAB 1.48 
1983 3 34 4 1 LAB 1.49 
1984 4 33 5 0 LAB 1.56 
1986 2 36 4 0 LAB 1.34 
1987 2 37 3 0 LAB 1.28 
1988 4 35 3 0 LAB 1.41 
1991 6 33 3 0 LAB 1.56 
1992 7 32 3 0 LAB 1.63 
1994 6 33 3 0 LAB 1.56 
1995 2 37 3 0 LAB 1.28 
1996 0 39 3 0 LAB 1.15 
1998 1 38 3 0 LAB 1.21 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
The party system in Harlow provides evidence to support the hypothesis that single 
party systems are likely to be stable due to the inherent electoral homogeneity of the 
authority. I f voters in Eden view the Independents as a coherent party then this would 
support the hypothesis also. Although such authorities do not disprove the hypothesis 
that local government elections favour two-party systems, they do demonstrate that 
the electoral system is not itself a sufficient condition for two-parties. The en-bloc 
support for a single party (or group of Independents), may well be representative of 
specific local policy desires of the electorate. 
5.4.2 Typical Two-Party Systems in English Shire District Councils 
Among die 222 shire districts classed as having two-party systems during the period, 
Welwyn Hatfield is a typical example of a strong and stable system (mean Ns=1.99, 
s.d.=0.09). The Conservatives and Labour dominated the council with the two parties 
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controlling all of the seats in the council for 22 years with the value of Ns ranging 
from 1.82 to 2.18. Although the Labour councillors had an absolute majority for 17 
years, the Conservatives as the second party, have also been very strong during those 
years, controlling the council for five years, and winning 45% of the seats on average 
over the period. 
Table 5-14 - Number of Elected Parties for Welwyn Hatfield Shire District 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTl. Ns 
1973 19 24 0 0 LAB 1.97 
1976 24 19 0 0 CON 1.97 
1978 23 20 0 0 CON 1.99 
1979 21 22 0 0 LAB 2.00 
1980 18 25 0 0 LAB 1.95 
1983 19 24 0 0 LAB 1.97 
1986 17 24 2 0 LAB 2.13 
1987 18 23 2 0 LAB 2.16 
1988 19 22 2 0 LAB 2.18 
1990 19 24 0 0 LAB 1.97 
1991 21 26 0 0 LAB 1.98 
1992 24 23 0 0 CON 2.00 
1994 23 24 0 0 LAB 2.00 
1995 20 27 0 0 LAB 1.96 
1996 16 31 0 0 LAB 1.82 
1998 20 27 0 0 LAB 1.96 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Wycombe is among those shire districts classed as having strong but unstable two-
party systems (Ns=1.9, s.d.=0.73). The party system could be classed as multi-party 
in 1973 when the Conservatives held a bare majority with 51% of the seats. Most of 
the remaining seats were distributed between Labour and Independents resulting in 
Ns=2.79. Between 1976 and 1990, however. Conservatives controlled 85-90% of the 
seats. The loss of seats by the party in 1991, resulted in a two-party system, and 
further gains by Labour and the Liberals in 1995 again produced a multi-party system 
that lasted until 1998. 
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Table 5-15 - Number of Elected Parties for Wycombe Shire District Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 30 12 3 14 CON 2.79 
1976 53 0 0 6 CON 1.22 
1979 52 2 0 5 CON 1.27 
1983 50 6 1 3 CON 1.41 
1987 51 4 4 1 CON 1.37 
1991 38 9 10 3 CON 2.20 
1995 24 15 18 3 NOC 3.17 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Examples of weak two-party systems also exist in the shire districts. Penwith in 
Cornwall is such, with a weak and unstable two-party system (mean Ns=2.38, 
s.d.=l. l l) . Between 1973 and 1982, there existed a single-party system with the 
number of elected parties ranging from 1.11 to 1.36. The council was dominated by 
Independents with no less then 73% of seats held by such councillors. Since then 
however, the authority has seen evidence of increasing party politicisation. Before 
1984, all of the three main parties contested less than a third of council seats. Since 
then the Liberals and Labour have, on average, contested over half the seats, while the 
Conservatives contested over two-thirds. In 1973 there were almost two Independent 
candidates for every vacancy. From 1984 onwards, however, there were on average, 
almost two vacancies to every Independent candidate. Such factors resulted in the 
transition to a weak two-party system in 1982 and subsequently into a strong multi-
party system in 1986. The number of parties continued to increase from 1986 
onwards, reaching a peak of 3.93 in 1994 and remaining high since then. The pattern 
of the party system in Penwith is similar to its higher tier authority of Cornwall. Both 
had single-party systems prior to 1980 and multi-party systems after 1986. Unlike 
Cornwall where the Liberals gained control in 1993, the seats in Penwith were more 
evenly distributed between the parties resulting in a hung authority from 1986 
onwards. 
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Table 5-16 - Number of Elected Parties for Penwith Shire District Council from 
1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 0 1 1 38 IND 1.11 
1979 4 1 0 29 IND 1.35 
1980 2 1 2 29 IND 1.36 
1982 4 1 2 27 INO 1.54 
1983 5 1 2 26 IND 1.64 
1984 6 2 1 25 IND 1.74 
1986 11 5 2 16 NOG 2.85 
1987 12 5 2 15 NOG 2.90 
1988 14 7 2 11 NOG 3.12 
1990 13 10 1 10 NOG 3.12 
1991 10 13 3 8 NOG 3.38 
1992 11 10 4 9 NOG 3.64 
1994 10 9 7 8 NOG 3.93 
1995 9 6 11 8 NOG 3.83 
1996 4 9 11 10 NOG 3.64 
1998 7 6 12 9 NOG 3.73 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.4.3 Typical Multi-Party Systems in English Shire District Councils 
Among the 56 shire districts with multi-party systems, Tynedale in Northumberiand 
may be considered a typical strong (mean Ns=3.44) and stable (s.d.=0.34) system. 
The lowest number of elected parties was between 1976 and 1979 when Independents 
held a narrow council majority. Although the number of such councillors decreased 
steadily after 1976, falling to just four by 1995, this did not result in any single party 
gaining an absolute majority of seats. Tynedale is a good example of a party system 
that does not support hypothesis 1.3. Electors in Tynedale do not appear to identify a 
third party that is unable to win and therefore not worth voting for. Rather it suggests 
that once established, a multi-party system may not conform to Duverger's law. 
Table 5-17 - Number of Elected Parties for Tynedale Shire District Council f rom 
1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 8 11 4 22 NOG 2.96 
1976 8 11 4 24 INO 2.84 
1979 10 8 10 19 NOG 3.53 
1983 12 7 12 16 NOG 3.73 
1987 16 9 12 10 NOG 3.80 
1991 17 13 8 9 NOG 3.66 
1995 11 19 13 4 NOG 3.31 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
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The multi-party system of West Oxfordshire is as strong but unstable (mean Ns=2.84, 
s.d.=0.67). At the beginning of this period, the party system could be classed as a weak 
two-party system with 78% of seats held by Independents and Ns=1.57. The number of 
Conservative seats increased fix)m one to 20 in the elections of 1976. This dramatically 
increased Ns to 2.36 with no single party having overall control of the council. Five of 
these gains were from previous Independent councillors standing on a Conservative 
ticket. Although the Conservatives controlled the council in 1983, 1987 and 1988, the 
number of elected parties increased steadily throughout the period, reaching a high point 
of 3.94 in 1998. Hie instability of the system is due to a steady increase in the number of 
parties during the 25-year period. Rather than gravitating towards a two-party system. 
West Oxfordshire appears to have gravitated towards multi-partyism. One explanation 
for this might lie with the mass resignation of Conservative councillors over the new-right 
policies of central government (Chandler, 2001: 129). This resulted in a doubling of 
Independent councillors to 25 by 1991. The Liberals and Labour benefited as this 
number fell back to its pre-1991 value in following elections. By the end of the period 
the council seats were distributed evenly among the four groups. West Oxfordshire is a 
good example of how national politics can affect the party systems of local government. 
Table 5-18 - Number of Elected Parties for West Oxfordshire Shire District 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 1 8 1 35 IND 1.57 
1976 20 4 0 21 NOG 2.36 
1979 24 5 2 18 NOG 2.58 
1980 23 6 2 18 NOG 2.69 
1982 24 6 5 14 NOG 2.88 
1983 25 5 5 14 CON 2.76 
1984 23 4 8 14 NOG 2.98 
1986 22 4 10 13 NOG 3.12 
1987 25 3 9 12 CON 2.80 
1988 26 4 6 13 GON 2.68 
1991 11 6 7 25 IND 2.89 
1992 15 6 8 20 NOG 3.31 
1994 13 6 12 18 NOG 3.57 
1995 12 9 13 15 NOG 3.88 
1996 9 11 14 15 NOG 3.85 
1998 14 10 12 13 NOG 3.94 
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Source: British Local Elections Database. 
West Dorset is also an example of a multi-party system that does not appear to be 
tending towards a two-party system. Unlike West Oxfordshire, however, the 
authority is classed as weak and unstable (mean Ns=2.51, s.d.=0.76). Both Labour 
and the Conservatives were marginalised towards the beginning of the period. 
Independent councillors dominated between 1973 and 1979, with no less than 78% of 
the seats going to these candidates and the Liberals were the second largest party until 
1983. This is reflected in the number of parties being 1.55 in 1973 and 1.46 in 1976. 
Since 1979 however, the number of Independent councillors decreased steadily as the 
number of seats won by die three main parties increased. It has been the Conservative 
and Liberal councillors that have benefited more from the decrease in Independents. 
The number of Labour councillors increased only from two to five after 1979 and 
went down to just one in 1983. 
Table 5-19 - Number of Elected Parties for West Dorset Shire District Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Na 
1973 0 2 10 43 (NO 1.55 
1976 2 1 7 45 IND 1.46 
1979 8 2 8 37 INO 2.02 
1983 15 1 6 33 IND 2.24 
1984 17 1 6 • 31 IND 2.35 
1986 11 2 8 34 IND 2.25 
1987 14 3 13 25 NOC 3.03 
1991 18 5 11 21 NOC 3.32 
1995 18 5 13 19 NOC 3.44 
1997 20 5 12 18 NOC 3.39 
1998 19 5 13 18 NOC 3.44 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.4.4 Third Party Success in English Shire District Councils 
The Liberals in the shire districts never gained control of authorities classed as single-
party. Change in control in a single-party system could only occur i f another party 
almost instantly succeeded the dominant one. Any gradual change in the controlling 
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party would result in the party system becoming a two-party system, as both would 
coexist during the transformation. Evidence from the shire districts suggests that it is 
difficult for the Liberals to quickly gain control of an authority dominated by a single 
party. 
Liberal Success did occur in districts classed as two-party. Aylesbury Vale 
(Buckinghamshire) is one such with a mean Ns=2.48. The system is also classed as 
stable with a standard deviation of just 0.14. Independent councillors controlled the 
council towards the beginning of the period, but their number was reduced from 31 to 
18 in the 1976 elections as Conservative councillors increased from 11 to 29. The 
following elections saw the beginning of a 12-year Conservative administration. 
Aylesbury Vale experienced dramatic socioeconomic changes during this time. 
Between 1971 and 1991 the county of Buckinghamshire had the fastest population 
growth in the UK (around 30%). This population increase was not distributed evenly 
however, as a local political coalition - made up of action groups, local residents and 
councillors - rigorously campaigned for the protection of the green belt and areas of 
outstanding natural beauty in the south of the county. As a result, the more northeriy 
district of Aylesbury Vale received much of the increase in population and housing 
(Murdoch et al, 2000: 205). Such changes are unlikely to have helped the 
Independent candidates, as new migrants may not have the same background 
knowledge of these candidates as longer-term residents, and therefore may be more 
likely to identify with one of the mainstream parties instead. In attempting to deal 
with the increased pressure upon local authority services, the Conservative council 
proposed to invite private tenders for refuse collection during the 1980s. The threat of 
joint industrial action however, was sufficient for the council to drop the scheme 
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(Hoiliday, 2000: 177). Such strong feeling towards local issues coupled with a 
decrease in Conservative support and lack of Labour presence provided ideal ground 
for Liberal success in Aylesbury Vale. The party quickly replaced Independents as 
the second largest group winning almost twice as many seats as these candidates in 
1987 and gaining control of the authority in 1995. 
Table 5-20 - Number of Elected Parties for Aylesbury Vale Shire District Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTU Ns 
1973 11 12 0 31 IND 2.38 
1976 29 9 2 18 NOG 2.69 
1979 33 8 1 16 CON 2.39 
1983 34 4 5 15 CON 2.37 
1987 34 2 14 8 CON 2.37 
1991 28 1 21 8 NOG 2.61 
1995 12 5 33 8 LIB 2.54 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Success for the Liberals also occurred in some multi-party systems. In Taunton 
Deane, the Conservatives were the strongest party from 1973 to 1991, with majority 
control throughout most of the period. The authority is classed, however, as weak but 
stable, with a mean Ns of 2.51 (s.d.=0.22) placing it just over the multi-party 
threshold. When it came. Liberal success was extremely sudden. The party held no 
seats on the council until 1983 when they gained a single seat. In the following 
elections of 1987 the Liberals increased their seats to 15 and then to 29 in 1991. In 
the elections of 1991, 15 Conservative councillors lost their seats on the council, 
while the Liberals enjoyed an increase of almost the same amount from 15 to 29, 
giving overall control of the council to what had been the third party. The Liberals 
managed to sustain their majority to 1998, which meant that the council has only been 
hung for a total of three years during the period under study. 
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Table 5-21 - Number of Elected Parties for Taunton Deane Shire District Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 22 13 0 13 NOG 2.80 
1976 26 11 0 11 GON 2.51 
1979 26 14 0 9 GON 2.52 
1983 32 10 1 6 GON 2.07 
1987 28 7 15 3 CON 2.63 
1991 13 7 29 4 LIB 2.61 
1995 14 7 29 3 LIB 2.57 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
The shire districts provide enough cases for chi-square to be an appropriate statistic 
for gauging the extent to which the Liberals performed better or worse than expected 
in the different party system classifications. Testing for the relationship between the 
type of party-system and Liberal success produces a two-tailed significance of 0.09 
(X^ =4.77, d.f =2), which is statistically significant at the 10% level. This figure is not 
entirely unexpected as the party failed to gain control of any districts classed as 
single-party when the expected number should have been four. From this we can 
deduce that it is far more difficuU than would normally be expected, for a third party 
to completely replace a dominant party in a shire districts. We would have expected 
the Liberals to gain control of 11 authorities with multi-party systems and they 
actually gained control of 12. They also gained control of 44 authorities with two-
party systems when we expected only 37. The party performed slightly better than 
expected, therefore, in both multi-party and two-party systems. 
When focussing upon Liberal success in strong and stable two-party systems, the 
party also appears to perfomi better than expected. Of the 95 systems classed in this 
way the Liberals won 22 (expected=19), of the remaining 201 the party won 37 
(expected=40). Calculating the chi-square statistic (x^  =0.912, d.f.=2) however, 
provides a two-tailed significance of 0.34. The difference in observed and expected 
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frequencies is not significantly different to what might occur by chance. The shire 
districts provide only some evidence to support hypothesis 1.4. 
5.4.5 A Summary of Party Systems in English Shire District Councils. 
The typical examples of party systems in the shire districts suggest that the method of 
classification is appropriate for this type of authority. The two-party classification 
was by far the largest with only a quarter of the authorities classed as single or multi-
party. Evidence frum the shire districts certainly supports the hypothesis that plurality 
elections in English local government favour two-party systems. The typology 
allowed us to identify single-party systems such as Eden and Harlow, reflecting well, 
the strength and stability of these party systems. Al l of the 18 single-party systems 
were classed as stable, supporting hypothesis 1.2 that single party systems in English 
local government tend to be stable. The remaining multi-party systems were found to 
be stronger than expected. Over half of these authorities were classed as strong. 
Evidence from the shire districts does not, therefore, support hypothesis 1.3 that 
multi-party systems in local government tend to be weak. The majority of multi-party 
systems in the districts do not appear, therefore, to be gravitating towards a two-party 
system. The success of the Liberals in strong and stable two-party systems initially 
appeared to be slightly better than expected. This difference, however, was shown to 
be no more than might normally occur by chance and we cannot, therefore, accept the 
hypothesis that authorities won by the Liberals wil l tend to have strong and stable 
party-systems. The party appears to be successful equally in party systems that are 
stable to those that are unstable. Evidence fh>m the shires suggests, therefore, that the 
Liberals can build gradually upon support, rather than having to win quickly. The 
mixture of electoral cycles allowed us to examine also the relationship between this 
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aspect of the electoral system and party system. We found that the proportion of 
stable party systems in authorities holding partial-council elections was, greater than 
in those holding whole council elections. Although the difTerence is small, this 
supports hypothesis 1.5, suggesting that whole-council elections result in greater 
changes in council composition than partial-council elections. 
5.5 Party Systems in Metropolitan Borough Councils 
The classifications of the party systems in the 36 metropolitan boroughs are shown in 
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Table 5-22. As with the shire counties and districts the majority of councils (24) are 
classed as two-party systems. Of the remaining 12 authorities, seven are classed as 
single party systems and five as multi-party systems. The metropolitan boroughs 
appear, therefore, to support the hypothesis that plurality elections in local 
government favour two-party systems. 
Among the seven single-party systems, only Rotherham in South Yorkshire is classed 
as strong and stable, with the remaining six being weak but stable. There were no 
unstable single-party systems for the metropolitan boroughs during this period. This 
supports hypothesis 1.2 that single-party systems tend to be stable. The majority of 
multi-party systems were classed as weak with three of these being stable and one 
being unstable. The one remaining borough, Stockport, is strong and stable. This 
supports hypothesis 1.3 that multi-party systems tend to be weak although the 
numbers are rather small. 
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Table 5-22 - Party Systems in the MetropoHtan Boroughs 



























































N 7 6 6 
SL Helens 26 1.77 0.26 Two strong Stable No 
Sheffield 26 1.78 0.15 Two Strong Stable No 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 26 1.90 0.38 Two Strong Stable No 
Bury 26 1.92 0.31 Two Strong Stable No 
Dudley 26 1.96 0.22 Two Strong Stable No 
Bolton 26 1.96 0.20 Two Strong Stable No 
Wolverhampton 26 2.03 0.22 Two Strong Stable No 
Bradford 26 2.05 0.19 Two Strong Stable No 
Otdham 26 2.07 0.29 Two Strong Stable No 
Leeds 26 2.13 0.34 Two Strong Stable No 
Bimilngham 26 2.14 0.17 Two Strong Stable No 
Trafford 26 2.14 0.30 Two Strong Stable No 
North Tyneside 26 2.21 0.28 Two Strong Stable No 
N 13 13 
Tameside 26 1.56 0.31 Two Weak Stable No 
Doncaster 26 1.56 0.33 Two Weak Stable No 
Sunderland 26 1.59 0.28 Two Weak Stable No 
South Tyneside 26 1.61 0.46 Two Weak Stable No 
Manchester 26 1.63 0.24 Two Weak Stable No 
Coventry 26 1.64 0.24 Two Weak Stable No 
Sandwell 26 1.73 0.25 Two Weak Stable No 
Wirral 26 2.37 0.22 Two Weak Stable No 
Kirklees 26 2.40 0.27 Two Weak Stable No 
Liverpool 26 2.46 0.31 Two Weak Stable Yes 
Rochdale 26 2.50 0.29 Two Weak Stable No 
N 24 11 11 
Stockport 26 2.78 0.41 MulU Strong Stable No 
N 1 1 
Calderdate 26 2.50 0.34 MulU Weak Stable No 
Sefton 26 2.58 0.33 Multi Weak Stable No 
Walsall 26 2.74 0.43 MultJ Weak Stable No 
N 
Solihull 26 2.50 0.61 MutU Weak 
3 
Unstable No 
N 5 4 1 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.5.1 Typical Single-Party Systems in Metropolitan Borough Councils. 
Among the seven single-party systems, only Rotherham in South Yorkshire was 
classed as strong and stable (mean Ns=1.16, s.d.=0.12). The Labour party controlled 
the council for the entire period with no less than 81% of the seats going to these 
candidates at any one time while the value of Ns ranged only from 1.03 to 1.46. An 
additional 12 seats were contested in the 1980 elections after the boundary changes. 
Labour candidates won all of these seats and since then the party has held at least 90% 
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of the total council seats. Rotherham is a good example where local culture has 
helped to create a self-identity for the local authority. According to Stewart (2000: 
21), such identities have a life of their own and may represent the past rather than the 
present. Even though no longer a mining area, the leadership in Rotherham referred 
to the authority as i f it were still a mining community. Despite a large reduction in 
the number of working class residents, Rotherhams's party system still appears to 
reflect that of a traditional mining community, providing perhaps, some explanation 
of why other parties are reluctant to contest seats in the authority^. 
Table 5-23 - Number of Elected Parties for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 3 50 0 1 LAB 1.16 
1975 7 44 0 3 LAB 1.46 
1976 6 45 0 3 LAB 1.41 
1978 6 46 0 2 LAB 1.35 
1979 4 50 0 0 LAB 1.16 
1980 3 63 0 0 LAB 1.10 
1982 4 61 1 0 LAB 1.17 
1983 4 60 2 0 LAB 1.20 
1986 2 63 1 0 LAB 1.10 
1987 1 62 2 1 LAB 1.13 
1991 1 65 0 0 LAB 1.03 
1992 2 64 0 0 LAB 1.06 
1994 3 63 0 0 LAB 1.10 
1995 2 64 0 0 LAB 1.06 
1996 1 65 0 0 LAB 1.03 
1998 1 65 0 0 LAB 1.03 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Gateshead (Tyne and Wear) is among those single-party systems classed as weak and 
stable (mean Ns= 1.44, s.d.=0.19). The Labour party controlled the council for the 
entire period, but unlike Rotherham, the party did not totally dominate, holding less 
than 75% of the seats in 19 of the 26 years examined. Towards the beginning of the 
period those seats not held by Labour went mainly to the Conservatives. 
On only four occasions between 1973 and 1998, was every seat contested in Rotherham. 
Contestation was even lower in the poll tax elections of 1990. The Labour party was 
unchallenged in nine of the 22 wards. 
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Conservative strength has decreased steadily since the reorganisation in 1982, with 
the Liberals replacing them as the second largest party towards the end of the period. 
Table 5-24 - Number of Elected Parties for Gateshead Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 6 71 0 1 LAB 1.20 
1975 10 65 2 1 LAB 1.41 
1976 13 59 4 2 LAB 1.66 
1978 14 56 5 3 LAB 1.81 
1979 11 57 6 4 LAB 1.78 
1980 11 61 4 2 LAB 1.58 
1982 8 55 1 2 LAB 1.41 
1983 7 56 1 2 LAB 1.37 
1984 7 57 1 1 LAB 1.32 
1986 5 59 2 0 LAB 1.24 
1987 4 58 3 1 LAB 1.28 
1990 2 60 4 0 LAB 1.20 
1991 1 60 5 0 LAB 1.20 
1992 1 56 7 2 LAB 1.37 
1994 1 51 12 2 LAB 1.58 
1995 1 50 13 2 LAB 1.63 
1998 0 51 15 0 LAB 1.54 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.5.2 Typical Two-Party Systems in Metropolitan Borough Councils 
Bradford is a typical example of a two-party system that is strong and stable (mean 
Ns=2.05, s.d.=0.19). Labour and Conservative councillors dominated with no more 
than 10% of the seats being held by other parties - the value of Ns ranges only from 
1.54 to 2.27. The Conservatives controlled the council from 1973 to 1980. Their 
number decreased after 1980, as the number of Labour councillors increased to 71 in 
1996. In only two of the last 13 years of the period under study, did Labour not 
control Bradford with the party holding over 77% of the total seats on the council in 
1996 and 1997. The Conservatives were still relatively strong, however. Only 
Birmingham had a higher number of Conservative councillors than Bradford between 
1981 and 1995. The prolonged strength of the party might be due partly to the 
geographical make-up of the authority itself Unlike many urban boroughs the 
boundaries of Bradford extend far beyond the core cities into more traditional 
Conservative rural areas and mooriand (Stewart, 2000: 73). The internal politics of 
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the authority might also help explain the party's relative strength. The Conservatives, 
in the early 1980s, had a very close working relationship with Labour in Bradford. 
The two parties formed a pact whereby Labour agreed to a Conservative minority 
administration to prevent a small number of Liberal councillors from controlling the 
balance of power (Leach et al, 1991: 79). Such a close relationship may well have 
lessened in Bradford, the losses experienced by the Conservatives in other authorities. 
Table 5-25 - Number of Elected Parties for Bradford Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 53 31 9 0 CON 2.25 
1975 57 28 8 0 CON 2.11 
1976 61 27 5 0 CON 1.93 
1978 60 28 4 1 CON 1.97 
1979 51 38 4 0 CON 2.13 
1980 37 50 3 0 LAB 2.09 
1982 42 42 6 0 NOC 2.27 
1983 43 41 6 0 NOG 2.27 
1984 44 40 6 0 NOC 2.27 
1986 36 51 3 0 LAB 2.07 
1987 38 49 3 0 LAB 2.10 
1988 44 44 2 0 NOC 2.09 
1990 40 48 2 0 LAB 2.07 
1991 35 53 2 0 LAB 2.01 
1992 38 50 2 0 LAB 2.05 
1994 35 51 4 0 LAB 2.11 
1995 27 59 4 0 LAB 1.92 
1996 13 71 6 0 LAB 1.54 
1997 14 70 6 0 LAB 1.58 
1998 18 65 7 0 LAB 1.76 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Coventry (West Midlands) was classed as a weak but stable two-party system (mean 
Ns=1.64, s.d.=0.24). Although Labour controlled for most of the period, the 
Conservatives were relatively strong towards the beginning, gaining the council 
briefly in 1978. The combined share of the seats for the two parties has never fallen 
below 96%. The niunber of Conservative seats fell dramatically, however, from 23 to 
15 in 1980, recovered slightly in 1982, only to fall again in 1986 to 13 seats. Labour 
councillors throughout the latter half of the period, consolidated their control of 
Coventry. The elected number of parties indicates a single-party system for seven of 
the last 11 years. 
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Table 5-26 - Number of Elected Parties for Coventry Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 12 42 0 0 LAB 1.53 
1975 21 33 0 0 LAB 1.91 
1976 26 28 0 0 LAB 2.00 
1978 29 25 0 0 CON 1.99 
1979 23 31 0 0 LAB 1.96 
1980 15 39 0 0 LAB 1.67 
1982 19 35 0 0 LAB 1.84 
1983 21 33 0 0 LAB 1.91 
1984 20 34 0 0 LAB 1.87 
1986 13 40 1 0 LAB 1.65 
1987 11 41 2 0 LAB 1.61 
1988 10 43 1 0 LAB 1.50 
1990 9 44 1 0 LAB 1.44 
1991 8 46 0 0 LAB 1.34 
1992 12 42 0 0 LAB 1.53 
1994 13 41 0 0 LAB 1.58 
1995 11 43 0 0 LAB 1.48 
1996 4 49 0 1 LAB 1.21 
1998 7 45 0 2 LAB 1.40 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.5.3 Metropolitan Borough Councils with Multi-Party Systems 
Stockport in Greater Manchester is the only multi-party metropolitan borough classed 
as strong and stable (mean Ns=2.78, s.d.=0.41). Although so classed, the mean 
elected number of parties is very close to the weak multi-party threshold (2.75), while 
the standard deviation is close to the unstable threshold (0.5). These values reflect the 
fact that towards the beginning of the period, the Conservatives controlled the council 
for eight out of ten years. Councillors standing on a Labour or Liberal ticket have 
also been fairly strong throughout the period, resulting in the fact that no single party 
controlled the council for 18 of the years examined. Not only are levels of turnout in 
Stockport generally higher than the other metropolitan boroughs (Railings and 
Thrasher, 1994, Stewart, 2000: 133), but party contestation is much higher also. With 
three or more candidates contesting each seat in every year, only three other 
authorities (Leeds, Liverpool and Wolverhampton) had similar levels of contestation. 
Unlike the more working-class Rotherham, Stockport appears to be far less 
homogenous in terms of its cultural identity. 
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Table 5-27 - Number of Elected Parties for Stockport Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 27 16 13 4 NOC 3.08 
1975 34 12 10 4 CON 2.54 
1976 39 11 7 3 CON 2.12 
1978 40 13 4 3 CON 2.01 
1979 35 16 6 3 CON 2.36 
1980 33 22 5 3 CON 2.47 
1982 32 20 8 3 CON 2.65 
1983 30 18 12 3 NOC 2.88 
1984 28 17 15 3 NOC 3.04 
1988 24 16 18 5 NOC 3.36 
1987 22 15 22 4 NOC 3.28 
1988 22 14 24 3 NOC 3.14 
1990 18 17 25 3 NOC 3.18 
1991 17 17 26 3 NOC 3.14 
1994 13 17 30 3 NOC 2.90 
1995 10 23 27 3 NOC 2.90 
1996 2 27 31 3 NOC 2.33 
1998 3 27 30 3 NOC 2.41 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Calderdale is a typical example of those metropolitan boroughs with a weak but stable 
multi-party system (mean Ns=2.5, s.d.=0.34). The council was controlled by Labour 
for eight years, Conservatives for five years and hung for the remaining 13 years. 
During this time the elected number of parties ranged from 1.94 in 1976 - when the 
Conservative party held 67% of the seats, to 3.02 between 1984 and 1986 - when no 
one party held more than 41% of the seats. The performance of the Liberals in 
Calderdale reflects that which we would expect to find i f hypothesis 1.4 (and 
Duverger) was correct. The party gradually increases its strength, fails to gain control 
of the council, and thus loses support to the established parties. A loss of support by 
Labour, after its parliamentary victory in 1997, appears to have benefited the Liberals, 
however. 
Table 5-28 - Number of Elected Parties for Calderdale Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 18 28 5 0 LAB 2.30 
1975 28 18 5 0 CON 2.30 
1976 34 13 4 0 CON 1.94 
1978 34 11 6 0 CON 1.98 
1979 26 17 7 1 CON 2.56 
ConW-.y 
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YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Na 
1980 23 22 9 0 NOC 2.67 
1982 22 23 9 0 NOC 2.67 
1983 20 22 11 1 NOC 2.90 
1984 16 22 15 1 NOC 3.02 
1986 15 22 16 1 NOC 3.02 
1987 16 24 14 0 NOC 2.84 
1988 18 26 10 0 NOC 2.65 
1990 20 29 5 0 LAB 2.30 
1991 21 28 5 0 LAB 2.33 
1992 25 22 7 0 NOC 2.52 
1994 23 22 7 2 NOC 2.74 
1995 17 28 7 2 LAB 2.59 
1996 8 37 8 1 LAB 1.95 
1997 8 36 9 1 LAB 2.02 
1998 13 28 12 1 LAB 2.66 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
The only metropolitan borough council classed as having a weak and unstable multi-
party system was Solihull (mean Ns=2.5, s.d.=0.61). The instability of the party-
system is apparent. Despite the fact that the Conservatives controlled the council for 
18 consecutive years from 1973 (Ns being only 1.64 in 1978), the elected number of 
parties increased after 1984, resulting in a strong multi-party system towards the end 
of the period. In 1985 the Conservatives controlled five of the 32 metropolitan 
boroughs, by 1986 Solihull was the only one remaining (Gyford et al, 1989: 307). 
Although Liberals are generally the partners in a coalition with Conservatives, in 
Solihull after 1991, it was the Ratepayers (Stewart, 2000: 162-3). The previous 
Conservative administration's policies - including financial devolution of some 
schools in 1981 (Young & Rao, 1997: 286) - resulted in the lowest per-head spending 
on primary and secondary education, of all the metropolitan boroughs (Game & 
Leach, 1994: 108). This made them ideal coalition partners for the Ratepayers! 
Despite such policies, the Conservative administration was perceived as relatively 
*wet' (in Thatcherite terms). After the abolition of the metropolitan counties, some 
services provided by this tier were provided by joint arrangements between the 
metropolitan boroughs. Although this might have caused conflict between Solihull 
and the Labour controlled metropolitan authorities. Solihull worked well with these 
194 
authorities (Leach et al, 1991). The accommodating nature of the authority might 
explain why the Conservative administration survived longer than in Sefton or Bury. 
Table 5-29 - Number of Elected Parties for Solihull Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON UVB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 28 12 2 9 CON 2.57 
1975 30 12 2 7 CON 2.37 
1976 34 12 1 4 CON 1.97 
1978 38 12 0 1 CON 1.64 
1980 36 13 0 2 CON 1.77 
1982 33 12 2 4 CON 2.08 
1983 34 12 2 3 CON 1.98 
1984 33 13 1 4 CON 2.04 
1986 28 14 2 7 CON 2.52 
1987 28 14 3 6 CON 2.54 
1988 29 14 4 4 CON 2.43 
1990 27 15 5 4 CON 2.61 
1991 23 16 6 6 NOC 3.04 
1992 24 15 6 6 NOC 2.98 
1994 22 15 8 6 NOC 3.22 
1995 21 14 10 6 NOC 3.36 
1996 16 16 12 7 NOC 3.69 
1998 20 17 11 3 NOC 3.18 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5,5-4 Third Party Success in Metropolitan Borough Councils 
Liverpool was the only metropolitan borough gained by the Liberals prior to 1998. 
Classed as weak but stable (mean Ns=2.46, s.d.=0.31), the authority had the highest 
proportion of Liberal councillors (48.5%) of any English local authority in 1973 
(Eastbourne excluded). Before gaining the authority in 1998, the Liberals were the 
second largest party with an average seat share of 38.5%. This process of 
entrenchment, began in the 1960s with the emergence of community politics in the 
form of the Focus leaflets. The 1973 elections saw such leaflets distributed in every 
ward and the number of Liberal seats tripled, resulting in the Conservatives becoming 
the third party in the authority (Gyford & James, 1983: 78). Other local factors also 
influenced the party system in Liverpool. During the 1980s, the Labour party was 
infiltrated by Militant Tendency, an extreme left wing group. The activities of the 
group led to the expulsion of its members from the party in the late 1980s (Railings & 
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Thrasher, 1997: 159). This in tiun resulted in a large increase in the number of 
Independent councillors in 1992 and demonstrates the extent to which national policy 
decisions can influence the local party system. 
Table 5-30 - Number of Elected Parties for Liverpool Metropolitan Borough 
Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTL Na 
1973 9 42 48 0 NOC 2.36 
1975 14 42 43 0 NOC 2.57 
1976 17 42 40 0 NOC 2.68 
1978 24 40 35 0 NOC 2.88 
1979 23 46 30 0 NOC 2.76 
1980 21 40 38 0 NOC 2.81 
1982 21 42 36 0 NOC 2.80 
1983 18 51 30 0 LAB 2.56 
1984 13 58 28 0 LAB 2.27 
1986 7 55 37 0 LAB 2.21 
1987 4 51 44 0 LAB 2.15 
1988 2 56 39 2 LAB 2.10 
1990 2 67 28 2 LAB 1.86 
1991 2 63 27 7 LAB 2.06 
1992 2 38 37 22 NOC 2.97 
1994 2 45 43 9 NOC 2.48 
1995 2 49 43 5 NOC 2.29 
1996 1 51 41 6 LAB 2.27 
1998 0 39 52 8 LIB 2.29 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.5.5 A Summary of Party Systems in Metropolitan Borough Councils. 
Evidence from the metropolitan boroughs provided mixed results. The majority of 
party systems (24) are two-party supporting hypothesis 1.1 that the use of simple 
plurality favours two-party systems. Al l of the single-party systems are classed as 
stable. The typical examples of single-party systems that are strong (Rotherham), or 
weak (Gateshead) support hypothesis 1.2 and highlights the difficulty other parties 
have in these relatively homogenous areas. With the exception of Stockport, all the 
multi-party systems support hypothesis 1.3. The experience of the Liberals in 
Calderdale is a particularly good example of an authority that supports the 
proposition. After gradually increasing their share of the seats, the party lost ahnost 
two-thirds between 1988 and 1990, and the authority reverted back to a two-party 
system. With only one Liberal authority in the metropolitan boroughs, it is difficult to 
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test hypothesis 1.4. The initial strength of the party at the beginning of the period and 
problems associated with the left-wing militant party, however, is not generally 
typical of the metropolitan boroughs. Nevertheless, the Liberal's success in Liverpool 
appears to contradict the hypothesis that the party will tend to gain authorities with 
strong and stable two-party systems. The Liberal's brand of community politics 
appears, in Liverpool at least, able to overcome the effects of the plurality system. 
5.6 Party Systems in London Borough Councils 
Among the 32 London borough councils, the majority (27, or 84%) can be classed as 
two-party, with an average number of elected parties between 1.5 and 2.5. Of the 
remainder, four are classed as single-party, while only one is classed as multi-party. 
Two-party systems in London, to a greater extent than other types of authority 
examined, appear , to be the norm. Of the single-party systems, only Newham is 
classed as strong and stable, the remaining four being classed as weak but stable. 
Evidence from London appears to support both hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. Havering is 
the only London borough classed as multi-party. Although classed as weak but 
stable, supporting hypothesis 1.3, no conclusions can be drawn from only a single 
authority. 
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Table 5-31 - Party Systems in London Borough Councils 




26 1.12 0.10 
26 1.30 0.33 




26 1.38 0.40 
26 1.76 0.36 
Croydon 26 1.76 0.27 
Westminster 26 1.78 0.17 
Hammersmith & Fulham 26 1.80 0.32 
Redbridge 26 1.81 0.40 
Hounslow 26 1.81 0.18 
Bamet 26 1.84 0.34 
Hilllngdon 26 1.86 0.33 
Enfield 26 1.89 0.12 
Ealing 26 1.93 0.12 
Kingston Upon TTiames 26 2.00 0.49 
Merton 26 2.01 0.28 
Lambeth 26 2.06 0.45 
Brent 26 2.08 0.20 






26 2.24 0.45 
26 1.91 0.52 
26 1.51 0.30 
Tower Hamlets 26 1.55 0.40 
Richmond Upon Thames 26 1.59 0.35 
Haringey 26 1.65 0.30 
Greenwich 26 1.66 0.21 
Kensington & Chelsea 26 1.68 0.04 
Southwark 26 1.69 0.46 
Camden 26 1.71 0.21 
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26 2.75 0.36 
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Two-party Strong Stable 
Two^)arty Strong Stable 
Two-party Strong Stable 
TwoiJarty Strong Stable 
Two-party Strong Stable 
Two-party Strong Stable 
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Twoi)arty Weak Stable 
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Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.6.1 Typical Single-Party Systems in London Borough Councils 
Newham is the only single-party system classed as strong and stable (mean Ns=1.12, 
s.d.=0.1). Labour dominated the council with no less than 87% of the seats going to 
the party at any time, and the elected number of parties ranging only from 1 to 1.29. 
Compared with other London boroughs, levels of contestation are low in Newham, 
with a candidate to seat ratio of less than three in every year except 1986. This is less 
than the London boroughs on the whole (see appendix four). In fact, the only 
authority with lower levels of contestation was Barking and Dagenham. Given the 
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almost total monopoly of seats by Labour (and total monopoly in 1986 and 1998), 
potential candidates may well feel it is not worth contesting these seats. 
Table 5-32 - Number of Elected Parties for Newham London Borough Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 0 63 0 7 LAB 1.22 
1974 0 61 0 9 LAB 1.29 
1976 0 57 0 3 LAB 1.10 
1982 0 54 6 0 LAB 1.22 
1986 0 60 0 0 LAB 1.00 
1990 2 57 1 0 LAB 1.11 
1994 0 59 1 0 LAB 1.03 
1998 0 60 0 0 • LAB 1.00 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Barking and Dagenham has the lowest levels of contestation of all the London 
boroughs. Like Newham, the authority has a stable single-party system. Unlike 
Newham, however, Barking and Dagenham is classed as weak (mean Ns=1.36, 
s.d=0.25). Although Labour controlled the council for the entire period, there are a 
greater number of councillors from the other parties, than in Newham. Labour did 
particularly well in the "poll-tax" elections of 1990. Barking and Dagenham was one 
of the lowest taxing Labour strongholds. Labour voters had little reason, therefore, to 
change their allegiance. Non-Labour supporters, on the other hand, had an incentive 
to switch to Labour as a sign of protest (Wilson & Game, 1998: 212). As a result, 
Labour's share of the seats increased from 73% to 92%, highlighting the effect of 
national policy upon the local party system. 
Table 5-33 - Number of Elected Parties for Barking and Dagenham London 
Borough Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 0 53 0 4 LAB 1.15 
1978 3 42 0 3 LAB 1.29 
1982 3 37 3 5 LAB 1.63 
1986 3 35 5 5 LAB 1.79 
1990 0 44 1 3 LAB 1.18 
1994 0 44 2 2 LAB 1.19 
1996 0 47 1 3 LAB 1.17 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
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5.6.2 Typical Two-Party Systems in London Borough Councils. 
Ealing is a typical example of a strong and stable two-party system (mean Ns=1.93. 
s.d.=0.12). Although traditionally Labour, with a high proportion of ethnic minorities 
and black councillors (Gyford et al, 1998: 48), control of the authority alternated 
between Labour and the Conservatives, with no more than three seats being held by 
other candidates at any time. The cycle of this alternation in Ealing is particularly 
interesting. The loss of 21 Labour seats to the Conservatives in 1978 can be 
explained by the unpopularity of the Labour government at the time. The Falklands 
conflict might also have helped reduce Conservative losses in the following 1982 
elections (Wilson & Game, 1998). Labour eventually regained the council in 1986, 
only to lose control again in 1990, the very year when the poll-tax issue should have 
benefited the party. Ealing at the time, however, was among the Mooney-left' 
councils targeted by the government and tabloid newspapers (Gyford et al, 1989: 
311). It is possible that the media attention might have softened the impact of the poll 
tax upon the Conservative vote in the authority and delayed the reversion back to a 
Labour controlled authority. The resulting party-system in Ealing is typical of that 
envisaged by Duverger under simple plurality. Although the salient issues, and thus 
choice of party, may change over time, voters in Ealing form into two distinct groups 
to express their policy desires. 
Despite contesting as many seats as the largest two-parties in 1982 and receiving over 
one-fifth of the votes in Ealing, the Liberals appear to be completely marginalised in 
terms of seats. Ealing highlights the extent to which plurality elections can 
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discriminate against the third party. The extent of such discrimination in London is 
examined in more detail in Chapter 6, 
Table 5-34 - Number of Elected Parties for Ealing London Borough Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 25 45 0 0 LAB 1.85 
1974 24 46 0 0 LAB 1.82 
1978 41 28 0 1 CON 1.99 
1982 37 30 0 3 CON 2.15 
1986 20 47 3 0 LAB 1.87 
1990 40 30 0 0 CON 1.96 
1994 20 47 3 0 LAB 1.87 
1996 19 48 3 0 LAB 1.83 
1997 20 48 3 0 LAB 1.86 
1998 15 53 3 0 LAB 1.66 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
The London borough of Kensington and Chelsea is also interesting. It is the most 
stable two-party system within the London boroughs (mean Ns=1.68, s.d.=0.04) and 
unlike Ealing, where political control fluctuated between two parties, Conservatives 
controlled Kensington and Chelsea for the entire period. With Labour always second, 
the party system is extremely stable. For the 17 years between 1982 and 1998, there 
was no change in the political composition whatsoever. According to Stewart (2000: 
169), the party system in Kensington and Chelsea strongly reflects a socioeconomic 
division within the authority, which is sharply divided between affluent areas 
returning Conservatives and more deprived areas returning Labour (Stewart, 2000: 
169). 
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Table 5-35 - Number of Elected Parties for Kensington & Chelsea London 
Borough Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 46 24 0 0 CON 1.82 
1974 52 19 0 0 CON 1.64 
1978 39 13 0 2 CON 1.72 
1982 39 15 0 0 CON 1.67 
1998 39 15 0 0 CON 1.67 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
Figure 5-1 illustrates that this social division also reflects a class cleavage within the 
authority. Using data from the 1991 census, it divides the wards into those where the 
majority of residents are categorised as middle class (social classes 1, 2 and 3N) or 
working class. A clear division is apparent in the north of the authority with the five 
most northerly wards all being categorised as working class and all returning a full 
slate of Labour councillors. The wards of South Stanley and Church are also classed 
as working class. While since 1978, South Stanley has returned a full slate of Labour 
councils in every election, Church always returned a full slate of Conservatives. 
South Stanley, however, adjoins a large working class area in the adjacent borough. 
South Stanley's immediate neighbour in Hammersmith and Fulham is Sands End, 
which also traditionally returns only Labour councillors. Church, on the other hand, 
is surrounded entirely by middle class wards. Kensington and Chelsea provides, 
therefore, not only evidence that voting behaviour is influenced by the socioeconomic 
characteristics of a ward, it supports also the argument that voting is influenced by the 
characteristics of the immediate neighbourhood (see Miller, 1991; Railings et al; 
1998). The effect of the electoral system, however, helps clearly to maintain the two-
party system in Kensington and Chelsea. I f the Liberals had been awarded the same 
proportion of seats as votes there would have been seven Liberal councillors elected 
in 1998 when the party polled 13.8% of the vote. 
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Figure 5-1 - C lass C omposition In Kensington & Chelsea 
Working Class 
Middle Class 
5.6.3 I vpical Multi-Party Systems In London Borough Councils 
Havering is the only London borough council classed as having a weak but stable 
multi-party system (mean Ns=2.75, s.d.=0.36). For 17 of the 26 years, no single party 
had overall control and the elected number of parties ranged from 2.26 to 3.33. Local 
spending issues appear to be important such as housing,, with candidates representing 
Ratepayers groups and Residents Associations being strong throughout the entire 
period. The political composition is such that it provides minor parties and 
Independents with a far greater opportunity to influence policy decisions through 
coalition formation or alliances than in single-party or two-party systems. A 
combination of such factors may cause the electorate to perceive such candidates as 
more politically relevant, resulting in increased support for the group. Indeed the loss 
of Conservative support in the "poll-tax" elections of 1990 resulted in additional seats 
for such candidates. 
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Table 5-36 - Number of Elected Parties for Havering London Borough Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CIL Ns 
1973 17 35 0 12 LAB 2.47 
1974 23 31 0 10 NOC 2.58 
1978 38 12 0 13 CON 2.26 
1982 37 12 5 9 CON 2.45 
1986 28 20 5 10 NOC 3.03 
1990 19 25 6 13 NOC 3.33 
1994 11 31 4 17 NOC 2.86 
1996 12 31 3 17 NOC 2.83 
1998 14 29 3 17 NOC 2.97 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
5.6.4 Third Party Success in London Borough Councils 
Kingston upon Thames is a good example of a London borough that supports 
hypothesis 1.4. The authority is among those two-party systems classed as strong and 
stable (mean Ns=2, s.d.=0.49). The reduction in the number of seats after the 1974 
elections appeared to damage both the Labour and Liberals. When the Liberals did 
recover, they did so extremely quickly. They held no seats in 1981, but by 1986 had 
aknost replaced the Conservatives as the largest party. Local politics is strong in 
Kingston upon Thames, the party introduced neighbourhood committees composed of 
councillors elected for their area (Stewart, 2000; Wilson & Game, 1998: 333). Such a 
view of community politics was strongly advocated in the local Liberal party's 
manifesto and according to Stewart (2000: 131), highlights how the party locally can 
make advances, while nationally they might not. 
Table 5-37 - Number of Elected Parties for Kingston upon Thames London 
Borough Council from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB UB OTH CTL 
1973 49 21 0 0 CON 1.72 
1974 48 16 6 0 CON 1.89 
1978 44 6 0 0 CON 1.27 
1982 40 3 7 0 CON 1.51 
1986 24 4 22 0 NOC 2.32 
1990 25 7 18 0 NOC 2.51 
1994 18 6 26 0 LIB 2.41 
1996 17 6 25 0 LIB 2.43 
1997 18 6 26 0 LIB 2.41 
1998 21 10 19 0 NOC 2.77 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
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The Liberals were also successful in Sutton, the only London borough with a strong 
but unstable two-party system (mean Ns=1.91, s.d=0.52). The classification of 
unstable reflects the fact that Sutton has been a single-party, two-party and multi-
party system. Unlike Kingston upon Thames, the Liberals in Sutton became the 
dominant party in what was essentially a single-party system towards the end of the 
period. Sutton provides little evidence supporting the hypothesis that they will tend to 
win authorities with strong and stable two-party systems. The party also appears able 
to win authorities in unstable systems. 
Table 5-38 - Number of Elected Parties for Sutton London Borough Council 
from 1973 to 1998. 
YEAR CON LAB LIB OTH CTL Ns 
1973 31 23 0 5 CON 2.30 
1974 33 15 7 4 CON 2.52 
1978 47 7 2 0 CON 1.39 
1982 46 7 3 0 CON 1.44 
1986 21 7 28 0 NOG 2.46 
1990 18 6 32 0 LIB 2.27 
1994 4 5 47 0 LIB 1.39 
1998 5 5 46 0 LIB 1.45 
Source: British Local Elections Database. 
As with the English shire counties, we cannot use the chi-square statistic to gauge the 
extent to which the Liberals performed better or worse than expected, for the different 
classifications of party system. The small number of London boroughs results in 50% 
or more of the cells with an expected count of less than five. Comparing the observed 
and expected frequencies of Liberal success, however, reveals that the party 
performed slightly worse than expected. As half of the London boroughs were 
classed as strong and stable, we should expect to find over half of the Liberal 
successes to be in this classification i f the hypothesis were true. Of the four 
authorities gained by the party, only one was classed as strong and stable. Evidence 
fix)m the London boroughs does not, therefore, support hypothesis 1.4. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the party systems that existed in local government between 
1973 and 1998. It developed several hypotheses - underpinned by the theoretical 
effects of the electoral system suggested by Duverger - on the expected nature of local 
party systems. The typology of party systems presented, then enabled us to gauge 
easily, the overall nature of the party system within an authority. Typical examples of 
the different classifications were highlighted and the party systems for these 
authorities were examined in greater detail, allowing us to assess i f the method of 
classification appeared appropriate. Examining the party systems in this way 
provided us with evidence to test the previously formulated hypotheses. 
The different classifications of party systems appeared to reflect accurately the party 
system for each type of authority. Stable single party systems, such as Rotherham, 
were characterised by long periods where a single party dominated the authority. 
Such dominance by a single-party was not as evident in authorities classed as two-
party (Suffolk), while the political composition of multi-party systems such as 
Cambridgeshire and West Oxfordshire appeared far more fragmented. As the 
typology reflects well, the actual party systems that existed, it was subsequently used 
to test the hypothesis for each type of authority. 
The first hypothesis tested, for local government, Duverger's general proposition that 
simple-plurality favours two-party systems. For the shire county and district councils, 
almost three-quarters are classed as having two-party systems. This figure was 
slightly lower for the metropolitan boroughs (64%) and slightly higher for the London 
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boroughs (84%). The classification of the majority of local government authorities as 
two-party systems supports, therefore, hypothesis 1.1 that the use of simple plurality 
in English local government favours two-party systems. Propositions 1.2 and 1.3 
hypothesised the expected nature of the party system for those authorities not classed 
as two-party. Proposition 1.2 stated that a single-party system - as a result of a 
homogenous electorate - would tend to be stable, despite the use of simple plurality. 
This indeed appeared to be the case as no single-party systems were classed as 
unstable. It appears, therefore, that simple plurality is not itself, a sufficient condition 
for a two-party system. Hypothsis 1.3 stated that multi-party systems would tend to 
be weak. In the shire counties, metropolitan boroughs and London boroughs, the 
majority of multi-party systems were weak, suggesting that simple plurality may push 
such authorities towards two-partyism. This effect appears to be much more 
prevalent in the metropolitan authorities. Indeed, over half of the multi-party systems 
in the shire districts were not classed as weak. Smaller parties appear far more able to 
survive in these more rural authorities. 
One factor that may explain the nature of the party system, is the electoral cycle. 
Electors in authorities holding whole-council elections have the potential to make 
large and sudden changes in political composition. We tested whether this was the 
case in the shire districts, using the hypothesis that authorities holding partial-council 
elections would be more stable than those holding whole-council elections. We found 
a larger proportion of authorities holding partial-council elections were classed as 
stable compared with authorities holding whole-council elections. Whole-council 
elections do appear, therefore, to produce much larger changes in political 
composition than partial-council elections. I f Duverger were correct then we would 
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also expect the third party to lose support after successive electoral defeats. In order 
to gain control of an authority, therefore, the party would have to make large gains 
very quickly. This phenomenon was examined by testing hypothesis 1.4 that the 
Liberals would tend to win strong and stable two-party systems. Comparing the 
observed and expected frequencies of Liberal success in such systems provided little 
evidence that this was the case. The party appears equally able to gain control of 
authorities quickly as it does over a longer period. 
The chapter has provided some evidence that the electoral system does appear to 
affect the party system in English local government. It suggested also, however, that 
these effects do not completely determine the party system. Detailed analysis of local 
authorities found that other factors were important. National issues such as the poll-
tax appear able to effect the party system at a local level (Havering), as do the actions 
of national parties (Liverpool). Local factors and characteristics also appear to be 
important in explaining the local party systems. Distinct socioeconomic divisions 
may contribute to the production of a two-party systems such as in Kensington and 
Chelsea, whereas, authorities with homogenous socioeconomic characteristics can 
produce single-party systems as in Rotherham. 
Although we found little evidence that the Liberals were any more or less successful 
in the different types of party system, there is evidence that the variations in the 
electoral system (see Chapter 2.7) - not examined in this chapter - may have some 
affect upon the party. The following chapter examines the effects of such structural 
characteristics upon the party system. 
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Chapter 6 The Effect of the Electoral System upon Party Systems in 
English Local Government 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effects of the electoral system upon party systems in 
English local government between 1973 and 1998. It begins by discussing the most 
important characteristics of electoral systems and highlights district magnitude as 
being of particular relevance to party system development. The effects of district 
magnitude are also shown to have repercussions for smaller parties such as the 
Liberals. The chapter formulates, therefore, hypotheses necessary to test the effects 
of district magnitude upon local party systems and, specifically, the fortunes of the 
Liberals. It examines each type of local authority and ascertains their suitability for 
testing the hypotheses. Following sections examine in turn, each hypothesis for the 
suitable types of local authority and highlight evidence supporting or refuting the 
hypothesis. The final section summarises the findings and draws conclusions 
regarding the effect of district magnitude upon party systems and the Liberal party in 
particular. 
6.2 District Magnitude and Plurality Elections 
According to Lijphart (1995), there is broad agreement that the two most important 
dimensions of electoral systems with major consequences for party systems are the 
electoral formula and district magnitude. Duverger's (1964) study suggested that the 
plurality electoral formula would favour two-party systems. This was examined in 
Chapter 5, which provided evidence that the use of plurality voting in English local 
government does indeed tend to produce two-party systems. The effects of district 
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magnitude (M) upon the party system were previously discussed in chapter (2), which 
highlighted the importance of this for proportionality. District magnitude is a key 
determinant of proportionality in a P.R. system. According to Lipjhart (1994: 11), the 
chances for small parties to gain representation increase dramatically as district 
magnitude rises in a P.R. system. Little research has been conducted, however, on the 
effect of district magnitude upon parties in plurality systems. Some authors have 
suggested that higher district magnitudes might exaggerate the effect of plurality 
elections (see Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, and Lijphart, 1995). Given that small 
parties are generally disadvantaged in a plurality system, we would expect increases 
in district magnitude to adversely affect the Liberals more than Conservative or 
Labour. The following discussion focuses upon both the general effects of district 
magnitude upon the party system and its more specific effect upon the Liberals. 
Differences in district magnitude may affect the party system in several ways. Not 
least of these is the amount of party competition for seats. Railings and Thrasher 
(1997: 92) identify a clear difference in party competition between shire districts with 
whole council and partial council elections, with the former being less competitive. 
District magnitude differs largely between these types of authority, and although 
suggesting a number of contributory factors for this phenomenon,* the effect of 
district magnitude upon party competition was not examined. 
' Railings and Thrasher (1997: 94) suggest that higher levels of party competition in 
authorities holding partial council elections might be explained partly by increased party 
politicisation in these more urban authorities. Wards in these authorities are also more likely 
to be compact, making it easier for parties to find candidates. They suggest also, that the 
higher frequency of contests in authorities holding partial council elections may produce more 
efficient electoral machines for parties than in authorities holding elections every four years, 
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In simple plurality elections, parties have a strong incentive not to field more than one 
candidate. So doing will likely result in votes being split between candidates, 
reducing the chance of winning the seat. This is not the case in multi-member 
plurality elections, where voters receive an equal number of votes as vacancies and 
may vote for the same party more than once. The best strategy for parties contesting 
these elections is, therefore, to field as many candidates as vacancies. As district 
magnitude increases, however, parties require greater resources in order to contest all 
of the seats. As district magnitude increases, therefore, parties may find it more 
difficult to field a fiill slate of candidates. Accordingly, we might expect to find the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2.1: As district magnitude decreases the proportion of full slates 
fielded by the main parties will decrease. 
The ability to field a full slate of candidates might vary also, however, by the ability 
of a party to attract a sufficient number of candidates prior to the election. I f 
Duverger (1964) were correct then smaller parties will be perceived by voters as 
having little chance of winning. As elections are costly for the candidate in terms of 
time and money, potential candidates may be dissuaded from standing for such parties 
i f the chance of victory is low (Cox, 1997), Increases in district magnitude may, 
therefore, result in a particular difficulty for parties such as the Liberals to recruit 
sufficient candidates to contest all available seats. In addition, smaller parties with 
limited resources may feel it more practical to concentrate those resources on fewer 
candidates than the seats available. As the Liberals are the smaller party for much of 
the period we would expect that: 
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Hypothesis 2.2; As district magnitude Increases, the proportion of full slates 
fielded by the Liberals will be disproportionately less than that for Labour and 
the Conservatives. 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Duverger (1964) and Lijphart (1995) all speculated 
that higher district magnitudes might exaggerate the effect of plurality voting. I f 
voters cast their vote along party lines, then each should cast all of their votes for 
candidates of the same party. In a multi-member plurality district, the largest voting 
bloc should, therefore, win all of the seats available. Rather than increasing 
proportionality, this might result in far greater difficulty for a third party - such as the 
Liberals - to succeed in districts holding multi-member elections. I f this were the case 
then increases in district magnitude would not lead to proportional increases in the 
number of parties elected. We would expect, therefore, evidence supporting the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2.3: The elected number of parties will not increase In proportion 
with district magnitude. 
I f the third party were particularly disadvantaged in a plurality system, then a 
disproportionately small increase in the elected number of parties as district 
magnitude rises, would more likely affect the Liberals than Conservatives or Labour. 
I f this were the case then we would expect the share of seats won by the Liberals also 
to decrease as district magnitude increased. Accordingly we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2.4; The seat share of the Liberals will decrease as district magnitude 
increases. 
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Although examining the seat shares of the main parties might provide evidence 
indicating that district magnitude disadvantages the Liberals more than Labour or 
Conservatives, it might be useful also to take account of the vote share for the parties. 
Chapter 4.4.4 discussed how such electoral discrimination could be gauged using 
measures of proportionality. I f increases in district magnitude exaggerate the effects 
of plurality elections we would expect elections with large district magnitude^ to 
produce less proportionate results. 
Hypothesis 2.5: Plurality elections with large district magnitude will be more 
disproportlonal than other elections. 
But what of the effect of district magnitude upon the proportionality of the Liberals 
seat share? Smaller parties generally receive a far lesser share of seats than votes in 
plurality elections. I f elections with large district magnitude are less proportionate, 
then we would expect that small parties would be disadvantaged the most. This being 
the case, we would expect: 
Hypothesis 2.6: Dlsproportlonality will be greater for the Liberals In authorities 
with a majority of large district magnitude elections. 
In order to test for effects of district magnitude upon local party systems it would first 
be appropriate to determine the extent to which we have suitable cases for study. 
District magnitude varies both between and within local authority types and also over 
time (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 3). Ironically, the least varied are those local 
^ Of those authorities holding multi-member elections since 1979, only a handful held 
elections with more than three vacancies (see appendix 3). For many authorities, elections 
with three vacancies are the largest they hold. We consider large district magnitude, 
therefore, to mean those elections with three or more vacancies. 
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authorities that were abolished in the 1980s. Of these, Greater London had a total of 
92 seats elected by single member wards in 1973, 1977 and 1981; the metropolitan 
counties a total of 601 seats, 511 single member wards, 36 two member wards and 54 
three member wards in 1973, 1977 and 1981. The lack of elections with large district 
magnitude in these authorities makes them unsuitable for this analysis. 
For those authorities not abolished in the 1980s, a mixture of different district 
magnitudes exists. In most years, around 45% of London borough elections had 
district magnitudes of two or less. The remaining elections had district magnitudes 
considered to be large. Since 1974 when four and five vacancy elections were held, 
the largest district magnitudes were mainly in three vacancy elections. The London 
boroughs provide, therefore, an excellent opportunity to study the possible effects of 
district magnitude upon the party system. 
I f we consider M>2 to be large, then the district magnitude of elections held in shire 
district authorities towards the beginning of the period might be considered as very 
large. In 1973, 2,259 (16.7%) councillors were elected using district magnitudes of 
between 5 and 12 (see Appendix 3). Reorganisation throughout the 1970s resulted in 
a reduction of councillors in such wards. The last elections in wards using M ^ 10 
were held in 1976 and no elections have been held in wards with more than five 
vacancies since 1979. Since then only a handful of shire district elections have been 
held where M>3 and just over half (54%) of all councillors were elected in wards that 
used a single member ballot system. Such variation of district magnitude within the 
shire districts should be ideal for testing the hypotheses. 
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Although elections where M>1 were held in the shire counties, only 9% of wards 
elected councillors using multi-member ballots in 1973 and 1977. Multi-member 
wards in these authorities were reduced by almost half in 1981 and abolished 
completely after those elections. The metropolitan boroughs also held elections 
where M>1. In 1973 M=3 was used in over 95% of cases. After the 1973 
reorganisation, these authorities held partial council elections and contests since then 
were, therefore, mainly single-vacancy affairs. Exceptions to this were the whole 
council elections held after boundary reviews between 1979 and 1982. Some 
variation in district magnitude also exists where councillors retired before the end of 
their four-year term. The shire counties and metropolitan districts are not as suited to 
test the hypotheses as the London boroughs or shire districts. Those years where 
large district magnitudes were employed may, however, provide some scope for 
examining the effects of district magnitude upon the party system. 
6.3 The Effect of District Magnitude upon Party Competition 
The supposed effect of district magnitude upon party competition was stated in 
hypothesis 2.1 which asserts that the proportion of fiill slates fielded by the main 
parties will decrease as district magnitude increases. We can test this hypothesis by 
examining the percentage of wards where the three main parties fielded a ftill slate of 
candidates for each of the different district magnitudes. Finding a significant decrease 
in the percentage of ftill slates, as district magnitude increases, would provide 
evidence to support hypothesis 2.1. 
The percentage of three-party fiill slates for shire district council elections are shown 
in Table 6-1 (whole council election years are shaded). Generally, since 1978, the 
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percentage of full party slates in single vacancy elections has exceeded those with two 
vacancies. In every year, therefore, the hypothesis is supported when M increases 
from one to two. Focussing on those years when whole council elections were held 
shows that this difference is quite large with less than half the number of full slates 
when M=2 compared with M = l . Where M>2, however, the relationship no longer 
appears to hold. This is particularly true of whole council election years, when there 
are a significant number of cases where M>2. In view of this, we could not accept the 
hypothesis when M increases from two to three. In addition, wards that have very 
large district magnitudes are so few that a single high profile ward such as the 
Clitheroe ward in the Ribble Valley (M=10 in 1973) can produce possibly misleading 
results (i.e. 20% of full slate elections for district magnitudes of 10 in 1973). 
Evidence from the shire districts supports hypothesis 2.1 when M increases from one 
to two, but not when M increases from two to three. I f Railings and Thrasher (1997) 
are correct then the explanation for this non-linearity may be because three vacancy 
wards are generally more urban and more party competitive. 
Table 6-1 - Percentage of Three-Party Full Slate Elections in Shire Districts 
ElecUon District Magnitude (M) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1973 2.3 3.9 8.2 7.6 7.3 5.1 2.6 6.3 0.0 20.0 0.0 o.o! 
1976 3.1 9.6 12.7 7.7 7.7 10.1 13.0 25.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 , 0.0 
1978 35.0 25.0 0.0 
1979 s.q 5.6 8.9 10.2 15.6 22.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 
1980 46.0 32.6 0.00 
1982 74.7 72.1 
1983 35.1 22.4 24.7 0.0 25.0 
1984 66.3 37.2 100.0 
1986 74.3 51.9 23.8 
1987 46.1 28.7 28.7 50.0 0.0 
1988 60.8 46.7 100.0 
1990 57.4 45.7 14.3 
Id91 37.9 18.6 17.3 33.3 0.0 
1992 71.9 44.4 8.3 
1994 69.6 45.7 50 
1995 43.1 21.5 21.6 ' 0.0 0.0 
1996 69.5 46.5 
1997 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1998 70.8 49.1 100 
Source: Local Elections Database 
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Table 6-2 shows the impact of increasing district magnitude upon party competition 
for London borough elections. As before, the percentage of wards in which all three 
main parties fielded a full slate of candidates are consistently higher for wards with 
single seat elections than for those with larger district magnitudes. Although the 
significance of this finding is somewhat weakened by the small number of elections 
where M = l (n=16), the fact that the relationship is negative in every year leads us to 
supports the hypothesis when M increases from one to two. This relationship is not 
consistent, however, for the percentage of full slates as M increases torn two to three. 
Although, torn 1974 to 1986 the number of full slates fielded by the parties was 
lower for M=3 than M=2, the parties appeared to field more full slates in three 
member wards torn 1990 onwards. Although this supports hypothesis 2.1 for the 
beginning of the period, and also for increases in M fixjm one to two, is does not for 
increases in M fi-om two to three after 1986. The argument that the parties are 
attracted to more urban wards, as in the shire districts, hardly applies to London 
borough wards, as all are urban. Why London wards with three vacancies are more 
party competitive than wards with two vacancies after 1986 is not clear at this point. 
Table 6-2 - Percentage of Three-Party Full Slate Elections in London Boroughs 
Election 
Year 1 2 
District Magnitude (M) 
3 4 5 
1974 100.0 64.4 59.4 56.1 44.4 
1978 50.0 47.5 46.4 
1982 93.8 89.5 87.5 
1986 93.8 90.2 87.0 
1990 68.8 49.5 52.6 
1994 100.0 72.4 76.3 
1998 80.0 70.6 74.6 
Source: Local Elections Database 
With the exception of by-elections, the only years when both single and multiple 
vacancy elections occurred in the metropolitan boroughs were 1980 and 1982. In 
1980, the percentage of full slates where M = l (44.4%) was higher than those where 
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M=2 (24.1%) and M=3 (36.3%). In 1982 the percentage o f full slates where M = l 
(89.7%) was higher than those where M=2 (85.7%) and M=3 (51.4%). In both years 
less full slates were fielded for two and three vacancy elections than for those M = l . 
As with the shire districts and London boroughs, the proportion of full slates is higher 
for elections where M=3 than those where M=2. The metropolitan boroughs appear 
to support the earlier findings. 
Although in the shire counties, M>1 wards were abolished after 1981, the earlier 
period offers some scope for examining the relationship between district magnitude 
and party competition. In 1973 the proportion of three party full slates were 14.8%, 
14.7%, and 6.5% for M = l , M=2, and M=3 respectively. In 1977, the proportions 
were 29.9% where M = l , 32.2% where M=2 and 22.2% where M=3. In 1981 the 
proportions were 51.5% where M = l , 51,7% where M=2 and 28.6% where M=3. In 
each year, the difference between the percentage of full slates in single and two 
vacancy elections provides little evidence to support hypothesis 2.1. Indeed, the 
greatest difference was in 1977 when the percentage of ftill slates actually increased 
by 2.3% from single to two-vacancy elections. There were, however, far greater 
differences between the number of ftill slates fielded by the parties in elections where 
M=2 compared to those where M=3. Less than half as many three vacancy elections 
were fully contested in 1973 than were two vacancy elections. The percentage of 
three vacancy elections fiilly contested in 1977 was 10 points less than fully contested 
two vacancy elections that year. The greatest difference between fully contested three 
vacancy elections and fully contested single or two vacancy elections was in the last 
year that multi-member elections were held for the shire counties. Despite the fact 
that over 50% of elections where M = l or M=2 were ftilly contested by all three 
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parties in 1981, only 28.6% of elections where M=3 were fiilly contested, supporting 
hypothesis 2.1. 
For most types of authority, there was a significant decrease in the percentage of three 
party ftill slates when district magnitude increased fi*om one to two. The only 
exception to this was the shire districts when the decrease occurred where M 
increased fix)m two to three. Comparing the difference between single and three 
vacancy elections, shows that the percentage of fiill slates decreases in abnost every 
case. Given this evidence, it appears that hypothesis 2.1 is correct, suggesting that 
some parties do have difficulty fielding ftill slates as district magnitude increases. 
6.4 District Magnitude, Competitiveness and the Liberals 
The evidence shows that not all parties field a ftill slate of candidates and that district 
magnitude may have some effect on this. But are small parties with limited resources 
less likely to field a full slate of candidates than larger parties? Hypothesis 2.2 stated 
that the Liberals would be far less likely to contest all of the seats in wards with 
higher district magnitudes than the Conservatives and Labour. We can test this 
hypothesis by comparing the percentage of ftill slates fielded by the Liberals with that 
for the Conservatives and Labour. If, as district magnitude increases, the proportion 
of fiiU slates fielded by the Liberals decrease more than the other parties, this would 
support the hypothesis. 
The shire districts provide a large number of cases where the three main parties 
contested multiple vacancy elections. Table 6-3 shows that in those years when very 
large district magnitudes were employed (1973 and 1976), the percentage of fiill party 
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slates rises for wards with two or three vacancies^. This indicates that all three parties 
were more successful in contesting these wards. As district magnitude exceeds three 
however, the percentage of full states tends to decrease. In both years, however, the 
parties fielded a lesser percentage of full slates in elections where M = l than where 
M>1. We suggest that this supports hypothesis 2.2 for these two years. Examining 
elections since 1976 brings mixed results. In most years between 1978 and 1990, the 
percentage of Liberal full slates is lower in elections where M=2 and M=3 than in 
those where M = l . The only exception to this was in 1982 when the party fielded 
more candidates in two vacancy elections (presumably due to additional SDP 
candidates). In all cases where the percentage of Liberal full slates was lower, the 
decrease was more disproportionate than any decrease for the other parties, except in 
1986 when the Conservatives fielded a disproportionately lower percentage of 
candidates. 
Between 1991 and 1995, district magnitude appears to affect the Conservatives more 
than the Liberals. Given the general unpopularity of the Conservative government at 
the time, potential party candidates may have been dissuaded fi-om standing in some 
two or three vacancy elections. In 1997 and 1998, however, the decrease in 
percentage of Liberal full slates is disproportionately greater than that for the 
Conservatives. For 10 of the 16 elections since 1978, the findings do not contradict 
hypothesis 2.2, as the proportion of full slates was lower for the Liberals. For the 
remaining six elections, political factors might explain the higher number of full 
^ Because of the problems associated with the small number of cases highlighted in section 
6.3, only those cells that contain over 1% of cases are shown. The only authority with 
elections in 1997 (Malvem Hills) is also excluded. 
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slates. Evidence from the shire districts, therefore, generally supports hypothesis 2.2. 
It appears that increases in district magnitude generally affect the Liberal's ability, 
more than the other two parties, to field a full slate of candidates. 
Table 6-3 - Proportion of Available Vacancies Contested by Each Main Party in 
the Shire District Elections 
Election 
Year Party 1 2 3 
1973 CON 40.0 47.8 60.1 
LAB 31.1 51.9 71.4 
LD 9.3 11.1 16.0 
1976 CON 51.1 59.3 72.3 
LAB 26.7 49.3 67.8 
LD 13.1 18.5 20.6 
1978 CON 94.3 87.5 
LAB 83.5 75.0 
LD 42.1 31.3 
1979 CON 64.9 67.9 76.8 
LAB 36.5 50.3 62.8 
LD 16.1 11.8 15.6 
1980 CON 89.4 90.7 
LAB 85.8 86.0 
LD 53.0 39.5 
1982 CON 87.6 79.1 
LAB 87.4 90.7 
LD 90.0 93.0 
1983 CON 71.9 62.8 65.4 
LAB 55.8 59.5 64.5 
LO 50.5 35.4 40.2 
1984 CON 91.2 90.7 
LAB 88.6 72.1 
LD 75.3 46.5 
1986 CON 91.5 82.7 33.3 
LAB 89.8 76.9 90.5 
LD 85.0 82.7 42.9 
1987 CON 77.6 63.4 62.2 
LAB 64.1 60.5 64.2 
LD 66.3 53.0 50.9 
1988 CON 95.6 91.1 
LAB 87.8 80.0 
LD 68.0 53.3 
1990 CON 90.9 84.8 74.3 
LAB 91.5 87.0 88.6 
LD 64.6 63.0 34.3 
1991 CON 79.2 64.8 61.9 
LAB 64.1 61.1 62.6 
LD 53.7 36.9 38.7 
1992 CON 94.6 80.6 
LAB 89.9 77.8 
LD 80.0 72.2 
1994 CON 89.7 69.6 
LAB 91.7 78.3 
LD 80.0 76.1 
1995 CON 74.3 53.4 51.3 
LAB 72.6 65.9 70.8 
LD 63.8 48.5 48.2 
1996 CON 91.3 81.4 
LAB 94.2 93.0 
LO 77.7 58.1 
1998 CON 94.1 77.4 
LAB 92.0 90.6 
LD 80.9 60.4 
- District Magnitude (M) 



















Source: Local Elections Database 
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Table 6-4 below shows the same pattern of contestation for London borough 
elections. The most competitive years for the London boroughs were 1982 and 1986 
when all of the three main parties fielded a full slate of candidates in over 90% of 
elections. This contrasts with 1990 when the Liberals barely managed to contest half 
of all multi-member wards. The most likely explanation for the increase in candidates 
during the 1980s is the alliance with the SDP. In every year between 1974 and 1986, 
the percentage of Liberal ful l slates decreased as district magnitude increased - with 
the exception of two vacancy elections in 1982 - supporting hypothesis 2.2. Between 
1990 and 1998, the percentage of Liberal full slates generally decreased 
disproportionately as district magnitude increased from one to two but not from two 
to three. 
Generally, as district magnitude increases the percentage of full slates fielded by the 
Liberals in London is disproportionately less than those for the other parties -
supporting hypothesis 2.2. It appears that not only are the Liberals less able to field a 
full slate of candidates than the other parties, but this is exaggerated by increases in 
district magnitude. 




District Magnitude (M) 
3 1 2 4 5 
1974 CON 100.0 88.3 91.7 80.5 88.9 
LAB 100.0 99.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 
LO 100.0 67.8 61.4 58.5 44.4 
1978 CON 93.8 94.1 93.8 
LAB 100.0 100.0 100.0 
LD 56.3 48.4 45.6 
1982 CON 93.8 93.8 92.8 
LAB 100.0 99.7 99.3 
LD 93.8 94.5 93.5 
1986 CON 93.8 93.2 93.5 
LAB 100.0 100.0 99.3 
LD 93.8 95.1 91.8 
1990 CON 97.5 94.5 95.4 
LAB 100.0 99.4 99.3 
LD 68.8 51.7 55.5 
1994 CON 100.0 94.2 94.7 
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1998 
LAB 100.0 100.0 100.0 
LD 100.0 76.7 80.2 
CON 100.0 91.8 91.1 
LAB 100.0 100.0 100.0 
LD 80.0 73.6 77.5 
Source: Local Elections Database 
The efFect of district magnitude can also be examined for shire county elections held 
before 1985, where M>1. In these elections, the Liberals appear least able to field a 
full slate in every election year. The percentage of Liberal full slates decreases as 
district magnitude increases and the decrease is greater than for the other parties. In 
addition diese effects are more severe for the Liberals as district magnitude increases. 
As partial council elections are held for all the metropolitan boroughs, they provide 
few cases where M>1. In 1980 and 1982, however, over half of all metropolitan 
boroughs councillors were elected using complex ballots (see Appendix Three). On 
both occasions, the percentage of Liberal full slates was lower for M=3 then for M = l . 
In 1980 this decrease was disproportionately greater than that for the other parties, 
although in 1982, the decrease in the percentage of full slates was disproportionately 
lower for the Conservatives. Despite the few cases of large magnitude in the shire 
counties and metropolitan boroughs, what evidence there is shows that the decrease in 
full slates was generally greater for the Liberals in these authorities. 
Summarising for all four types of authority, it was the Liberals that were generally 
least able to contest all of the seats available. This inability also appears to have been 
exaggerated by the effects of district magnitude. Hypothesis 2.2 was accepted for 
both the shire districts and London boroughs while evidence from the shire counties 
and metropolitan boroughs also supports this conclusion. It appears, therefore, that 
the ability of the Liberals to field full slates as district magnitude increases is 
disproportionately less than that for the other two parties. 
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6.5 The Eflect of District Magnitude upon the Elected Number of Parties 
The evidence so far shows that the Liberals are not as successful as the other two 
main parties at fielding a full slate of candidates in elections with larger district 
magnitudes. Unlike PR systems where increases in district magnitude generally 
produce greater proportionality (Sartori, 1997), the same may not apply in a plurality 
system. I f this were the case then we would expect the elected number of parties (Ns) 
not to rise significantly as district magnitude increases. Hypothesis 2.3 stated, 
therefore, that the elected number of parties would not increase in proportion with 
district magnitude. We can test this hypothesis by comparing Ns for elections with 
different district magnitudes for each year. I f hypothesis 2.3 is correct, and we 
observe an increase of Ns from I to 2 as M rises from 1 to 2, we would expect Ns to 
increase disproportionately from 2 to less than 3 as M rises to 3. 
Shire district elections are most varied in terms of the size and changes in district 
magnitude. Table 6-5 shows that these variations also reflected the average elected 
number of parties, particularly where district magnitude exceeded three. In some 
cases the elected number of parties was relatively high. The highest value was in 
1973 when Ns was 1.89 where M=4 (n=432), indicating that no single party 
completely dominated these elections during that year. The elected parties for 
elections where M=9 (n=7) were over 1.4 in 1973 and 1976. This indicates that 
theoretically, seats can be divided between the parties in elections with higher district 
magnitudes. Elections with large district magnitudes do not, however, guarantee that 
more than one party will be elected. In the only two elections where M=12 
candidates from only a single party were returned in both 1973 and 1976. 
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Table 6-5 highlights also those years when whole council elections were held. The 
elected number of parties for two and three vacancy wards during these years appears 
remarkably stable. The value of Ns for elections where M=2 ranges only fi-om l . l 1 to 
1.13 and ranges only from 1.14 to 1.18 where M=3. The difference between the 
elected number of parties for single and two vacancy elections is generally over twice 
that of the difference between two and three vacancy wards. The elected number of 
parties does not, therefore, increase in proportion to district magnitude, indicating that 
elections where M=3 may be relatively more disproportional than those wards where 
M=2. On this evidence we would, therefore, accept hypothesis 2.3 for the shire 
districts. 
Table 6-5 - Average Elected Number of Parties by District Magnitude in Shire 
District Elections. 
Election District Magnitude <M) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1973 1.00 1.11 1.14 1.89 1.13 1.18 1.13 1.24 1.40 1.05 1.00 1.00 
1976 1.00 1.11 1.15 1.17 1.22 1.21 1.14 1.07 1.43 1.00 1.43 1.00 
1978 1.00 1.07 1.0q_ 
fr;>":i979^^iToo7^rrr^"^ ^xoo'^^w^"^ • ^ - . . . s • .i 
1980 1.00 1.12 1.15 
1982 1.00 1.17 
frri98r3iT6b~TciT^^ : ''rr:::^ 
1984 1.00 1.14 1.40 
1986 1.00 1.10 1.15 
1988 1.00 1.02 1.00 
1990 1.00 1.11 1.09 
1992 1.00 1.06 1.00 
1994 1.00__ 1.0J 1.00 _ 
1996 1.00 1.07 
1997 1.00 1.75 1.20 
1998 1.00 1.06 1.00 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Table 6-6 shows that for London boroughs the average elected number of parties for 
two vacancy elections ranged from only 1.04 to 1.09. For three vacancy elections this 
value ranged from 1.03 to 1.09. Comparing the difference in Ns between two and 
three vacancy elections for each year reveals that the elected number of parties 
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increases for less than half of the cases. In those cases where Ns does rise, the 
increase is not proportionate to that of single and two vacancy elections. 
Furthermore, the value of Ns does not increase for four vacancy (n=82) or five 
vacancy (n=9) elections in 1974. The smaller number of cases for these elections 
however, must be borne in mind. Evidence fi^om the London boroughs supports 
hypothesis 2.3 that the elected number of parties increases disproportionately with 
district magnitude. 
Table 6-6 - Average Elected Number of Parties by District Magnitude in London 
Borough Elections. 
Election 
Year 1 2 
District Magnitude (M) 
3 4 5 
1974 1.00 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.00 
1978 1.00 1.04 1.05 
1982 1.00 1.04 1.04 
1986 1.00 1.09 1.06 
1990 1.00 1.05 1.06 
1994 1.00 1.06 1.05 
1998 1.00 1.04 1.09 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Evidence fix)m both the shire districts and London boroughs supports hypothesis 2.3. 
The elected number of parties in these authorities does not increase in proportion to 
district magnitude. Indeed in some years the elected number of parties actually 
decreases when district magnitude increases. It appears therefore that Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989) were correct in suggesting that district magnitude might exaggerate 
the effect of plurality elections. 
6.6 The Effect of District Magnitude upon the Distribution of Seats 
Increases in district magnitude appear to result in disproportionately small increases 
in the elected number of parties. Given that the plurality system tends to produce 
two-party systems (see Chapter Five), we might expect that any exaggeration of this 
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effect would particularly affect third parties such as the Liberals? I f this were the case 
then we would expect the share of seats won by the Liberals to decrease as district 
magnitude increases (Hypothesis 2.4). 
We tested hypothesis 2.4 by examining the relationship between district magnitude 
and the distribution of seats between the three main parties. Table 6-7 shows the 
percentage of seats won by the three main parties in shire district, whole council 
elections. The percentage of seats won by the Liberals increases as district magnitude 
approaches three in every year except 1976. The Liberal's seats share in 1987, for 
example, was 14.1 in elections where M = l , 16.2 where M=2 and 17 where M=3. I f 
hypothesis 2.4 were correct then we would expect a decrease in seat share. Even in 
wards where M>3, the proportion of seats won by the party exceeds those won in 
single vacancy wards for most cases. 
Table 6-7 - Seat share of main parties by district magnitude for shire district 
whole council elections. 
Election U l S i n C l M a Q n l l U Q O \m} 
Year Party 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1973 CON 27.9 30.5 35.2 33.4 36.1 31.2 34.6 36.7 46.0 36.0 0.0 58.3 
LAB 7.5 26.2 41.8 40.5 40.4 45.7 44.7 47.7 38.1 24.0 100.0 0.0 
LD 3.1 7.4 7.7 9.7 7.6 7.7 1.1 7.0 11.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 
1976 CON 42.0 49.7 54.9 49.9 54.5 53.2 57.8 62.5 65.1 50.0 18.2 100.0 
LAB 5.5 17.5 27.7 28.8 23.4 23.6 25.5 20.3 20.6 0.0 81.8 0.0 
LD 2.5 5.5 4.1 5.7 6.2 7.5 0.6 1.6 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1979 CON 48.4 48.0 48.4 51.7 58.8 68.2 57.1 0.0 100.0 
LAB 10.7 24.3 32.3 27.5 14.4 12.9 4.8 0.0 0.0 









































































Source: Local Elections Database 
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Table 6-8 shows that for the London boroughs the Liberals also appear to be more 
successful in winning seats in elections where M=3 as opposed to those where M=2. 
This is even the case in 1982 and 1986 when the proportion of elections in which the 
party fielded a full slate of candidates was lower for elections where M=3 compared 
to those where M=2 (see Table 6-4). 
Table 6-8 - Seat Share of Main Parties by District Magnitude in London 
Boroughs 
Election 
Year Party 1 
— District Magnitude (M) 
2 3 4 5 
1974 CON 75.0 37.6 37.1 39.6 55.6 
LAB 25.0 56.8 59.9 57.6 44.4 
LD 0.0 2.9 1.4 0.0 0.0 
1978 CON 62.5 52.3 49.1 
LAB 37.5 44.9 47.0 
LO 0.0 1.9 1.4 
1982 CON 62.5 51.8 50.7 
LAB 25.0 41.8 40.3 
LO 6.3 4.9 7.3 
1986 CON 56.3 35.8 35.4 
LAB 25.0 51.1 49.5 
LD 12.5 12.0 13.5 
1990 CON 56.3 38.8 37.4 
LAB 31.3 48.6 48.2 
LD 12.5 10.8 12.4 
1994 CON 40.0 28.8 26.0 
LAB 40.0 56.1 53.8 
LO 20.0 13.6 18.5 
1998 CON 33.3 28.0 28.0 
LAB 46.7 56.2 54.1 
LD 20.0 14.5 16.3 
Source: Local Etections Database 
For those authorities holding multi-member elections, it appears that the third party is 
generally more successful in winning seats in elections where M=2 or M=3 than they 
are in wards where M = l . We did not, therefore, find evidence to support hypothesis 
2.4. It appears that the Liberals seat share will not decrease as district magnitude 
increases. This contradicts the earlier findings that suggested the party might fare 
worse in these larger wards. The chapter has not yet, however, examined how these 
findings compare with the actual number of votes that the parties attracted. 
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6.7 The Effects of District Magnitude upon Proportionality 
The share of seats won by the Liberals was not shown to decrease as district 
magnitude increased. Does this mean that district magnitude does not exaggerate the 
effects of the plurality system? Not necessarily! The increase in the share of seats 
might be due to an increase in votes received by the party. Indeed, it may be that the 
party actually received a far greater share of votes than seats in elections with large 
district magnitude (i.e. M>2). Assuming this to be true, hypothesis 2.5 stated that 
elections with large district magnitude would be more disproportionate. 
Electoral proportionality can be measured by using the Loosemore-Hanby index 
(Loosemore and Hanby, 1971)'*. Examining the correlation between this index and 
the proportion of councillors elected in contests with large district magnitude in each 
authority may shed some light on the relationship between district magnitude and 
proportionality. I f there were no linear relationship then we would expect little or no 
correlation between the index and the proportion of councillors elected in elections 
with large district magnitude. 
The Pearson correlation scores for those shire districts with whole council elections 
reveals that for every election year a positive relationship exists between the 
Loosemore-Hanby index and the proportion of elections with more than two 
vacancies. While this relationship is relatively weak in most cases it is statistically 
significant in all election years and relatively high in 1973 with a correlation 
^ The Loosemore-Hanby index is obtained by summing the absolute values of seat-vote share 
differences for each party and dividing the total by two. The index produces a value of zero 
for authorities where the proportion of seats allocated to each party is exactly the same as the 
proportion of votes for that party. As the amount of disproportionality within an authority 
increases so too does the value of the Loosemore-Hanby index. 
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coefficient of 0.469. As the proportion of seats contested in large district magnitude 
electoral areas increases, the Loosemore-Hanby index increases, and hence electoral 
proportionality decreases^ - supporting hypothesis 2.5. 
We can try to confum these findings by comparing the average Loosemore-Hanby 
index in authorities that elected half or more of their seats in one or two member 
wards with authorities that predominantly used larger district magnitudes^. It can be 
seen from Table 6-9 that the mean Loosemore-Hanby scores for authorities using 
large district magnitudes are consistently higher than for those where half or more of 
the seats were contested in single or two vacancy wards. The standard deviations of 
the scores are fairly consistent which indicates that there is little evidence that these 
averages are affected by extreme values. This evidence supports the previous 
findings. Elections with large district magnitude will be more disproportionate in the 
shire districts. 
Table 6-9 - Average Loosemore-Hanby indexes for Shire District Elections. 
Auttioritles where 50% or 
more of wards are M=1 or M°2 
Authorities where more 
than 50% of wards are 
Election 
Year N MeanLH StdDev N Mean LH SMDev 
1973 78 10.5 5.3 104 16.7 9.2 
1976 79 17.2 8.0 103 20.2 9.2 
1979 95 14.8 7.5 87 19.9 9.1 
1983 120 19.0 8.2 62 21.4 9.2 
1987 127 18.7 8.1 55 20.6 8:3 
1991 125 16.1 6.4 57 17.4 8.2 
1995 119 15.8 7.0 48 19.3 9.2 
Source: Local Elections Database 
^ The small number of cases for London borough councils (32) precludes us from conducting 
a similar analysis of these authorities. 
^ Although the correlation scores provide an accurate measure of the strength of the 
relationship, dichotomising the authorities in terms of small or large district magnitude allows 
us to gauge the net difference in proportionality between the two types of election. 
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A similar phenomenon can be observed for the London boroughs (see Table 6-10). 
With the exception of 1982, the average Loosemore-Hanby index is higher in every 
year for those authorities where more than half of the seats are contested in elections 
with large district magnitudes. One possible explanation for the deviation fix)m this 
pattern in 1982, might lie with the alliance between the Liberals and the Social 
Democrats. The Alliance appeared to have resulted in an increase in Liberal 
candidates for this year, with the number of Liberal full slates exceeding that of the 
Conservatives (see Table 6-4). This may have resulted in a lower index for 1982. 
Despite the slight decrease in 1982, however, the evidence provided by the London 
boroughs supports hypothesis 2.5. 
Table 6-10 - Average Loosemore-Hanby Indexes for London Borough Elections. 
Authorities where 50% or 
More of wards are M^i or M=2 
Authorities where more than 50% of 
wards are 
Election 
Year N MeanLH StdDev N Mean LH StdDev 
1974 5 17.1 5.7 27 22.7 6.4 
1978 6 15.0 6.8 24 22.4 9.7 
1982 8 26.0 5.6 24 25.2 7.9 
1986 8 20.4 6.8 24 22.0 8.4 
1990 8 17.9 7.8 24 22.9 9.7 
1994 8 20.0 7.7 24 21.8 10.7 
1998 8 20.6 8.4 24 21.2 10.0 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Evidence to support hypothesis 2.5 was provided by both the shire districts and 
London boroughs. We conclude, therefore, that elections with large district 
magnitude wil l be more disproportionate than other elections. It appears that in terms 
of proportionality, Taagepera and Schugart and others were correct in speculating that 
district magnitude will exaggerate the effect in terms of seat/vote ratios of plurality 
elections. 
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6.8 District Magnitude, Proportionality and the Third Party 
An increase in an authority's proportion of multimember elections adversely affects 
the proportionality of its party system. It is not possible, however, to infer directly 
from this evidence that this disproportionality adversely affects the third party as was 
stated in hypothesis 2.6. We can test this hypothesis by examining the difference 
between Liberal vote and seat share against the proportion of an authority's seats 
elected in multimember wards. I f the hypothesis were correct then we would expect 
this difference to be greater in authorities where the majority of elections have large 
district magnitude. In other words, the seat-vote share difference for the Liberals 
would be higher in authorities with large district magnitudes. 
This relationship can be examined in terms of those authorities with more than 50% of 
seats elected in wards where M = l and M=2 against those with 50% or more seats 
elected in wards where M>2. Table 6-11 shows the difference in vote and seat share 
for the two categories of shire district authorities. Negative values indicate that a 
party's share of seats is less than its vote share. The mean difference in vote share for 
the third party is consistently higher for those authorities where the majority of seats 
are contested in wards with three or more vacancies. By contrast, the figures for the 
two main parties vary in different ways for the various election years. In view of this 
evidence, we accept hypothesis 2.6 and conclude that, for the shire districts, 
disproportionality will be greater for the Liberals in shire district elections with large 
district magnitude. 
Table 6-11 - Difference between Seat and Vote Share Percentage for Shire 
District Whole Council Elections 
Authorities where 50% or Authorities where more 
more of wards are M=1 or M=2 than 50% of wards are 
Election 
Year N CON LAB LD N CON LAB LD 
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1973 52 3.5 •1.8 •2.6 68 6.5 1.6 •4.6 
1976 65 11.8 -5.1 -6.2 91 14.0 -4.2 -7.8 
1979 81 6.9 -2.7 -2.8 75 12.1 -4.5 -5.3 
1983 116 12.1 -2.9 -9.4 60 12.9 -0.9 -10.1 
1987 124 11.5 -2.2 -9.2 54 11.3 -0.2 -9.6 
1991 122 4.5 -2.4 -1.0 55 3.3 2.0 -2.2 
1995 115 •4.2 2.5 2.8 47 ^.3 8.2 -0.4 
Source: Local Elections Database 
A different picture emerges for the London boroughs. Table 6-12 shows little 
evidence of such a clear pattern for these authorities. The mean differences in Liberal 
seat and vote shares do not appear to be better or worse according to district 
magnitude. In most election years the party performs better in authorities where the 
majority of elections are large (i.e. between 1978 and 1994). In 1974 and 1998 
however, the reverse is true. For the London boroughs, therefore, we would not be 
able to accept hypothesis 2.6. Disproportionality is not greater for the Liberals in 
those London boroughs with a majority of large district magnitude elections. 
Table 6-12 - DifTerence between Seat and Vote Share for London Borough 
Elections. 
AuthoriUes where 50% or 
More of wards are M^l or M=2 
Authorities where more 
than 50% of wards are 
Election 
Year N CON LAB LD N CON LAB LD 
1974 5 2.0 9.3 -10.2 27 0.0 14.1 -10.8 
1978 8 6.8 1.9 •6.0 24 2.5 6.6 -5.3 
1982 8 16.1 6.9 -21.8 24 8.5 9.9 -15.8 
1986 8 0.0 13.9 -12.4 24 1.5 10.4 -9.5 
1990 8 3.8 9.9 -4.3 24 0.8 7.7 -1.2 
1994 8 -3.3 11.8 -5.4 24 -3.3 12.0 -4.6 
1998 8 -6.7 13.3 -3.5 24 -1.5 12.8 -5.2 
Source: Local Elections Database 
While the hypothesis was accepted for the shire districts, it was rejected for the 
London boroughs. Do we therefore conclude that hypothesis 2.6 is correct or 
incorrect? The evidence from the shire districts consists of far more authorities than 
that for the London boroughs. It is therefore more likely that, purely by chance, the 
geographical distribution of support for the Liberals in the London boroughs 
corresponds to authorities with large district magnitudes. Far greater significance 
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should be placed, therefore, upon the findings from the shire districts, which 
supported the hypothesis for every year. 
6.9 Conclusion 
District magnitude varies considerably both between and within local government 
authorities in England. Although most of the larger wards (M>3) have been 
abolished, there still remain a significant number of two and three vacancy elections 
within the shire districts and London boroughs. An examination of the relationship 
between different district magnitudes and party competition at the ward level reveals 
that the proportion of elections in which all three parties fielded a full slate of 
candidates was consistently higher in single member elections than those with a larger 
district magnitude. For the London boroughs this relationship was also the case for 
two and three member elections until 1990. Until then the main parties fielded fewer 
full slates of candidates for three member elections than for those with two vacancies. 
Focusing upon the proportion of full slates fielded by the individual parties reveals 
that the Liberals are the least successful party in these terms, with the exception of the 
London boroughs in 1982. In terms of party competition, district magnitude does 
matter, particularly in terms of the competitiveness of the third party. It appears, 
therefore, that the Liberals are less able than Labour and the Conservatives, to contest 
fully elections with higher district magnitude. 
Analysing the effect of district magnitude upon the elected number of parties revealed 
that this generally increases with district magnitude. Voters, therefore, do not always 
cast all of their votes for the same party in elections where M>1. The amount of the 
increase was not proportional, however. The difference in the elected number of 
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parties between single and two vacancy elections was generally higher than the 
difference between two and three vacancy elections. On some occasions in the 
London boroughs the average elected number of parties was actually lower in three 
vacancy than in two vacancy elections. This indicates that the electorate in London 
votes more homogeneously in elections with larger district magnitude. This implies 
that even when district magnitude varies, Duverger's view that plurality elections help 
to foster a two-party system remains valid. It implies, also, that increased district 
magnitude may exaggerate the effect of plurality elections. Contrary to expectation, 
however, the Liberals generally increased their share of the seats as district magnitude 
increased, prompting further analysis of the difference in vote and seat shares for the 
third party. 
Correlating the Loosemore-Hanby index with the proportion of seats contested in 
elections with large district magnitude provides some evidence of a positive 
relationship between authorities with large wards and disproportionality. In order to 
investigate this phenomenon further, those authorities where the larger proportion of 
seats were contested in wards where M<3 were compared with those where M>2. 
The results reveal that with the exception of one year, the index of proportionality was 
lower for those authorities with a majority of elections of small magnitude compared 
to authorities that use larger district magnitudes. These findings support the view of 
Taagepera and Shugart, that large district magnitude in plurality elections lead to 
higher levels of disproportionality. 
Finally, we focused upon the effect of this disproportionality upon the third party by 
examining the difference in vote and seats shares for the main parties when 
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controlling for different district magnitudes. This produced mixed results. Although 
there is no evidence of a relationship between district magnitude and third party 
disproportionality in the London boroughs, there is evidence of a relationship in the 
shire districts. In every year the penalty incurred by the Liberals in terms of the 
difference between seat and vote shares was higher in shire district authorities that 
used larger district magnitudes. This finding provides further evidence that larger 
district magnitude adversely affects third party success. Although plurality elections 
are generally known to discriminate against smaller parties we have shown that the 
level of discrimination can be much higher in those systems where large district 
magnitudes are used. 
Although structural determinants of party system development, such as district 
magnitude, are important, we should not forget that it is the electorate that chooses the 
parties, and the characteristics of voters to some extent determine their vote. The 
following Chapter conducts, therefore, a preliminary examination of socioeconomic 
characteristics that are theoretically linked to voting. 
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Chapter 7 Socioeconomic Determinants of Vote Choice in English 
Local Government 
7.1 Introduction 
The typology of party systems in Chapter 5 identified two-party systems as being the 
most common in English local authorities. Although Chapter 6 provided some 
evidence that the electoral system discriminated against the third party, it does not 
offer a full explanation for the propensity towards two-party dominance. This chapter 
extends the analysis by conducting a preliminary examination of socioeconomic 
explanations of voting. The purpose of the chapter is to identify those socioeconomic 
characteristics that may be included in a theoretical model of voting. We begin by 
briefly discussing the theoretical relationships between voting and different 
socioeconomic characteristics, highlighting the suitability of local elections for 
examining such relationships. Subsequent sections expand upon this discussion for 
distinct groups of socioeconomic characteristics and in so doing formulate hypotheses 
which can test the theoretical relationships. Each hypothesis is examined in terms of 
its validity and evaluated prior to its inclusion, or not, in a theoretical model of voting 
that wil l be the subject of Chapter 8. 
7.2 Socioeconomic Characteristics and Voting 
The relationship between socioeconomic characteristics and voting in England has 
been examined by many authors. Chapter 2 discussed Duverger's view of the 
importance of socioeconomic factors upon the national party system at the beginning 
of the 20**^  century, which resulted in the formation of the Labour party to represent 
the newly enfranchised working class (Duverger, 1964: 204). Lipset and Rokkan 
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noted that the industrial revolution forced the enfranchised citizenry to choose sides in 
terms of their economic interests (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967: 19). For national elections 
the choice appeared to be clear. Persons employed in professional or business 
occupations or those with high levels of income or education are more likely to vote 
for a party that stands for protection of business interests and little welfare education 
than other persons (Alford, 1967:68). Survey data appear to show that the effect of 
socioeconomic characteristics upon voting in English local government elections 
reflects that of national elections. Miller (1988), for example, found not only that four 
fifths of respondents voted for the same party in national elections as local elections, 
but also that the determinants of vote choice are also similar for both. Surveys of 
local voting are rare, however, and capture behavioural patterns for relatively few 
elections. 
Lx)cal elections are ideally suited to study the relationship between class and voting. 
Not only are a large number of elections held, but ward-level socioeconomic data is 
also available for 1981 and 1991 in the form of the British censuses. Aggregate data 
analysis can, therefore, be conducted at a much higher resolution than is the case for 
parliamentary elections. Unlike small-scale surveys, such as those conducted by 
Miller, the census includes detailed socioeconomic data covering almost the entire 
country. The combination of a large number of cases and high resolution can produce 
results with higher levels of significance than survey data. We can be extremely 
confident, therefore, in any evidence produced from the analysis in 1981 and 1991. 
Unfortunately, no data is available for the years a census was not conducted. Chapter 
4.6 discussed this problem and concluded that extrapolating the missing values was 
not a reliable method. The following analysis assumes, therefore, that the 
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socioeconomic characteristics of individual wards changed little around the census 
years. Analysis of elections between 1977 and 1986 use the 1981 census, while 
elections between 1987 and 1996 use the 1991 census. While there is no doubt that 
the socioeconomic characteristics of wards did change, we show that the possible 
effect of these changes upon the analysis is small. 
7.3 Social Class and Partisan Voting in English Local Government 
Duverger (1964) believed that social conflict within a society would naturally result in 
a division into two opposing groups. In twentieth century England this dualism was 
primarily manifest by inequalities within the labour market. On one side were those 
employed in low paid manual occupations, with a low level of education and reliant 
upon the state for social protection in the form of employee rights and public services 
such as housing or transport. Those on the other side were mainly employed in 
professional or business occupations. They were generally better educated and more 
highly paid and as such more able to provide for their own welfare needs. The 
historical view of this division, posits that the former group identify themselves as 
working-class and as such more likely to vote for the Labour party. The latter group 
identify themselves as middle class, and as such more likely to vote for the 
Conservatives (Rose & McAUister, 1986: 11). 
The deterministic view of partisan choice is clear about the relationship for class and 
voting for Labour and the Conservatives. But what relationship, i f any, exists 
between class and Liberal voting? Miller (1988) found that although there were no 
strong relationships between any of his pane! survey predictors and Liberal voting, 
there was evidence that the party had more support amongst the middle class (Miller, 
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1998: 160). Previous research, therefore, scant though it is, suggests, that social class 
is related to local voting for not only the Conservatives and Labour, but for the 
Liberals also. The relationship between the main parties and voting can be 
summarised by the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Voting for the main parties in /oca/ elections Is related to social 
class 
Previous research suggests that the direction of the relationship between social class 
and partisan voting is also pre-determined. The directions of these relationships can 
be specified accordingly: 
Hypothesis 3.2: Conservative voting in local elections is positively related to the 
proportion of middle class residents. 
Hypothesis 3.3: Labour voting in local elections is positively related to the 
proportion of working class residents 
Hypothesis 3.4: Liberal voting In local elections Is positively related to the 
proportion of middle class residents 
I f a relationship between class and voting did exist between 1976 and 1996 then to 
what extent did the relationship remain static over the period? Chapter 2 suggested 
that the relationship might have declined over recent years. The changing nature of 
the workplace has certainly resulted in a reduction of traditional manual occupations, 
while government policies have helped to create more home-owners, car-owners and 
share-holders. Many authors have argued that this has resulted in an electorate that is 
less aligned with any one class or party (Crewe, 1984; Crewe, 1986; Rose & 
McAllister, 1986). I f the same were true of local elections then we would expect to 
find evidence to support hypothesis 3.5: 
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Hypothesis 3.5; Class voting In local elections declined between 1976 and 1996 
The validity of these hypotheses are determined in the following two sections. The 
first section examines the relationship between the class composition of wards won by 
the parties while the second looks more specifically at the relationship between voting 
and each of the social class groups. 
7.3.1 Social Class and Party Success in Local Government Wards 
One simple method of examining the relationship between class and partisan voting is 
to compare the class composition of wards won and not won by each party. I f no 
relationship existed between social class and party success then we would expect to 
find no significant difference in class composition between the two types of ward. 
Table 7-1 shows the mean percentage of residents within each social class group 
variables for all second-tier local government wards contested by the main parties'. 
Wards are divided according to whether or not they were won by the party before 
1987, or after 1986. A ward is classed as won i f the party came top of the ballot at 
any time during the period. The average percentage of residents in each social class is 
shown for wards won or not won by each party. The total net difference in social 
class between wards won or not is also shown for each party. 
' As the census data small area statistics are collected for second tier local govemment wards, 
the socioeconomic analysis focuses only upon these types of authority. 
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I f hypothesis 3.1 were not correct then we would expect to see no significant 
difference in the average proportion of residents for each social class between wards 
won or not won by the parties^. This is not the case. There is a significant difference 
(t-sig. < 0.01) in the proportion of residents fix)m each social class between wards 
won or not won by the parties. The only exception is that for the proportion of 
residents employed in unskilled (PCLASS5) and professional (PCLASSl) 
occupations in Liberal wards. 
The hypothesis that Conservative vofing is positively related to the proportion of 
middle class residents (3.2) is supported by Table 7-1. Both before and after 1987, 
there were, in Conservative won wards, higher proportions of residents fix>m 
professional (PCLASSl), managerial and technical (PCLASS2) and skilled non-
manual (PCLASS3N) occupations. In Labour won wards, there were a higher 
proportion of skilled-manual (PCLASS3N), partly skilled (PCLASS4) and unskilled 
(PCLASS5) occupations. This supports the hypothesis that Labour voting is 
positively related to the proportion of working class residents (3.3). The evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that voting for the Liberals is positively related to the 
proportion of middle class residents is not as strong. After 1986 the relationship 
appears to be positive. Before 1987, however, there was a lesser proportion of 
residents in PCLASS2 than we expected in wards won by the party compared to those 
not won and a higher proportion of residents in PCLASS3M. The higher proportion 
of manual workers in Liberal won wards may be because of the alliance with the SDP 
^ The significance level reports the likelihood of the results occurring by chance. A 
significance of 0.01 indicates that the result would normally occur by chance, only once in a 
hundred. 
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during the 1980s. Having splintered from the Labour party, the "class-left" SDP 
should have appealed more to skilled manual residents (PCLASS3M) than managerial 
or technical (PCLASS2) (Webb, 2001: 49). As the proportion of residents in the other 
class groups are as we expected - especially after 1986 - we would suggest that the 
evidence does support hypothesis 3.4. A more detailed analysis might shed more 
light on this, however. 
Hypothesis 3.5 stated that class voting declined between 1976 and 1996. Table 7-1 
shows for each party, the net difference in class voting between wards won or not 
won. Class voting appears to be strongest for Labour (35.3 before 1987, 25.7 after 
1986), next strongest for the Conservatives (21.2 and 18.5) and weakest for the 
Liberals (5.3 and 4.8). Previous research suggested that the relationship between 
class and voting is stronger for Labour supporters (Heath et al, 1985). Comparing the 
net difference in class voting between the parties appears to support this argument. 
For all three parties the net difference in class voting was lower in the period after 
1986, supporting the hypothesis that class voting did decline between 1976 and 1996. 
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Table 7-1 - Social Class and Party Success in Wards Won by Main Parties. 
Conservative 
Wards Won After 1976 and Before 1987 Wards Won After 1986 and Before 1997 
Mean of Non-Con Won Con Won Difference Non-Con Won Con Won Difference 
Varlabre N=2297 N=3106 Actual t-sig. N=3070 N=3924 Actual t-slg. 
PCLASS1 3.7 6.4 +2.7 0.00 4.1 6.5 +2.4 0.00 
PCLASS2 19.0 26.0 +7.0 0.00 20.9 28.7 +7.8 0.00 
PCLASS3N 7.2 9.2 +2.0 0.00 7.4 8.2 +0.8 0.00 
PCLASS3M 27.2 22.6 -4.7 O.OD 21.8 18.2 -3.6 0.00 
PCLASS4 13.4 10.1 -3.3 0.00 11.0 8.3 -2.7 0.00 
PCLASS5 4.0 2.5 -1.5 0.00 3.6 2.3 -1.2 0.00 
Net Net 
Difference 21.2 Difference 18.5 
Labour 
Wards Won After 1976 and Before 1987 Wards Won After 1986 and Before 1997 
Mean of Non-Lab Won Lab Won Difference Non-Lab Won Lab Won Difference 
Variable N=4004 N=1399 Actual t-sig. N=4359 N=2635 Actual t-slg. 
PCLASS1 6.1 2.8 -3.3 0.00 6.5 3.6 -2.9 0.00 
PCLASS2 26.5 12.9 -13.6 0.00 29.6 18.2 -11,3 0.00 
PCLASS3N 8.6 7.6 -1.0 0.00 7.7 8.1 +0.3 0.00 
PCLASS3M 21.9 32.2 +10.4 0.00 17.4 23.7 +6.3 0.00 
PCLASS4 10.4 14.6 +4.2 0.00 8.2 11.5 +3.3 0.00 
PCLASS5 2.4 5.2 +2.8 0.00 2.3 3.8 +1.6 0.00 
Net Net 
Difference 35.3 Difference 25.7 
Liberal 
Wards Won After 1976 and Before 1987 Wards Won After 1986 and Before 1997 
Mean of Non-Ub Won UbWon Difference Non-Ub Won Ub Won Difference 
Variable N=4563 N=840 Actual t-sig. N=4714 N=2280 Actual t-slg. 
PCLASS1 5.2 5.5 0.3 0.06 5.2 5.9 0.7 0.00 
PCLASS2 23.3 21.6 -1.7 0.00 24.9 26.1 1.3 0.00 
PCLASS3N 8.1 9.6 1.4 0.00 7.6 8.5 1.0 0.00 
PCLASS3M 24,4 25.6 1.2 0.00 20.0 19.4 -0.6 0.00 
PCLASS4 11.6 11.0 ^.7 0.00 9.8 8.8 -1.0 0.00 
PCLASS5 3.1 3.1 0.0 0.64 2.9 2.7 -0.2 0.00 
Net Net 
Difference 5.3 Difference 4.8 
7.3.2 Social Class and Partisan Voting in Local Government Elections 
Although evidence from party successes in the shire districts supports hypotheses 3.1 
to 3.5, the analysis is problematic for a number of reasons. The period from 1976 to 
1996 is divided into two 10-year periods. Any fluctuation in party success during 
each lO-year period would not, therefore, be highlighted. This makes it difficult to 
ascertain i f the relationship between class and voting was consistent throughout the 
period. In addition, by comparing wards won (or not) by the parties, the analysis is 
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also including the mechanical effects of the electoral system (see Chapter 6). This 
section addresses these problems by examining the relationship between the 
proportion of residents in each ward and the percentage of votes received by the 
parties for individual election years. 
The relationship between voting and class can be assessed by calculating the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between vote share and each of the class categories. The 
statistical significance of correlation coef[icients will be greater as the number of 
cases increases.^ The following sections focus mainly, therefore, upon shire districts 
with partial council elections, as these have the greatest number of elections in most 
years. It will be shown, however, that many of the conclusions drawn fix)m this 
particular type of authority apply also to other types. 
The Pearson correlation scores for the five different social classes and the share of 
votes received by the main parties in shire district partial council elections held 
between 1978 and 1996 are shown in Table 7-2. The fewer number of cases in 1979 
and 1979 is a function of wards not matched to the 1981 census and elections not 
contested by the parties. The large number of cases in which the parties contested 
elections produces significant (a > 0.01) correlation scores for every variable in 
almost every year during the period. Exceptions to this are mainly those for the 
Liberal vote in 1978 and 1979 when the number of cases are just 251 and 581. In 
order for the hypothesis to be rejected we would expect to find few significant 
correlation scores. As this is not the case, we accept the hypothesis for shire district 
^ Increases in N reduce the likelihood of any relationship occurring by chance. 
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partial council elections. Social class does appear to be related to voting for the three 
main parties in these elections. 
Table 7-2 - Correlation Scores of Party Vote Share and Social Class in Shire 
District Partial Council Elections. 
Conservative 
Election 1978 1970 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1000 1091 1992 1904 1995 1996 
Year 








































































































































































































Election 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Year 
Variable N 470 1216 1173 1201 1187 1220 1231 1208 1168 1225 1232 1181 1199 1114 1054 
PCLASS1 Score -0.52 •0.53 -0.56 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.54 -0.53 -0.54 -0.56 -0.54 -0.52 -0.53 -0.50 -0.50 
Sig. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS2 Score -0.72 -0.67 -0.72 -0,73 -0.71 -0.71 -0.73 -0.71 -0.71 -0.69 -0.70 -0.69 -0.67 -0.66 -0.63 
Sig. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS3N Score -0.30 -0.34 -0.33 -0.39 -0.35 -0.35 -0.37 -0.25 •0.28 -0.22 -0.23 -0.28 -0.26 -0.16 -0.18 
SIg. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS3M Score 0.62 0.57 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.47 
SIg. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS4 Score 0.61 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.58 
SIg. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS5 Score 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.49 0,47 0.47 




1078 1079 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Variable I car N 251 581 720 1231 1088 1001 1136 1333 1018 1004 1144 1209 1226 1111 1015 
PCLASS1 . Score 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.14 
SIg. 0.29 0.62 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS2 Score 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.31 0.28 0.19 
Sig. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS3N Score 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.07 6.08 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.06 
Sig. 0.15 0.87 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 
PCLASS3M Score -0.12 -0.10 -0.15 -0.01 -0.13 -0.18 •0.21 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16 -0.21 -0.21 -0.14 
SIg. 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 
PCLASS4 Score -0.20 -0.18 -0.19 -0.10 -0.19 -0.20 -0.28 -0.15 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.28 -0.26 -0.22 
Sig. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS5 Score -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.11 -0.18 -0.20 -0.28 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.14 -0.16 -0.23 •0.19 -0.15 
SIQ. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The relationships between class and partisan voting (see Table 7-2) can be seen more 
clearly i f the correlation scores over time are plotted on a line graph. Figure 7-1 plots 
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the correlation between vote share for each party and the social class variables. Not 
only are the correlation coefficients significant, the directions of the relationships are 
also consistent for much of the period. The hypothesis concerning class and voting 
for the individual parties specified that a positive relationship would exist between 
working class social groups and Labour voting while the inverse would be true for the 
Conservatives and Liberals. For each of the parties, such a class division appears to 
exist. The working class groups (PCLASS3M, PCLASS4 and PCLASS5) are all 
positively related to the Labour vote share. The middle class groups (PCLASSl, 
PCLASS2 and PCLASS3N) are positively related to the Conservatives' and Liberals' 
vote share. The only exception to the pattern is the relationship between Conservative 
voting and the proportion of skilled non-manual workers (PCLASS3N) fi-om 1994 to 
1998. The direction of this relationship changed from positive to negative after 1994. 
I f the hypothesis were incorrect then we would not expect to find such a pattern of 
coefficients. We might instead find that the directions of the relafionships fluctuated 
during the period or that they were consistently different to what we expected. 
Evidence from the shire district council elections supports hypothesis 3.3, that Labour 
voting is positively related to the proportion of working class and hypothesis 3.2 and 
3.4, that voting for the Conservatives and Liberals negatively related to the proportion 
of residents in this social group. 
Hypothesis 3.5 stated that the relationship between social class and partisan voting 
declined between 1976 and 1996. I f the hypothesis were correct then we would 
expect to fmd a decrease in the strength of the relationships. The correlation scores 
would, therefore, tend towards zero over time. There is only little evidence that this is 
actually the case. The values of the coefficients tend to rise and fall over the period 
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and for the Conservafives and Labour, although there appears to be a slight downward 
trend. The fluctuations are particularly dramatic for the Liberals, however. The peaks 
in the strength of the relationships between class and Liberal voting also appear 
higher towards the end of the period than earlier. We could not reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the relationship between class and local voting did not 
decline over the period. 
The graphs shown in Figure 7-1 plot the correlation scores between 1977 and 1986 
against the 1981 census and that received between 1987 and 1996 against the 1991 
census. The socioeconomic composition of wards would no doubt have changed 
during the years between the census. Using the data as of 1981 and 1991 instead of 
extrapolating corrected values between the census years appears, however, to make 
little difference to the analysis. The line graphs in Figure 7-1 are similar to those 
plotted with the extrapolated data (see Chapter 4.6). Unlike the extrapolations, 
however, using static values produces more realistic results for those years before 
1981 and after 1991. The correlation coefficients calculated using extrapolated values 
tended to zero after 1991 and especially before 1981. 
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Figure 7-1 - Party Vote Share and Social Class in Shire District Partial Council 
Elections 1978-19%. 
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A similar analysis of social class and voting was conducted for other types of local 
authority. Shire district whole council elections produced similar results to partial 
council elections. For the Conservatives and Labour, the significance of the 
correlation coefficients were less than 0.01, indicating that it is unlikely that the 
results could occur by chance, while most of the coefficients for the Liberals are 
significant at 0.1. Although the significance of the Liberal coefficients are not as 
strong as those for Conservative and Labour they are strong enough not to discount 
the hypothesis that class relationships exist for the Liberals. A class division appears 
for all three main parties with the strongest relationship being that between the 
proportion of technical and managerial residents (PCLASS2) and voting. For the 
Conservafives, the correlation scores for this variable ranged from 0.56 in 1983 to 
0.47 in 1979. The relationship was stronger for Labour, ranging from -0.52 to -0.61, 
while for the Liberals this relationship is much weaker. The Liberal correlation 
coefficient in 1979 in not significant (sig=0.22) and ranges only from 0.06 in 1983 to 
0.18 in 1995. The weakest relationship for all parties is that for social class 3N. 
While the relationship reflects the pattern for shire districts with partial council 
elections, the significance of these scores for the Liberals was greater than 0.1 fix>m 
1979 to 1991. Presented with this evidence, we would have to reject the null 
hypothesis for shire district whole council elections. Class is related to voting for the 
main three parties. 
Turning our attention to the Metropolitan borough councils we find that not only does 
class voting appear to exist, the relationships are stronger than for the shire districts. 
This indicates the electorate in these wards is more homogenous than in the shires. 
The significance of correlation scores for all of the variables are less than 0.01 in 
252 
every year for Labour and Conservatives and almost all years for the Liberals. The 
correlation coefficient for Labour voting and social class 2 ranges from -0.83 to -0.64, 
for the Conservatives it ranged from 0.79 to 0.63, while for the Liberals, after 1979 it 
ranged fix)m 0.11 to 0.35. 
For the London boroughs, all of the correlation scores for Labour and Conservative 
are significantly different (sig.>0.01) for every election year during the period. The 
strongest relationship with Labour and Conservative voting is that for PCLASS2 
which ranged fiom 0.85 in 1978 to 0.65 in 1994, for Labour and from 0.80 in 1978 to 
0.61 in 1994 for the Conservarives. Far fewer significant correlation scores are 
produced for Liberals in the London boroughs. In fact, the level of significance for 
over half of the correlation scores was above 0.1 while PCLASS3N produced no 
significant correlation scores whatsoever. There was also little consistency in the sign 
of the coefficients. Social class 2 was positively correlated (r=0.2) in 1978 but 
negatively correlated (r=-0.13) in 1990. This indicates that in London, this social 
base of voter support for the party was far weaker than for the other parties over the 
period. 
Our examination of class and partisan voting reveals that class relationships do exist 
in local government elections. For the shire districts and metropolitan boroughs, class 
is consistently related to voting for all three main parties, with the strongest 
relationships appearing in the metropolitan areas. The directions of the relationships 
confirm the existence of the traditional class voting model for Labour and the 
Conservatives. The consistent relationships between class and Liberal voting support 
Miller's findings that the party may have a slightly better voter base among the 
253 
middle class. Evidence supporting the hypothesis that class voting has weakened 
during the period is not as strong, however. An examination of social composition of 
wards won by the parties before and after 1986 provided only little evidence that class 
voting has declined. Plotting the correlation scores for the shire districts reveals that 
class voting for the parties appeared to fluctuate throughout the period, while for the 
Liberals it increased as the party became more successful in the 1990s. 
7.4 Housing Tenure and Partisan Voting in English Local Government 
Many authors have identified a relationship between housing tenure and partisan 
voting (see Butler & Stokes, 1974; Rose & MacAllister, 1985; Webb & Fisher, 1999). 
Heath et al (1991) argued that after controlling for social class, housing produces the 
strongest influence of all socioeconomic characteristics upon the voting decision. The 
following section, therefore, focuses upon the bivariate relationship between the 
different types of housing tenure and partisan support. 
Most authors agree that the primary housing cleavage is that between the public and 
private sector. Public sector housing was provided specifically for the working class 
and previous research has shown that it is the working class that mainly occupy this 
type of housing (Butler and Stoker, 1974: 109). As the previous section suggested 
that working class voters were more likely to support Labour in local elections, we 
would expect, therefore, that a positive relationship existed between public sector 
housing and local Labour voting. 
Hypothesis 3.6: Public sector housing is positively related to Labour voting. 
254 
If such a relationship exists then we would expect the antithesis of 3.6 to reflect the 
relationship for the Conservatives. Given that the direction of the relationships 
between Liberal voting and class are similar to that for the Conservatives we would 
expect also that private sector housing'* would be positively related to Liberal voting. 
Survey research on local voting provides some evidence that this appears to be the 
case (Miller, 1988: 160), giving rise to the following: 
Hypothesis 3.7; Private sector housing Is positively related to Liberal voting. 
Figure 7-2 plots the significant (p<0.01) correlation scores between the proportion of 
residents fi-om each type of housing tenure and voting for Labour and the Liberals^. 
The graph shows a clear division between Labour voting and public sector 
(PCOUNCIL) and voluntary sector (PHASSOC) housing compared to the other types 
of housing tenure. The strongest relationship is that between council tenants and 
Labour voting with correlation scores around 0.6 for most of the period. Figure 7-2 
also shows consistent relationships between housing tenure and Liberal voting, 
although much smaller than those for Labour. The strongest relationships with 
Liberal voting are those between council tenants (PCOUNCIL) and owner-occupiers 
(POWNEROCC) which almost exactly mirror themselves throughout the period. For 
two of the private sector groups POWNEROCC and POTHTENUR (residents in other 
tenures such as housing included with employment), the relationship with Liberal 
* We classify private sector residents as owner-occupiers, privately renting tenants and 
residents whose housing is included with employment. Council and housing association 
dwellings are classed as public sector housing for both 1981 and 1991 censuses. So doing 
reduces the net effect of increases in housing association and decreases in council housing 
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voting is consistently positive. The remaining category of private sector housing is 
the proportion of residents in privately rented accommodation (PPRIVATE). 
Ahhough the correlation coefficient is not significant (sig>0.1) in some years, those 
where it is produce coefficients consistent with hypothesis 6.7. 
Figure 7-2 - Housing Tenure and V o^ting in Sbire District Partial ( ouncil 
Elections 1978-1996. 
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^ The correlation scores for the Conservatives generally mirror those for Labour. Following 
sections compare either Conservative or Labour correlation scores with those for the Liberals. 
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The examination of housing and voting supports hypotheses 3.6. There appears to be 
a clear division between public and private sector housing and Labour voting. As the 
proportion of council tenants in wards increases so too does the share of the Labour 
vote. For the Liberals the opposite appears to be the case. The share of the Liberal's 
vote generally increased as the proportion residents in private sector housing 
increased, supporting hypothesis 3.7. 
7.5 Employment and Partisan Voting in English Local Government 
Employment status has been shown to be related to voter turnout (Miller, 1988: 95; 
Railings & Thrasher, 1997: 55) but what of its effect upon voting? Alford (1967) 
suggested that those employed in professional or business occupations would be more 
likely to vote for a party, such as the Conservatives, that stands for the protection of 
business interests. Research for national elections has shown that even manual 
workers that are self-employed are more likely to vote for the Conservatives (Sarlvik 
& Crewe, 1983). We would expect, therefore, that local voting for the Conservatives 
would be positively related to the proportion of self-employed residents. As the 
relationships for Liberal voting, examined so far, appear to reflect that of the 
Conservatives we would expect the same to be true for the Liberals: 
Hypothesis 3,8: Self-employment Is positively related to local Conservative and 
Liberal voting. 
Unemployment may also have a substantial effect upon voting. In the 1979 
parliamentary elections unemployment was a particularly contentious issue. The 
Conservative slogan at the time, 'Labour isn't working', was set alongside a picture of 
a dole queue. Evidence fcom survey data suggest, however, that despite the 
Conservative campaign, the electorate still viewed the Labour party as being more 
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likely to reduce unemployment than either the Conservatives or Labour (Johnston et 
al, 1988: 234). If this were also the case in local elections then we would expect: 
Hypothesis 3,9: Unemployment Is negatively related to local Conservative and 
Liberal voting. 
Figure 7-3 plots the significant (p<0.01) correlation scores for all categories of 
employment status and Conservative and Liberal voting. The strongest relationship 
between employment and Conservative voting is that for the proportion of self-
employed with employees (PSELFWITH). This relationship was quite strong (over 
0.6) for most of the period. The proportion of self-employed residents without 
employees (PSELFWOUT) is also positively correlated with Conservative voting, 
although not as strongly as for those with employees. It appears that self-employed 
with employees might favour the more *employer-finendIy' policies of the 
Conservatives than those of Labour. Although not as strong as the Conservatives, the 
relationship between self-employed residents and Liberal voting is also consistently 
positive during the period. Hypothesis 3.8 appears therefore to be correct for both 
parties. 
Figure 7-3 also supports the argument that the unemployed are less likely to vote for 
the Conservatives or Liberals. The correlation score for the proportion of 
unemployed (PWORKSEEK) is consistently and negatively related to voting for both 
parties, thus supporting hypothesis 3.9. 
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Figure 7-3 - Employment Status and Voting in Shire District Partial Council 
Elections 1978-1996. 
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7.6 A Consideration of Other Demographic Factors and Partisan Voting 
in English Local Government. 
The previous sections have examined the theoretical relationship between those 
socioeconomic characteristics considered as important determinants of vote choice. 
This final section briefly examines a range of additional socioeconomic characteristics 
that may also be related to voting. The section assumes that the similarilies between 
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the Conservatives and Liberals will also be manifest in the analysis of these 
characteristics and focuses therefore upon only the Liberals. 
The first group of characteristics examined relates to the occupation of employed 
residents. The relationship between occupation and class, however, can be fairly well 
predefined. Those residents categorised as working in manual or unskilled 
occupations would fall also into the previously examined working class category. We 
would assume, therefore, such occupations to be negatively correlated with Liberal 
voting. Figure 7-4 shows that this assumption appears to be correct. The relationship 
between residents employed in the transport (PTRANS) and manufacturing 
(PMANUF) sectors and Liberal voting is consistently negative, while the relationship 
is positive for those employed in banking and other service industries (POTHSERV). 
One manual occupation that is clearly at odds with the assumption is the agricultural 
sector (PAGRICULT). Despite being a mainly manual occupation, the proportion of 
residents employed in this sector is positively related to Liberal voting. 
Figure 7-4 - Occupation of F^mployed Residents and Liberal Voting in Shire 
District Partial Council Elections 1978-1996. 
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The relationship between several other ward-level characteristics and Liberal voting 
might also be worthy of an examination. Several authors have noted a small but 
positive relationship between higher education and support for the Liberals (Butler & 
Stokes, 1974; Heath et al, 1985). Voting behaviour has also been claimed by some 
authors to be related to the voter's sex. Despite the fact that there are important 
socioeconomic differences between men and women (such as age and religion), 
women are generally more likely to vote Conservative than men. According to Pugh 
(1994), the "comparison of men and women of similar age and similar religious 
affiliation still suggest that the latter lean somewhat to the Conservatives" (Pugh, 
1994: 21), 
The effect of marriage upon voting might also be worthy of consideration. Married 
residents might be more likely to support a party that campaigns on local issues such 
as road safety and housing than single residents. According to Jones, the Liberals 
emphasis on community politics, in practice, meant building a more participatory 
society and democracy through local community structures, such as neighbourhood 
councils and various co-operative ventures, designed to give people in local 
communities a greater influence over decisions affecting their lives (Jones, 1996: 69). 
If then were the case then we might expect that voting for the Liberals would be 
positively related to the proportion of married residents. Among the geographic 
characteristics are population density and the Northeriy position of the ward. Do the 
Liberals perform better in densely populated areas where they can campaign more 
effectively? Is the party subjected to a similar North/South divide as the 
Conservatives? 
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The correlation scores for these characteristics and Liberal voting are shown in Figure 
7-5. There is a great deal of fluctuation in the scores during the period. The party 
appears to perform consistently better in wards with a higher proportion of qualified 
or male residents and worse in more northern wards or those with higher population 
densities. There was however, little evidence of a relationship between sex and 
Liberal voting. The correlation coefficient was significant only in five of the 14 years 
that elections were held. On these five occasions the correlation score was also lower 
than the other variables. One explanation for this might be the lack of variance in the 
proportion of males in wards (mean=48.6, s.d.=1.45). Such a small deviation is 
unlikely to explain large differences in Liberal voting. 
Figure 7-5 - Liberal Vote Share and Other Demographic Variables in Shire 
District Partial Council Elections 1978-1996. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has conducted a preliminary examination of the relationship between 
certain ward socioeconomic characteristics and support for the main parties. In 
Duverger's (1964) theory, these characteristics - and particularly class - might 
produce the sources of conflict that are the main driving force behind the party 
system. For Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and others, these characteristics might 
provide bases around which societal cleavages might form and be represented. 
We found that several of theoretical relationships do appear to exist for local 
government elections. The strongest socioeconomic relationship appears to be that 
between class and voting. For the Conservatives and Labour, this relationship was 
significantly different to zero. The proportion of residents in working class groups 
was positively related to Labour voting and negatively related to Conservative voting. 
The opposite relationship exists for middle class groups. A class relationship also 
exists for Liberal voting. The direction of these relationships matches that of the 
Conservatives although they are much weaker. A positive relationship existed 
between middle class groups and a negative relationship existed for working class 
groups. 
Several other ward socioeconomic characteristics were found also to be related to 
voting for all three parties. Variables such as housing tenure; employment status; 
industry of occupation; age; marriage; higher education; geographical location and 
population density have also been shown to be related to voting for the three main 
parties in national elections. The bivariate relationships for the Liberals were, 
however, consistently weaker than those of the other two parties. 
We can not tell torn this analysis however, the extent to which the different variables 
are inter-related or the extent to which a combination of these factors can explain 
voting for the parties. The following Chapter examines the combined effect of these 
characteristics using multiple regression analysis. 
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Chapter 8 Combined Effect of Ward Characteristics upon Local 
Party Systems 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws upon findings Irom previous chapters in order to identify ward 
level characteristics that may have an independent effect upon the party systems in 
English local government. In so doing, it develops a single model of local voting 
which attempts to maximise the explanatory power of such characteristics for the 
main parties. Applying such a model to elections held between 1976 and 1996 not 
only allows us to test previous assumptions, but helps to identify similarities and 
differences in voting patterns between different types of authority. 
The chapter begins by explaining why such a model is necessary for understanding 
English local party systems. It describes the methods used and summarises the 
relationships between local voting and ward level characteristics identified as relevant 
by the previous chapters. As shire district partial council elections cover almost the 
entire country, subsequent sections examine the effects of these characteristics upon 
voting in these authorities, to determine whether the previously identified 
relationships exist independently of one another. Those characteristics found to 
exhibit an independent relationship are then included into the model in order of their 
theoretical and statistical importance. The model is then applied to the other types of 
local authority allowing us to identify similarities and differences in the relationships 
both over time and also between the different types of authority. 
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8*2 Modelling the Independent Effects of Ward Level Characteristics 
upon Party Systems 
Previous research has suggested that certain relationships appear to exist between 
ward level characteristics and local party systems (Widdecombe, 1986; Miller, 1998; 
Railings & Thrasher, 1994). The bivariate analysis conducted in Chapters six and 
seven provided further evidence that such relationships exist at the local election 
level. Chapter six demonstrated that the effect of district magnitude may well have 
discriminated against the Liberals in some authorities while Chapter seven highlighted 
a division between certain socioeconomic characteristics and partisan voting. 
Bivariate analysis, however, measures the relationship between each pair of variables 
separately. Our analysis of district magnitude did not, therefore, take into account any 
effect of the socioeconomic characteristics of wards and visa versa. If wards with 
large district magnitude have similar socioeconomic characteristics we may have been 
measuring the effect of the socioeconomic characteristics and not district magnitude. 
This situation is particularly likely to occur when conducting a bivariate analysis of 
the relationship between socioeconomic characteristics and voting. For example, the 
proportion of residents in receipt of higher education is likely to be positively related 
to the proportion of residents employed in professional and technical occupations. If 
a positive correlation coefficient between the Conservative vote and professional 
occupations were produced, we would likely find such a relationship for residents 
with a higher education. 
Measuring the individual effect of each socioeconomic characteristic is important. 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggested that social cleavages were responsible for the 
formation and development of party systems. What was important for these authors 
266 
was die identification of relevant cleavages and how they reinforced or cut across 
each other. While chapter seven identified that such social cleavages appear to be 
related to local voting, the limitations of bivariate analysis does not allow us to 
ascertain which were independently reinforcing voting patterns. 
In order to address these problems, this chapter employs the widely used method of 
single-equation linear regression analysis. The technique attempts to explain 
movements in a dependent variable - in this case vote share - as a function of 
movements in a set of explanatory or independent variables (Studenmund, 1997: 6). 
The independent variables included in the model are those ward-level socioeconomic 
and electoral system characteristics identified and discussed in previous chapters. Not 
only does this method allow us to gauge the independent effect of each variable', it 
also allows us to estimate the total contribution of all included variables upon the 
variance of vote share. This, in turn, provides us with an indication of the extent to 
which voting in local elections is pre-determined by the characteristics of the ward. 
8 J A Class Based Model of Vote Choice 
Bivariate analysis demonstrated that social class was related to the Conservative and 
Labour vote in English local elections. The proportion of residents in skilled manual; 
technical and managerial; and business and professional occupations were 
consistently positively related to the Conservative vote and negatively related to the 
Labour vote. Although weaker, a similar class/vote relationship to that of the 
Conservatives appeared to exist for the Liberals (see section 7.3). This section uses 
' When we use the term "independent effect" we mean the effect of the explanatory variable 
when holding all other variables are held constant. 
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regression analysis to estimate the independent contribution of each class group and 
the extent to which class characteristics explains voting in local elections. 
In section 7.3, hypotheses 3.2 and 3.4 proposed that the Conservative and Liberal vote 
would be positively related to the proportion of middle class residents, while 
hypothesis 3.3 stated the reverse would be the case for Labour. The results of the 
bivariate analysis confirmed that this appeared to be the case. If our theoretical 
justification of hypotheses 3.2-3.4 were correct then we would expect each of the 
class groups to be independently related to partisan voting in a similar manner. The 
following hypotheses can be used to test these propositions: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Conservative voting in local elections is independently positively 
related to the proportion of residents In middle class groups. 
Hypothesis 4.2: Labour voting In local elections Is independently positively 
related to the proportion of residents In working class groups. 
Hypothesis 4.3: Liberal voting In local elections Is independently positively 
related to the proportion of residents In middle class groups. 
If these hypotheses are proven then we would expect to find positive regression 
coefficients between Conservative and Liberal vote share and the proportion of 
residents employed in professional; technical and managerial; and skilled non-manual 
occupations. We would expect also, positive coefficients between Labour vote share 
and skilled; semi-skilled; and unskilled manual occupations. 
Hypothesis 3.5 stated that class voting in local elections declined between 1978 and 
1996. Although the bivariate analysis provides some evidence that the relationship 
between partisan voting and certain class groups may have declined, a reduction in the 
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combined effect of class voting was not tested. Such a decline can be tested using the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4.4: The combined effect of class voting in local elections declined 
between 1976 and 1996. 
If hypothesis 4.4 were correct then we would expect to find that the amount of 
variance in the vote share of the parties, explained solely by class, decreased during 
the period. 
8 J . l Class and Voting in Sbire District Partial Council Elections 
Table 8-1 shows the results of a regression of the three main parties' vote share on the 
proportion of residents fix)m each social class for shire district partial council elections 
held between 1978 and 1996. Only significant (a=0.1) coefficients for the class 
variables are shown. Setting the level of alpha to 0.1 increases the chance of us 
accepting a coefficient as being different to zero, when it is actually zero, to 1 
coefficient in 10 times. The similarity between the values of the coefficients fix)m 
year to year, however, increases the likelihood that they are accurate. The table 
shows also the total amount of variability in vote share explained by the model (R?) 
and a constant term. 
The values of R^ range between 0.34 and 0.52 for the Conservatives, 0.50 and 0.63 for 
Labour and 0.02 to 0.12 for the Liberals. Class voting appears, therefore, to be 
strongest for Labour. In every election, class alone explains over half of the variance 
in the party's vote share. Class voting does not appear as strong for the Conservatives 
during the period, suggesting that the Labour party drew more (or less) support fix)m 
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specific class groups than the Conservatives. The Conservative vote appears to be 
drawn slightly more evenly across the different classes. Voting for the Liberals 
appears largely to transcend the different class groups. At most, class alone can 
explain only 12% of the variance in the Liberal's vote share. 
Table 8-1 - Regression of Vote on Class in Shire District Partial Council 
Elections 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Conservative 
N 511 1318 1190 1193 1222 1221 1240 1564 1545 1534 1595 1544 1498 1391 1314 
0.42 0.35 0.46 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.38 0,40 0.39 
Constant 53.29 45.31 51.88 56.36 51.49 55.15 54.03 38.27 41.06 34.53 32.29 42.74 31.79 37.52 39.81 
PCLASS1 -0.33 -0.22 -0.30 -0.26 -0.19 -0.30 
PCLASS2 0.58 0.53 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.46 0.66 0.68 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.56 
PCLASS3N •0.30 -0.21 -0.35 -0.43 •0.29 -0.48 -0.51 -0.56 
PCLASS3M -0.27 -0.17 -0.36 -0.47 -0.30 -0.32 -0.42 -0.13 -0.14 -0.30 -0.25 
PCLASS4 -0.25 -0.42 •0.38 •0.38 -0.57 -0.46 -0.53 -0.74 -0.55 -0.40 -0.57 -0.46 -0.61 -0.66 
PCLASS5 -1.14 -0.69 -1.08 -1.38 -1.35 -1.32 -1.28 -1.13 -1.39 -1,44 -1,35 -1.49 -1.18 -1,25 -1.42 
Labour 
N 470 1218 1171 1200 1186 1219 1231 1519 1458 1531 1544 1480 1516 1441 1348 
R* 0.59 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.50 
Constant 16.92 20.55 19.17 19.60 23.64 21.54 21.53 41.27 50.10 42.29 41.85 38.90 42.73 41.17 36.69 
PCLASS1 -0.25 -0.33 -0.28 -0.28 -0.38 -0.28 
PCLASS2 -0.59 -0.35 -0.57 -0.56 -0.59 -0.61 -0.65 -0.88 -0.99 -0.72 -0.81 -0.77 -0.76 -0.77 -0.67 
PCtJVSS3N -0.44 -0.46 -0.38 -0.37 -0.61 -0.64 -0.47 -0.51 -0.64 -0.74 -0.33 -0.40 
PCLASS3M 0.55 0.49 0.71 0.44 0.45 0.56 0.51 0.12 0.39 0.22 0.12 0.46 0.54 0.54 
PCIJ\SS4 0.73 0.66 1.03 0.75 0.70 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.99 1.13 0.94 1.04 1.06 1.15 1.22 
PCLASS5 1.41 1.34 1.25 1.31 1.56 1.20 1.68 1.29 1.44 1.68 1.44 1.39 1.29 1.39 1.54 
Ut>eral 
N 251 581 720 1231 1088 1001 1136 1456 1119 1096 1247 1326 1332 1211 1107 
0.07 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0,12 0.10 0.06 
Constant 31.87 53.53 45.19 27.29 33.26 37,68 35.05 28.69 29.38 28.13 35.40 34.06 39.08 33.29 40.19 
PCLASS1 -0.68 -0.69 •0.33 -0,30 
PCLASS2 0.21 0.15 0.27 0.24 
PCLASS3N -0.54 -0.54 0.21 0.39 0.30 0.36 
PCLASS3M -0.19 0.14 -0.16 -0.16 -0.19 
PCLASS4 -0.47 •0.62 -0.45 -0.32 -0.31 -0.38 -0.56 -0.45 -0.63 -0.67 -0.69 -0.63 -0.76 
PCLASS5 -1.30 -1.45 -1.27 -0.31 -0.56 -0.62 -0.73 •0.62 -0.84 -0.91 -0.58 
All coeffidents are significant at P<0.1 
The independent relationships between each of the class groups and voting can be 
more clearly seen in Figure 8-1. For Labour, we see a similar class cleavage to that 
found in chapter 7.3. The coefficients for the working class groups (PCLASS3M, 
PCLASS4 and PCLASS5) are consistently positive and, where significant, the 
middle-class groups are negative. The directions of each class coefficient are as we 
would expect if hypothesis 4.2 were correct. The weaker class relationship for the 
Liberals is reflected also by the coefficients. Only PCLASS4 (proportion of semi-
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skilled manual woricers) and PCLASS5 (proportion of unskilled woricers) are 
significant for the Liberals during most of the period. Of the other Liberal 
coefficients that are significant, some display unusual changes in direction fi-om one 
year to the next (e.g. PCLASS3M in 1982). Such unexpected results may be due to 
accepting a 1 in 10 chance of error. As such we would be unwise to draw conclusions 
fiiom these coefficients. We can only be confident, therefore, that PCLASS4 and 
PCLASS5 are consistently related negatively to the Liberal's vote share. As such the 
model provides only little evidence to support the hypothesis that Liberal voting is 
independently positively related to the proportion of residents in each middle class 
group. Instead it suggests, that the negative relationship between Liberal voting and 
the working class groups might be more important. 
Perhaps the most surprising feature of Figure 8-1 is the pattern of coefficients for the 
Conservatives. If hypothesis 4.1 was correct, we would expect to see the opposite 
class division to that displayed by Labour. This is not the case. Holding all other 
variables constant, only the proportion of residents in managerial or technical 
occupations (PCLASS2) is positively related to the Conservative vote. While the 
direction of the working class coefficients are the same as the analysis in Chapter 7.3, 
those for the proportion of residents employed in professional or skilled non-manual 
occupations are the opposite. Before speculating about the reasons for such a finding 
it would be wise to check the regression model in order to ascertain whether the 
assumptions for using the technique have been met (see chapter 4). The following 
section checks, therefore, the validity of these assumptions for our model. 
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Figure 8-1 - Class Coefficients in Shire District Partial Council Elections 
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S3.2 Assumptions of a Class Based Regression Model 
This section lists and checks the assumptions of the class based regression model. 
Rather than report all of the assumptions of the regressions, for each party in all years, 
this section wil l concentrate upon 1982 when the model produced the strongest 
explanations of class voting. Although this might appear as though we are "cheating" 
by picking the best year, the regression coefficients in 1982 are similar to those for the 
other years - certainly in terms of their direction. The conclusions about most of the 
assumptions were found to be similar for the other years also. The only exception to 
this concerns the phenomenon of heteroskedasticity, which will be discussed in more 
detail later. As it was the model when applied to the Conservatives, that produced the 
most unexpected findings, the section focuses mainly upon this party. Fortunately, 
significant coefficients are produced for Conservative vote share and all of the class 
groups in 1982. 
The regression analysis was conducted using SPSS. The first output provided by the 
software is a summary of the regression model (Table 8-2). The model summary 
shows the total amount of variance in Conservative voting (R^) explained by the 
model (also shown in Table 8-1). The adjusted is an estimate of how the model 
would perform for the entire population. The difference between R^ (0.521) and the 
adjusted R^ (0.519) is very small, indicating that the model is suitable for generalising 
to the population from which the sample was taken (Field, 2001:146). This gives us 
more confidence that the model estimates are accurate. 
Table 8-2 also shows the Duibin-Watson statistic. This allows us to test the 
assumption that observations of the error term are uncorrelated with each other - no 
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serial correlation or autocorrelation (see Assumption two chapter 4). The value of the 
statistic can range between 0 (positive correlation) and 4 (negative correlation) with a 
value of 2 indicating no correlation whatsoever. The value of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic for the Conservative regression in 1982 is 1.04. Although this value lies 
almost midway between perfect positive correlation and no correlation, it is arguable 
whether this is greatly affecting the model. Field (2001: 138) suggests, that a value of 
less than 1 or greater than 3 should give cause for concern. In this case the value of 
the Durbin-Watson statistic is just within this threshold. Autocorrelation, according 
to Dougherty (1992), normally occurs only in regression analysis using time series. 
This is because the disturbance term in a regression equation picks up the influence of 
those variables that have not been included in the regression equation. Autocorrelation 
occurs when the effect of such a variable increases over time (Dougherty, 1992: 217). 
This caiuiot be the case in our regression, however, as it includes only the 1982 
elections. We assume, therefore, that the regression model meets the assumption of 
independent error terms. 
Table 8-2 - Conservative Vote 1982 on Class (Model Summary) 
Model SummanP 








1 .722^ .521 .519 11.2472 1.039 
a. Predictors: (Constant). PCLASS5. PCLASS3N. PCLASS3M, 
PCLASS4. PCLASS1, PCLASS2 
b. Dependent Variable: CONSHARE 
The SPSS output also provides an overall measure of the coefficients calculated in the 
model (see Table 8-3). The F-Test provides an indication of the model's success in 
predicting values better than simply using the average of the sample. The value of F 
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= 215.12 (sig.<0.001), which indicates that the slope of at least one of the regression 
coefficients is significantly different than zero. The model provides, therefore, better 
estimates of the Conservative vote share than simply using the mean value. 





Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 163274.6 6 27212.429 215.121 .000» 
Residual 150027.2 1186 126.498 
Total 313301.8 1192 
a- Predictors: (Constant), PCLASS5. PCLASS3N, PCLASS3M, PCLASS4. 
PCLASS1,PCLASS2 
b. Dependent Variable: CONSHARE 
A breakdown of the values of each coefficient is shown in Table 8-4. The t-test 
provides a measure of confidence that the individual coefficients are different than 
zero. Although the level of a was set to 0.1 for Table 8-1, the significance level of 
the t-test for most coefficients are less than 0.005. This increases our confidence that 
the coefficients do indeed differ Grom zero for 1982. The value of the unstandardised 
coefficient (B) indicates the unit change in the Conservative vote share for every unit 
change in the independent variables. The constant term indicates the value of the 
Conservative vote i f the values of all independent variables were zero. Holding all 
other variables constant, the model estimates that the Conservatives could expect to 
receive 56.36% of the vote plus an additional 0.55% for every percentage increase in 
PCLASS2 (managerial and technical occupations). 
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Coliinearit^  / Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 56.359 3.406 16.546 .000 
PCLASS1 -.334 .100 -.095 -3.327 .001 .492 2.030 
PCLASS2 .555 .057 .354 9.713 .000 .303 3.298 
PCLASS3N -.207 .102 -.046 -2.032 .042 .792 1.263 
PCLASS3M -.467 .055 -.252 -8.412 .000 .450 2.221 
PCLASS4 -.363 .091 -.120 -4.211 .000 .495 2.019 
PCLASS5 -1.376 .164 -.227 -8.367 .000 .547 1.829 
a- Dependent Variable: CONSHARE 
Although the value of B provides an estimate of how a unit change in the proportion 
of residents in each class group affects the vote share, the proportion of residents in 
each class group varies dramatically. In Conservative contested wards, there was an 
average of 21.5% residents in PCLASS2 while only 3.5% in PCLASS5 (unskilled 
workers). PCLASS2 has the potential, therefore, to produce much greater changes in 
the Conservative vote. The standardised coefficients (Beta) are estimates of the effect 
of each class group expressed in terms of standard deviations. Beta allows us, 
therefore, to assess the contribution of each independent variable to the variance in 
vote share. Although the unstandardised coefficient (B) for PCLASS5 was -1.38, the 
smaller average number of residents in this group produces a standardised coefficient 
of only -0.23. An examination of the other standardised coefficients reveals that 
PCLASS2 (Beta=0.35) exerts the greatest influence upon the variance in vote share, 
while PCLASS3N (Beta=0.05) exerts the least. 
Assumption Five is that the variance of the error term is constant (homoskedastic). 
Heteroskedasticity would occur in our data i f the Conservative vote share in wards 
with a high proportion of residents in one class group varied more than in wards with 
276 
a low proportion of these residents. That this may occur is not an unreasonable 
expectation. In fact, heteroskedasticity is quite common in socioeconomic data 
(Pindyck & Runbinfield, 1997: 146). Hcteroskedasticity can be detected by 
examining a scatter plot of the standardised residuals (error terms) by the standardised 
predicted values (Figure 8-2). A distribution of points resembling a funnel shape 
lying along the red horizontal regression line would indicate that the variance in the 
errors of the predicted values was not constant. There is little evidence of such a 
pattern for our regression. The points appear to be fairly evenly distributed and the 
regression line appears to fit the data points quite well. 
Figure 8-2 - Conservative Vote 1982 on Class (Scatterplot of Residuals by 
Predicted Values) 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: CONSHARE 
3 - 2 - 1 0 1 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
The value of V I F (variance inflation factor) in Table 8-4 allows us to test the 
assumption of no perfect multicollinearity amongst the class groups (Assumption 
Six). According to Bowcrman and O'Connell (1990), there would be cause for 
concern if the largest V I F was greater than 10 or the average for all coefficients was 
substantially greater than 1. The V I F ranges between 1.3 and 3.3 with an average 
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value for the six independent variables of 2.12. We can therefore be confident that 
there is little collinearity between the independent variables. This can be checked, 
however, by examining the variance proportions shown in Table 8-5. Finding the 
variance proportion of more than one independent variables loaded onto the same 
dimension would provide evidence that those variable were collinear. PCLASS2 has 
58% of its variance loading onto dimension seven, while 50% of the variance in 
PCLASS3M loads onto the same dimension. These values are not that great, 
however. As we are looking for perfect multicollinearity, we would only have cause 
for concern i f around 90% of the variance of both variables loaded onto the same 
dimension. 
Table 8-5 - Conservative Vote 1982 on Class (CoUineanty Diagnostics) 
CoUliwarlty Diagnostics 








M PCLASS4 PCLASS5 
1 1 6.696 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 JB32 2.617. .00 .08 .01 .00 .00 .01 .07 
3 .201 6.322 .00 .29 .00 .10 .02 .00 .39 
4 .118 6.957 .00 .14 .02 .18 .01 .34 .33 
5 e.403E-02 8.234 .00 .34 .39 ^ .01 .01 .00 
e 6.187E-02 0.695 .00 .04 .00 .21 .47 .34 .02 
7 7.312E-03 27.912 1.00 .11 .68 .23 .60 .30 .18 
0. Dopondent VartatXe: CONSHARE 
Assumption Seven is that the error term is normally distributed. Figure 8-3 shows a 
histogram of the residuals (with normal distribution curve superimposed). The 
distribution of the residuals resembles closely the normal distribution curve, 
suggesting that the error tenm is indeed normally distributed and the assumption has 
been met. 
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Figure 8-3 - Conservative Vote 1982 on Class (Histogram of Residuals) 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: CONSHARE 
std D e v » 1 00 
Mean > 0 00 
N « 1193 00 
Regression Standardized Residual 
8.3.3 What No Heteroskedasticity? 
If heteroskedasticity is so common then why do we have little evidence of it in the 
Conservative model? When applied to Labour in the same year, we found that the 
regression model meets all assumptions except that of constant variance. A scatter 
plot of standardised residuals by predicted values of Labour vote share is shown in 
Figure 8-4. Heteroskedasticity and its effect on the regression line are clearly evident. 
The variance in the errors in wards with small predicted Labour vote shares is far less 
than the variance in the wards where predicted vote shares are higher. As the 
regression line minimises the sum of the squared errors, it will give far more weight to 
the cases with higher variance (Pindyck & Rubinfield, 1997: 147). As a result, the 
regression line does not fit the data points as well as for the Conservatives. Although 
not affecting the value of the coefficients, heteroskedasticity can result in an 
underestimation of their standard error. This would produce lower values for the 
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significance of our t-test, which in turn may lead us to believe that the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero when in fact it is not (Dougherty, 1992: 204). 
Figure 8-4 - Labour Vote 1982 on Class (Scatterplot of Residuals by Predicted 
Values) 
Scatterplot 









Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
Why would heteroskedasticity be present for Labour but absent for the 
Conservatives? If, for each ward, we plot the actual Labour vote share against 
PCLASS2 (the largest class group), we see that the Labour vote share varies less as 
the proportion of such residents increases (see Figure 8-5). This results in the familiar 
funnel shape. In wards with over 40% of these residents the Labour vote share ranges 
between 2.6% and 28.5% with a standard deviation of 4.8. For wards with less than 
20% of residents in PCLASS2 the variance in Labour vote is much higher ranging 
from 2% to 85.2% (s.d.= 16.2). Figure 8-5 shows that for the Conservatives, the 
funnel shape is not present. In fact the difference in the variance in the parties vote 
share between those wards where PCLASS2>40 (s.d.=10.7) and those where 
PCLASS2<20 (s.d.= 12.9) is not as great as for Labour. The variance is more constant 
for the Conservatives. 
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Figure 8-5 - Scatterplot of Labour and Conservative Vote Share by PCLASS2 
In wards with less than 20% of residents in social class 2, voting for both parties 
varies widely (Labour s.d.=16.2. Conservative s.d.=12.9). In wards with over 40% 
residents in this group, voting for Labour varies little (s.d.=4.8). In these wards the 
Labour vote share is always quite low (mean=7.9). For the Conservatives in these 
wards, however, the vote share still varies widely (s.d.=10.7). The reluctance of these 
wards to vote Labour, therefore, does not necessarily result in a proportionate 
advantage to the Conservatives. The variation must be due, therefore, to those not 
supporting Labour instead of voting for candidates other than the Conservatives - such 
as the Liberals, for example. The absence of heteroskedasticity for the Conservatives, 
actually supports our earlier findings that suggested that if not voting Conservative, 
voters from social class 2 would be more likely to support the Liberals than Labour. 
This is particularly true of 1982 when the Liberals polled over 28% of the vote in 
shire district partial council elections. 
Dougherty (1992) suggests that heteroskedasticity may result in the significance 
levels of regression coefficients being underestimated. We determined that each 
regression coefficient was significant if the t-test was less than 0.1. We might. 
281 
therefore, be concerned i f the significance of the Labour coefficients were close to the 
0.1 threshold. Table 8-6 shows the significance levels of those coefficients previously 
accepted as being different to zero. Most of the coefficients are significant at a=.01 
which is well below our level of 0.1. Moreover, the coefficients for those years where 
the significance levels are higher (PCLASSl in 1988 and 1996, PCLASS3M in 1987 
and 1992) are not markedly different fit)m those in the other years. Although 
heteroskedasticity exists, therefore, we have good reason to believe that we can 
remain confident in the coefficients. 
Table 8-6 - Labour Vote 1982 on Class T-Test Significance Values 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
PCLASSl 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.07 
PCLASS2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS3N 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 
PCLASS3M 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PCLASS5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
With the exception of heteroskedasticity, all of the assumptions are met for each 
regression in every year. As the model appears to work well for the Conservatives 
and the pattern of coefficients for the Liberal and Labour vote share is as expected 
(despite the heteroskedasticity), we would suggest the coefficients shown in Table 8-1 
are an accurate reflection of the independent class relationships. Unfortunately, this 
still leaves the unexpected direction of the coefficients PCLASSl and PCLASS3N for 
the Conservative vote unexplained. 
8.3.4 A Decline of Class Voting? 
The previous chapter found only little evidence of a decline in class voting in local 
elections between 1978 and 1996. It is possible, however, that examining the 
combined effect of class voting might reveal more compelling evidence that class 
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declined. Figure 8-6 plots the total explained variance in vote share during the period. 
For each of the parties, a linear regression trend line is also shown. Despite 
fluctuations in explained variance of both Conservative and Labour voting the trend 
lines appear to show a reduction in combined class voting. 
Figure 8-6 - Total Explained Variance in Party Vote Share 1978-96. 
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8.3.5 Which Class Groups are Relevant? 
Before examining the effects of other characteristics, it would be useful to reduce the 
model so that it includes only the most relevant class variables. Doing so will provide 
a more concise and easily interpretable model, especially when other variables are 
included later. The previous section discussed the relevance of each class coefficient 
in terms of its contribution to the amount of variance in vote share. Coefficients could 
also be considered to be relevant if they contributed consistently to the variance in 
every election. Table 8-7 shows the standardised betas for the three main parties. 
After 1978, only the coefficients for PCLASS2 , PCLASS4 and PCLASS5 
significantly and consistently contributed to the variance of the Conservative and 
Labour vote. For the Liberals also, PCLASS4 and PCLASS5 were relevant both in 
terms of the size and consistency of contribution to the variance of the party's vote. 
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While PCLASS2 was significant for the Liberals in only four years, the value of the 
standardised beta on these occasions indicates that the contribution of this variable 
was quite large. The reduced model will include, therefore, only PCLASS2. 
PCLASS4andPCLASS5. 
Table 8-7 - Standardised Betas for Class Voting 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Conservative 
PCLASS1 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 
PCLASS2 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.35 
PCLASS3N -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
PCLASS3M -0.14 -0.10 -0.18 -0.25 •0.16 -0.17 -0.24 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.11 
PCLASS4 -0.09 ^.12 •0.12 -0.12 -0.17 -0.15 •0.14 -0.19 -0.16 -0.11 -0.16 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 
PCLASSS -0.17 -0.13 -0,17 -0.23 -0.22 -0.21 •0.22 -0.15 -0.17 -0.20 -0.18 -0.19 -0.17 •0.17 -0.18 
Labour 
PCLASSI -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 
PCLASS2 -0.32 -0.21 -0.27 -0.31 -0.31 -0.29 -0.30 -0.44 -0.43 -0.33 -0.39 •0.37 -0.33 -0.34 -0.28 
PCLASS3N •0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 •0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 
PCLASS3M 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.16 
PCLASS4 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.23 
PCLASSS 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Uboral 
PCLASSI -0.25 -0.21 -0.11 -0.08 
PCLASS2 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.13 
PCLASS3N -0.14 -0.12 O.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 
PCLASS3M -0.10 0.10 -0.09 -0.07 •0.07 
PCLASS4 -0.17 -0.24 -0.14 •0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.14 -0.18 
PCLASSS -0.19 -0.28 -0.22 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 •0.13 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 
Ail coefficients are significant at P<0.1 
Omitting those class variables not considered as relevant fi*om the model changes the 
value of only slightly (see 
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Table 8-8). A regression of vote share upon only PCLASS2, PCLASS4 and 
PCLASS5 produces on average, an of only 0.02 less than the models that included 
the other class groups. Reducing the model provides us with a simpler model thai 
retains much of the strength of the fully specified model. In so doing, it excludes 
also, those coefficients that did not confirm our theoretically expected results 
(PCLASSl and PCLASS3N). 
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Table 8-8 - DifTerence in between Full and Reduced Class Model 
1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Conservative R* 
Full Model 0.42 0.35 0.46 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.39 
Reduced Model 0.41 0.34 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.37 
Labour 
Full Model 0.59 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.50 
Reduced Model 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.48 
UberaIR' 
Full Model 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.06 
Reduced Model 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06 
8.3.6 Class Voting - a Conclusion? 
This section illustrated the nature of the relationship between class groups and voting 
using a multiple regression model. While the direction of the relationships between 
each class and the Liberal and Labour vote supported findings fix)m the bivariate 
analysis, those for the Conservatives were not all as expected. When holding the 
other class variables constant, PCLASSl and PCLASS3N appear to be negatively 
related to the party's vote. Testing the assumptions of the model for the 
Conservatives produced no evidence that the model was incorrectly estimating the 
coefficients, leaving this phenomena unexplained. Reducing the coefficients to those 
considered most relevant produced a model that is both simpler to interpret and 
reflects the hypothesised nature of the class relationships. The model reveals that 
class relationships were strongest for Labour, accounting for almost half of the 
variance in vote share in every election. Class relationships were weakest for the 
Liberals with die model explaining less than 10% of the variance in most elections 
while for the Conservatives' the model explained between a third and half of the 
variance. 
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8.4 Class and Housing 
After controlling for class. Heath et al (1991) identified housing tenure as the most 
influential explanatory socioeconomic variable upon voting for the parties. Although 
the bivariate analysis conducted in Chapter 7.4 identified an apparent public/private 
sector housing cleavage, the effect of class was not considered. However, any 
relationship between class and housing may have affected such an analysis. I f a 
strong relationship existed between the proportion of council tenants and the 
proportion of working class residents then some of our previous correlation 
coefficients would be influenced by the effects of class. 
I f Heath et al (1991) are correct then we would still find evidence of a relationship 
between housing tenure and partisan voting after controlling for class. Such a 
relationship could be tested with the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4.5: After controlling for class, housing tenure Is related to partisan 
voting 
The inclusion of the different housing variables into the class model developed in 
Chapter 8.3, allows us to estimate the effects of housing tenure upon partisan voting 
while controlling for class. Given the previous findings, we would expect negative 
coefBcients for Conservative and Liberal voting and public sector housing, while we 
would expect the reverse for Labour. 
Although Chapter 7.4 revealed that all types of housing tenure were consistently 
related to partisan voting, the inclusion of all housing variables into the regression 
model produces strange results. Table 8-9 shows the SPSS output for the 
Conservatives in 1983. Not only is the value of the constant impossibly high (110.23) 
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- suggesting that the Conservative may poll over 100% of the vote - but all of the 
housing coefficients are negative. I f correct, this would suggest that residents of all 
types of housing tenure would be unlikely to vote Conservative. However, as the 
value of the variance inflation factor is over 10 for most of the housing coefHcients it 
is likely that collinearity exists between the variables. 





CoefTIdents ts Colllnearlh / Statistics 
Model B Std. Error Beta 1 SJq. Tolerance VIF-. 
1 (Constant) 110.236 22.423 4.916 .000 
PCLASS2 .593 .049 .366 1Z224 .000 .435 2.300 
PCLASS4 -.183 .088 -.056 -2.077 .038 .537 1.864 
PCLASS5 -.776 .161 -.124 •4.826 .000 .586 1.706 
PHASSOC -.781 .252 -.132 -3.097 .002 .215 4.651 
PCOUNCIL -.008 .224 -1.125 -4.055 .000 .005 197.875 
POWNEROCC -.674 .224 -.794 -3.009 .003 .006 179.016 
PPRfVATE -.809 .231 -.274 -3.504 .000 .064 15.692 
POTHTENUR -.300 .247 -.083 -1.217 .224 .083 12.031 
a- Dependent Variable: CONSHARE 
We can identify any collinearity be examining the variance proportions of each of the 
independent variables. Table 8-10 shows that the variances of those variables with 
high variance inflation factors are all loading onto dimension nme. In particular, there 
is evidence of very high collinearity between the proportion of council house residents 
(PCOUNCIL) and the proportion of owner occupiers (POWNEROCC). Such 
collinearity would be expected given the theoretical justification of the inclusion of 
housing into the model. I f a public/private sector housing cleavage existed then we 
would expect an opposite relationship between council housing and voting to that for 
owner-occupiers. Indeed, Figure 7-2 in Chapter 7.4 revealed that the relationship 
288 
between PCOUNCIL and partisan voting is almost the exact mirror image of the 
relationship between POWNEROCC and such voting. 
Table 8-10 - Conservative Vote 1982 on Class and Housing (Collinearity 
Diagnostics) 
CoUnMrttyOUonocUd 











i i 9.B40 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 JOO 
2 1.(03 Z379 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 
3 Ze24 .00 .00 .00 .00 .20 .00 .00 .00 .00 
4 J78 3.160 .00 .03 .00 .02 . r a .00 .00 .00 .04 
9 J S 7 3.088 .00 .02 .00 .08 .01 w .00 M m 
e .178 9,728 .00 .01 .00 .51 .00 .00 .00 .02 .01 
7 .120 a073 .00 .11 .44 26 i n .00 .00 .00 xa 
e 3JSZE-02 13.140 .00 .82 .59 .11 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 
0 1 . 3 8 0 E ^ 205.681 1.00 .01 .00 .00 .78 .09 1.00 .02 .89 
a- Oepondcm VartaUe: CONSHARE 
We can avoid this collinearity by excluding PCOUNCIL or POWNEROCC from the 
model. Excluding POWNEROCC leaves us with two categories on each side of the 
housing cleavage. Table 8-11 shows the effect upon the variance inflation factors 
when POWNEROCC is excluded from the model. The maximum VIF is now only 
2.29. Not only has the exclusion of owner-occupiers eliminated the high collinearity, 
the value of the constant has returned to a more realistic level and the coefficients are 
more in line with our public/private sector housing hypothesis. 











B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 43.061 2.084 20.658 .000 
PCUSS2 .598 .049 .369 12.293 .000 .435 2.298 
PCLASS4 -.176 .089 -.054 -1.991 .047 .537 1.862 
PCLASS5 -.784 .161 -.126 -4.860 .000 .586 1.706 
PHASSOC -.111 .119 -.019 -.934 .351 .979 1.022 
PCOUNCIL -.237 .022 -.294 •10.899 .000 .537 1.861 
PPRIVATE -.147 .070 -.050 -2.096 .036 .698 1.433 
POTHTENUR .403 .080 .112 5.053 .000 .802 1.247 
a- Dependent Variable: CONSHARE 
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When the model applied over the entire period, the only coefficients that are 
consistently significant are those for council tenants and other types of tenure 
(POTHTENUR). Table 8-12 shows the significant standardised betas for class and 
housing, the total variance explained (R^) and the change fi-om the reduced class 
model. After controlling for class, the coefficients for PCOUNCIL and 
POTHTENUR are significantly different than zero for most years. This supports 
hypothesis 4.5. After controlling for class, housing tenure does appear to have an 
effect on partisan voting. 
The directions of the standardised coefficients for PCOUNCIL are consistently 
negative for the Conservative and Liberals, v^ h^ile positive for Labour. For 
POTHTENUR the opposite relationship appears to exist. The directions of the 
coefficients are, as we would expect, i f we support a private/public sector housing 
cleavage. The size of the housing coefficients is interesting also. The proportion of 
council tenants appears to have the second largest influence upon the variance of the 
Conservative and Labour vote - the largest being social class 2. This suggests that 
council housing is more relevant to Conservative and Labour voting than employment 
in semi-skilled or non-skilled occupations. For the Liberals, this variable appears to 
influence voting more than any one of the class groups. 
Table 8-12 - Regression of Vote on Class and Housing 1978-96. 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Conservatlvo 
R* 0.46 0.37 0.50 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.40 
Change 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
PCLASS2 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.36 0.37 
PCLASS4 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.15 -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 
PCLASS5 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 ^.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 
PCOUNCCL -0.28 -0.20 -0.26 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.24 -0.25 -0.22 -0.17 -0.21 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
POTHTENUR 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.11 
Labour 
R* 0.67 0.55 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.53 
R* Change 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
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PCLASS2 -0.37 -0.33 -0.40 -0.39 -0.37 -0.40 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.37 -0.36 -0.34 -0.38 -0.37 -0.32 
PCLASS4 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 
PCLASS5 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 
PCOUNCIL 0.35 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.24 
POTHTENUR -0.14 •0.06 -0.08 •0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 •0.10 •0.10 •0.11 
Contd..../ 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Liberal 
0.09 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.09 
Change 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
PCLASS2 -0.12 0.11 0.11 
PCLASS4 •0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.13 -0.10 •0.11 •0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
PCLASS5 -0.14 -0.16 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 •0.13 -0.07 
PCOUNCIL •0.21 -0.17 •0.08 •0.10 -0.12 -0.17 -0.21 •0.18 -0.19 -0.14 -0.18 -0.16 •0.19 
POTHTENUR 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 
All coefficients are slgnincant at p<0.1 
The inclusion of housing into the reduced class model increases the total amount of 
explained variance for all of the parties. The greatest increase was for Labour. The 
model, averaged over the entire period, explains 60% of the variance in Labour voting 
- an increase of five percentage points over the class model. The mean explained 
variance in the Conservative vote increased four points to 46% while for the Liberals 
it increased from 6% to 8% on average, 
8.5 Class, Housing and Employment Status 
While class and housing together can account for almost two thirds of the variance in 
Labour voting and ahnost half the variance in Conservative voting, they explain, on 
average, less than 10% of the Liberal vote. After class and housing, employment 
status is possibly the most influential socioeconomic characteristic upon partisan 
voting (Heath et al, 1991). Chapter 7.5 identified high correlation scores between 
voting and certain employment characteristics. This section examines the extent to 
which these variables exert an independent effect upon partisan voting. 
Chapter 7.5 hypothesised that self-employment would be positively related to 
Conservative and Liberal voting while unemployment would be negatively related. 
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When the correlation scores for voting and these variables were examined, we found 
that not only were the hypotheses supported, but also that these characteristics exerted 
the greatest influence upon voting of all the employment variables. I f the influence of 
these variables were independent then we would expect that: 
Hypothesis 4.6; After controlling for class and housing, self-employment and 
unemployment are related to partisan voting. 
Table 8-13 shows the standardised betas for the model when employment status is 
included. For all parties, the coefficients for the proportion of unemployed residents 
(PWORKSEEK) are significantly different from zero in most years. The directions of 
these relationships are as expected given the previous findings. Those for the 
proportion of self-employed with employees (PSELFWITH), are less significant for 
Labour than the Conservatives or Liberals, while self-employed without employees 
(PSELFWOUT) are least significant for the Conservatives. There does appear to be 
an independent relationship between partisan voting and the proportion of self-
employed and unemployed residents. Hypothesis 4.6, therefore, appears to be correct. 
Although the directions of the coefficients for PWORKSEEK conformed to our 
expectations, those for self-employed residents do not. Chapter 7.5 revealed that both 
types of self-employed residents were positively correlated with Conservative and 
Liberal voting. When holding class, housing and the other employment types 
constant, however, the relationship appears ftxndamentally different for the Liberals 
than the Conservatives. The coefficients for (PSELFWITH) suggest that increases in 
the proportion of self-employed with employees leads to an increase in Conservative 
voting, but a decrease in Liberal voting. The coefficients for (PSELFWOUT) suggest 
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that an increase in self-employed without employees will lead to an increase in the 
Liberal vote and a decrease in both Conservative and Labour voting. This is 
interesting, because it is the only socioeconomic variable identified so far, where 
Labour and Conservatives are consistently related in the same direction. I f correct 
this would suggest that the Liberal have a distinct (although small) voter base. 
Table 8-13 - Regression of Vote on Class, Housing and Employment 1978-96. 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Consorvatlve 
R* 0.49 0 .39 0.57 0.62 0.57 0.54 0 .55 0.52 0 .55 0 .58 0.46 0.41 0.51 0.53 0.48 
R* Change 0.03 0.02 0.07 0 .05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0 .05 0 .05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.09 
P C L A S S 2 0 .19 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.10 0 .13 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.10 0 .13 0.11 0 .13 
P C L A S S 4 -0 .05 -0.07 -0 .05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0 .08 -0.09 -0.08 
P C L A S S 5 -0 .09 -0 .08 -0.08 -0.07 -0 .06 -0.06 -0 .10 •0.09 -0 .08 •0.06 -0.06 -0.07 
P C O U N C I L -0.21 -0 .15 -0 .19 -0 .18 -0.20 -0.18 -0 .15 -0.17 -0.14 •0 .09 -0 .13 -0.11 -0 .08 -0.08 -0.07 
P O T H T E N U R 0.09 0 .12 0.08 0 .05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0 .05 
PSELFWnrH 0.30 0.20 0.43 0.34 0.30 0.41 0.37 0.24 0 .28 0 .39 0.34 0 .30 0.45 0.50 0 .39 
P S E L F W O U T -0 .08 -0 .15 -0.09 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0 .05 
PWORKSEEK -0 .12 -0.14 -0 .16 -0 .15 -0 .16 -0 .15 -0 .13 -0 .17 -0 .16 -0.14 -0 .15 -0 .17 •0.10 -0.10 -0.14 
Labour 
R ' 0.68 0.57 0 .65 0.68 0.64 0 .63 0.66 0.66 0 .65 0.62 0.63 0.60 0.57 0 .56 0 .56 
R ' Change 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 .05 0.04 0.03 0 .03 0 .03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
P C L A S S 2 -0 .30 -0 .25 -0 .30 -0 .30 -0.31 -0 .32 •0 .29 -0 .25 -0 .26 -0 .26 -0 .25 -0 .23 -0 .28 -0 .26 -0.21 
P C L A S S 4 0.14 0.12 0 .15 0 .15 0.12 0.14 0 .15 0.13 0.13 0 .19 0 .15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
P C L A S S S 0 .09 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.06 0 .05 0.06 0.06 
PCOUNCIL 0.32 0.21 0.27 0 .23 0.22 0 .22 0.16 0 .19 0 .23 0 .15 0.21 0.18 0 .13 0.15 0.18 
POTHTENUR -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 -0 .06 -0 .05 -0.06 •0.07 •0.05 -0 .06 -0 .08 -0.08 •0 .06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 
PSELFWrTH -0 .12 -0 .06 -0.08 -0 .05 
PSELFWOUT -0 .06 -0.07 -0 .09 -0.09 -0.06 •0 .10 -0.20 -0 .18 -0 .15 -0 .15 -0.17 -0 .17 -0.17 -0.16 
P W O R K S E E K 0 .15 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.16 
Uberal 
R^  0.14 0.14 0.14 0 .03 0.07 0.10 0 .13 0.09 0.11 0 .15 0.11 0 .12 0.17 0.14 0.11 
R ' Change 0 .05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0 .03 0 .03 0.06 0.03 0 .03 0 .03 0.03 0.02 
PCLASS2 -0 .24 -0 .10 
PCLASS4 -0.11 -0.07 •0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0 .10 -0.07 -0.11 
PCLASSS -0 .18 -0 .15 -0.09 -0.07 •0 .09 0.07 
PCOUNCIL •0 .16 -0 .13 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16 
POTHTENUR 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.07 0 .09 0.06 
PSELFWrrH 0.13 -0 .17 -0.17 -0 .22 -0 .13 -0.20 -0.11 -0 .15 -0.13 -0.16 
PSELFWOUT 0.21 0.16 0 .25 0.10 0.16 0 .22 0.12 0 .15 0.14 0 ,15 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.16 
P W O R K S E E K -0 .12 -0 .15 -0 .19 •0.28 -0.18 -0 .15 -0 .22 -0.18 -0.14 
All coefficients are slgntflcant at p<0.1 
The inclusion of employment status increases the average amount of explained 
variance in Conservative voting by six percentage points, and in Liberal voting by 
four percentage points. The increase in explained variance is the least for Labour 
voting - although from a higher initial threshold. When employment status is 
included the explained variance of the Labour vote increased by only 3%. 
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8.6 A Socioeconomic Model of Partisan Voting 
Chapter 7.6 considered a range of other socioeconomic characteristics that might be 
considered to have an independent effect upon voting. The most relevant of these 
appeared to be the proportion of qualified residents (PQUALIFEED) and those 
working in agriculture (PAGRICULT) or other service industries (POTHSERV) such 
as banking. This section completes the model of socioeconomic voting by examining 
the relevance of these variables. 
The standardised betas for the final model of partisan voting are shown in 
294 
Table 8-14. Although the inclusion of the additional socioeconomic characteristics 
into the model adds little to the total variance of the parties' vote, the direction of 
some of the coefficients are worthy of discussion. The coefficients for PAGRICULT 
and POTHSERV indicate that there is an independent positive relationship between 
the proportion of residents employed in agriculture or other service industries and 
voting for the Conservatives and Liberals. The opposite is the case for Labour. These 
values confirm findings from Chapter 7.6. The coefficients for the proportion of 
qualified residents, however, are different than we expected. Chapter 7.6 suggested 
that there is a positive relationship between this characteristic and voting for the 
Liberals and Conservatives. When controlling for all relevant socioeconomic 
characteristics it appears that both these parties' votes will decrease as PQUALIFIED 





Regression of Vote on Relevant Socioeconomic Characteristics 1978-
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Conservative 
0.51 0.40 0.57 0.63 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.54 0.49 
Change 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
PCLASS2 0.21 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.18 
PCLASS4 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 •0.09 -0.06 •0.09 •0.10 •0.10 -0.09 
PCLASS5 -0.09 -0.08 •0.08 -0,07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
PCOUNCIL -0.21 -0.16 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.17 -0.19 -0.15 -0.11 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 
POTHTENUR -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 
PSELFWITH 0.34 0.22 0.44 0.32 0.26 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.35 0.36 0.45 0.48 0.41 
PSELFWOUT -0.16 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.07 
PWORKSEEK -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 •0.14 -0.12 -0.16 -0.15 •0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 -0.09 -0.14 
PAGRICULT -0.08 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 
POTHSERV 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.08 
PQUALIFIED -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 -0.26 -0.10 -0.08 •0.12 
Labour 
R' 0.69 0.60 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.59 
R ' Change 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
PCLASS2 -0.31 -0.17 -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 •0.29 -0.26 -0.24 -0.25 -0.20 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.13 
PCLASS4 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.09 
PCLASS5 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 
PCOUNCIL 0.33 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.17 
POTHTENUR 0.05 0.04 0.04 
PSELFWITH -0.11 -0.06 •0.09 -0.06 •0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 •0.09 
PSELFWOUT -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 •0.04 -0.10 -0.17 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 •0.17 -0.15 
PWORKSEEK 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 
PAGRICULT -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 
POTHSERV -0.17 -0.23 -0.25 -0.22 -0.24 -0.23 -0.19 -0.25 -0.24 -0.31 -0.25 -0.28 -0.34 -0.27 -0.27 
PQUALIFIED 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.07 
Uberal 
R* 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.12 
R* Change 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
PCLASS2 -0.15 0.13 
PCLASS4 -0.36 -0.15 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 
PCLASS5 -0.20 -0.16 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 0.06 
PCOUNCIL -0.19 -0.15 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 •0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 
POTHTENUR 0.08 -0.05 
PSELFWITH -0.19 -0.15 -0.25 -0.14 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 
PSELFWOUT 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.15 
PWORKSEEK -0.10 -0.15 -0.18 -0.26 -0.18 -0.15 -0.21 -0.18 -0.13 
PAGRICULT 0.39 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07 
POTHSERV 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.16 
PQUALIFIED -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 
All coefficients are significant at p<0.01 
Despite the inclusion of three additional socioeconomic characteristics, the total 
explained variance in vote share changes little. It appears, therefore, that we have 
reached the limit to which socioeconomic characteristics can theoretically and 
practically explain partisan voting. For Labour the model is quite successful, 
explaining over two thirds of the party's vote in some years. For the Conservatives, 
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the model explains over half of the variance in most years, while for the Liberals the 
model generally explains less than 20% of the variance. 
Upon considering the model it becomes apparent that POTHTENUR and 
PAGRICULT contribute only rarely to the variance in the main parties' vote share. 
When they do contribute, the standardised betas are small when compared to the other 
independent variables. Excluding these variables from the model results in a 
reduction in R^ of less than 0.01, while making it easier to interpret. The following 
sections apply this more concise model to the other types of local authority. This will 
allow us to identify any fimdamental differences in the ways that these characteristics 
impact upon partisan voting for quite distinct types of local authority. It wi l l also, 
where appropriate, allow us to test our previous findings regarding the effect of the 
electoral system while controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. 
8.7 Shire District Whole Council Elections 
This section applies the model to shire districts with whole council elections. The 
standardised regression coefficients for this type of authority are shown in Table 8-15. 
The average value of R^ indicates that the model explains 38% of the variance in 
Conservative voting^, 53% of the variance in Labour voting but just 8% of the 
variance in Liberal voting. The total explained variance in voting for the parties is, 
therefore, on average less than the shire districts with partial council elections. The 
decline in class voting evident in partial council elections is not as clear for whole 
council elections. The value of R^ for the Conservatives falls in 1987 and 1991, only 
to rise again in 1995, while for Labour it seems to decrease slightly. With only five 
^ Calculated for each party by summing for all years and dividing by the number of years. 
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years to compare, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the change in class 
voting. 
The direction of the Labour and Conservative coefficients are identical to partial 
council elections and the values of the coefficients are similar also. The main 
difTerence between the two types of authority appears to be for the proportion of 
qualified residents (PQUALIFIED). For partial council elections, this variable tended 
to be negatively related to Conservative voting when controlling for the other 
characteristics. For whole council elections, however, this variable had no significant 
effect upon Conservative voting. The variable appears to have a significant effect, 
upon Labour voting, between 1987 and 1995, but intriguingly, the direction is the 
opposite of that for partial council elections. For the Liberals, the only socioeconomic 
characteristic that produces significant coefficients in every year is the proportion of 
unemployed residents (PWORKSEEK). The direction of the relationship between 
this variable is the same as for partial council elections, as are for most years, the 
proportion of self-employed (both PSELFWITH and PSELFWOUT) or those working 
in other service industries (POTHSERV). It appears, therefore, that the relationships 
between partisan voting and ward level socioeconomic characteristics in shire district 
whole council elections reflect that of partial council elections. 
Shire district whole council elections allow us to estimate the effect of the electoral 
system upon vote share while controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. The 
standardised coefficients for the number of vacancies (VACANCIES) indicate that for 
all parties, an increase in the number of vacancies will result in a lower share of the 
vote. This is probably an indication of the effect of the voter's ability, in theory, to 
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split their ticket. The coefficient for VACANCIES is generally lowest for Labour and 
highest for the Liberals in 1979, On most occasions, however, it is the Conservative 
vote share that is largely affected by the number of vacancies. One explanation for 
this might be protest voting against the government in urban areas with higher district 
magnitudes. 
Table 8-15 - Regression of Vote on Model in Shire District Whole Council 
Elections 
Year 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 
Conservative 
N 1983 2133 3276 3231 2905 
R" 0.26 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.46 
Constant 44.25 45.90 50.00 48.53 28.48 
PCLASS2 0.27 0.21 0.10 0.18 0.11 
PCLASS4 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
PCLASS5 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
PCOUNCIL -0.16 -0.13 •0.12 -0.09 
PSELFWITH 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.38 
PSELFWOUT -0.13 
PWORKSEEK -0,09 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 
POTHSERV 0.06 0.06 0.05 
PQUAL1F(ED 
VACANCIES •0.11 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 
Labour 
N 1694 1977 2920 2829 2985 
R* 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.48 
Constant 58.31 50.06 39.81 47.24 60.37 
PCLASS2 -0.11 ^).11 •0.06 -0.05 
PCLASS4 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 
PCLASSS 0.06 0.06 0.04 
PCOUNCIL 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.05 
PSELFWrm -0.25 -0.16 -0.04 
PSELFWOUT -0.12 -0.17 -0.26 -0.23 -0.29 
PWORKSEEK 0.10 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.28 
POTHSERV -0.22 -0.21 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
PQUALIFIED -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 
VACANCIES -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 
Uberal 
N 650 1629 3052 2309 2551 
R* 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 
Constant 40.60 39.29 37.54 45.27 36.38 
PCLASS2 -0.13 -0.17 
PCLASS4 
PCLASSS 0.04 
PCOUNCIL 0.05 -0.07 
PSELFWITH 0.10 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 
PSELFWOUT 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.20 
PWORKSEEK -0.16 -0.22 -0.17 -0.15 -0.18 
POTHSERV 0.16 0.06 0.07 
PQUALIFIED 0.07 
VACANCIES ^.27 -0.14 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 
All coefficients are significant at p<0.01 
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8.8 Metropolitan Borough Elections 
When the model was applied to the metropolitan boroughs, we found that the value of 
R^ was 0.62 for Labour, 0.57 for the Conservatives and O.I I for the Liberals (see 
Table 8-16), The model explains slightly less variance in partisan vofing than for 
shire district partial council elections. For all three parties, the values or R^ are 
markedly lower after 1986. It appears, therefore, that class voting in the metropolitan 
boroughs declined after 1986, supporting hypothesis 4.5. 
The directions of most of the coefficients are similar to those for the shire districts. 
Before 1987, however, the relationship between the proportion of unemployed 
residents (PWORKSEEK) and voting tended to be positive for the Conservatives and 
negative for Labour. The direction of the standardised coefficient reverses in 1987 for 
both the Conservatives and Labour, suggesting that the image of the two parties, 
regarding unemployment, may have changed radically in the metropolitan boroughs 
during the period. The proportion of residents classed as unemployed was over 7% in 
both the 1981 and 1991 census, compared with less than 5% for the whole of 
England. I f as Webb (2001: 143) suggests, issues such as high unemployment 
adversely affect the government of the day, then we might be observing a 
manifestation of such a phenomenon as the Conservatives term in office lengthened. 
Table 8-16 - Regression of Vote on Model in Metropolitan Borough Elections. 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 19S3 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Conservative 
N 53 146 480 474 467 474 444 750 778 729 758 767 740 727 720 
0.67 0.57 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.65 0.53 0.59 0.56 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.47 
Constant 24.85 21.71 20.44 25.55 12.86 28.72 16.49 24.26 27.57 30.13 18.20 19.38 24.63 
PCLASS2 1.55 0.S3 0.36 0.55 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.40 
PCLASS4 
PCLASS5 -0.31 ^.15 -0.25 -0.22 -0.14 -0.11 -0.16 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 
PCOUNCIL -0.18 -0.19 ^.12 -0.11 
PSELFWITH 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.13 0.32 0.32 0.30 
PSELFWOUT 0.08 -0.10 -0.13 
PWORKSEEK 0.43 0.18 0.12 -0.19 -0.12 -0.16 -0.16 -0.19 
POTHSERV 0.42 0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 
PQUALFIED ^.75 -0.17 
VACANCIES 
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Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 
Labour 
N 52 158 506 507 505 505 493 808 809 772 789 814 798 794 791 
R^  0.64 0.62 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.72 0.75 0.64 0.67 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.44 
Constant 92.24 62.74 70.65 67.02 66.49 77.17 75.58 67.68 84.51 70.31 68.11 63.71 73.96 77.51 86.97 
PCLASS2 -0.76 -0.38 -0.40 -0.64 •0.62 -0.62 •0.61 -0.34 -0.32 -0.26 -0.23 -0.33 -0.25 -0.21 -0.24 
PCLASS4 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.13 
PCLASSS 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.07 
PCOUNCIL 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.12 
PSELFWITH -0.11 
PSELFWOUT -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16 -0.14 -0.10 -0.15 -0.18 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 
PWORKSEEK -0.18 -0.22 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.08 
POTHSERV -0.24 -0.27 -0.17 -0.16 -0.19 -0.22 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 
PQUALFIED 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.18 -0.13 -0.13 
VACANCIES -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 
Liberal 
N 17 58 286 501 480 417 437 754 591 517 589 668 617 637 640 
R* 0.41 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.09 




PCOUNCIL -0.25 -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 •0.17 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
PSEL^ITH -0.24 -0.24 -0.30 -0.26 -0.16 -0.17 
PSELFWOUT 0.53 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 
PWORKSEEK -0.77 0.27 -0.17 -0.14 -0.16 -0.13 -0.19 
POTHSERV 0.27 0.21 0.20 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.17 0.13 0.15 
PQUALFIED •0,37 -0.22 -0.23 -0.21 
VACANCIES -0.36 0.09 0.07 
All coefTidents are significant at p<0.01 
The sudden reversal of the relationship between voting and PWORKSEEK in 1987. 
however, is some cause for concern. The socioeconomic data for metropolitan 
borough elections before 1987 is derived from the 1981 census and those after, the 
1991 census. As a result of the reorganisations between 1979 and 1982 (see 
Appendix One), some of the elections could not be accurately matched to the census 
data. Labour, for example, contested all 827 elections held in 1986, but our sample 
for this year is only 497 elections. In 1987 our sample size is much larger (808). Is it 
possible that the reduced sample is producing unreliable results? Figure 8-7 shows 
histograms of PWORKSEEK for all metropolitan wards in the 1981 census (n=830), 
and the sample of wards contested by Labour in 1986. Although the mean value of 
PWORKSEEK in Labour contested wards (6.8%) is slightly less than in all wards 
(7.4%), the distribution of wards is similar suggesting that our sample accurately 
reflects the socioeconomic characteristics of all the metropolitan boroughs. The value 
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of R for Labour in 1986 was 0.745 compared with an adjusted of 0.740. The very 
small difference also indicates that we can be confident that findings from our sample 
are reliable. In addition, the reversal in the relationship between voting and 
P W O R K S E E K is still apparent when the level of significance for the l-test is reduced 
to 0.01. 
Figure 8-7 - Histogram of PWORKSEEK in Metropolitan Boroughs 
All 1981 Census Wards Sample of Labour Contested Elections (1986) 
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In order to try and confirm the reliability of the finding, we re-analysed the 1987 
elections using only those wards that were included in the 1981 census. If the 
negative relationship between the proportion of unemployed and Labour voting were 
caused by the reduction in the 1981 sample, then we would expect to see the same 
negative relationship for the reduced sample in 1987. The results of the regression on 
this sample, however, revealed the same reversal in the relationship. 
It appears that in the metropolitan boroughs, therefore, a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the proportion of unemployed and Conservative or Labour 
voting did occur. Unfortunately because of the static nature of our socioeconomic 
data, it is not possible to pinpoint exactly when the change occurred. 
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8.9 London Boroughs 
When applied to London borough elections, the model explains the greatest variance in 
partisan voting among the different types of authority. It explains up to three-quarters 
of the variance in Conservative voting and almost four fifths of the variance in Labour 
voting. For Liberal voting, however, the model explains just over a tenth of the 
variance in most years. The value of appears markedly lower after 1986, supporting 
the hypothesis that class voting declined during the period. The values of the 
Conservative and Labour coefficients are again similar to the other types of authority. 
For Liberals, however, several of the relationships appear to be fundamentally different. 
Table 8-17 - Regression of Liberal Voting on Model in London Boroughs 
Year 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 
Conservative 
N 706 691 708 741 731 
0.73 0.75 0.70 0.61 0.55 
Constant 50.44 45.43 34.71 48.98 43.25 
PCLASS2 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.15 
PCLASS4 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 •0.16 
PCLASS5 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 
PCOUNCIL -0.15 -0.16 -0.14 -0.23 -0.26 
PSELFWrTH 0.20 0.21 0.30 0.42 0.47 
PSELFWOUT -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 
PWORKSEEK -0.18 -0.23 -0.12 -0.12 
POTHSERV 0.14 0.14 0.14 
PQUAUFIED -0.10 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.11 
VACANCIES -0.44 0.63 -0.13 -0.15 -1.14 
Labour 
N 724 723 723 756 757 
R* 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.58 0.55 
Constant 56.91 37.19 51.94 36.32 51.70 
PCLASS2 -0.42 -0.36 -0.42 -0.27 -0.32 
PCLASS4 0.10 0.17 0.19 
PCLASS5 
PCOUNCIL 0.09 0.07 -0.09 
PSELFWrTH -0.10 -0.07 •0.23 -0.22 
PSELFWOUT 0.14 0.09 
PWORKSEEK 0.30 0.39 0.44 0.34 0.32 
POTHSERV -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 
PQUAUFIED 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.19 
VACANCIES -1.66 -1.04 -1.07 0.16 -1.16 
Uberal 
N 454 689 704 542 681 
R* 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.09 
Constant 27.17 19.92 18.06 23.72 
PCLASS2 0.32 0.21 0.34 
PCLASS4 
PCLASS5 0.14 0.15 0.20 
PCOUNCIL 0.26 0.25 0.38 0.35 0.36 
psELFwrrn •0.28 ^.21 -0.29 •0.27 -0.21 
PSELFWOUT 0.20 0.15 0.20 
PWORKSEEK -0.48 -0.39 -0.51 -0.34 -0.38 
POTHSERV 
PQUAUFIED 0.36 0.17 
VACANCIES -0.04 -0.68 -0.50 -0.10 0.17 
All coefficients are significant at p<0.01 
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The similarities and differences in the parties' coefficients between the different types 
of authority can be seen in Figure 8-8, which summarises the effects of ward-level 
characteristics upon the vote. For each characteristic the average standardised 
coefficients for all years is shown for each type of authority. The total variance 
explained (R2) is shown also. Care must be taken when interpreting this chart as 
some characteristics may have been significantly different fi'om zero on only a few 
occasions."* For the Conservative and Labour vote share, the greatest amount of 
variance explained by the model (R2) was in the London boroughs and the least 
amount in shire districts with whole council elections. Although the sizes of the 
coefficients fluctuate between authorities, the directions remain the same for both 
parties. Al l of the Conservative coefficients for PCLASS2 are positive, for example, 
while for Labour they are all negative. It appears that the directions of the 
relationship between the different ward level characteristics and Labour or 
Conservative are similar for the different types of authority. In most cases the 
direction of the Labour coefficients are opposite to those of the Conservatives. For 
the proportion of self employed residents without employees (PSELFWOUT), 
however, they are mainly both negative. 
The chart highlights the unique different relationship between PSELFWOUT and 
Liberal voting. Where this tended to be negative for the Conservatives and Labour, it 
was positive for the Liberals in all types of authority. The possible unique Liberal 
^ In the metropolitan boroughs, the only year in which the coefficient for PCLASS2 was 
significant for the Liberals was in 1986. The average Liberal coefficient for PCLASS4 in the 
metropolitan boroughs (-0.15) reflects, therefore, only the value in 1986. 
304 
voter base identified in section 8.5 appears to exist in all types of authority. The chart 
highlights also, some interesting differences in Liberal voting between London and 
the other types of authority. The variables for PCLASS2, PCOUNCIL and 
PQUALIFIED appear to be fundamentally different in London. For PCLASS2, 
however, there are only a few significant coefficients, making any conclusion about 
the difference unreliable. With the exception of shire district whole council elections, 
the average for PCOUNCIL and PQUALIFIED shown in Figure 8-8 appears to 
accurately reflect the relationships in each authority. Holding all other ward 
characteristics constant, there appears to be a positive relationship between the 
proportion of council tenants or qualified residents and Liberal voting in London. In 
the other authorities the relationship tends to be the opposite. This appears to be 
particularly true of the relationship for council tenants, which was significantly 
positive in every year. 
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Figure 8-8 - Mean Standardised Betas for Main Parlies 
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8.10 Conclusion 
This chapter produced a model of voter choice for the Liberals that can be applied to 
the different types of local authority. The model was designed by maximising the 
combined explanatory power of those variables that were theoretically and previously 
linked to party voting. The model produced the greatest explanation for the London 
boroughs. In some years, three quarters of the variance in Labour and Conservative 
vote share (and two-thirds on average) could be accounted for using only ward level 
characteristics. The model performed worst in shire district whole council elections, 
explaining only 38% of Conservative and 53% of Labour vote variance. In all types 
of authority the model explained Liberal voting least. On average it accounted for 
only 8% of the variance in shire district whole council elections and 14% in 
metropolitan borough elections. 
The total explained variance in Labour and Conservative vote share did not remain 
constant. Instead, the amount of explained variance tended to decline during the 
period, suggesting that the relationship between class and local voting has grown 
weaker. 
For all types of authority there was a significant negative relationship between the 
Conservative vote and the proportion of residents in working class groups, council 
tenants, and the unemployed. For the proportion of residents in social class 2, self-
employed with employees and those employed in other service industries a significant 
positive relationship appears to exist. For all of these ward characteristics, the 
opposite relationship appears to exist for Labour. Only one socioeconomic 
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characteristic was identified where the relationship was the same for bodi parties - the 
proportion o f self employed without employees. This characteristic was found to be 
negatively related to both parties' vote share. 
Although the variance in Liberal voting was largely unexplained, there were some 
interesting features highlighted by the model. When holding all other variables 
constant, social class, housing, employment status, occupation and education were 
significantly related to Liberal voting in all authorities. The proportion of self-
employed residents without employees is particularly interesting in that it was the 
only characteristic uniquely related to Liberal voting. The relationship between 
qualified residents and Liberal voting is also interesting. Although research by Miller 
(1991) suggested that more qualified residents may vote for the Liberals, there 
appears to be a negative relationship between this characteristic and Liberal voting in 
the shire districts and metropolitan boroughs. The same does not appear to be the 
case in London. When significant, the relationship was positive in these elections. 
More of a conundrum, is the positive relationship between council tenants and Liberal 
voting in London, which was shown to be distinctly different than the relationship in 
other types of authority. 
Although the model can explain more than half of the variance in vofing for Labour 
and Conservatives, it by no means explains these parties' entire vote. It appears, 
therefore, that local political characteristics (identified in Chapter 2) not measured by 
the census might also be important determinants of voting - particularly for the 
Liberals. The model, however, does highlight areas worthy of further investigation. 
The effect of council tenancy upon voting for the party appears to be fundamentally 
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different in London than in other types of local authority. The following chapter 
examines such differences in the housing cleavage by focusing in greater detail upon 
individual level voting behaviour. 
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Chapter 9 Inferring Individual Voting Behaviour in Local 
Government Elections 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to provide a methodological corroboration of flndings from the 
regression analysis conducted in Chapter 8.9. The analysis suggested that in 1994, the 
relationship between council tenants and Liberal voting was fundamentally different 
in the shire districts than in the London boroughs. We could not infer from the 
findings, however, i f this was the result of different voting behaviour by council 
tenants in the two types of authority due to problems related to the ecological fallacy 
(see Chapter 4.4.9). This chapter attempts to determine i f council tenants did in fact, 
vote differently in the shire districts than in the London boroughs. In so doing it using 
a recent and innovative technique developed by King (1997) that claims to solve some 
of the problems of making such ecological inferences. 
The chapter begins by highlighting the apparent difference between the two 
authorities and suggests some reasons for this difference. We then remind the reader 
of the main methodological problems associated with the research by applying 
Goodman's technique to the problem of estimating the proportion of council tenants 
voting for the Liberals. Because our data does not contain the actual proportion of 
council tenants voting, we must either assume that this is the same as the proportion 
of council tenants or estimate the proportion of these residents voting. In fact, to 
increase the strength of our findings, we use both approaches and compare the results 
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with those for the Goodman's (1953) model and also a nonparametric approach.' The 
first sections apply the methods to the 1994 shire district elections, which are 
followed by a similar analysis for the 1994 London borough elections. 
9.2 Inferring Individual Level Local Voting Behaviour 
Chapter 8.9 revealed that the influence of council tenants upon the Liberal vote 
appears to be fundamentally different in the London Boroughs than the shire districts. 
In 1994 for example, die regression coefficient for council tenants on Liberal vote 
share was negative (-0.26) in the shire districts while in the London boroughs it was 
positive (0.12). This would appear to suggest that when holding all other variables 
constant, the vote share for Liberal candidates would decrease by a quarter of a 
percent for every percentage rise in council tenants in shire district wards. For the 
same one percentage point rise in the London boroughs however, the Liberals' vote 
share would increase by 0.12%. Although these effects are quite small, the fact that 
they are influencing the Liberal's vote share in opposite directions is rather 
interesting. Why would it be that, according to our regression models, council tenants 
are more likely to vote Liberal in the London boroughs and less likely in the shire 
districts (and metropolitan boroughs)? I f such differences exist between the two types 
of authority, then exactly what proportion of council tenants are voting for the 
Liberals in the shire districts compared to the London boroughs? 
We could suggest many reasons why council tenants might behave differently in the 
London boroughs compared with the shire districts. The two types of authority have 
* A nonparametric approach does not assume that the distribution of the actual values is 
truncated bivariate normal. 
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different kinds of council housing. In London there is a greater amount of high-rise 
council accommodation. Such housing provides smaller parties with the opportunity 
easily to reach a large number of potential voters. The type of housing in London 
might produce particular kinds of local issues, which the Liberals seek to champion. 
The Liberal controlled Tower Hamlets, for instance, pioneered a 'one-stop shop' 
system to deal with public enquiries. The system was considered by the party to be at 
the cutting edge of community politics (Ingle, 1996: 126). 
Although the regression model highlighted the difference between the independent 
effect of council tenancy upon Liberal voting, without survey data we have no idea of 
the actual difference in the behaviour of individual voters. One way to examine the 
differences might be the Goodman regression model (outlined in Chapter 4.4.10), to 
estimate the proportion of council tenants as opposed to other residents voting for the 
party. Figure 9-1 plots the proportion of votes polled by Liberal candidates 
(LDSHARE) in the shire districts in 1994 by the proportion of council tenants 
(PCOUNCIL) in each ward^. The regression line calculated using the Goodman 
model equation is also plotted. The model estimates that the line intersects the left y-
axis (PCOUNCIL=0) at 0.422 and the right y-axis (PCOUNCIL=100) at 0.007. The 
model suggests, therefore, that while 42.2% of other residents vote for the Liberals, 
just 0.7% of council tenants do so. However, although both of these estimates are 
valid in that they lie between 0 and 1, the very small proportion of council tenants 
suggests that some aggregation bias may exist within the model. 
^ The methods for inferring individual level behaviour express both the known values and the 
model estimates as a proportion of one. A percentage vote share of 37% would, therefore, be 
expressed as 0.37. 
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Figure 9-1 - Scatter Plot of Liberal Voting by Council Tenancy in 1994 Shire 
District Elections 
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In addition to the general problems with using this method to infer individual level 
behaviour outlined in chapter 3, there is also a problem with the inferences that can be 
made using census data. Firstly, the proportion of council tenants is assumed to be 
the same in the electorate as it is for all residents. Secondly, the proportion of the 
electorate turning out to vote is assumed to be the same for both council tenants and 
other residents. While the first assumption might be reasonably acceptable, the 
consequences of the second assumption (which is usually ignored in the 
methodological literature on ecological inference) may be too great to rely solely 
upon findings from the model (King, 1997: 69). Indeed, i f turnout was lower for 
council tenants than for other residents, such a model might underestimate the 
proportion of council tenants voting for the Liberals. Techniques for reducing the 
impact of these assumptions are themselves problematic. One method involves 
estimating the unknown values (such as proportion of council tenants turning out to 
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vote) fix)m the known values (proportion of council tenants from all residents). 
Unfortunately, using estimates instead of real values is likely to increase the amount 
of error in the final estimations. In order to address such problems, the King method 
will be applied to the problem using both the known values for council tenants (with 
the previous assumptions) and the estimated unknown values. I f both models produce 
similar results then we can be more confident in the results than would be the case had 
we used a single model. 
9.3 Ecological Inference Model with Assumptions 
I f we assume that the proportion of council tenants voting is equal to the proportion of 
other residents then the results of the Goodman regression model can be easily 
checked against the King method. Figure 9-2 shows a plot of the same data divided 
into four sections (an X-graph). An X-graph is useful as it allows us to draw certain 
conclusions regarding the data points in the different sections. Data points that lie in 
the left-hand triangle have [0,1] bounds for number of council tenants (fi?) and very 
narrow bounds for other residents ( ) , where / is the individual ward. For these data 
points therefore, the true proportion of council tenants voting Liberal can range 
between 0 and 1, while the true proportion of other residents wil l have a more limited 
range (King, 1997: 89). Most of the data points lie in this quarter and many of these 
are close to 0 along the x-axis. For these wards, therefore, the proportion of council 
residents is quite low. The highlighted ward is that of Mile Cross in the district of 
Norwich. In 1994, the Liberals proportion of the vote (Vj) in this ward was 0.1393 
(13.93% of total votes polled) and the proportion of council tenants (Xj) was 0.6992 
(69.92% of total residents). Knowing this information allows us to make statements 
about the actual number of council tenants (>9f) and other residents ) that voted 
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for the Liberals. For example, i f turnout was equal for both groups, it would not 
possible for 100% of council tenant voters to have voted Liberal. I f this were the case 
then the vote share for the party would be at least 69.92%. 
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Knowing this information allows us to specify the possible range of values (bounds) 
for both the proportion of council tenants and other residents voting Liberal. The 
bounds for fij are calculated as follows: 
max 0 , - ^ — — 
(v ) 
<, fi' <, min 
J V-^i ) 
max (0,-0.2303)^ <. min(0.1992,1) 
The bounds for are calculated in a similar way: 
max <.p. <. min 
\-X i J 
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max (0 , -1 .8613)^^ ; <min(0.463,l) 
The true values for in Mile Cross must lie, therefore, between 0 and 0.1992 while 
those for fi^ must lie between 0 and 0.463. In this ward, therefore, the percentage of 
council tenants that voted for the Liberals must have been between 0 and 19.9% while 
the percentage of other residents voting for the party must have been between 0 and 
46.3%. The possible range of values for council tenants voting Liberal are far less 
than those for other residents. I f the method is applied to all shire district wards it can 
considerably reduced the range of possible values for this type of authority. Of the 
1332 shire district elections in 1994, for example, the possible value of>9°can be 
determined to within 2.5% for 319 (23.9%) of wards. Most of these wards have a low 
proportion of council tenants (under 5%). Brickhill ward in Bedford has only 2.3% 
council tenants and the Liberals polled 58% of the vote in 1994. Although the range 
f o r ^ ; is [0.1] the true value f o r ^ ; must lie between 0.569 and 0.593. Between 56.9% 
and 59.3% of non-council tenants must, therefore, have voted for the party in 
Brickhill. A narrow range for/?,"does not always require a small proportion of X/. 
Haymill ward in Slough has 25.3% of residents living in council housing. However, 
as the Liberals' vote in this ward was only 3.6% the value of must lie between 0 
and 0.048 (between 0% and 4.8% non-council tenants voting Liberal). While small 
values for X/ provide a narrow range of values brfi^, small values for V/ generally 
provide narrow ranges for both yff/'and y?/". The value for y?/in Haymill ranges 
between 0 and 0.142. Because there are generally fewer council tenants in a ward, on 
the whole the bounds for fi^ are far greater than are those fory9/. In fact, the bounds 
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for/?' are [0,1] in 991 of the 1332 wards. For these wards the percentage of council 
tenants voting Liberal can range from 0% to the 100%. 
As the value for non-council tenants is linearly related to council tenants, Goodman's 
regression equation can also be rearranged to express the proportion of council tenants 
voting Liberal, as a linear function of the proportion of other residents voting for the 
party (King, 1997: 80). 
V, 
I f the proportion of council tenants (yfff) voting for the party in the Mile Cross ward 
was 0 then the value for the proportion of other residents (y?°) voting for the party 
must be: 






The percentage of other residents voting Liberal in the Mile Cross ward in 1994 must, 
therefore, have been between 0% and 46.31% i f no council tenants voted for the 
party. A similar method can also be used to calculate the proportion of council 
tenants voting for Liberal candidates: 
r V 
P>= — 
I f the number of other residents voting were zero then the proportion of council 
tenants voting Liberal must be: 
^' [0.6992 J 
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A'=0.1992 
For each shire district ward, a line representing the range of possible values 
for>ff/'and>9/can be plotted. Figure 9-3 shows a sample of the data^ with one line 
plotted for each shire district ward. Each line represents all of the possible true values 
of the proportion of council tenants and other residents that voted Liberal in 1994. 
The thick black line which corresponds to the Mile Cross ward, is relatively short in 
length which indicates a limited range for the true values of council tenants voting 
Liberal (0-19.9%) but a larger range for the proportion of other residents voting for 
the party (0-46.3%). A l l of the flatter horizontal lines originated from data points in 
the left hand side of the X-graph shown in Figure 9-2. The proportion of council 
tenants in these wards is very small and nearly all of the Liberal support must have 
come from other residents. Because a far greater number of wards have a small 
proportion of council tenants, the majority of lines traverse the y-axis very little but 
extend across the entire x-axis. Although we know little about the behaviour of 
council tenants in these wards, we can use those wards we do know more about (such 
as Mile Cross) to estimate where along the horizontal line the true point is most likely 
to lie. 
^ A sample (1 in 10) is used as plotting all of the lines on the graph results in a solid block. 
The reduced size of the sample allows us to identify easily, the Mile Cross ward, 
319 
Figure 9-3 - Possible True Values of Council Tenants and Other Residents 
\ oting Liberal in 1994 District Flections 
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The distribution of these lines for the entire data set can be estimated by calculating 
the truncated bivariate normal distribution for all cases (King, 1997). Truncating the 
bivariate normal distribution ensures that the parameters always range between 0 and 
1. The model also weights the size of each ward when calculating the distribution. 
The parameters of the truncated bivariate normal distribution are estimated using the 
maximum likelihood technique and consist of the mean and standard deviations 
of/?; (0.1380,0.1071) and y?; (0.3425,0.2080) with a correlation between and 
fl-{\n this case 0.9341). The truncated bivariate normal distribution can be 
represented by a tomography plot, on which 50% (inner) maximum likelihood 
contours and 95% (outer) maximum likelihood contours of the distribution are 
overlaid. The likelihood function, (which is proportional to the sampling 
distribution), is used to summarise all information in the data about the parameters on 
the scale most convenient for estimation (King, 1997: 139). Figure 9-4 displays for 
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each ward, the Hnes on which the true values of p. and P- must lie, together with the 
50% and 95% maximum likelihood contours. The true values ^or P- and p^ MQ most 
likely to lie within the centre of the contours. As the contours are centred round the 
area where the lines appear more densely clustered we can be reasonably confident 
that the contours are an accurate reflection of the correct distribution. Another 
characteristic of the model is that when>9/ is equal to/?," this value must also be equal 
to the Liberal vote share. The vote share for the Liberals in each ward can, therefore, 
be read off from where its tomography line crosses the 45-degree diagonal. As only 
three lines cross this diagonal where y^/>0.8 (the top right comer of the graph) we 
know the Liberals polled more than 80% of the vote in only three wards. 
^i^ure M-4 - Tomography plot with 50% and 95% Maximum Likelihood Contours 
0 75 
b e t o COUNCIL 
Before proceeding to the next stage in this method, the estimate of the distribution can 
be compared with an alternative non-parametric visual representation of the 
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distribution of lines. The method for the non-parametric surface plot does not assume 
that the distribution of the lines is truncated bivariate nomial. The surface plot in 
Figure 9-5 shows a representation of the lines. The portions of the volume above the 
unit square (such asfi->0.9 andfi°<0.2) indicate the probability of these events 
occurring under the model (King, 1997: 133). The distribution of the lines is 
therefore represented by the vertical axis. The highest point of the surface plot is 
similar to the distribution indicated by the contour lines in the tomography plot shown 
in Figure 9-4. The distribution is affected by truncation along the fi- axis due to the 
fact that a large number of values for the parameter ranged across the entire [0,1] 
bounds. Without truncation, therefore, the estimated value of the proportion of 
council tenants would not be restricted to between zero and one. 
Figure 9-5 - Nonparametric Surface Plot Representing the Beta Distribution for 
Shire Districts 
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Now that we have some idea of the distribution of ^fmd P° we can estimate the 
authority level proportions of both council tenants voting Liberal {P^) and other 
residents voting Liberal {P°). The technique of simulation is the easiest way to 
estimate these values from the truncated bivariate normal distribution. The technique 
can estimate the numerical value of these quantities to any degree of precision. The 
basic idea involves taking random samples of the parameters of interest from the 
given probability distribution, averaging to approximate the mean and calculating the 
standard deviation to approximate the standard error (King 1997, 141). I f the degree 
of precision is not sufficient then simply increasing the number of random draws will 
provide greater precision (King, 1997: 143). Figure 9-6 shows a smoothed histogram 
of the results of the estimates for each ward. The aggregate lower bound for)?" is 
0.0061 and its upper bound is 0.6999. The aggregate lower bound for y?" is 0.2586 
and its upper bound is 0.4037. Although the range of values between the lower and 
upper bound is greater for than iorP°, the histogram foryS^is negatively skew. 
The estimates for ^ ff* are, therefore, generally higher than are those for>9/. The 
variances of the both of the distributions are not great although the sharp cut off for 
the estimates ofyS," reveal that these estimates are strongly affected by their upper 
bound. We can also tell from Figure 9-6, that while the probability of>3/falling 
between 0.35 and 0.4 is quite likely, the probability of exceeding 0.41 is highly 
unlikely. However, while the probability ofy^ ,"" exceeding 0.25 is remote, it is still 
possible that it might be as high as 0.6999. 
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Figure 9-6 - Posterior Distributions of Shire District Ward Estimations 
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The estimated authority level values for council tenants and other residents voting 
Liberal can be calculated from the central tendency and distribution of the 
simulations. The estimated value fory^ *" is 0.1379 (13.8%) with a standard deviation 
of 0.01 (1%) while that fory?" is 0.3762 (37.6%) with a deviation of 0.002 (0.2%). 
The standard deviation of both parameters is quite small, indicating there is little 
variation in the estimates from ward to ward. Indeed the lower the standard deviation 
of the parameters, the more confidence we have that the true value falls close to the 
estimate (King, 1997: 206). The model estimates that the proportion of council 
tenants in the districts voting for the Liberals is 13,8% and the proportion of other 
residents voting for the party is 37.6%. There does appear, therefore, to be a large 
difference in the behaviour of council tenants compared with other residents. 
9.4: Ecological Inference using Parameter Estimates for Shire Districts 
The model appears to suggest a large difference between the proportion of council 
tenants and other residents voting for the Liberals, assuming that turnout in the 
districts is the same for both groups. Unfortunately the King method was used to 
estimate the voting pattems according to the model specified in Figure 9-7. Neither 
the census nor the local election data, however, include the values for the number of 
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council tenants that voted. The analysis in the previous section used the total number 
of residents instead**. In order for the model to be correct, we would have to assume 
that the proportion of council tenants voting is the same as the proportion of council 
residents in the ward. Unfortunately, this may be an unrealistic assumption. Previous 
survey based research suggests that turnout among council tenants may be higher than 
that for home-owners (Miller, 1988: 96). Miller's research, however, does not include 
other forms of housing tenure and more recent research has suggested that voter 
turnout may well be lower among council tenants than other residents (Railings et al, 
1996). Differences in turnout between the two groups might lead to errors in the 
estimates of the proportion of council tenants voting for the Liberals. I f turnout is less 
for council tenants our estimate of 13.79% of this group voting for the Liberals may 
well be lower than the correct value. 









Liberal Voting Non-Liberal Voting Total Council 
Council Tenants Council Tenants Voters 
Liberal Voting Non-Liberal Voting Total Other 
Other Residents Other Residents Voters 
Total Liberal Votes Total Non-Liberal Total Voters 
Votes 
^ The King model estimate the values in the cells (e.g. Liberal Voting Council Tenants) using 
infomiation from the values in the marginals (e.g. Total Council Voters). 
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One ^proach to this problem is to estimate the unknown marginal values (e.g. 
proportion of council tenants turning out to vote) from the information about the 
group that is known (proportion of council tenants). Figure 9-8 shows the 
specification that is required to estimate the proportion of council tenants turning out 
to vote. Unfortunately, we are again subject to a similar condition whereby the total 
number of council tenants registered to vote is not known. In order to use this model 
we would have to assume that the proportion of council tenants registered to vote was 
equal to the proportion of council residents. This again might not be the case as voter 
registration, according to Miller (1988: 60), may also vary between different social 
groups. 





Vote Not Vote 
Council Voting Council Non-Voting Council Total Council 
Tenants Tenants Tenants Electorate 
Other Voting Non-Voting Other Total Other 
Residents Other Residents Residents Electorate 
Total Voters Total Non-Voters Total Voters 
The proportion of council tenants registered to vote could be estimated using the 
model shown in Figure 9-9. In this case the data used in the model contains all of the 
available information required to produce reliable estimates of the proportions of 
council and non-council tenants registered to vote. It will estimate the proportion of 
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council tenants registered to vote fix)m the total number of council tenants and as such 
will take into account not only those residents under 18, but also those of voting age 
that are not registered. 








Registered Not Registered 
Registered Council Non- Registered Total Council 
Tenants Council Tenants Tenants 
Registered Non- Registered Other Total Other 
Other Residents Residents Residents 
Total Registered Total Non-Registered Total Voters 
The model now becomes a three-stage process of estimation. Firstly, the proportion 
of council tenants registered to vote is estimated from the total number of council 
tenants. These estimates are then used to estimate the proportions of registered 
council tenants turning out to vote which in turn can be used to estimate the 
proportion of council tenant voters voting for the Liberals. The preliminary estimates 
are not only usefiil in determining the final quantities of interest but also provide 
useful information themselves. 
The first stage of the model produces estimates for the proportion of council residents 
that are registered to vote. As the model estimates voter registration as a proportion 
of the entire electorate, we might expect the proportion of residents registered to vote 
to be higher for those residents that were not council tenants. One of the main reasons 
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for this is that the number of children under voting age is positively related to council 
tenancy. There should, therefore, be fewer residents of voting age among council 
tenants. Figure 9-10 shows a tomography plot of all possible values oifi^ (registered 
council tenants) and>9/ (registered other residents) for each ward. The figure also 
shows the 50% and 95% maximum likelihood contours, indicating the most likely 
location of the true aggregate quantities of interest. The area within the 95% contour 
line is considerably less than the entire unit square. The model has, therefore, 
narrowed the possible values for /? /andf rom the entire unit-square, to only this 
area for 95% of the cases. The position of the centre of the contours indicates that the 
estimates will be higher for other residents. Indeed the model estimates that the 
aggregate proportion of council tenants registered to vote is 0.693 (69.3%) with a 
standard deviation of 0.009 (0.9%). The estimated aggregate proportion of other 
residents that are registered to vote however is 0.786 (78.6%) with a standard 
deviation of 0.002 (0.2%). As expected the model estimates registration is lower 
among council tenants than for residents not in this type of housing - due to a 
proportion of children living in local authority as opposed to other accommodation. 
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Figure 9-10 - Tomography Plot of Voter Registration in 1994 Shire District Flections 
OUNOIL 
The second stage of the model produces estimates of the proportion of council 
residents turning out to vote from the estimated proportion of council tenants that 
were registered to vote. The estimates of p. from the first stage must first be 
converted into the proportion of the electorate consisting of council tenants\ Using 
these estimates, both the Goodman and King models have similar proportions for the 
average turnout of both groups. The Goodman model estimates the average 
proportion of council tenants turning out to vote as 0.258 (25.8%) with a standard 
deviation of 0.013 (1.3%) and other residents as 0.460 (46%) with a standard 
deviation of 0.003 (0.3%). A tomography plot for the data with 50% and 95% 
maximum likelihood contours is shown in Figure 9-11. The King model estimates 
^ In order to calculate these values, the estimated number of council tenants registered to vote 
in each ward is first calculated by multiplying the estimates produced by the first stage by 
the total number of council tenants in each ward. Dividing this value into the electorate for 
each ward provides the estimated proportions of the electorate that were council tenants. 
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turnout among council tenants as 0.246 (24.6%) with a standard deviation of 0.012 
(1.2%) and other residents as 0.447 (44.7%) with a standard deviation of 0.002 
(0.2%). Both models estimate that turnout among council tenants is over 20 
percentage points less than that for non-council tenants. Miller (1988) suggested that 
a greater proportion of council tenants turn out to vote than home-owners. When 
compared with all other residents however, council tenants appear far less likely to 
vote. Such a large difference in turnout may well have affected our previous 
estimates for the proportion of council tenants voting Liberal. The model may have 
underestimated the values for this group, resulting in significant errors in the final 
estimates. 
Figure 9-11 - Tomography Plot of Voter Turnout in 1994 Shire District Klections 
b e t o COUNCIL 
The third stage produces estimates of the proportion of council tenants voting for the 
Liberals from the estimated proportion of council tenants turning out to vote. The 
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estimates of/?/from the second stage must first be converted into the proportion of 
voters consisting of council tenants^ . The tomography plot for the third stage is 
shown in Figure 9-12. The model estimates the proportion of council tenants voting 
for the Liberals as 0.112 (11.2%) with a standard deviation of 0.032 (3.2%) and other 
residents as 0.371 (37.1%) with a standard deviation of 0.003 (0.3%). This suggests 
that other residents are three times more likely to vote Liberal than council tenants. 
How do these results compare with the model that assumed turnout was the same for 
both groups? For that model, the estimated percentage of council tenants voting 
Liberal was 13.8% while other residents were 37.6%. The percentage of other 
residents voting for the Liberals differs by only 0.5% from the model that assumed 
that turnout was the same for both groups. The estimates for the percentage of 
council tenants voting for the party is 2.6% lower than the previous estimate. The 
estimates for the percentage of council tenants voting for the Liberals, therefore, did 
not increase greatly when the model was adjusted for voter turnout. Evidence fcom 
both models (Goodman and King) appears to support that there is a significant 
difference in voting for the party among the different types of resident. 
^ In order to calculate these values, the estimated number of council tenants turning out to 
vote in each ward is first calculated by multiplying the /?/ estimates produced by the second 
stage by the estimated number of council tenants registered in each ward. Dividing these 
values into the total votes cast in each ward provides the estimated proportion of voters that 
are council tenants. 
331 




9.5: Ecological Inference in the London Boroughs 
By contrast, the relationship between council tenants and Liberal support appears 
much more positive in the London boroughs. The nature of this relationship will be 
examined both with and without the assumptions relating to voter turnout. The first 
section therefore examines the relationship using the known values for the proportion 
of council tenants in each ward. Figure 9-13 shows a scatter plot of Liberal vote share 
by proportion of council tenants for the 1994 elections with Goodman's regression 
line plotted. The regression line is almost flat indicating that there is little difference 
in the proportion of the two groups voting for the Liberals. The Goodman model 
estimates reflect this fact. It estimates the percentage of council tenants voting for the 
party as 24.5% {s.d. = 2.44) and non-council residents as 23.7% (s.d. = 0.95). 
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Figure 9-13 - Scatter Plot of Liberal Vote Share by Council Tenants in 1994 
London Borough Elections 
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A tomography plot showing the possible values for ^ / and P^ for all wards is shown in 
Figure 9-14. The parameters for the truncated bivariate normal distribution consist of 
the mean and standard deviation of>S; (0.1673, 0.1686) andy?/ (0.1800.0.1414) with 
a correlation between yS," and yff/* (0.8703). The tomography plot reveals that the 
distribution appears to be densely concentrated around the bottom left comer of the 
graph. The maximum likelihood contours are also elongated along they?/ axis which 
indicates that the range of possible values for the proportion of council tenants is 
wider than that for non-council tenants. 
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Figure 9-14 - Tomography Plot of Council Tenancy and Liberal Voting in 1994 
London Borough Flections with SOVo and 95% Maximum Likelihood Contours 
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The distribution of the lines along which the actual values must lie can be verified by 
examining a non-parametric representation of the distribution shown in Figure 9-15. 
The method for the non-parametric surface plot does not assume that the distribution 
of the lines is truncated bivariate normal. The highest point of the surface plot is 
similar to the distribution indicated by the contour lines in the tomography plot. The 
surface plot appears therefore, to support the maximum likelihood contours estimated 
using the truncated bivariate normal distribution. 
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Figure 9-15 - Nonparametric Surface Plot Representing the Beta Distribution for 
1994 London Borough Klections 
The smoothed histograms of the simulations produced by the model are shown in 
Figure 9-16. The histograms are plotted from the estimated values o(fi^ and fi^ (or 
each ward. The aggregate lower bound for/?/ is 0.032 and its upper bound is 0.589. 
The aggregate lower bound f o r i s 0.134 while its upper bound is 0.297. The 
estimated percentage of council tenants voting Liberal, therefore, lies between 3.2% 
and 58.9%, while the percentage of other residents voting for the party lies between 
13.4% and 29.7%. The King model estimates the aggregate percentage of council 
tenants voting for the Liberals as 25.5% (s.d. = 4.25). We would expect therefore, the 
actual percentage of council tenants voting for the Liberals to lie between 17% and 
34% in 95% of cases - that is, within two standard deviations. The estimated 
aggregate percentage of other residents voting for the party is 23.2% (s.d. = 1.24). 
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We would expect therefore, the actual percentage of other residents voting for the 
Liberals to lie between 20.7% and 25.7% in 95% of cases. 
Figure 9-16 - Posterior Distributions of London Borough Ward Estimations 
CCUNC4. 
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9«6 Ecological Inference using Parameter Estimates for London Boroughs 
The three-stage extension of the previous model revealed that in the shire districts, 
turnout appeared to have an effect upon its results in an unexpected way. We would 
expect the actual level of support among council tenants to be greater than predicted if 
turnout was lower for this group. This proved not to be the case for the shire districts 
and levels of support for the party actually reduced when turnout was lower. I f a 
similar phenomenon occurred in London then the previous estimates for these wards 
might well be too high! 
Given the previous observations we would expect registration among council tenants 
in London to be lower than that for other residents. But what of the difference 
between the London boroughs and the shire districts? Previous research suggests that 
voter registration in London is far lower than in the shire districts (Miller, 1988: 60). 
In addition to this, non-payment of the community charge was much more prevalent 
in London than in the shires (Travers, 1995: 19) and although the poll-tax was 
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abolished in 1991, it is arguable that the electoral effects of the legislation remained 
for some time after (Railings & Thrasher, 1997: 40). This being the case we would 
expect the estimates of voter registration in London to be less than those for the shire 
districts. Figure 9-17 shows a histogram of the estimates for the values of and p°. 
The model estimates that the aggregate percentage of council tenants registered to 
vote in the London boroughs is 68.8% (s.d. = 1.2). The estimated aggregate 
percentage of other residents registered to vote however is 74.2% (s.d. = 0.35). The 
model, which estimates that voter registration is higher among non-council tenants, 
reflects the higher proportion of children living in council housing. 
Figure 9-17 - Posterior Distributions of London Borough Voter Registration 
Estimations. 
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Using the results to estimate the proportion of council residents turning out to vote, 
reveals, as with the shire districts, that both the Goodman and King models produce 
similar results. The Goodman model estimates the aggregate percentage of council 
tenants voting as 36.4% (s.d. = 0.97) and other residents as 49.3% (s.d. = 0.36). A 
histogram of the estimates for each ward is shown in Figure 9-18. The King model 
estimates turnout among council tenants as 36% (s.d. = 0.76) and other residents 
49.2% (s.d. = 0.2). Both models estimate that turnout among council tenants is 
around 13% less than that for non-council tenants. But do these differences affect our 
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previous estimates for the London boroughs in the same way as they did for the shire 
districts? If the effects of turnout are similar then we may well expect the third stage 
to produce lower estimates of the proportion of council tenants voting Liberal. 
Figure 9-18 - Posterior Distributions of London Borough Voter Turnout 
Estimations. 
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The tomography plot for the estimates of the proportion of council tenants voting 
Liberal is shown in Figure 9-19. The centre of the contours appears to be located 
somewhere off the graph, indicating truncation of the normal distribution. Most of 
the lines, however, appear to be concentrated, within the section of the 50% contour 
line that is visible. We can be reasonably confident that the contour lines are an 
accurate description of the distribution. The area within the 95% contour is almost 
half of the area of the entire unit square. Unlike the more compact tomography plot 
for voter registration, the model has only narrowed the possible values to half of the 
unit square. The 50% contour is clearly representing much higher values for/?/ than 
for/?;. The highest 50% likelihood value for/?/ indicated by the contour is 0.48 
while that for>5/ is 0.25. There if a far higher likelihood therefore that the values for 
are higher than those for>^;. 
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The hislograms for the estimates of fi^ and /3" for each ward are shown in Figure 9-20. 
The model estimates the percentage of council tenants voting Liberal as 31.2% (s.d. = 
3.61) and other residents as 22.8% (s.d. = 0.71). The percentage of other residents 
voting for the Liberals differs by only 0.4% from the model that assumed that turnout 
was the same for both groups. The estimate for the percentage of council tenant 
voters that voted for the party is 5.7% higher than the previous estimate. Unlike the 
shire districts, the estimate for Liberal voting council tenants in the London boroughs 
did increase when the model was adjusted for voter turnout. As turnout among 
council tenants was estimated to be far higher in London than the shires, the increase 
is not unexpected. Evidence from both models appears to suggest that there is a 
significant difference in support for the Liberals between the two groups. 
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Figure 9-20 - Posterior Distributions of London Borough Liberal Voting Estimations. 
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I f we compare the results of the models for both types of authority there appears to be 
a distinct difference between the behaviour of council tenants. The percentage of 
Liberal voting council tenants in the shire districts (11.2%) is far less than the 
percentage of non-council tenants voting for the party (37.1%). The percentage of 
council tenants voting for the party (31.2%) in the London boroughs is, however, far 
greater than that for non-council tenants (22.8%). 
9.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined apparent difTerences in Liberal voting by council tenants 
compared with other residents. Although the previous chapter highlighted these 
differences, any assumptions made about the individual behaviour of council tenants 
might be considered unsound because of the problems associated with ecological 
inference. As no method for inferring individual behaviour from aggregate data can 
be considered totally reliable, a number of methods for measuring this phenomenon 
were employed. Foremost among these methods was a recent and innovative 
technique, developed by King (1997) which claims to make substantial improvements 
in reliability over traditional methods. 
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Due to the nature of the census and election data, the parameter values (number of 
council tenant voters) required to produce estimates of the proportion of council 
tenants voting Liberal does not exist. One method that is widely used is simply to 
assume that turnout is the same for both groups. The proportion of council tenants 
that voted in an election is assumed to be equal to the proportion of council tenants in 
the ward. The Goodman model estimated that 0.7% council tenants voted for the 
Liberals in the districts while the King model estimated 13.8%. When the same 
models were applied to the London boroughs the Goodman model estimated that 
24.5% council tenants voted Liberal while the King model produced an estimate of 
25.5%. Goodman's estimate for the districts is a good example of why the model 
ought not to be used in this case: it is unlikely that less than 1% of council tenants 
voted for the party. The estimates produced by the King model appear more realistic. 
Furthermore, the estimates also appear to confirm the regression estimates that 
council tenants are far more likely to vote for the Liberals in the London boroughs 
than in the shire districts. 
The assumption that the proportion of council tenants voting is the same as the 
proportion of residents voting can produce estimates that are unreliable - especially as 
children are included in the sample. An alternative method, therefore, was used to 
estimate the proportion of voters torn information known already. This process 
requires not only an estimation of voter turnout, but also an estimation of voter 
registration among council tenants. The model produced similar estimates of 
registration and turnout among council tenants for both authority types. For the shire 
districts the estimated proportion of council tenants that were registered was 69.3% 
while the proportion of these that voted was 25.8%. For the London boroughs the 
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proportion of council tenants registered was 68.8% and the proportion of these that 
voted were 36.4%. The final estimates of the proportion of council tenants that voted 
for the Liberals, however, were markedly different for the two types of authority. The 
estimated proportion of council tenants in the shire districts that voted for the Liberals 
was 11.2%, while for the London boroughs it was 31.2%. The estimated proportion 
of voters living in other types of housing tenure voting for the Liberals was 37.1% in 
die shire districts while in London it was 22.8%. The number of council tenants 
voting for the Liberals appears to be over three times higher in the London boroughs 
as it is in the shire districts. In addition to this, the proportion of council tenants 
voting Liberal in the London boroughs is greater than the proportion of non-council 
tenants voting for the party. 
While the Goodman model proved to be inaccurate at providing individual level 
inferences about the voting behaviour of council tenants the King model appears to 
provide more realistic results. The findings from the model may not be so evident in 
a normal regression model due to the problems of ecological inference and also 
because there is little strength (low R-square) in the relationships. In addition to 
providing an easy visual guide to the data, the model combines the information that is 
known about each ward in a way that strengthens the estimates of those wards where 
little information can be determined. 
If the estimates provided by the model are accurate then this may help to explain the 
unusual nature of the London boroughs. With council tenants making up ahnost a 
quarter (23.1%) of all residents in London and 16.2% of all residents in the shire 
districts, a party that can gain support from a substantial proportion of this group will 
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receive a considerable payoff in terms of total vote share. More importantly, 
however, is the fact that support for the Liberals among this social group in London 
appears to be quite distinct from that in the shires. The behaviour of council tenants 
might be different because the fundamental difference in the nature of council housing 
between the two-types of authority might make the Liberals brand of community 
politics more appealing to these residents. Another possibility might be that the 
Liberals are able to reach a larger proportion of council tenants in the more densely 
populated council estates of London and/or specifically target these areas. 
Unfortunately, while the effects of such behavioural differences can be highlighted 
using aggregate data, it is not possible to identify the reasoning behind the voter's 
decision. In this case survey data would be a more appropriate method to determine i f 
such reasons for the difference were correct. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
This study has applied various theories regarding the development of party systems 
using results from English local government elections held between 1973 -1998. The 
quantitative ^proach used widiin the thesis has enabled conclusions to be drawn, 
which are based upon the individual circumstances of over 10,000 local authority 
wards. The main purpose of the research has been to provide an understanding of the 
development of local party systems since local government reorganisations in the 
early 1970s. The results detailed in this thesis show that the approach has succeeded 
in throwing new light on the nature of party systems. Some of the flndings support 
previous theories. Others, however, have raised important new questions, in the areas 
of both party system development generally and local government studies 
specifically. 
We begin by providing the reader with a brief summary of each chapter. We then 
summarise the nature of local party systems in England and consider the extent to 
which they conform to prior theoretical expectations. Following sections highlight 
the effect of a range of characteristics considered as determinants of party system 
development. Finally, the consequences of our findings for future studies of party 
systems and English local government are assessed. 
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10.2 Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 1 outlined the nature of the research. It discussed why the study of party 
systems is important and also why the English local party systems are a particular area 
of interest. We highlighted a fimdamental problem with conducting research in local 
party system development - a lack of individual voting data, before outlining the 
structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 discussed previous research on party systems with a view to identifying 
theories that can be applied to a local study. It discussed the nature of the relationship 
between parties and voters, and socioeconomic and structural determinants of local 
party system development. The chapter also identified the importance of local factors 
such as local issues and campaigning. 
Chapter 3 provided the reader with an overview of the English local government 
system. It discussed the evolution of the local government system in terms of its 
structure and frmctions and identified how this reflected the need to provide services 
at a local level. We discussed in more detail, structural differences between different 
authorities and the impact of party politicisation upon the party system. 
Chapter 4 discussed the various research questions emerging from the previous 
chapters. It provided a justification for the quantitative methodology used before 
proceeding to review commonly used methods for answering the research questions. 
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The problems of acquiring, storing and analysing the large amount of aggregate data 
required by the research were also addressed. 
Chapter 5 employed a typology of party systems in order to provide an understanding 
of the nature of party systems in local government authorities. It allowed us to gauge 
the extent to which party system did or did not conform to expectations and also 
provided us with a framework with which to examine the success of the Liberals. 
Chapter 6 examined the efTects of the structural differences in electoral system upon 
local party systems. It focussed upon one of the most important of these differences -
district magnitude - in order to ascertain whether, as some authors believe increased 
district magnitude discriminates against the third party. 
Chapter 7 conducted a preliminary examination of those socioeconomic 
characteristics identified as important in Chapter 2 in order to ascertain their 
suitability for inclusion in a subsequent model of partisan voting. 
Chapter 8 developed a model of partisan voting based upon the theoretical and actual 
relationships identified in the previous chapter. The model allowed us to test the 
independent effect of socioeconomic characteristics and identify such characteristics 
considered as relevant. The model also allows us to examine the effect of district 
magnitude when controlling for socioeconomic characteristics and gauge the extent to 
which the combination of these factors influences the party system 
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Chapter 9 attempts to validate the results of the previous chapter by using a recent and 
innovative technique that claims to make more reliable, the inference of individual 
behaviour from aggregate data. It focuses upon the apparent difference in Liberal 
voting between two types of authority and attempts to estimate the exact proportion of 
voters fix)m a specific social group voting for the party. 
10.3 The Nature of English Local Party Systems 
One of the first questions this thesis has asked is "what is the nature of local party 
systems?" Previous writers viewed the national party system as consisting 
fundamentally of only two parties. Duverger (1964), suggested that the effect of 
simple plurality elections would encourage the formation and maintenance of such a 
two-party system. The local political system in England, however, has not remained 
static during the period. Examining the political control of local authorities after 1973 
highlighted the nature of these changes. Increased party politicisation of local 
authorities took place and when, in 1979, the Conservatives came to power in national 
government, they dominated local government also, before succumbing to Labour and 
then, as the second largest party, to the Liberals. 
ff Duverger were correct, it would be difficult for the Liberals to achieve the level of 
success that they attained. Was Duverger incorrect (and many others who subscribe 
to the original analysis) or were the Liberals somehow able to overcome the effects of 
the electoral system? Local government, however, consists of not one, but many 
party systems. In order to answer this question, a classification of local party systems, 
in terms of the number of parties, was required. This research presents the first 
comprehensive classification based on local elections held between 1973 and 1998. 
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Our classification revealed the extent of the diversity that exists in English local party 
systems. With the exception of county councils, single party systems, for example, 
existed for all types of local government authority. Some of these authorities (such as 
Rotherham) have a distinct cultural identity while others (such as Barking and 
Dagenham) are so dominated by a single party that other candidates feel that there is 
little point in contesting elections. Rather than encouraging a two-party system, the 
simple plurality electoral helps to maintain single-party systems in authorities such as 
these. 
For all types of local authority, we found that multi-party systems also exist. The 
presence of these systems contradicts the rationale that underpins Duverger's theory 
of the relationship between simple-plurality elections and two-party systems - the 
notion that voters coalesce into two opposing categories in an attempt to prevent an 
unwanted result. I f such an effect does occur then some audiorities proved to be 
extremely resilient to it. In Tynedale, for example, the increasing party politicisation 
coincided with an increase in Liberal councillors. The net effect of this was an overall 
stability in the system and the authority remained hung for most of the period. While 
Tynedale was perennially classed as a multi-party system, other authorities were less 
stable. In West Dorset, the decline of Independents coincided with gains for both the 
Conservatives and Liberals. As a result the authority could be classified as single-
party, two-party or multi-party, dependent upon the year under review. 
However, it is the case that a large number of two-party systems existed throughout 
the period. Some authorities are typical of what we might expect i f aspects of the 
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electoral system dissuaded voters from supporting third parties. In Welwyn Hatfield, 
third parties were marginalised during the entire period. Power was balanced instead 
between Labour and the Conservatives, with control alternating between the two-
parties. Two party systems in local government are not simply the result of the 
electoral system. In Kensington and Chelsea, the two-party system reflects a distinct 
socioeconomic divide within the authority. 
There is evidence, therefore, that the electorate acts in ways that Duverger suggested, 
thereby reinforcing the dominance of the two parties. The unpopularity of the Labour 
party in Derbyshire in 1977, however, resulted in a loss of over half of the parties 
representation. Rather than this adverse swing against Labour resulting in additional 
seats for the Liberals or Independents, these groups also lost seats on the council. 
Instead, voters polarised around the Conservatives in a concerted effort to defeat the 
incumbent party. 
When comparing the number of party systems in English local government we found 
those classed as two-party by far the most common. In all types of local authority, the 
number of councils classed in this way outnumbered the combined number of single-
party and multi-party systems. For English local government elecfions, it appears that 
Duverger may have been correct in asserting that the operation of simple plurality 
favours two-party systems. Despite the proliferation of Independents at the beginning 
of the period and the increased success of the Liberals in the 1990s, two-party systems 
have remained most common. We examined whether the Liberals were more 
successfiil in certain types of party system. In terras of the number of parties there 
appeared to be little in common between authorities won by the Liberals. One 
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possible explanation for the lack commonality might be that the electoral system does 
not discriminate against the Liberals to an extent that prevents them fi*om winning. 
Another explanation might be that examining party systems of local authorities 
somehow "masks" relationships that exist at a more local level. 
10.4 Effects of the Electoral System 
The use of a common electoral system prevents comparisons between simple-plurality 
and other types of ballot system in English local government elections. Several 
authors suggested, however, that increases in district magnitude may exaggerate the 
effects of the plurality system (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989; Ware et al, 2001). 
Following this line of reasoning we would expect this phenomena to manifest itself in 
local elections that use large district magnitudes. In particular this should result in a 
disadvantageous situation for the Liberals. Examining such ward-level characteristics 
overcomes also, the problems associated with aggregation of data to the local 
authority level. 
Some of out most important findings relate to the effects of district magnitude upon 
the third party. Our analysis revealed that the Liberals were disadvantaged in terms of 
its ability to contest elections with higher district magnitudes. In such cases where the 
party does not contest all available seats, potential Liberal voters are forced to either 
choose another candidate or abstain. District magnitude also adversely affects the 
elected number of parties in local govenmient. The additional available seats in 
elections with large district magnitude will tend to go to the party that come top of the 
poll. Examining the seat share of the parties for each authority type revealed that the 
Liberals net share of seats was not adversely affected by district magnitude. When 
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the share of vote is also taken into account, however, the Liberals appear to be 
distinctly disadvantaged, particularly in the shire districts. Although other authors 
have discussed these effects, we have for the first time, proved that district magnitude 
discriminates against the third party. Multimember plurality elections, therefore, do 
disadvantage third parties in English local government, thereby confirming Taagepera 
and Shugart's (1989) speculations to this effect. 
10.5 Effects of Socioeconomic Characteristics 
The electoral system, however, is by no means the sole determinant of party systems. 
Many authors - Duverger among them - have highlighted the relationship between 
class and partisan voting as being relevant in national politics - particularly for the 
Conservatives and Labour. Significant relationships between other socioeconomic 
characteristics and national voting for the two parties have also been previously 
highlighted. The availability of ward socioeconomic and voting data for most of the 
period, allows us to examine these relationships in far greater detail and at a lower 
level of aggregation than has previously been the case. 
Our preliminary examination of ward socioeconomic characteristics in shire districts 
confirmed several important hypotheses. Voting for the Conservatives and Labour 
are indeed related to a wide range of socioeconomic characteristics but by far the 
strongest relationship is that between class and voting. Positive relationships exist 
between the proportion of residents in all of the working class (defined as those 
employed in manual occupations) and Labour voting, while the reverse is the case for 
the Conservatives. For both parties, the relationship between class and voting appears 
to be strongest for managerial and technical occupations. As the proportion of such 
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residents in a ward increases, voters are far more likely to support the Conservatives 
and far less likely to vote for Labour. In terms of direction a similar class/vote 
relationship to that of the Conservatives appears to exist for the Liberals. As the 
proportion of residents in non-manual, technical and managerial or professional and 
business occupations in wards increase voters are slightly more likely to vote Liberal. 
As the proportion of ward residents employed in skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
manual occupations increases, local voters are slightly less likely to support the 
Liberals. 
Statistically significant relationships also exist between partisan voting and housing, 
reflecting a public/private sector provision cleavage. Increases in proportions of 
council or housing association tenants are positively related to increases in Labour 
voting and decreases in Conservative and Liberal voting. Increases in owner-
occupiers, tenants renting privately and residents living in other types of tenure - such 
as those included with employment - are related to decreases in Labour voting and 
increases in Conservative and Liberal voting. The strongest relationship between 
housing and partisan voting is that for the proportion of owner-occupiers. 
Employment status also showed strong bivariate relationships with voting. Wards 
with higher proportions of unemployed residents were consistently positively related 
to Labour voting and negatively related to Liberal voting. Consistent relationships 
between employment status and partisan voting were also observed for self-employed 
residents. For Labour these relationships were consistently negative, while for the 
opposite is true for the Conservatives and Liberals. Other variables related to 
employment were also shown to be significant. In particular, the proportion of 
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residents employed in agricultural or other service industries - such as banking - were 
shown to be positively related to Liberal voting, as was the proportion of residents in 
receipt of a higher educational qualification. 
There is little doubt that some socioeconomic characteristics are related to each other. 
Those residents in the higher social class groups are more likely to own their own 
homes, for example. We examined, therefore, the extent to which the relationships 
between voting and ward characteristics exist independently of each other by 
constructing an OLS model of partisan voting and applying it to different types of 
local authority. 
The OLS model of partisan voting produced some interesting results. When applied 
to shire district partial council elections, the relationships between the class groups 
and Labour or Liberal voting does not contradict findings from the bivariate analysis. 
Consistently positive and independent relationships exist between Labour voting and 
the proportion of residents in each working class group. Consistently negative and 
independent relationships exist between Labour voting and the proportion of residents 
in each middle class group. For the Liberal vote, however, some of the class groups 
do not appear to have an independent effect. In most years, a consistent relationship 
only existed for the proportion of residents employed in semi-skilled and unskilled 
manual occupations. Liberal voting appears, as we expected, to be negatively related 
to these class groups. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding was the relationship between class and the 
Conservatives. For working class groups, the relationships support existing theories. 
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As the proportion of these residents in a ward increase, voters are less likely to vote 
Conservative. The proportion of residents employed in technical and managerial 
occupations also support previous hypotheses. Conservative voting was consistently 
and independently positively related to this variable. The relationship between 
Conservative voting and the proportion of residents employed in professional, 
business or skilled non-manual occupations was contrary to expectations, however. 
In those years when the relationships were significantly different than zero, the 
directions were always negative. Holding the other class groups constant, the 
Conservative vote decreases when the proportion of these residents increases. 
Reducing the model to only class groups which significantly contributed to the total 
variance and including the other significant ward characteristics revealed that the 
determinants of Conservative and Labour voting are generally as we expected. When 
controlling for all our ward characteristics, the Conservative vote generally decreases 
while Labour's increases as the proportion of council tenants or unemployed residents 
increases. In the metropolitan boroughs, however, the relationship appears to have 
been reversed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, suggesting that the impact of 
unemployment in these wards damaged Labour, to the advantage of the 
Conservatives. The proportion of qualified residents also produced unexpected 
results for some types of local authority. Holding all other characteristics constant, 
increases in the proportion of residents in these wards corresponded to increases in 
Labour voting and decreases in Conservative voting. 
In some types of authority the relationship between our combined ward characteristics 
and Conservative or Labour voting was considerable. On average in London, these 
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characteristics alone can explain two-thirds of the variance in Labour voting between 
1978 and 1996. Although slightly weaker, combined ward characteristics still 
accounted for well over half of the variance in Conservative vote share. For the two-
parties, it appears not only that voting patterns are largely deterministic, but that they 
are deterministic in ways we would expect given the traditional notions of voting. 
The total amount variance explained, however, tends to have lessened. It appears, 
therefore, that a degree of partisan dealignment has occurred in local government. 
The Conservative party's growing unpopularity while it was in office might account 
for such a dealignment. Disaffected Conservative voters switching to Labour and the 
Liberals would have diluted the effect of any underlying socioeconomic relationships. 
Explaining the variance in Liberal voting using ward characteristics provided far more 
difficult. In all types of authority, on average, less than a fifth of the variance in 
Liberal voting could be explained using a linear regression model. The Liberals drew 
support, therefore, far more evenly across the different socio-economic groups than 
did the Conservative or Labour parties. Despite this, some ward characteristics do 
emerge fi"om the analysis that appear to be related to Liberal voting. Some of these 
relationships reflect those found to be significant for the Conservative vote. The 
proportion of residents seeking woric and those employed in other service industries 
are positively related to Liberal voting. Other relationships appear to be similar to 
those for Labour. The proportion of self-employed residents with employees is 
negatively related to both parties, as is the proportion of council tenants - except in 
London where this relationship appears to be positive. The relationship between 
Liberal voting and the proportion of self-employed residents without employees 
appears to be distinctly different for the Liberals than the other two parties. In each 
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type of authority, a negative relationship exists between this characteristic and 
Conservative or Labour voting. For the Liberals however, the relationship tends to be 
positive. It appears that small "one-man" businesses appear to support the Liberals 
10.6 Ecological Inferences 
We then focused upon one interesting aspect of Liberal voting - the apparent 
difference in the relationship between the proportion of council tenants and Liberal 
voting in London compared with other parts of the country. Unlike rises in 
unemployment - which may actually have produced a positive relationship with 
Conservative voting in the metropolitan counties in the early 1980s - it is difficult to 
see how increases in council tenants would produce an increase in Liberal support 
unless people from this type of housing actually voted for the party. We attempted, 
therefore, to estimate the actual proportion of council tenants that voted for the 
Liberals in London and the shire districts to see i f we could replicate our findings 
from the regression analysis. 
Reliably inferring individual level behaviour from aggregate voting data is extremely 
difficult and popular methods - such as Goodman's regression - can produce 
unreliable results. The main method employed here was developed by Garry King 
and is innovative in that the estimates are based upon all possible true values for the 
number of council tenants voting for the party (King, 1997). However, because we do 
not know how voters actually behaved it is not possible to compare the results with 
actual behaviour. We approached the problem using a combination of ecological 
inference methods. Comparing the results produced by the different methods allowed 
us to provide some validation of the findings. 
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The results of the ecological inference analysis supported our previous findings. All 
of the methods employed suggest that Liberal voting by council tenants is far higher 
in London than in the shire districts. It appears, therefore, that council tenants in 
London differ torn their counterparts in the shire districts, in terms of Liberal voting. 
10.7 Future Research 
This thesis has addressed some important issues relating to local party system 
development in England. It has provided empirical evidence from aggregate data for 
some theories while confounding others. It has also identified fiuther areas of 
research that are required i f the variation among local party systems is to be 
understood in more detail. Important research should be undertaken regarding the 
nature and effects of local party organisation and campaigning. What is the nature of 
party membership and what are its effects upon the pattern of voter support for local 
parties? In what ways does the brand of 'community politics' favoured by the 
Liberals, and to some extent copied elsewhere by other parties, affect the 
effectiveness of campaigning by these candidates? 
Answers to such questions can not be found in the aggregate voting and 
socioeconomic data used in this thesis. What is required is more detailed survey data 
regarding the motivations influencing specifically local electoral behaviour. 
Additionally, the lack of information regarding the motivations of candidates and 
councillors represents a serious gap in our knowledge base. Without such research we 
may never fully understand the nature of local voters' attachments to Conservative 
and Labour, traditional class parties, and support for local parties and candidates. 
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particularly the Liberals. Equipped with those data we could contribute still further to 
our knowledge of the evolution and development of party systems in English local 
government. 
10.8 An Explanation of English Local Party Systems? 
Although this thesis has addressed many important questions, it has also highlighted 
several others. In shire district authorities, the effect of district magnitude appears to 
discriminate against third parties. Although the findings support the "mechanical" 
relationship between the electoral system and party-system, it was not possible with 
aggregate data, to determine the "psychological" effects upon the voters or parties. 
What causes voters and parties to behave differently in multi-member elections? Are 
there tactical advantages to fielding fewer candidates in wards with large district 
magnitude and/or what is the impact of local party resources upon contestation in 
these wards? The answers to such questions wil l help political science understand 
better, the effects of district magnitude in plurality elections. Given the recent move 
to three-member wards in the London boroughs, a better understanding of the effects 
of district magnitude may also allow those responsible for adopting this policy to 
ascertain better the likely impact of these and similar changes elsewhere. 
Although the electoral system was shown to affect the Liberals adversely, we faced 
particular difficulty in deriving socioeconomic explanations of the Liberal vote. This 
difficulty, is in itself, informative because it indicates the relatively amorphous nature 
of Liberal support. It also leaves us asking why people voted, and still vote for the 
party. Our research suggests that the relationships between ward characteristics and 
Liberal voting are similar to those of the Conservatives. The success of the Liberals 
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in the 1990s corresponds to a national downturn in support for the Conservatives. As 
the Conservafives were the party of government for much of the period, we could not 
gauge the effect upon the Liberals, of a similar downturn in national Labour 
popularity. 
The unexplained variance in voting itself raises important questions. To what extent 
is this caused by local characteristics and how do the effects of these characteristics 
persist over time? One method of examining such phenomena might involve 
comparing differences between estimates of partisan voting and the actual vote 
received by the parties. I f in a ward, our model consistently underestimated voting for 
a party then the underestimation might be attributable to persistent local factors. 
The unexpected results of some relationships also raise important questions. The 
apparent change in the effect of unemployment upon Labour and Conservative voting 
in the metropolitan boroughs is certainly worthy of further investigation. Were 
unemployed residents in these areas more likely to vote for the Conservatives in the 
early 1980s or were employed residents disproportionately voting for the party in 
areas of high unemployment? The positive relationship between qualified residents 
and Labour voting - apparent in most types of authority - is also interesting, as it 
appears to contradict previous theories of how these residents might vote. After 
controlling for other ward characteristics, do these residents actually tend to vote 
Labour? When controlling for the other ward characteristics, the Liberals appear to 
have a distinct voter base among self-employed residents without employees. It is 
difficult to see why the Liberals would appeal to such residents. It may be more 
likely that these residents are turned of f by Labour and Conservative policies and vote 
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instead for the Liberals. We eagerly await the results of the 2001 census, so we can 
examine effects of five years of Labour government, upon the relationships identified 
in this study. 
The quantitative methods employed in this thesis can be used to identify areas where 
answers to these questions might be found. In particular, the King method may be 
used to identify wards where residents Gcom different social groups vote more or less 
in favour of a particular party. In the case of unemployed residents in metropolitan 
boroughs, the method can help us determine the extent to which this group 
contributed to Conservative voting. For self-employed residents without employees, 
we might use the method to identify wards where high and low proportions of this 
group vote for the Liberals. More detailed case studies of these wards might shed 
more light upon this phenomenon. 
For much of the period that this thesis covers, a Conservative government was in 
office. This enabled us to observe the party systems, for a long period, without the 
additional "noise" that changes in government may have produced. During this time, 
the deterministic relationships for the parties appeared to have weakened, suggesting 
partisan dealignment. If , as mentioned previously, such a dealignment was caused by 
Conservatives voters switching in protest of their performance in national 
government, then we might expect them to return to their "natural" party once out of 
power. Such a phenomenon would result in a degree of partisan realignment. As the 
Labour party has been in government for over five years we are at a point where we 
are able to examine the effects of New Labour upon the local party system. The 
361 
results of the 2001 census will be available for analysis shortly V It wil l be interesting 
to see not only i f the individual relationships identified in this thesis have remained 
stable but also i f apparent partisan dealignment has continued into Labour's second 
term of office. 
' The first results from the 2001 census are due to be published in September 2002 with the 
main results being published between December 2002 and the summer of 2003 (see 
http://www.statistics,gov.uk/census2001 f) 
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Appendix One - English Local Government Authorities 
This appendix lists all local government authorities that existed between 1973 and 
1998. The date that authorities were created is shown and also the date of abolition 
for those that no longer existed in 1998. The number of councillors is shown both for 
1973 (or the creation date for unitary authorities), and 1998 (or abolition year for 
authorities that became unitary). The election type indicates those authorities that 
elect the whole council every four years or those where partial council elections are 
held in three years out of four. 
Top Tier Local Government Authorities 
Greater London Council 
Created: 1964 
Abolished: 1986 
Election Type: Whole Council 
Councillors 1973: 107 
Councillors 1985: 92 





Source: Local Elections Database 
Metropolitan County Councils 
Changes In Number of Councillors 
1 9 7 7 - 9 2 
Created: 1973 
Abolished: 1986 
Election Type: Whole Council 
Councils 1973: 6 
Councils 1998: 6 
Councillors 1973: 601 
Councillors 1998: 601 
Table B - Metropolitan County Councils 













Source: Local Elections Database 
Shire County Councils 
Created: 1973 
Election Type: Whole Council 
Councils 1973: 39 
Councils 1998: 34 
Councillors 1973: 3128 
Councillors 1998: 2203 
Table C - Shire County Councils 
Authority Name 1973 
Councillors 
Changes In Number of Councillors 
Avon 73 1981 -76 Abolished 1994 
Bedfordshire 83 1985 -73 1997 -49 
Berkshire 86 1977 -87 1985 -76 Abolished 1996 
Buckinghamshire 70 1985 -71 1997 -54 
Cambridgeshire 68 1985 -77 1997 -59 
Cheshire 67 1981 -71 1997 -48 
Cleveland 89 1985 -77 Abolished 1994 
Cornwall 79 
Cumbria 82 1981 -83 
Derbyshire 98 1981 -84 1997 •64 
Devon 98 1985 -85 1997 -54 
Dorset 91 1985 -77 1997 •42 
Durham 72 1997 -61 
East Sussex 84 1985 -70 1997 -44 
Essex 97 1981 -98 1997 •79 
Gloucestershire 61 1985 -63 
Hampshire 97 1981 - 102 1997 •74 
Hereford & Worcester 92 1985 -76 1997- •57 
Hertfordshire 72 1981 -77 
Humberside 99 1981 -75 Atx)lished 1994 
Isle Of Wight 42 1981 -43 Abolished 1994 
Kent 102 1981 -99 1997. 84 
Lancashire 96 1981 -99 1997- 78 
Leicestershire 93 1985 -85 1997- 54 
Lincolnshire 75 1981 -76 
Norfolk 83 1985 -84 
North Yorkshire 93 1985 -96 1997- 74 
Northamptonshire 90 1981 -68 
Northumberland 62 1981 -66 
Nottinghamshire 89 1981 -88 1997- 63 
Oxfordshire 70 1977 -69 
Shropshire 63 1981 -66 1997- 44 
Somerset 56 1981 •57 
Staffordshire 85 1981 •82 1997- 62 
Suffolk 82 1985 •80 
Surrey 72 1977 •73 1981 - 76 
Warwickshire 55 1981 -62 
West Sussex 83 1977 •80 1985- 71 
Wiltshire 79 1981 •74 1985- 75 1993-68 1997-47 
Source: Local Elections Database. 
Second Tier Local Government Authorities 
London Borough Councils 
Created: 1964 
Election Type: Whole Council 
Councils 1973: 32 
Councils 1998: 32 
Councillors 1973: 2172 
Councillors 1998: 1917 
Table D - London Borough Councils 
Authority Name 1973 
Councillors 
Changes in Number of Counciilors 
Barking & Dagenham 57 1978 -48 1996- -51 
Bamet 70 1978 -60 
Bexley 65 1974 -68 1978- - 6 2 
Brent 70 1978 -66 
Bromley 70 1978 -60 
Camden 70 1978 -59 
Croydon 70 
Ealing 70 1997 -71 
Enfield 70 1978 -60 1982- - 6 6 
Greenwich 70 1978 -62 
Hacl^ney 70 1978 -60 
Hammersmith & Fulham 70 1978 -50 
Haringey 70 1978 - 5 9 
Han-ow 65 1978 -63 
Havering 64 1978 - 6 3 
Hillingdon 70 1978 -69 
Hounslow 70 1978 -60 
Islington 70 1978 -52 
Kensington & Chelsea 70 1974 -71 1978- -54 
Kingston Upon Thames 70 1978 -50 1996- -48 
Lambeth 70 1978 -64 
Lewisham 70 1978 -67 1982- -68 
Merton 63 1978 -57 
Newham 70 1978 -60 
Redbridge 70 1978 -63 1997- -62 
Richmond Upon Thames 63 1978 -52 
Southwark 70 1978 -64 
Sutton 59 1978 -56 
Tower Hamlets 70 1978 -50 
Waltham Forest 56 1978 •57 
Wandsworth 70 1978 -61 
Westminster 70 1978 •60 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Metropolitan Borough Councils 
Created: 1973 Councils 1973:36 Councillors 1973: 2517 
Councils 1998:36 Councillors 1998: 2481 
Election Type: Whole Council 
T a b l e E - Metropolitan Borough Counci ls 
Authority Name 1973 Changes in Number of Councillors 
Councillors 
Bamsley 60 1979-66 
Birmingham 126 1982-117 
Bolton 69 1980-60 
Bradford 93 1980 - 90 
Bury 48 
Calderdale 51 1980-54 
Coventry 54 
Doncaster 60 1980-63 
Dudley 66 1982-72 
Gateshead 78 1982 - 66 
Kirklees 72 
Knowsley 63 1982-66 
Leeds 96 1980-99 
Liverpool 99 
Manchester 99 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 78 
North Tyneside 78 1982-60 
Oldham 57 1979-60 
Rochdale 60 
Rotherham 54 1980-66 
Salford 66 1982-60 
Sandwell 90 1979-72 
Sefton 69 
Sheffield 90 1980-87 
Solihull 51 
South Tyneside 66 1982-60 
St. Helens 45 1980-54 
Stockport 60 1980 - 63 
Sunderland 78 1982-75 
Tameside 54 1980-57 
Trafford 63 





Source: Local Elections Database 
Shire District Councils 
Created: 1973 Councils 1973: 296 
Councils 1998: 267 





Table F - Shire District Councils 




Changes In Numt>er of Councillors 
Adur 37 Partial 1979-39 
Allerdale 56 Whole 1979-55 
Alnwick 28 Whole 1979-29 
Amber Valley 60 Partial 1979-43 
Arun 60 Whole 1983-56 
Ashfield 55 Whole 1976-33 
AshfoFd 44 Whole 1976-49 
Aylesbury Vale 54 Whole 1976-58 
Babergh 38 Whole 1979-42 
Barrow In Fumess 33 Partial 1979-38 1996-36 
Basildon 46 Partial 1979-42 1983-39 
Basingstoke & Deane 54 Partial 1976-59 1994-57 
Bassetlaw 51 Partial 1979-50 1996-48 
Bath 45 Partial 1976-48 Abolished 1994 
Bedfonj 56 Partial 1983-53 
Berwick Upon Tweed 28 Whole 
Beveriey 60 Whole 1979-53 1991 -52 Abolished 1994 
Blaby 37 Whole 1983-39 
Blackbum 60 Partial 1997-62 
Blackpool 56 Whole 1976-44 
BIyth Valley 48 Whole 1979-47 
Bolsover 36 Whole 1979-37 
Boothferry 35 Whole Abolished 1994 
Boston 34 Whole 
Bournemouth 57 Whole 
Bracknell Forest 31 Whole 1979-40 
Braintree 58 Whole 1979-60 
Breckland 51 Whole 1979-53 
Brentwood 38 Partial 1976-39 
Bridgnorth 32 Whole 1979-33 
Brighton 59 Partial 1983-48 Abolished 1995 
Bristol 84 Partial 1983-68 Abolished 1994 
Broadland 49 Partial 
Bromsgrove 42 Whole 1979-41 1995-39 
Broxboume 40 Partial 1976-42 
Broxtowe 46 Whole 1976-49 
Burnley 53 Partial 1976-54 1991 -48 1996-44 
Cambridge 42 Partial 
Cannock Chase 37 Partial 1976-42 
Canterbury 51 Whole 1979-49 
Caradon 41 Whole Contd...7 




Changes In Numt)er of Councillors 
Carlisle 48 Partial 1983-51 
Carrick 45 Whole 
Castle Morpeth 34 Whole 
Castle Point 39 Whole 
Chamwood 58 Whole 1983-52 
Chelmsford 60 Whole 1987-56 
Cheltenham 35 Partial 1983-33 1991-41 
ChenA e^ll 45 Partial 1979-52 
Chester 62 Partial 1979-60 
Chester Le Street 33 Whole 
Chesterfield 54 Whole 1979-47 
Chichester 50 Whole 
Chiltem 51 Whole 1976-50 
Chorley 47 Partial 1987-48 
Christchurch 22 Whole 1979-25 
Cleethorpes 48 Whole 1979-41 Abolished 1994 
Colchester 60 Partial 
Congleton 45 Partial 
Copeland 48 Whole 1979-51 1995-49 
Corby 33 Whole 1976-27 
Cotswold 45 Whole 
Craven 35 Partial 1979-34 
Crawley 32 Partial 1976-25 1979-26 
Crewe & Nantwich 60 Partial 1979-57 
Dacorum 62 Whole 1979-58 
Darlington 49 Whole 1979-52 
Dartford 44 Whole 1976-45 1987-47 
Daventry 35 Partial 
Derby 54 Partial 1979-44 
Derbyshire Dales 40 Whole 1979-39 
Denventside 55 Whole 
Dover 55 Whole 1979-56 
Durtiam 61 Whole 1979-49 
Easlngton 60 Whole 1979-51 
East Cambridgeshire 35 Whole 1983-37 
East Devon 60 Whole 
East Dorset 33 Whole 1983-36 
East i-lampshire 42 Whole 
East i-lertfordshire 48 Whole 1979-50 
East Undsey 58 Whole 1983-60 
East Northamptonshire 37 Whole 1979-36 1995-16 
East Staffordshire 60 Whole 1979-46 
East Yorlcshire 43 Whole Abolished 1994 
Eastbourne 33 Partial 1976-30 
Eastleigh 42 Partial 1976-44 1997-45 
Eden 37 Whole 
Ellesmere Port & 42 Partial 1976-41 
Neston 
Elmbridge 64 Partial 1976-60 Contd....7 




Changes In Number of Councillors 
Epping Forest 59 Partial 
Epsom & Ewell 40 Whole 1976-39 1991 -42 
Erewash 54 Whole 1979-51 1987-52 
Exeter 34 Partial 1983-36 
Fareham 36 Partial 1976-42 
Fenland 40 Whole 
Forest Heath 25 Whole 
Forest Of Dean 47 Whole 1983-49 
Fylde 45 Whole 1976-49 
Gedling 55 Whole 1987-57 
Glllingham 35 Partial 1979-42 1996-43 Abolished 1996 
Glanford 34 Whole 1979-40 1983-41 Abolished 1994 
Gloucester 33 Partial 1991 -35 1998-39 
Gosport 33 Partial 1979-30 
Gravesham 44 Whole 
Great Grimsby 42 Partial 1979-45 Abolished 1994 
Great Yarmouth 48 Partial 
Guildford 42 Whole 1976-45 
Halton 43 Partial 1976-47 1986-53 1997-56 
l-lambleton 48 Whole 1979-47 
Hart)orough 37 Whole 
Harlow 42 Partial 
Harrogate 60 Partial 1996-59 
Hart 33 Partial 1976-35 
Hartlepool 46 Partial 1976-47 Abolished 1994 
Hastings 33 Partial 1979-32 
Havant 42 Partial 
Herefordshire 24 Partial 1979-27 Abolished 1996 
Hertsmere 55 Partial 1976-39 
High Peak 46 Whole 1979-44 
Hinckley & Bosworth 34 Whole 
Holdemess 29 Whole 1976-31 Abolished 1994 
Horsham 41 Whole 1979-43 1983-42 
Hove 36 Whole 1979-30 Abolished 1995 
Huntingdonshire 50 Partial 1976-53 
Hyndbum 48 Partial 1979-47 
Ipswich 47 Partial 1979-48 
Kennet 37 Whole 1976-40 
Kerrier 42 Whole 1979-44 
Kettering 45 Whole 
Kings Lynn & West 
Norfolk 




Partial 1983-60 Abolished 1994 
Kingswood 45 Whole 1976-47 1987-50 Abolished 1994 
1-ancaster 60 Whole 
l^ngbaurgh 64 Whole 1976-60 1991 -59 Abolished 1994 
Leicester 48 Whole 1983-47 1986-56 
Leominster 36 Partial Abolished 1996 
Lewes 47 Whole 1983-48 Contd / 





Lichfield 56 Whole 
Lincoln 30 Partial 1979 -33 
Luton 48 Whole 
Macclesfield 63 Partial 1979 -60 
Maidstone 60 Partial 1979 •55 
Maldon 30 Whole 
Malvern Hills 47 Whole 1979 •51 
Mansfield 45 Whole 1979 -46 
Medina 33 Whole 1979 -36 
Melton 24 Whole 1979 -26 
Mendip 44 Whole 1979 -43 
Mid Bedfordshire 49 Whole 1979 •53 
Mid Devon 40 Whole 
Mid Suffolk 40 Whole 
Mid Sussex 54 Whole 
Middlesbrough 56 Whole 1979 53 
Milton Keynes 40 Partial 1976 • 46 
Mole Valley 41 Partial 
New Forest 60 Whole 1976- 58 
Newaric & Sherwood 52 Whole 1979- 56 
Newbury 57 Whole 1983- 45 
Newcastle-under-Lyme 62 Partial 1979- 56 
North Cornwall 44 Whole 1979- 38 
North Devon 44 Whole 
North Dorset 31 Whole 1983- 33 
North East Derbyshire 51 Whole 1979- 53 
North Hertfordshire 48 Partial 1979- 50 
North Kesteven 37 Whole 1979- 39 
North Norfolk 47 Whole 1979- 46 
North Shropshire 38 Whole 1976- 40 
North Wanvickshire 33 Whole 1979- 34 
North West 43 Whole 1983- 40 
Leicestershire 
North Wiltshire 50 Whole 1983- 52 
Northampton 48 Whole 1979- 43 
Northavon 54 Whole 1976- 57 
Norwich 48 Partial 
Nottingham 54 Whole 1976- 55 
Nuneaton & Bedworth 35 Partial 1979- 45 
Oadby & Wigston 30 Whole 1979- 26 
Oswestry 29 Whole 
Oxford 45 Partial 1991 - 51 
Pendle 51 Partial 1994- 41 
Penwith 40 Partial 1979- 34 
PetertK) rough 48 Partial 1997- 57 
Plymouth 66 Whole 1979- 60 
Poole 36 Whole 1996- 39 
Portsmouth 48 Partial 1983- 39 
Preston 57 Partial 













Changes In Number of 
Purbeck 21 Partial 1979-22 
Reading 46 Partial 1979-49 1983-45 
Redditch 25 Partial 1983-29 
Reigate & Banstead 50 Partial 1976-60 1979-49 
Restormel 38 Whole 1983-44 
Ribble Valley 38 Whole 1987-39 









Rossendale 36 Partial 
Rother 45 Whole 
Rugby 51 Partial 1979-48 
Runnymede 40 Partial 1976-42 
Rushcliffe 49 Whole 1976-54 
Rushmoor 43 Partial 1979-45 1996-46 
Rutland 20 Whole 
Ryedale 45 Whole 1983-42 1996-21 
Salisbury 56 Whole 1976-58 
Scarborough 50 Whole 1979-49 
Scunthorpe 40 Partial 
Sedgefield 53 Whole 1983-49 
Sedgemoor 48 Whole 1979-49 
Selby 48 Whole 1979-50 
Sevenoaks 54 Whole 1979-53 
Shepway 54 Whole 1979-56 
Shrewsbury & Atcham 45 Partial 1976-48 
Slough 40 Partial 1983-39 1997-41 
South Bedfordshire 45 Partial 1976-53 
South Buckinghamshire 42 Whole 1983-41 1995-40 
South Cambridgeshire 53 Partial 1976-55 
South Derbyshire 35 Whole 1979-34 
South Hams 41 Whole 1979-44 
South Herefordshire 34 Partial 1979-35 1994-39 
South Holland 35 Whole 1979-38 
South Kesteven 55 Whole 1979-57 
South Lakeland 54 Partial 1979-52 
South Norfolk 47 Whole 1979-55 
South Northamptonshire 36 Whole 1976-40 
South Oxfordshire 62 Whole 1979-59 1983-56 1991 
South Ribble 49 Whole 1976-54 
South Shropshire 36 Whole 1976-40 
South Somerset 61 Whole 1976-60 
South Staffordshire 48 Whole 1979-50 
South Wight 24 Whole 
Southampton 51 Partial 1979-45 
Southend On Sea 48 Partial 1976-39 
Spelthome 52 Whole 1979-40 










Changes In Numk>er 
St Edmundsbury 44 Whole 
Stafford 57 Whole 1979 -60 
Staffordshire Moorlands 54 Whole 1976 -56 
Stevenage 34 Partial 1979 -39 
Stockton-on-Tees 60 Whole 1979 -55 
Stoke On Trent 72 Partial 1979 -60 
Stratford On Avon 54 Partial 1979 -55 
Stroud 56 Partial 1991 -55 
Suffolk Coastal 55 Whole 
Surrey Heath 36 Whole 
Swale 50 Partial 1979 -49 
Tamworth 24 Partial 1976 -27 1987 -30 
Tandridge 42 Partial 
Taunton Deane 48 VVhole 1979 -49 1987 -53 
Teesdale 29 Whole 1983 •31 
Teignbridge 57 Whole 1979 -58 
Tendring 60 Whole 
Test Valley 43 Whole 1976 -44 
Tewkesbury 51 Whole 1983 -45 1991 •36 
Thamesdown 46 Partial 1983 •49 1986 -54 
Thanet 63 Whole 1979 •54 
The Wrekin 56 Whole 1979 •46 1997 •54 
Three Rivers 44 Partial 1976 •47 1991 •48 
Thurrock 39 Partial 
Tonbridge & Mailing 53 Whole 1979- 52 1991 . 55 
Torbay 36 Whole 
Torridge 36 Whole 
Tunbridge Wells 54 Partial 1976- 48 1991 - 58 
Tynedale 45 Whole 1976- 47 
Uttlesford 42 Whole 
Vale Of White Horse 48 Whole 1979- 51 
Vale Royal 57 Whole 1976- 60 
Wansbeck 45 Whole 1976- 46 
Wansdyke 45 Whole 1976- 47 
Warrington 60 Whole 
Warwick 58 Whole 1983- 45 
Watford 36 Partial 
Waveney 57 Partial 1983- 48 
Waverley 61 Whole 1983- 57 
Wealden 56 Whole 1983- 58 
Wear Valley 41 Whole 1983- 40 
Weltingtx}rough 33 Whole 1983- 34 
Welwyn Hatfield 43 Partial 1991 - 47 
West Devon 30 Whole 
West Dorset 55 Whole 
West l^ncashire 52 Partial 1976- 55 
West Lindsey 37 Partial 








Changes In Number of Councillors 
West Somerset 32 Whole 
West Wiltshire 42 Whole 1983-43 
Weymouth & Portland 39 Partial 1979-35 
Winchester 51 Partial 1976-54 1986-55 1994-45 
Windsor & Maidenhead 59 Whole 1983-58 
Woking 32 Partial 1976-35 
Wokingham 52 Partial 1979-54 
Woodspring 61 Partial 1979-59 Abolished 1994 
Worcester 36 Partial 
Worthing 30 Partial 1983-36 
Wychavon 45 Whole 1979-49 
Wycombe 59 Whole 1983-60 
Wyre 55 Whole 1979-56 
Wyre Forest 45 Partial 1979-42 
York 39 Whole 1979-45 Abolished 1994 
Source: Local Elections Database 
New Unitary Authorities 
Councils 1998: 16 
Election Type: Mixed 
Councillors 1998: 926 
Table G - New Unitary Authorities 




Changes in Number of Councillors 
Bath & North East 1995 65 Whole 
Somerset 
Brighton & Hove 1996 78 Whole 
Bristol 1995 68 Partial 1996-66 
East Riding Of Yorkshire 1995 67 Whole 
Hartlepool 1995 47 Partial 
Herefordshire 1997 60 Whole 
Isle Of Wight 1995 48 Partial 
Kingston Upon Hull 1995 60 Partial 
Middlesbrough 1995 53 Whole 
North East Lincolnshire 1995 42 Whole 
North Uncolnshire 1995 42 Whole 
North Somerset 1995 59 Whole 
Redcar & Cleveland 1995 59 Whole 
South Gloucestershire 1995 70 Whole 
Stockton-on-Tees 1995 55 Whole 
Yori^  1995 53 Whole 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Appendix Two - Boundary Changes in English Local Government 
This appendix details changes to boundaries of local government wards. The Tables 
show the change year for each type of authority and the total number of wards after 
boundary changes. The number of wards abolished and created is also shown. There 
were for example, 2938 shire county wards in 1981. In 1985, 1,251 wards were 
abolished and 1,318 new wards were created. The net result of these changes left the 
shire counties with a total of 3,009 wards. 
Shire Counties 
Change Year Wards Created Wards Abolished Total Wards 
1973 2826 2826 
1981 1694 1582 2938 
1985 1318 1251 3005 
1995 40 47 2998 
1997 0 796 2202 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Shire Districts 
Change Year Wards Created Wards Abolished Total Wards 
1973 6229 6229 
1976 1129 869 6489 
1979 2018 1633 6874 
1983 900 778 6996 
1986 23 114 6905 
1987 99 6 6998 
1991 180 171 7007 
1992 24 406 6625 
1995 6 215 6416 
1996 171 6245 
1997 904 5341 
1998 1 5342 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Metropolitan Counties 
The metropolitan counties consisted of 547 Wa^ ds from 1973 until they were 
abolished in 1986. There were no boundary changes during this lime. 
Metropolitan Boroughs 
Change Year Wards Created Wards Abolished Total Wards 
1973 822 0 822 
1979 108 108 822 
1980 349 341 830 
1982 303 306 827 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Greater L o n d o n 
The Greater London Council consisted of 92 wards from 1973 to when it was 
abolished in 1986. There were no changes to the ward boundaries during this time. 
London Boroughs 
Change Year Wards Created Wards Abolished Total Wards 
1973 638 
1974 22 660 
1978 602 508 754 
1982 33 30 757 
1996 2 0 759 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Appendix Three - District Magnitude in English Local Government 
This appendix lists the variations in district magnitude for each local authority type. 
The district magnitude of elections in Greater London is not included as single 
member plurality elections were employed until the authority was abolished in 1986. 
Shire Counties 
Elections District Magnitude (M) 
Year N 1 2 3 
1973 2826 2569 211 46 
1977 2826 2570 211 45 
1981 2938 2801 116 21 
1985 3005 3005 
1989 3005 3005 
1993 2998 2998 
1997 2202 2202 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Shire Districts 





Year N 1 2 3 4 5 
1973 6229 2723 1239 1450 432 178 
1976 6489 2718 1440 1798 284 117 
1978 659 642 16 1 
1979 6678 3183 1703 1673 59 32 
1980 1542 1488 43 11 
1982 1536 1493 43 
1983 6438 3645 1629 1159 1 4 
1984 1852 1807 43 2 
1986 1857 1784 52 21 
1987 6410 3821 1577 1006 2 4 
1988 1752 1706 45 1 
1990 1739 1658 46 35 
1991 6417 3776 1587 1047 3 4 
1992 1722 1674 36 12 
1994 1712 1664 46 2 
1995 5907 3541 1424 936 2 4 
1996 1485 1442 43 
1997 20 11 5 4 
1998 1314 1258 53 3 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
38 16 7 5 2 1 
23 8 7 2 2 1 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Metropolitan Counties 
Elections District Magnitude (M) 
Year N 1 2 3 
1973 547 511 18 18 
1977 547 511 18 18 
1981 547 511 18 18 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Metropolitan Boroughs 
Elections District Magnitude (M) 
Year N 1 2 3 
1973 822 804 
1975 821 786 34 1 
1976 822 792 28 2 
1978 822 772 47 3 
1979 822 718 40 64 
1980 830 549 29 251 
1982 827 564 14 249 
1983 827 809 18 
1984 827 801 26 
1986 827 792 35 
1987 827 790 28 9 
1988 827 798 28 1 
1990 827 794 33 
1991 827 814 13 
1992 827 811 16 
1994 827 806 20 1 
1995 827 812 15 
1996 827 817 10 
1998 827 805 22 
6 
17 
Source: Local Elections Database 
London Boroughs 
Elections District Magnitude (M) 
Year N 1 2 3 4 5 
1974 660 4 205 360 82 9 
1978 754 16 322 416 
1982 757 16 325 416 
1986 757 16 325 416 
1990 757 16 325 416 
1994 759 15 330 414 
1998 759 15 330 414 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Unitary Authorities 
Elections District Magnitude (M) 
Year N 1 2 3 
1995 389 108 163 118 
1996 271 38 79 154 
1997 484 122 164 198 
1998 204 202 2 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Appendix Four - Contestation of Local Government Elections 
This appendix lists patterns of electoral contestation and non-contestation for the 
different types of English local government authorities. The Tables for contestation 
show the total number of candidates standing and proportion of candidates to 
vacancies in elections for different district magnitudes. The proportion of all 
candidates to all seats is shown also. In the 1973 shire county elections for example, 
there were 2.2 times as many candidates as total seats available. The proportion of 
candidates contesting 3 vacancy elections was 2.1 in the same year. The Tables for 
non-contestation show the total number and percentage of uncontested elections and 
also the percentage of uncontested elections by district magnitude. In the 1973 shire 
county elections, a total of 390 elections were uncontested, representing 13.8% of all 
elections. Of single vacancy elections 14.9% were uncontested, while 2.8% of two 
vacancy elections were uncontested. 
Contestation in Shire Counties 
Candidates Proportion of Candidates to Seats by 
District Magnitude (M) 
Year N All 1 2 3 
1973 6783 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 
1977 7570 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 
1981 8432 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.5 
1985 8742 2.9 2.9 
1989 8946 3.0 3.0 
1993 9068 3.0 3.0 
1997 6809 3.1 3.1 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Non-Contestation in Shire Counties 
Elections Percentage Uncontested Seats by 
District Magnitude (M) 
Y«ar N All 1 2 3 
1973 390 13.8 14.9 2.8 
1977 361 12.8 13.6 4.7 2.2 
1981 121 4.1 4.2 1.7 
1985 61 2.0 2.0 
1989 64 2.1 2.1 
1993 60 2.0 2.0 
1997 33 1.5 1.5 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Contestation in Shire Districts 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.4 1.6 1.8 
2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6 1.8 1.9 
2.0 
2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.8 2.5 
1.8 
Candidates Proportion of Candidates to Seats by District Magnitude (M) 
Y«ar N All 1 2 
1973 26902 2.0 2.0 2.0 
1976 27179 2.0 1.7 2.0 
1978 1666 2.5 2.5 2.3 
1979 23636 1.9 1.7 1.9 
1980 4079 2.5 2.6 2.5 
1982 4536 2.9 2.9 2.8 
1983 23406 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 1.8 2.3 
1984 5252 2.8 2.8 2.6 3.0 
1986 5555 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.1 
1987 24189 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.0 
1988 5122 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.0 
1990 5509 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.4 
1991 23844 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.9 
1992 5253 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.4 
1994 5104 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.5 
1995 22313 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.0 
1996 4387 2.9 2.9 2.7 
1997 74 2.2 1.8 2.4 2.5 
1998 3987 2.9 2.9 2.7 3.0 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Non-Contestation in Shire Districts 
Elections Percentage Uncontested Seats by District (M) 
Year N All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1973 1171 18.8 31.6 14.0 6.1 8.3 4.5 3.6 
1976 1684 26.0 48.8 16.2 5.7 5.3 3.4 2.2 4.3 
1978 46 7.0 7.0 6.3 
1979 1844 27.6 45.8 16.1 6.3 8.5 4.5 
1980 107 6.9 7.2 
1982 48 3.1 3.2 
1983 1118 17.4 25.1 9.9 3.6 
1984 90 4.9 4.9 4.7 
1986 53 2.9 3.0 
1987 720 11.2 15.5 6.2 3.0 
1988 76 4.3 4.4 2.2 
1990 60 3.5 3.6 
1991 798 12.4 16.8 7.2 4.5 25.0 
1992 57 3.3 3.4 
1994 64 3.7 3.8 
1995 519 8.8 11.6 5.9 2.7 50.0 
1996 32 2.2 2.2 
1997 2 10.0 18.2 
1998 13 1.0 0.9 3.8 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Contestation in Metropolitan C ounties 
Candidates Proportion of Candidates to Seats by District 
Magnitude (M) 
Year N All 1 2 3 
1973 1520 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 
1977 1819 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.5 
1981 1824 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 
Source; Local Elections Database 
Non-Contestation in Metropolitan Counties 
Elections Percentage Uncontested Seats by District 
Magnitude (M) 
YMf N All 1 2 3 
1973 20 3.7 3.7 5.6 
1977 6 1.1 1.2 
1981 2 0.4 0.4 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Contestation in Metropolitan Boroughs 
Candidates Proportion of Candidates to Seats by District 
Magnitude (M) 
Year N All 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1973 5810 2.3 2.3 1.5 2.2 
1975 2445 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.7 
1976 2457 2.9 2.9 2.7 1.8 
1978 2458 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 
1979 2642 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.2 
1980 3527 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.3 
1982 3855 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.7 
1983 2560 3.0 3.0 2.6 
1984 2441 2.9 2.9 2.6 
1986 2536 2.9 3.0 2.6 
1987 2665 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.1 
1988 2628 3.1 3.1 2.9 1.3 
1990 2622 3.0 3.1 2.8 
1991 2614 3.1 3.1 2.7 
1992 2721 3.2 3.2 2.9 
1994 2580 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.0 
1995 2587 3.1 3.1 2.9 
1996 2566 3.1 3.1 2.8 
1998 2722 3.2 3.2 2.8 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Non-Contestation in Metropolitan Boroughs 
Elections Percentage Uncontested Seats by District 
Magnitude (M) 
Year N All 1 2 
1973 21 2.6 
1975 23 2.8 2.9 
1976 13 1.6 1.6 
1978 7 0.9 0.9 
1979 7 0.9 0.8 2.5 
1980 13 1.6 2.0 
1982 3 0.4 0.4 
1983 6 0.7 0.6 5.6 
1984 13 1.6 1.5 3.8 
1986 24 2.9 2.9 2.9 
1987 14 1.7 1.6 3.6 
1988 16 1.9 1.9 3.6 
1990 53 6.4 6.5 3.0 
1991 37 4.5 4.5 
1992 12 1.5 1.5 
1994 29 3.5 3.6 
1995 31 3.7 3.8 
1996 34 4.1 4.2 







Source: Local Elections Database 
Contestation in Greater London 
Candidates Proportion of Candidates to 

















Source: Local Elections Database 
Non-Contestation in Greater London 
No Greater London elections were uncontested from 1973 to 1981 
Contestation in London Boroughs 
Candidates Proportion of Candidates to Seats by District 
Magnitude (M) 
Year N All 1 2 3 4 5 
1974 5300 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 
1978 5763 3.0 2.6 3.1 3.0 
1982 5980 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 
1986 5992 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 
1990 5779 3.0 3.8 3.1 3.0 
1994 5834 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 
1998 5839 3.0 3.1 3,0 3.1 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Non-Contestation in London Borouglis 
Elections Percentage Uncontested Seats by District 
Magnitude (M) 
Year N All 1 2 3 4 5 
1974 9 1.4 2.4 1.1 
1978 
1982 1 0.1 0.3 
1988 1 0.1 0.2 
1990 1 0.1 0.2 
1994 
1998 1 0.1 0.2 
Source; Local Elections Database 
Contestation in Unitary Authorities 
Candidates Proportion of Candidates to Seats by 
District Magnitude (M) 
Year N All 1 2 3 
1995 1995 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 
1996 1996 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.0 
1997 1997 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.7 
1998 1998 3.3 3.3 3.0 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Non-Contestation in Unitary Authorities 
Elections Percentage Uncontested Seats by District 
Magnitude (M) 
1.2 
Year N All 1 
1995 1 0.3 0.9 
1996 3 1.1 7.9 
1997 2 0.4 
1998 1 0.5 0.5 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Appendix Five - Party Control in English Local Government 
This appendix lists the party control of the English local government system between 
1973 and 1998. The Tables show the total number of councils controlled by each of 
the main parties separately for top tier and second tier authorities. The Tables also 
show the number of authorities controlled by other councillors (OTH) and those 
where no one group has overall control (NOC). 
Table A - Party control of English Local Authorities 1973 to 1998 - Top Tier 
YEAR N CON LAB LD OTH NOC 
1973 46 13 14 2 17 
1974 46 13 14 2 17 
1975 46 13 14 2 17 
1976 46 13 14 2 17 
1977 46 41 3 1 1 
1978 46 41 3 1 1 
1979 46 41 3 1 1 
1980 46 41 3 1 1 
1981 46 19 17 1 1 8 
1982 46 19 17 1 1 8 
1983 46 19 17 1 1 8 
1984 46 19 17 1 1 8 
1985 46 10 12 1 23 
1986 39 10 5 1 23 
1987 39 10 5 1 23 
1988 39 10 5 1 23 
1989 39 17 8 1 13 
1990 39 17 8 1 13 
1991 39 17 8 1 13 
1992 39 17 8 1 13 
1993 39 1 9 3 26 
1994 39 1 9 3 26 
1995 35 1 7 2 25 
1996 35 1 7 2 25 
1997 34 9 8 2 15 
1998 34 8 8 2 16 
Source: Local Elections Database 
Table B - Party control of English Local Authorities 1973 to 1998 - Second Tier 
YEAR N CON LAB LD OTH NOC 
1973 364 76 118 1 66 103 
1974 364 79 115 1 66 103 
1975 364 83 111 1 66 103 
1976 364 193 64 53 54 
1977 364 193 64 53 54 
1978 364 201 57 53 53 
1979 364 190 80 1 42 51 
1980 364 172 96 3 43 50 
1981 364 172 96 3 43 50 
1982 364 170 90 3 42 59 
1983 364 168 91 3 37 65 
1984 364 160 91 3 37 73 
1985 364 160 91 3 37 73 
1986 364 134 107 7 35 81 
1987 364 134 99 11 21 99 
1988 364 140 102 10 21 91 
1989 364 140 102 10 21 91 
1990 364 129 109 8 22 96 
1991 364 85 122 25 27 105 
1992 364 89 111 24 25 115 
1993 364 89 111 24 25 115 
1994 364 69 118 32 25 120 
1995 356 12 158 48 15 123 
1996 355 13 166 53 17 106 
1997 351 14 163 48 14 112 
1998 351 16 161 40 13 121 
Source: Local Elections Database 
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